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Clifford J. Rogers

EDITOR IN CHIEF

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COMMON ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK

b.	born; ibn (in Arab names)
B.C.E.	before the common era (= B.C.)
c.	<i>circa</i> , about, approximately
C.E.	common era (= A.D.)
cf	<i>confer</i> , compare
d.	died
diss.	dissertation
ed.	editor (pl., eds.), edition
f.	and following (pl., ff.)
fl.	<i>floruit</i> , flourished
HRE	Holy Roman Empire
l.	line (pl., ll.)
n.	note
n.d.	no date
no.	number
n.p.	no place
n.s.	new series
p.	page (pl., pp.)
pt.	part
rev.	revised
ser.	series
supp.	supplement
vol.	volume (pl., vols.)

THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

M

CONTINUED

MERCENARIES

These were warriors who received payment for military services provided outside the context of pre-existing social and political obligations. In Latin documents they are principally called "mercennarius," "stipendiarii," and "solidarii," although regional variations existed, as did other renderings in vernacular texts. Mercenaries bolstered the size and/or enhanced the effectiveness of armies and so were attractive to medieval commanders. Initially serving as complements to local hosts and levies, mercenaries became ubiquitous after the year 1000, and their presence on medieval campaigns was particularly notable in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries. Thereafter gradual political efforts aimed at military recruitment and professionalization led to a declining role for hired soldiers in many regions, but at the close of the Middle Ages mercenary companies remained significant elements on the battlefield.

Much like the classic but problematic depiction of knights, mercenaries varied so much in description and purpose that even the briefest and most general of definitions is instantly subject to qualification. The most obvious questions concern the precise manner of payment, but confusion also persists about the sort of warrior hired, the purpose of hire, and the duration, all of which differed according to region and period.

An imperfect but useful distinction can be drawn between soldiers paid directly for military service and those who had received payment well in advance of the initiation of campaigns. The latter consisted of those under a particular obligation to serve when called upon. Enfeoffed knights and holders of money fiefs or fief rents, for example, took oaths to provide their military service in exchange for cash or movables. Construed in this way, they were not mercenaries because they maintained preexisting political ties to a lord, as well as social and cultural ties. These soldiers' offering their skills in war, while perhaps obligatory, served to defend, maintain, or advance their native society's interests. In contrast, mercenaries were typically sought in anticipation of a particular and more immediate need, contracted, and released or rehired according to negotiated agreements. Neither a prior relationship between employer and employee nor a social bond between the hired soldier and the community on whose behalf he fought was requisite. Because the mercenary repeatedly offered his services, he can be characterized as having fought for profit. While obligatory service could well bring favors and even titles to an enfeoffed knight, a mercenary could expect repeated contracts and, so long as war endured, an available stream of money serving as his principal means of income.

The regional origin of the mercenary is another point of demarcation. Even native soldiers receiving direct payment in the form of wages were nonetheless expected to serve on the basis of their citizenship. Lacking such a bond, a mercenary was in the classic sense a soldier for hire, paying little heed to the ambitions of the hiring commander so long as his wages were sufficient and forthcoming. Yet this did not preclude the mercenary from regarding his employer highly or from adopting his cause with honor, even when the two shared a dissimilar ethnic background. Still, the cultural or racial differences between hired soldiers and native levies have led numerous historians to depict mercenaries as typically foreign. At times the distinction was more or less clear—as in the case of Christian mercenaries in Spain and the Holy Land serving for pay in Muslim armies and vice versa—but different locales did not necessarily imply that outsiders were viewed as distinctly foreign. Indeed, scholars have recently noted that the absence of nationalities in the Middle Ages, as well as the overlapping of customs, languages, and ethnicities, renders the modern conceptualization highly problematic. More precise, then, is Philippe Contamine's qualification that mercenaries were not foreign but rather stateless.

Whatever their characteristics, mercenaries featured significantly in medieval warfare. Mercenaries are briefly mentioned in Vegetius's *De re militari*, a work of late antiquity, and in the fourth and fifth centuries Roman commanders contracted federates, or affiliated barbarians, in an attempt to bolster legion numbers. Whether they were mercenaries is uncertain; federates often volunteered for regular service or were absorbed into imperial armies. By the sixth and seventh centuries, Merovingians were hiring barbarians on a temporary basis, and by the eighth century Magyar mercenaries had established a Magyar presence in the Carpathian Basin. Exceptions still existed, such as in Anglo-Saxon England, where most hired soldiers were of the stipendiary type, possessing social and/or political ties to their lords that superseded any monetary impulses.

The hiring of mercenaries increased dramatically in the High Middle Ages. William the Conqueror deployed mercenaries from Boulogne at Hastings in

1066. Thereafter hired soldiers became a mainstay of Anglo-Norman armies, and Flemish mercenaries in particular were often seen in the isles in the twelfth century. Henry II and King John regularly hired Welsh mercenaries and the notorious Brabançons, often by taking scutage payments, or the shield tax, in lieu of knightly obligations (a practice roundly condemned in the Magna Carta). The Varangian Guard, an elite force of Scandinavian warriors, formed a critical component of Byzantine armies. Western leaders also financed the hiring of Eastern soldiers for the protection of crusader states. Mercenaries without active assignments were routinely accused of lawless and destructive behavior. This reputation was reflected in periodic attempts to restrain their activities. In 1171 Louis VII and Frederick Barbarossa tried to limit their own use of mercenaries in France and the empire by way of treaty. At the Third Lateran Council (1179) the church pointedly excommunicated Brabançon, Aragonese, Navarrese, Basque, and French Cottereaux mercenary bands, along with those individuals protecting, employing, or supporting them. Yet such prohibitions were generally ineffective because mercenary captains offered a tantalizing benefit: unlike the uneven response to feudal summonses, they were usually dependable and arrived with roughly predictable numbers of reliable, battle-tested soldiers.

The late Middle Ages witnessed the transformation of malleable roving bands into full-fledged mercenary companies. These "great" or "free" companies were formed by men of similar regional and ethnic origins, with the most famous led by condottieri, captains who agreed to contracts (*condotte*) with political leaders that enumerated specific rates of pay and service durations. Prominent examples include the famous White Company, led by the Englishman John Hawkwood, who became heavily involved in the savage warfare consuming northern Italy in the fourteenth century, and the companies of Swiss pikemen, who plied their trade with great efficiency and skill in the following century.

As early as the late thirteenth century, however, mercenary companies were giving way to permanent armies, in which native soldiers were

paid wages. The reasons for the change are many and varied, but in general the growing size of the *familia regis*, an increasing role in the fourteenth century for infantry (which could be more easily trained), and a burgeoning sense of civic responsibility enabled governments to pay their own citizens to conduct the business of war while maintaining tighter control over their military activities. Unlike mercenary companies, citizens could be deployed for internal security detail and paid through state funding mechanisms rather than binding contractual agreements. Emblematic of changing attitudes was Niccolò Machiavelli's famous denunciation of mercenaries in *The Prince*. He castigated their lack of loyalty, fickleness, and cowardliness. Dubbing them "useless and dangerous," he blamed the bulk of Italy's military disasters on their widespread employment. Machiavelli's view was partly realistic, partly prescient. Still valuable military components in the early modern period, after 1500 the influence of mercenary companies nonetheless declined in the face of state armies.

[See also Armies, *subentry on* Organization; Brabançons; Catalan Company; Condottieri; *Familia Regis*; Frederick I Barbarossa; Great Companies; Hastings, Battle of; Hawkwood, John; Henry II of England; Hungarian Raids; Infantry; John, King of England; Louis VII of France; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Switzerland, *subentry on* Narrative; Varangian Guard; Vegetius; and William I of England.]

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John D. Hosler

MESEMBRIA, SIEGE OF

After driving back a Byzantine attack in 811, in the spring of 812 the Bulgarian khan Krum (r. 802–814) launched a broad offensive in Thrace and the Aegean region and managed to capture several fortresses, shattering the defense of Byzantine Empire possessions in the Balkans. Krum next opened negotiations, proposing to renew the peace treaty of 716 between the two states. "If you do not hurry up with peace," wrote the khan to Emperor Michael I Rangabe (r. 811–813), "it will be your fault that I will lead the troops to Mesembria" (present-day Nesebŭr, Bulgaria). The fortress was of key significance and served as a concentration point for the Byzantine army in its land and sea operations against Bulgaria. However, negotiations broke down over the khan's insistence on a treaty provision that would have required the emperor to return to him many distinguished Bulgarians—mostly Christian converts—who had found refuge in the empire. True to his threat, in late October 812 Krum moved his troops toward Mesembria, armed with fighting and siege machines thanks to Eumatius, an Arab convert to Christianity who had sought refuge at Krum's court. Following a short siege, the town was taken by the Bulgarians. Here they found large treasures of gold and silver coins, an abundance of food, and thirty-six copper siphons with a supply of the "Greek fire" that was thrown through them. Its use had given the Byzantines an enormous advantage in sea battles and siege warfare. Now it was in Bulgarian hands too. Krum's army advanced to the south, toward Adrianople. The capture of Mesembria not only put an end to negotiations but also forced the Byzantine Empire to start preparing for decisive battle in the renewed war. The loss of this strategically important stronghold reduced Byzantine chances of success.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900).]

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Vassil Gjuzelev

METALLURGY

The two most important metals for weapon production throughout much of the medieval period were iron and copper, although those metals were used less in their pure forms and more often as alloys with zinc or tin. Lead and, to a very much lesser extent, tin, were also used at times, the latter mainly as an alloying element. The primary decorative metals were gold and silver.

The production of iron for most of the medieval period was based on the making of a very-low-carbon iron called wrought iron. Although wrought iron contains few metallic impurities, it does contain a variable amount of nonmetallic inclusions called slag. Slag comes from the manufacturing process in which the iron is never molten and the nonmetallic materials from the iron ore are incorporated in the metallic structure. Although slag is an impurity, it conveys important and significant properties to the iron. Wrought iron is very ductile and can be shaped and formed with relative ease, while pieces of wrought iron can be joined to one another by heating them to white heat and hammering them together—a process called hammer, or pressure, welding. Slag is important in this process as it melts and runs over the areas to be welded, preventing oxidation of the metal, which adversely affects the welding process.

Iron with a small amount of carbon, from about 1 percent to 2 percent, produces steel, one of the most important materials for both weapons and armor. Steel can be significantly hardened by a process of heating and quenching. The process is simple but was not mastered completely until the fifteenth century. Essentially steel has to be heated to around 800–900°C and then plunged into water or oil, a process called quenching. The resultant metal is very

hard but also very brittle. To make a useful material it has to be reheated to a temperature in the region of 250°C to temper the metal, producing a material that retains most of its hardness but is much tougher. An intermediate process where the steel was partially quenched, called slack quenching, was also sometimes used and did away for the need to temper.

Iron with more than about 3 percent carbon has a lower melting point than wrought iron and can be melted and poured into molds. Cast iron is a very different material from wrought iron or steel and is very brittle, with none of the ductile properties of wrought iron or steel. It cannot be used for weapons or armor, but it was used mainly for artillery ammunition from the early fifteenth century, though not in large quantities until the second half of the century. Using cast iron to make artillery was certainly carried out in the fifteenth century, but its brittle nature resulted in guns of uncertain quality. It was not until the middle years of the sixteenth century that the process was perfected to make serviceable cast-iron ordnance.

For much of the medieval period most arms and armor were made from wrought iron and were relatively soft. Steel was being made from the early medieval period, though in small quantities and was consequently expensive. It was used extensively to provide a hard edge to edged weapons—for example, many Anglo-Saxon knives had steel edges and there is evidence that armor-piercing arrowheads were similarly edged. The technology of steel, and hardening methods, were perfected in the fifteenth century and were used on high-status armor and weapons.

A special form of sword blade was developed in the early medieval period, made from rods of iron of different composition—differing in phosphorus or carbon content. The rods were joined, twisted, folded, and hammered out to make the characteristic pattern-welded swords produced from the third to the ninth centuries. In addition a steel edge was sometimes welded to the core of twisted iron, yielding a weapon of strength and beauty with a hard sharp edge and a flexible blade.



Blacksmith at Work. Illustration from MS Fr143, fol. 148, fifteenth century. BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/ARCHIVES CHARMET/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

Copper is relatively soft and not an ideal material from which to make weapons or armor. However, alloying it with other materials, especially tin in the case of bronze, made it much harder and suitable for a range of objects. In the early medieval period bronze was occasionally used to make armor, though most pieces of armor and nearly all weapons were made from iron. By the sixth century bronze had been largely superseded by iron and was only used for a few specialist weapons such as maces and clubs. However, bronze is an ideal material from which to cast artillery, and from the fourteenth century on bronze barrels became common throughout Europe.

Brass, the alloy of copper with zinc, is a yellow decorative metal and used extensively to embellish and decorate arms and armor, either by inlaying it into the surface or adding elements such as decorative edges.

Lead was not used in the early medieval period except for sling ammunition, where its high density

made it ideal for small projectiles. After hand firearms were developed in the fourteenth century, lead became the common ammunition. Lead was also a component of the casting of copper with zinc or bronze, though whether it was added deliberately or was just an impurity is hard to establish with certainty. It was used, however, with tin to make a low-melting-point alloy that was used to coat small items (particularly stirrups and the small plates in brigandines and jacks) to prevent corrosion—somewhat like modern tin coatings.

Gold and silver were used to decorate high-status arms and armor. Gold was applied either as leaf over a prepared roughened surface or in the form of an amalgam, mixed with mercury. The resultant paste was applied to the surface where required. Subsequent heating drove off the mercury, leaving the gold decoration behind. Silver was used both as wire and occasionally as leaf like gold. Silver, and sometimes brass, wire was hammered into prepared grooves (cut to the pattern required) as a means of decoration.

[See also *Armor, Body*; *Arms Industry and Trade*; *Artillery*; *Metal Production*; and *Weapons, Hand-to-Hand*.]

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Robert Douglas Smith

METAL PRODUCTION

Throughout the medieval period two metals predominated in the manufacture and use of arms and armor: iron and copper. Throughout most of the medieval period wrought iron, with less than

about 0.1 percent carbon, was the usual material from which weapons and armor were made. Steel, containing from 1 to 3 percent carbon, was difficult and expensive to make and was often limited to edges. Cast iron, with more than 3 percent carbon, was used to make ammunition for cannon and then (though only rarely within the Middle Ages) for cannon themselves. Copper was rarely if ever used on its own for weapons. It was alloyed with zinc to make brass or with tin to form bronze.

For the greater part of the medieval period iron was made by a process in which the metal was never molten. Iron ore was heated in a furnace, the bloomery, with charcoal. The reaction of the iron oxides with the carbon monoxide from the burning of the charcoal produced iron in a solid state that contained a great deal of nonmetallic material—slag—from the ore. Subsequent reheating and hammering removed many of these impurities, though never all of them, producing a material that was tough and ductile, could be worked cold and hot by hammer, and, crucially, could be joined together by heating to a suitable temperature and hammering, known as hammer or pressure welding.

At the very end of the medieval period wrought iron was produced on a larger scale by a two-stage process. In the first iron ore was heated in large furnaces, called blast furnaces, to make iron with a high proportion of carbon—essentially cast iron. Remelting this high carbon iron in a second hearth, the finery, converted the carbon in the iron to carbon dioxide, resulting in a very low carbon iron—wrought iron. In the fifteenth century it was discovered that the cast iron produced by the blast furnace could be used first for cannonballs and then for artillery.

Copper was made by heating copper ores in a furnace to separate the rocky material, gangue, resulting in a cake or “matte” of copper sulfide at the bottom of the furnace. The matte was broken up and roasted before being heated with charcoal to reduce the copper oxide to copper metal.

Zinc is unusual in that when heated it goes from the solid state to the vapor phase without becoming molten, making it impossible before the modern

period to produce it as a pure material. Brass was therefore made by heating copper with zinc ore, calamine, in closed vessels. The molten copper absorbed the zinc produced as the calamine broke down, giving off zinc vapor, producing brass in the process. Chemical constraints mean that brass produced in this way cannot contain more than about 25 percent zinc.

Bronze was made by melting together copper and tin; the composition could be easily set by the addition of the required quantity of tin. Rarely, if ever, were brass or bronze mixtures of just copper and either zinc or tin. Production techniques and the lack of metallurgical knowledge meant that the final material contained a number of impurities, including iron, arsenic, and antimony.

[See also *Armor Industry, Milanese, and Arms Industry and Trade.*]

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Robert Douglas Smith

METHVEN, BATTLE OF

On 25 March 1306, Robert Bruce was enthroned as the king of Scots; preparing for a reaction by the English, he recruited, using some pressure, on an expedition north to the Moray Firth and back to Perth. Meanwhile Edward I appointed Aymer de Valence as lieutenant with full powers in Scotland, and with some twenty-three hundred paid men-at-arms and infantry, Valence came from Berwick to Perth, which he occupied in early June 1306. Bruce and his force, or envoys therefrom, came to the town walls on 18 June, challenging Valence either to come out and fight or to surrender. Clearly they had confidence in superior numbers, though John Barbour's *The Bruce* claims inferiority.

Valence declined, perhaps promising combat the following day. But following the advice of Ingram

de Umfraville, Valence took his men out at sunset (darkness lasted from 10 P.M. to 3 A.M.) and on 19 June fell upon the Scots at Methven, six miles (ten kilometers) away, where Bruce—who may have been there all day—had chosen the wooded high ground to camp. A third of Bruce's force had gone foraging; most of the rest had disarmed to bivouac. Some of the Scottish horsemen managed to form up in time to resist the charge of the English cavalry, but because they were overwhelmed by superior numbers, Bruce's common soldiers began to flee in panic. Bruce, said to have been taken by a Scot in Valence's army and released at once when recognized, escaped on horse with his leading followers. They were pursued by an English force under Sir Giles d'Argentan and after a further defeat at Loch Tay a few days later were probably scattered.

Many Scots were taken prisoner. Valence promised life to Robert's nephew Thomas Randolph (later Earl of Moray) and a few others, but sixteen prisoners, including two knights, were taken to Newcastle and hanged, and fourteen others taken to York probably suffered the same fate. Bruce's sister and daughter, along with the Countess of Buchan, were taken to a humiliating caged imprisonment in England; his wife and another sister were fortunate to escape with confinement in a convent. Some of Bruce's prisoners were released, including the six foreign merchants taken by Bruce in Dundee. There were still those who carried the king's standard, including Simon Fraser at a battle at Kirkencliff later in 1306; captured there, Fraser suffered the fate that William Wallace had: he was taken to London and, in September, hanged, drawn, and quartered. The Earl of Atholl, who had escaped with Bruce, suffered the same fate in November. Others had already been picked up and were shown no mercy.

The civil war between those appalled by John Comyn's murder and those adhering to Bruce seemed to have ended in defeat and death—along with, indeed, the kingship of Bruce itself. But King Robert—for whom the defeats of 1306 began fifteen months of privation and hardship as a hunted fugitive, causing him ill-health for the rest of his life—did not think so, and neither did many with him.

[See also Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500) and Robert I (the Bruce) of Scotland.]

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A. A. M. Duncan

MILAN, SIEGES OF

In 1158, four years after his imperial coronation in Rome, Frederick I Barbarossa decided to return to Italy specifically to humble "arrogant" Milan, a commune that had deliberately flouted a number of imperial directives. When Frederick's two legates, Rainald of Dassel and Otto of Wittelsbach, first crossed the Alps, they received oaths of loyalty from many towns, including Verona, Mantua, Cremona, Pavia, Bologna, Ravenna, Pesaro, Fano, and Senigaglia. After they had also assured themselves of the loyalty of Tuscany, the legates began to prepare the assault against Milan. First they verified what military aid would be forthcoming from those Italian communes that also wanted to see Milan's ruin, such as Pavia and Cremona. Piacenza, for instance, immediately provided one hundred knights and one hundred archers and paid a tribute of six hundred marks of silver. Tuscan soldiers came from Lucca, Florence, Siena, and Pisa; Pisa also sent a contingent of knights "with archers and builders." Barbarossa was determined to show his strength with a well-organized campaign.

A first muster of the army was set for 8 June 1158 at Augusta. From there the various armies swarmed over the Alps in order to close the Po Valley in a vise. After crossing the Brenner Pass with a following of one thousand knights and thousands of infantry, the emperor headed toward the Mincio River, where a second muster was to bring all the troops together on 10 July. Troops from Burgundy and Lorraine crossed the Great Saint Bernard Pass. Soldiers from Austria, Carinthia, and Bohemia crossed at Friuli and were joined by five hundred men sent by the Hungarian king Géza II.

On 10 July the army advanced. Brescia was the first city to surrender: it swore allegiance to Frederick after a two-week siege. On the advice of Anselm of Havelberg, Archbishop of Ravenna, the emperor encircled Milan on 5 August. The emperor's attempt to fire the eastern gate of the city failed, as did his efforts to lure the townsmen into doing battle outside their walls—though the emperor's forces did launch small-scale sorties with success. Nonetheless, after a month of resistance during which the surrounding countryside was devastated, Milan surrendered in early September and was forced to accept terms: an oath of allegiance, the payment of overdue taxes, an additional fine of nine thousand marks of silver, the construction in the city of a palace for Frederick, the repair of the cities of Lodi and Como (which Milan had damaged), the freeing of prisoners, and the surrender of three hundred hostages. In addition Frederick wanted a public submission: a procession of the consuls and the nobility of Milan, barefoot and in sackcloth, with their swords dangling from their necks by a rope, led by the archbishop and his prelates, also barefoot and in penitential habits. This happened, and the matter appeared settled. Frederick had won a major victory, and Milan's humiliation was a warning to all the communes of Italy.

On 11 November 1158, Frederick held a great assembly at Roncaglia and dictated rules that soon led to a new confrontation between Frederick and the communes. The emperor wanted to revive the ancient Roman legal principle that "what pleases the prince has the force of law" and to present himself as the

sole guarantor of public peace. The construction of an imperial palace in every city was to be the symbol of the new order. Frederick arrogated the appointment of consuls to himself and prohibited local wars and local associations—without realizing that because he had prevented the communes from fighting each other, he thus became their only enemy.

In 1159 the emperor became aware of the so-called Lombard League directed against him, and he determined to undertake a new expedition to punish the disobedient. In 1160, after needing six months to capture the small city of Crema, Frederick was attacked and defeated by the Milanese at the castle of Carcano, revealing the weaknesses of the imperial army.

In the spring of 1161, Frederick assembled a great army of many allies to punish Milan. The emperor's brother, Count Conrad, arrived at the beginning of April with six hundred knights, together with Rainald of Dassel, who brought five hundred. The king of Bohemia sent his son with a contingent of three hundred knights. The bishops of Novara, Vercelli, and Asti sent siege machines, and additional help came from Malaspina, Monferrato, Biandrate, and other loyal municipalities. A loose encirclement of the city was begun at the end of May, and within two weeks a circle of fifteen miles' radius had been devastated. Even after his Italian levies were dismissed, Barbarossa and his Germans, who were based around Lodi and Pavia, were able to keep the Milanese bottled up and prevent them from reaping their harvest in August.

The siege was a hard one, marked by sorties, the use of fire and machines of war, and infamous acts of cruelty. For instance, at one point when a number of Milanese fell into the hands of the imperials, all but one of them were blinded, and the nose of that one, who led the blinded men back to town, was cut off. Frederick cut off the hands of seventeen defenders and imprisoned a hundred others after taking the fortress Corno. In addition to facing fear and hunger, the citizens had been unable to have any communication with the outside world. Nonetheless the town surrendered only in March 1162, after nearly ten months of siege.

Frederick was determined to make an example of the rebellious city. On 1 March the consuls of Milan were obliged to present themselves before the emperor at Lodi, on 4 March three hundred knights arrived delivering banners and hostages, and on 6 March the *carroccio* (battlewagon) arrived, escorted by about a thousand soldiers dressed in sackcloth and with their swords hanging from their necks. The following day Frederick pronounced his verdict: although the Milanese deserved death for their treason, Frederick spared their lives. The consuls were imprisoned, the walls were torn down, and the moats were filled. The city was evacuated on 19 March, and the complete destruction of the walls by Milan's enemies, which began the following day, lasted ten days.

[See also Carcano, Battle of; Crema, Siege of; Frederick I Barbarossa; Henry the Lion; and Lombard League].

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Federico Canaccini

MILITIA PORTALIS

This term refers to a certain way of mobilizing soldiers in medieval Hungary. After the battle of Nicopolis (1396) a new way of defending Hungary against the Ottomans had to be drawn up. The diet of Temesvár (1397) decreed that landowners should equip and mobilize a mounted archer for every twenty peasant plots (*porta*) in their possession. Those who had less than twenty plots should combine their means to equip and mobilize an archer in the same way. For a long time Hungarian historians doubted whether this system had actually been employed, but archival sources seem to suggest that the king took the decree seriously and issued charters to the counties, instructing them to determine the number of peasant plots in each county so that the king could calculate the number of soldiers to be mobilized in this way. Unfortunately only a small fraction of these documents survives, so the evidence does not suffice to allow generalizations beyond the fact that the system did work in reality. In fact, in late medieval Hungary *militia portalis* became the basis for mobilizing the *banderia* (military units) of prelates and barons as well as those of the counties, comprising the backbone of the Hungarian army. The number of plots according to which the soldiers had to be mobilized changed from time to time, but in the southern counties of the realm, which were most exposed to the Ottoman threat, it remained stable: one warrior for every twenty peasant plots.

During the rule of King Mátyás Hunyadi, the importance of *militia portalis* decreased in the face of the king's mercenary army, though the prelates, barons, and the counties—when they were called to arms—mobilized their troops on the basis of the *militia portalis* system. After the death of King Mátyás in 1490, the mercenary army was disbanded—the

realm could not cover the expense of maintaining it—and the *militia portalis* system was invigorated again. The decrees of the Jagellonian era prescribed that warriors serving in the *banderia* on the basis of the *militia portalis* system should partly consist of heavy cavalry and partly of light cavalry. The soldiers who served in a *banderium* were paid warriors but cannot be regarded as mercenaries because they usually received their pay in kind and in land donations from their lords, nor did they serve all year round but only in times of need. Accordingly, their morale varied, the best units being the *banderia* of prelates, while the worst and relatively unreliable were those of the counties. From a social point of view, almost all layers of society were represented in the *militia portalis*: mostly younger sons of the lesser nobility, lower strata of town dwellers, and (rarely) even serfs, who were sometimes enrolled by their landowner masters.

For all these people military service meant the possibility to rise in social status as well as material enrichment through plunder. From a military point of view, the *militia portalis* system was capable of keeping small Ottoman forces at bay, but it was unable effectively to defend the realm against an all-out Ottoman attack.

[See also *Banderium*; Black Army of Hungary; Hungary, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, Mátyás; and Nicopolis, Battle of.]

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Ferenc Sebők

MILITIAS, URBAN

Municipal armies appeared in various parts of western Europe during the Central Middle Ages (1000–1300) but did not achieve equal development in all regions. Their emergence depended on the existence of certain conditions, including institutional and legal sophistication, population concentrations that encouraged particular economic structures, and the presence of a sufficient military threat to require the creation of such a force. In the territorial monarchies such organizations could contribute to the security of the realm, but they could pose a threat to centralized monarchy if the towns had occasion to oppose the ruler's policies or actions. Their kings or overlords had to need, not fear, urban military capability, if one was to be developed. In at least one area, urban militias emerged in spite of their rulers' preferences.

This was the case in northern Italy, where municipalities had to fight for their privileges against rural nobles, powerful bishops, and occasional imperial impositions of will. To enhance their ability to resist the Hohenstaufen emperors, the municipalities formed the powerful Lombard League, which, while it lost to the imperial forces more often than it won, achieved a remarkable victory against Frederick Barbarossa at Legnano (29 May 1176)—a unique European achievement by purely town forces against a powerful territorial monarch. In the later Middle Ages, the Italian militias of some of the municipalities became larger, enabling towns to overcome their neighbors and create veritable city-states. Different factions in a number of towns each had their own militias, and hired mercenary commanders (*condottieri*) to lead them. Such powerful municipal forces could only evolve in the absence of strong monarchy, an era that came to an end with the intervention of France and Spain in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

At the other extreme, the English monarchy made comparatively little use of formal urban militias in the core of England itself. Certain pressures were placed on some of the towns in northern England, especially York, to generate contributions both to

campaign against and to defend their territories from Scotland, a kingdom that the English monarchy made continuing efforts to occupy and that retaliated with raids of its own. No formal armies under the town standards emerged from this, and the towns often protested about the burdens of such demands. But with regard to the Angevin possessions in France, evidence exists to indicate support for urban militias, both to defend their areas and to contribute to the Angevin king's French campaigns. The policy surfaced in a period when relations were deteriorating between Henry II and Louis VII and took the form of communes granted to Rouen (1160-1170) called the *Établissements de Rouen*. This code demanded military service from the citizens in royal expeditions, and it became a pattern for *établissements* granted to other towns in the northern Angevin duchies by Henry and his son John, in effect until Philip II overran these lands between 1204 and 1206.

Prior to this, no French precedents for organizing town armies survive, but Philip II appears to have adopted the Norman practice with grants of commune status to some of his towns facing Norman lands toward the end of the twelfth into the early thirteenth century. At Bouvines (27 July 1214), five of these urban militias, from Corbie, Amiens, Arras, Beauvais, and Compiègne, fought at Philip's side, although their failure to hold fast almost cost the French king his life. Thereafter we hear little of such service requirements, once French territory was secure. In the south, Toulouse employed its military forces to control the central Garonne Valley during the mid-thirteenth century, terminated by the extension of royal power into southern France. Bastide towns with quasi-military purposes appeared by the end of the thirteenth century on both sides of the Angevin-French frontier in Gascony, but these foundations were established more for economic than military purposes. Fewer than half were ever even fortified, and no militia tradition emerged there. The two monarchies were more inclined to build castles, like Castlenaud and Beynac, to anchor their possessions militarily.

Fortified towns also served as devices of territorial settlement in central and eastern Germany, and received charters that included the provision of a militia. The militias in Germany functioned primarily as defensive forces, garrisoning their fortifications and securing their immediate area, staffed with infantry armed with spears and crossbows, with a minority of them rendering horse service. In the west the towns were larger, particularly the Imperial Free Cities, and during the later Middle Ages under weak emperors pooled their conglomerate forces in alliances such as the Swabian and Rhenish leagues. The Swiss cantonal militias became a substantial force on the late medieval battlefield, especially after the development of the pike.

The Iberian Peninsula offers the most interestingly developed municipal militias in Europe. Here the historical situation provided conditions leading to urban forces organized under municipal auspices, but serving both monarchical as well as local ends. While in many ways similar to German frontier evolution, in Iberia the monarchies maintained more consistent control over the municipalities from the eleventh through the fifteenth centuries, employing the towns as a settlement device, a maintainer of regional security, and a supplement to royal forces for campaigns. As in the rest of Europe, the Iberian towns had to fend off the local nobility as well as the competitive instincts of their urban neighbors. But unlike Germany, a powerful well-organized enemy faced them to the south: the Muslim states and their North African allies. The exquisite balance of all these forces produced militias that served as far as 250 miles (400 kilometers) from their home base, crossing hostile terrain to do so. Moreover, their lengthy urban charters described in considerable detail the organization for garrison duty, frontier patrolling, equipment requirements for knights and infantry, and their obligation to serve in the frequent royal campaigns. Their elaborate process of booty division made warfare virtually a business, and as elsewhere, the towns formed leagues (*hermandades*) to defend their interests against the nobility.

[See also Bouvines, Battle of; Legnano, Battle of; and Lombard League.]

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James F. Powers

MINISTERIALES

Whereas in Merovingian times the term *ministerialis* (pl. *ministeriales*) referred to retainers of the king, in the Carolingian period it signified royal office holders, from simple servants to high-ranking members of the nobility, like counts and bishops. These early medieval designations did not, however, provide the basis for the legal institution and social class of the ministerialage that only evolved in the German kingdom in the eleventh century, when it developed from the episcopal *familiae* (households). The bishops were then in service to the empire and therefore had to deliver most of the armed and mounted warriors needed by the German kings for public wars, as well as for their many expeditions to Italy to assert their authority beyond the Alps and become Roman emperors. To summon up the required manpower the bishops gave nonhereditary fiefs to unfree servants in exchange for military service. Unlike noble vassals, these retainers—who appear in the sources as *servi*, *ministri*, *servientes*, or *ministeriales*—kept their dependent status, making it more difficult for them to estrange the estates obtained from their lords. The legal bondage of *ministeriales* is evident from the fact that they needed their lords' permission to marry, as they were basically counted among the lord's possessions and could be sold or simply given away.

In the later eleventh and twelfth centuries these dependent retainers were employed not only by the German bishops but were also in the service of the king, the empire, or even secular princes. The unfree status of the *ministeriales* did not correspond with their social rank: they not only served as skilled and well-equipped combatants in wartime but also manned castles; held municipal offices; acted as household officers for the nobility; operated as administrators of ecclesiastical, imperial, and princely estates; and generally adopted a knightly lifestyle, so that the social difference between *ministeriales* and noble *milites* (knights) finally disappeared. Despite their legal status, their fiefs later became hereditary, and they were allowed to accumulate their own property as well as fiefs from different lords.

From the era of the Salian emperors onward, some *ministeriales* ascended into important political positions as bailiffs of imperial territories and even of counties. One early example of such advancement was a certain Frederic, who administered the county of Stade until the year 1112. Although the thirteenth-century chronicler Albert of Stade specified him as *mancipium* (property, i.e., servant) of the archbishop of Bremen, he also called him *comes* (count). Against the will of his lord, Frederic tried to buy his way out of the ministerialage, paying a large sum to Henry V, who then supported him against his opponents. Only after many years of dissension did Frederic manage to be reinstated as—the now legally free—Count of Stade. Thanks to their wealth and knightly lifestyle, from the late twelfth century onward many of the *ministeriales* found access to the lower German gentry; some even integrated themselves into the higher nobility.

[See also Andernach, Battle of (1114); Frederick I Barbarossa; Henry IV, Emperor; Henry V, Emperor; and Nobility.]

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Martin Völkl

MIRRORS OF PRINCES

The term "mirrors of princes" or "mirrors for princes" is used for a genre of didactic texts that set out an image of the ideal ruler. Intended as practical manuals, individual versions were frequently written for or were presented to kings and princes. The main emphasis was on providing political guidance to equip the ruler to govern his kingdom in times of peace and war, but issues of moral conduct—based on the four cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude—were also included.

This genre became particularly significant from the twelfth century on, but it drew its matter from much older sources, including a tradition of advice supposedly given by Aristotle to Alexander the Great. One of the most influential texts was Egidius of Colonna's *De regimine principum*, written for the future king of France Philip the Fair (d. 1314). Another version, the *Secreta secretorum*, was especially popular in later medieval England. Many well-known medieval authors produced writing in the mirrors tradition: Geoffrey Chaucer, Christine de Pizan, Alain Chartier.

Mirrors for princes exhort the king to conduct himself in this ideal fashion not only to make

himself a good ruler and thereby ensure the well-being of his realm, but also to serve as an example of conduct to his subjects. This ideal intersects with the image of the body politic, which generally identified the king as head. A crucial aspect of a king's status as his country's protector was his ability to order the defense of his country and, when necessary, successfully wage war. In advising the king on such matters, authors often outlined in some detail issues such as the importance of chivalry and the training of sons in the arts of war, explained the different sorts of combat troops and how they might be best employed in battle, and gave guidance on how to besiege and defend a castle. This information was often drawn directly from Vegetius's *De re militari*. That such accomplishments were deemed intrinsically important to good rule can be seen in Christine de Pizan's *Livre des trois vertues*, which exhorts high-status women to familiarize themselves with battle tactics, weaponry, and the garrisoning of troops so that they may defend their properties in the absence of their husbands. Although we know that many kings and other men of high status owned copies of mirrors, it is not easy to say how seriously they took them as guides. Yet it was clearly deemed important at least to possess the mirrors and thus be thought to be taking wise advice.

[See also Chivalry; Christine de Pizan; Laws of War and Just Conduct of War; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Manuals, Military; Romances; and Vegetius.]

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Katherine J. Lewis

MODON, BATTLE OF

Throughout 1403 Venetian authorities were warning galley captains of hostile action by the Genoese following attacks on Venetian shipping in 1402. Carlo Zeno, their captain general of the sea, was given authority to take any necessary action.

A Genoese fleet—consisting of nine galleys, seven *navi* (ships), a galleass, and a *huissier* (horse transport) all commanded by Jean II le Meingre, Marshal Boucicaut, the new French governor of the city—had set off in April to secure the position of the Genoese in Cyprus. The fleet appeared off Modon (a Venetian base) in May, but despite Venetian nervousness over its intentions no engagement took place. The Genoese continued on to Cyprus, and after settling matters there, Boucicaut, a fervent crusader, began to raid Ottoman cities on the Syrian coast. Beirut was thoroughly sacked, an action that infuriated the Venetians since most of the goods seized as booty were the property of Venetian merchants. In September Boucicaut, now overseeing a fleet of eleven galleys and two transport cogs, turned back and headed for home. The Genoese again reached Modon on 4 October. Probably to prepare for battle, Zeno moved his fleet (eleven galleys augmented by two large round ships) out into the bay while the Genoese anchored off Sapienza. Early the morning of 7 October the Genoese fleet began to sail north but found itself pursued by Zeno. The ensuing battle was very hard fought. Boucicaut's galley closed with that of Zeno in a furious hand-to-hand assault. Meanwhile the Venetian round ship the *Pisana* attacked three other Genoese galleys, which fell to the Venetians. At this point Boucicaut decided to break off the battle. The Genoese lost six hundred men, three galleys, and a further three hundred men as prisoners on the captured galleys. Venetian losses amounted to 153 wounded. The continuing confusion in the internal politics of Genoa ensured that the Venetians faced few further challenges from Genoese fleets. Soon the Ottoman Turks, rather than the Genoese, posed the greatest threat to Venetian domination of the region and the valuable trade with the East.

[See also Jean II le Meingre.]

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Susan Rose

MOHÁCS, BATTLE OF

Sultan Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566) inherited from his father an empire of about twelve million inhabitants, which extended over three continents, covering half a million square miles. The sultans of the Ottoman dynasty used most of these vast resources to finance their army. A record dating from 1527 informs us that 14,612 fully equipped and trained mercenaries (*kapi kulu* or *kapi kulu*) were encamped in the capital city of Istanbul, thus making it possible for the sultan to rely on 80,000 to 100,000 good horsemen from the provinces and forts of the empire's frontiers. Besides these elite forces, many tax-exempt peasant soldiers also fought in the Ottoman army. Although the entire military force was never mobilized at the same time, with these additional troops the size of the campaigning army occasionally numbered well over a hundred thousand even in the early sixteenth century.

In 1520 Süleyman's counselors were seeking a European target for this immense war machine. In such cases the choice normally fell on the weakest neighbor. At the time Hungary seemed the most obvious choice. After the successful siege of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade) (1521), Süleyman invaded Hungary in the summer of 1526 and captured the castles of Petrovaradin and Ilok. On 29 August Louis II, King of Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia (r. 1516–1526), blocked an Ottoman army of approximately eighty thousand men and three hundred to four hundred cannons at Mohács with the aid of his soldiers.

The papal legate Burgio estimated the Hungarian, Croatian, and Bohemian army that gathered before the battle at twenty-five to thirty thousand, with eighty-five cannons and five hundred Prague-type wall guns. It was a large army for its time, one of the

greatest armed forces that any medieval Hungarian king had ever assembled. The two opposing armies were equipped with quite similar armor, and it was not only the Ottomans who applied tactics based on the combination of an offensive cavalry and a defensive infantry.

Skirting the marshland of the Danube with their left wing, the Hungarians formed two lines, stretching out their forces in order to prevent the Ottoman lines from enveloping their right flank. In the first line stood the majority of the infantry—some ten thousand soldiers—divided into two wings, while certain cavalry groups were inserted there, too. The cannons were placed behind them. Then came the second line, with the king and his thousand armored cavalry in the center, flanked by magnates and their troops. This battle formation suggests that the Hungarians wanted to stay on the defensive, as they hardly had any of the new-style combat infantry (*Landsknechte*), and were holding their fast-moving, strong reserve forces for counterattacks, hoping to face only the advance troops of the enemy on the first day.

Ibrahim Pasha, grand vizier and commander of the Rumelian corps—which formed the Turkish vanguard of approximately 30,000 soldiers, strengthened by 4,000 janissaries, and 150 cannons—felt little urgency to attack. The ridge surrounding the Mohács plains provided him with excellent fighting positions, and probably neither the behavior nor the clearly visible battle order of the Hungarians suggested to him that fighting would be inevitable that day. It seemed more reasonable for him to wait for the arrival of the Ottoman main force and postpone the encounter until the next day, when their numerical superiority would almost guarantee victory. Consequently, contrary to Hungarian expectations, the Ottomans had no intention to attack on 29 August.

Seeing the enemy's slow march and the Rumelians preparing their encampment, Pál Tomori, the Hungarian commander-in-chief, concluded that Süleyman's full army would not reach the battlefield on that day. Taking advantage of the fact that the Christians would not have to face the whole Ottoman army at the time of the Muslims' afternoon

prayer (around 3:00 or 4:00), the right wing of the first Hungarian battle line attacked the Ottomans.


The assault pushed the Ottoman units defending the camp back to the cannons at the left wing of the Rumelian corps. The wagon fortress, set up to defend the cannons, halted the attackers. The Hungarian armored cavalry avoided the janissaries' shooting and, turning to the left, they struck the Rumelian cavalry and broke through its lines. To exploit this success, the second Hungarian line also hurled itself into the battle, beginning to encircle the Rumelian corps, while the infantry reached the cannons.

Fighting had been going on for about one or two hours when the rest of the Ottoman corps arrived at the field and joined the battle at various sites, independent of the continuing struggle of the Hungarian right flank. The Hungarian army command may have reckoned with this possibility, as the left flank had not engaged in the battle yet, and now it successfully took up the fight against the advancing Anatolian cavalry. The Hungarian commanders apparently reached the conclusion that Ottoman cavalry had been put to flight at both flanks, so an attack against the center was launched, which might have decided the battle for the Hungarians had it met with success.

The last charge of the Hungarian heavy cavalry, however, was not successful, though certain sources recount their breaking through the line of janissaries defending the sultan. Süleyman did not flee, however, and so few cavalrymen came near him that he was not killed, nor were the order and fighting morale of the Ottoman troops shaken.

Following this event, Turkish numerical superiority dominated the battlefield. After almost four hours of fighting, the fight was terminated by darkness and heavy rain. Because of the increasing number of fugitives and casualties, the Hungarian army, which had been smaller right from the beginning, ceased to represent any real threat. Its remaining segments were surrounded and eliminated by the Ottomans.

The Ottomans could not believe that they had already annihilated the Hungarian army and



Battle of Mohács. Miniature of the battle fought between the Ottomans and Hungarians in 1526. Illustration from the *Book of Excellence* by Lokman, 1588. TOPKAPI PALACE MUSEUM, ISTANBUL, TURKEY/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

remained alert throughout the night, with the sultan on horseback until midnight. Actually, they had nothing to fear. The Hungarian army lost about five thousand horsemen, and only about two thousand foot soldiers survived. All the commanders except for two, together with six bishops and numerous secular barons, died during the fight. King Louis fled the whirl of battle. Later he was found dead, having drowned in the swollen Csele Brook.

The Hungarian government was decapitated by this defeat. The sultan entered Buda without resistance, and the only reason he did not make Hungary a vassal state was that no one would take an oath of allegiance to him. After he left, János Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, was elected king, but his rule was not recognized by the followers of Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria. In the country exposed to Ottoman power, a struggle for the crown began. Hungary was divided for 150 years: the western and northern lands were ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs, with the capital at Buda; the central territories were occupied by the Ottomans; and Transylvania, the easternmost province, became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.

[See also Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); *Landsknechte*; Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Siege of; Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; and Tomori, Pál.]

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János B. Szabó

MONASTERIES AND MONKS

During the Middle Ages monks wrote about war in both spiritual and secular contexts and observed important events, such as the Crusades, even as monasteries themselves became military targets and contributed to the prosecution of warfare.

For the year 793 the author of the Canterbury manuscript of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* lamented the sacking of the Northumbrian monastery of Lindisfarne by Viking raiders, an event that caused consternation throughout western Christendom. Medieval writers also depicted monks engaged in unremitting daily battles with demons. Anselm of Canterbury described the world as a battleground between God and the devil, wherein God's kingdom represented a spiritual citadel defended by monks.

Monks employed military terminology to describe their role as spiritual warriors fighting against the devil. As a brother of the Benedictine abbey of St. Évroul, the twelfth-century historian Orderic Vitalis recorded the military exploits, crusades, and careers of Norman lords such as Duke Robert II Curthose. Writing retrospectively about the foundation of Shrewsbury Abbey in 1083, Orderic created in his *Historia Ecclesiastica* a scene in which his father, Odelarius, urged Roger de Montgomery to establish the house, as "countless benefits are obtained there every day, and Christ's garrisons struggle manfully against the devil." Roger's foundation would serve as "a citadel of God against Satan, where the cowed champions may engage in ceaseless combat against Behemoth for your soul." The *Historia Ecclesiastica* provides the best account for warfare in Western Europe during the early twelfth century.

Monastic propaganda was more than rhetoric; it was a self-conscious attempt to express a monastic version of society to a supporting audience. During the twelfth century in particular, adult converts to the monastic life in Western Europe, either as monks or as *conversi* (lay brothers), came mainly from knightly or noble families; Herluin of Bec, for instance, founded the abbey of Bec in 1040. Motives were mixed; some joined communities as young



Fortified Monastery. Nouaillé Abbey, France. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

knights, while others retired to them following an active military career.

Monasteries could be targeted in warfare for plunder, captured and used as bases for pillaging, or destroyed to prevent adversaries from seizing them. Melrose Abbey in Scotland was damaged in such a way in 1322, when the nearby town was attacked by the army of Edward II. Acts of desecration and the denial of sanctuary were condemned by monastic writers, who emphasized divine punishment and excommunication from the church as retribution for such crimes. The church, and monasteries in particular, contributed significantly to the logistics of military campaigns. The Norman monastery of St.-Florent-de-Saumur, for example, was exploited in order to provide the materiel of the Carolingian war machine.

Monasteries were often founded or financed with profits of war. During the eleventh century Cluny (in Burgundy) fought to make the Spanish *reconquista* into a holy war, establishing colonies and estates in regions recovered from Muslim control. Norman and Anglo-Norman monastic writers were interested in the exploits of the military elite and the Crusades. Drawing on the *Gesta Francorum* (Deeds of the Franks), Robert the Monk's *Historia Iherosolimitana* (History of Jerusalem,

c. 1106) formed the most popular account of the First Crusade, and his work shaped much of the perception of the Crusades in the Middle Ages. The *Gesta Normannorum Ducum* (Deeds of the dukes of the Normans) of William of Jumièges was begun before 1060 and then (at the behest of William the Conqueror) was extended by Orderic Vitalis and Robert of Torigni to justify the Norman invasion of England in 1066.

The crusading movement affected Byzantium and the religious houses of the east. During the Second Crusade in 1147 Frederick Barbarossa torched a monastery near Adrianople in revenge for the murder of a German crusader. And when Latin crusaders sacked Constantinople in 1204 they were responsible for the wholesale desecration of holy places, including the monastery of the Pantocrator, which housed the icon of the Theotokos of Nikopeia and other relics.

[See also Christianity; Clergy, Roles in Warfare of; Crusades; and Pacifism.]

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Andrew Abram

MONGOLS

"Mongol" is the name of a group of languages spoken by peoples originally situated in present-day Manchuria who in the tenth to twelfth centuries settled in present-day Mongolia. In the time of the tribal leader Temüjin (1165–1227), who in 1206 became Genghis Khan, their territory centered around the Onon and Kerülen rivers in Mongolia. They were called Tatars in Western medieval sources; in fact, the Tatars were a subgroup of Mongol extraction and were Genghis Khan's ancestral enemies.

Originally hunters and gatherers, by the eleventh century the Mongols were pastoral nomads living in tents. Enabled by the success of Genghis Khan's campaigns, the Mongols rapidly spread throughout Eurasia. They streamed into what is now Inner Mongolia as the Mongol conquest of China proceeded. They also moved west into Turkestan, and even into Iran and Azerbaijan. In most of these areas the Mongols mingled with other nomadic (mainly Turkic) groups, a process that was completed by the late thirteenth century, when the Mongols disappeared as an ethnic group in the West. As a result of


Mongol conquests, by the middle of the thirteenth century Genghis Khan and his successors had established the largest ever Eurasian continental empire. The Great Mongol Empire extended from China to as far as the Carpathian Basin. Following the death in 1259 of the great khan Möngke, the empire fell apart and was divided into four states: the Golden Horde, the Ilkhanid state in Iran, the Chagatayid state in Central Asia, and the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China.

The Mongol warrior's garment was expedient in every respect. He wore a long, robe-like coat, trousers, and leather boots suitable for riding. Cotton, fur, and leather were the principal components of his dress. His rations, held in a leather bag, consisted of dried milk curd, kumis (fermented mare's milk), and millet meal or cured meat. Warriors were hardy and their horses were tough.

The preferred weapon of the Mongol cavalryman was the composite bow, with quiver and arrows. A soldier in the heavy cavalry also used a long lance fitted with a hook, a mace, or a saber. A soldier in the light cavalry was occasionally equipped with a javelin, a light axe, or a horsehair lasso. Warriors and horses alike were often protected by lamellar armor made of either leather or iron plates. The Mongol army, organized along the decimal system, comprised three main forces: the left wing, the right wing, and the center. The kernel of the last component was the imperial guard. Upon Genghis Khan's death in 1227, the Mongol army consisted of 123,000 warriors. Even later the number of Mongol troops, often overestimated by contemporaries, was actually less than that of their enemies.

Mongol warfare was sophisticated for its age. In conducting warfare, Mongol armies used different methods of intelligence (false rumors, psychological terror) and different techniques (fake retreat, cruelty). The Mongols combined firepower with shock tactics and superior mobility. They believed in and for a long time could maintain an aura of invincibility.

[See also Kulikovo, Battle of; Legnica, Battle of; and Muhi, Battle of.]



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István Vásáry

MONS-EN-PÉVELE, BATTLE OF

After the victory at the battle of Arques, Willem van Jülich's rebel Flemish army marched against the French-allied Tournai, but the town did not fall. However, Philip IV (the Fair) was not ready to send an army against the Flemings, wishing instead to negotiate a truce. The king even released the imprisoned Count of Flanders, Guy of Dampierre, to aid in this peace process. Ultimately, this allowed Philip to rebuild his army. Early in 1304 the French king was ready to attack the Flemings. While the French army, led by the king himself, marched north to attack Flanders, the French navy sailed to Zeeland and struck the first blow on 11 May 1304 when it

soundly defeated the Flemish army and navy at Zierkzee. Philip the Fair camped at Mons-en-Pévèle, then in Flanders. Willem van Jülich, the Flemish leader, decided it was there he would fight the French. The battle of Mons-en-Pévèle is one of the most difficult medieval battles to describe, although not because of a paucity of contemporary sources, including most importantly one by a French soldier, Guillaume Guiart, who had fought in the battle, and another by the generally reliable *Annales Gandenses* (Annals of Ghent).

The French army was reputedly smaller than the Flemish one, although none of the contemporary sources have credible numbers. It also contained a large number of French knights, whereas the Flemish army, as at the battles of Courtrai and Arques, was almost entirely made up of townspeople, although now more experienced in warfare after almost three years of armed rebellion. The French army in addition had a number of artillery pieces—large mounted crossbows and perhaps some trebuchets—although the Flemings seem to have destroyed them in a raid before the battle began. Finally, the French

had brought the oriflamme, a banner of almost relic reputation that was normally only used in fighting against heretics or heathens.

Nevertheless, the French army faced Flemish soldiers highly encouraged by their victories thus far in the rebellion, who desired to fight the French king and believed they could defeat him. They arrived at Mons-en-Pève on 13 August and set up their line opposite the French. Their formation was similar to that used successfully at Courtrai, but with the addition of a field fortification made up of their wagons and carts circled at their rear. However, the battle was not fought for five days after the arrival of the Flemings, although skirmishing and cross-bow fire were frequent during this period. Peace was also discussed between ambassadors from both sides, but to no avail. The impasse was broken on the morning of 18 August when a French cavalry charge into the Flemish line initiated battle. The French fought well, but the Flemings held their position, and both sides took heavy casualties. By midday, after several hours of fighting, the Flemings began to gain the upper hand. Panic ran through the French army, and some began to flee from the battlefield. In desperation, Philip IV sent other cavalry to attack the flanks of the Flemish line, hoping that this would divert Flemish attention; an attempt was also made to attack the field fortification. But the Flemish infantry line continued to hold its position.

Soon the length of the battle and the August heat began to take its toll on both armies. Fatigue and thirst plagued everyone, but the French cavalry, in their heavier armor, seem to have been especially affected by it and many left the fighting. Some of the Flemish leaders believed that the battle was theirs and they withdrew their tired troops, leading Willem van Jülich to meet with the remaining Flemish leaders. They decided to break from their defensive formation and to charge into those French forces left on the battlefield. Initially the Flemish attack was successful, taking the discouraged French troops by surprise and forcing more into flight. Soon the Flemings were among the French camp, even threatening Philip the Fair. Only with great effort did the

king's bodyguards save him, all but two dying in the effort. The oriflamme was destroyed. But now the Flemings were even more exhausted, and Philip was able to rally his army and lead a counterattack that caught the fatigued and disordered Flemish army unprepared for such an assault. They turned and fled in a rout, with the French troops pursuing the fleeing Flemings well into the night. During this phase of the battle Willem van Jülich was killed, perhaps as some sources insist by fatigue and dehydration. Losses were high on both sides, but the Flemings were clearly demoralized, enough so that they agreed to the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge in June 1305, ending their rebellion.

[See also *Annales Gandenses*; Arques, Battle of; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; and Willem van Jülich.]

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Kelly DeVries

MONTAPERTI, BATTLE OF

The battle of Montaperti was fought near Siena on 4 September 1260. It forms part of the conflict between the Guelph and Ghibelline towns of Tuscany.

Guelph versus Ghibelline Factions. In 1250, Florence had established a coalition government of



Battle of Montaperti, 4 September 1260. Illustration by Giovanni di Ventura, thirteenth century. SCALA/ART RESOURCE, NY

Guelphs and Ghibellines to replace the previous government headed by the imperial vicar of Frederick II. The following year, the Ghibelline municipalities of Pistoia, Pisa, and Siena made an alliance against Florence, along with certain Florentine Ghibellines headed by Farinata of Uberti, who were prepared to unleash a civil war against the Guelphs. Twice, the Florentine Ghibellines had attempted to take over the city, but both attempts were thwarted (1251 and 1258). Though Siena and Florence had recently made peace, this was broken by Siena's sheltering of Farinata and his allies within the walls of Siena. These hostilities quickly led to the battle of Montaperti.

Siena recognized Manfred (the illegitimate son of Frederick II) as king of Sicily against the legitimate heir Conradin, still a minor. Florence, on the other hand, sent ambassadors to Conradin requesting aid and received a small squadron headed by Kroff von Fluglingen. The exiled Florentines sent a delegation to Manfred and obtained a modest contingent of German knights for the Ghibellines, headed by the king's cousin, Jordan of Anglona.

After an initial skirmish on 17 May at Santa Petronilla where Manfred's banner was captured, the king decided to send a stronger contingent of six hundred German knights. In response, Siena (led by Provenzano Salvani) began a military campaign and quickly besieged Montalcino. Florence's response was to send out an enormous army, including

militias from many of their allies. Their stated goal was to bring aid to Montalcino, but against the advice of the Guelph nobles, the Florentine popular government also provoked their rivals by parading the impressive army beneath Montalcino's walls.

The Florentine and Sienese Armies. The *Book of Montaperti* (a volume produced by the Florentine notaries who followed the Guelph troops, containing an incredible wealth of detail about the soldiers of their army and logistics) tells us that the army set out on 20 August, commanded by the *podestà* Iacopino Rangoni of Modena. The army was composed of about thirty thousand men, half of them from Florence and its *contado*. Another five thousand came from Lucca. The remaining soldiers were from other Tuscan allies, and there were also militias from Bologna, Piacenza, and Orvieto, as well as the squadron of German knights sent by Conradin. Approximately one-third of this army was composed of knights; the rest was infantry, variously armed. The Florentine *carroccio* led the troops, sounding the Martinella and waving the banners of the commune. (The *carroccio* was a wagon bedecked with standards and containing an altar on which to say Mass that was a rallying point and a powerful symbol for armies of the period, and the Martinella was the bell whose ringing both presaged war at home and served as a means of communication in battle.)

The Florentine army advanced along the valley of the river Arbia, and stopped at Pievasciata the night of 2 September. After a night march, the Florentines arrived close to Montaperti near dawn on 4 September, but found the road blocked by the Sienese army. The Sienese were outnumbered. Calculations suggest an army of twenty thousand, with approximately fifteen hundred to two thousand knights, headed by Manfred's vicar Count Jordan, the *podestà* Francesco Trogisio, and Count Aldobrandino from Santa Fiora. The Sienese deployed more than half of their fighters (about eleven thousand) along with Manfred's eight hundred German knights. Among the leaders was the charismatic Provenzano Salvani; at the head of the exiled Florentine Ghibellines (no more than three hundred knights) were Farinata of Uberti and Count Guido Novello of the Guidi family. An important role was also played by the astrologer Guido Bonatti, who recommended the precise moment of attack. The battle lasted from sunrise to sunset, and the outcome was in suspense until the very end.

The Guelph Defeat. The hostilities were opened by a few bloody clashes of individual knights, but the real battle was joined soon after. In one famous episode, Florentine soldiers in the Guelph army switched sides, wreaking havoc in the Florentine ranks. Dante later evoked the disarray of the Guelph knights after the Ghibelline knight Bocca di Rustico di Ranieri degli Abati cut off the hand of the Florentine cavalry gonfalonier Jacopo del Nacca of Pazzi; he placed Bocca, "the evil traitor," in hell.

The Sienese and German knights struck against the now demoralized Guelph army. The Florentine cavalry began a disorderly retreat, leaving the infantry and the knights of Lucca (led by Nicola Garzoni) to defend the *carroccio* in a fierce but futile stand. The Sienese cut them to pieces. The Sienese knights pursued and slaughtered the Florentine fugitives. The losses of Florence and its allies amounted to several thousand (reports range from twenty-five hundred to ten thousand), as well as the many prisoners who were taken to Siena (between fifteen hundred and fifteen thousand). Our only source for Siena tells us that six hundred died and four hundred were wounded.

The army returned to Siena the following day with the enemy's banners, their *carroccio*, its Martinella (the Martinella's clapper remained in Siena until the fifteenth century), and a crowd of prisoners so great that the commune had to employ 472 guards, and had to rent and adapt numerous towers and even many houses as prisons. The abundant spoils conquered from the Florentines and brought back in victory to Siena contained flags, arms, and other goods, as well as various parchments inscribed by the numerous notaries accompanying the defeated army, the "Libro di Montaperti." It is a unique document, not only because it is the only Florentine source on this campaign but also that it is the only surviving example of an "on the road archives of a fighting army in the military and archival history of the Middle Ages" (Paoli).

On 8 September, Montalcino surrendered to Siena unconditionally. The true turning of the tide, however, was in Florence. On 9 September, thousands of Guelphs fled Florence, leaving the government to the Ghibellines, who entered on 12 September led by Farinata and Count Guido. Following the victory of Montaperti in 1260, Tuscany became Ghibelline and remained so until the defeat of Manfred at Benevento in 1266.

[See also *Carroccio*; Conradin; Frederick II; and Italy, subentry on Narrative (1000–1300).]

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Federico Canaccini

MONTFORT, SIMON (IV) DE

(1165–1218) was the Lord of Montfort-L'Amaury, a small patrimony in northern France. Little is known of his early years. He only gained prominence during the Fourth Crusade. At Zara in 1202 he and a small group of nobles and prelates refused to participate in the attack on a Christian city, drawing the ire of the rest of the crusaders, who threatened his and the others' lives for their seeming treachery. Simon obeyed a higher power and refused to be swayed, exhibiting traits of stubbornness, righteousness, and religious zeal that defined his life. A devoted family man and extremely loyal to his followers, he was an excellent friend but an implacable enemy. In spite of his deep personal piety, he was a gambler who often risked everything and succeeded, as he did at Castelnaudary in 1211 and Muret in 1213. At Muret he foolishly abandoned his fortifications to fight, outnumbered, on the field, yet in wagering so much he won one of the most decisive battles of the Middle Ages.

Chosen as military leader of the Albigensian Crusade in the fall of 1209 after the successful siege of Carcassonne, he reluctantly accepted the assignment. Once having assumed command, however, he led with a determination and energy few others could match. Simon's sieges through 1214 were masterpieces of tenacity, skill, and leadership against long odds and terrible conditions. In a series of tough sieges in 1210 and 1211, Simon prevailed in spite of a hostile populace, harsh geography, brutal weather, uncertain reinforcements, and extreme supply shortages. Given his unpredictable manpower and limited resources, in 1211 he overwagered on besieging the large city of Toulouse. Failing to take Toulouse after a two-week investment, he broke off the siege before he damaged his army or his reputation. By that fall he had helped



Seal of Simon de Montfort (c. 1165–1218). CENTRE HISTORIQUE DES ARCHIVES NATIONALES, PARIS, FRANCE/ GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

defeat southern forces at Castelnaudary. In 1212 he surrounded the count of Toulouse's western territories and the city of Toulouse by winning important sieges at Penne d'Agenais and Moissac. After the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, Simon was essentially granted the territories he had already acquired by military conquest. In 1216 the young Count of Toulouse, Raymond VII, began another conflict by besieging the Montfortian garrison at Beaucaire. By then Montfort had lost patience with the constant rebellions and attempted more assaults at sieges rather than the methodical investments of earlier years. His assaults at Beaucaire failed and his garrison surrendered. In 1217 the city of Toulouse rebelled against him and he began a nine-month siege. As in 1211, the city was too large for Simon's manpower resources and he never controlled the Garonne River. Southern armies became more aggressive, and by the spring of 1218 Simon may have been mentally exhausted. In a final attempt to end the siege by means of an assault, Simon had a large siege cat or tower dragged to Toulouse's defenses, which was attacked by a large, coordinated

southern sortie. Under a heavy storm of missile fire, Simon was killed by a stone thrown from a mangonel and died instantly.

Simon de Montfort's overall reputation polarizes those who believe he was either a war criminal or a Christian martyr. He was neither. On the one hand, he was a courteous, religious, yet avaricious man by thirteenth-century standards. He tried to reconcile the indigenous nobility to his control by peaceful means. These nobles often pledged loyalty, only to break their word at the first opportunity. On the other hand, he allowed the massacres of heretics and summarily mutilated or executed those who were disloyal or had broken their word. Militarily Simon faced a classic but unsolvable dilemma in southern France: his army was tactically superior to that of his opponents but too small to control the territory he had acquired. So he spent much of his time stamping out one rebellion only to face others hundreds of miles away. He depended on forty-day crusaders from the north who came and left periodically but were gone by the fall and winter, a situation the southerners took advantage of by rebelling when he had the fewest troops. Still, between 1209 and his death Simon de Montfort outshone every southern leader in sheer ability and tactical aggressiveness. His willingness to take chances served him well for many years. The victory at Muret places him in a small circle of commanders during the Middle Ages who won full-blown victories in pitched battle.

[See also Atrocities; Castelnaudary, Siege and Battle of; Muret, Battle of; Termes, Siege of; and Toulouse, Sieges of.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

MONTFORT, SIMON (V) DE

(c. 1208–1265), crusader, reformer, and statesman. Named for his father, the renowned leader of the Albigensian Crusade, Simon de Montfort may best be described as a thirteenth-century archetype of Cromwell. He was a man of many accomplishments.

Third son in a large and devout family, Simon was most likely born in 1208. His eldest surviving brother, Amauri, inherited the family's holdings in Normandy but permitted Simon to lay claim to their English holdings in Leicester, which had been seized years before by King John and granted to Ranulf of Chester. The younger Montfort traveled to England and served as a household knight for Henry III during his botched campaign to Flanders in 1230. There the English army avoided direct combat with the much larger French host, but it did conduct a sustained siege of Mirabel and without Henry razed castles at Gonnard, Pontoise, and at least one other in Anjou. Simon's conduct sufficiently impressed Ranulf, who was serving as one of Henry's commanders, and the elder noble generously surrendered the Leicester lands to the young Montfort. Simon married Henry's sister, Eleanor, which also made him brother-in-law to Louis IX of France. Simon, although only in his early twenties, emerged as one of the most influential members of Henry's court.

In 1240, Simon disembarked for the Holy Land, joining the king's brother, Richard of Cornwall, on crusade. Although Richard's contingent did not engage in any fighting, it was able to secure an advantageous treaty. In 1248, Henry appointed Simon to be seneschal of Gascony. Simon's heavy-handedness made him unpopular with many local barons, and in

1252 Henry removed his lieutenant from the office, replacing him with the crown prince, Lord Edward. Simon would serve as his royal godson's mentor in the conduct of war.

Henry had long been at odds with his barons because of his poor grasp of finances and domestic politics, and Simon played an important role as a leader of the Barons' Rebellion (1258–1267). Simon, who had previously proven his leadership abilities and willingness to oppose the king during years of personal disputes, presided over the Provisions of Oxford (which effectively put the government in the hands of a baronial council) in 1258. After Henry reneged on his oaths in 1261, Simon organized the armed resistance to Henry during the civil war from 1263 to 1265. Although the war consisted mainly of sieges, two battles were especially decisive; Simon commanded the barons at both. At the battle of Lewes in 1264, under cover of darkness, Simon seized the key terrain of Offham Hill. In the morning, when Lord Edward impetuously chased the rebellious Londoners from the field, Simon seized his momentary advantage, captured Henry, and brought Edward to terms. After a brief captivity, the latter escaped and faced Simon again the following summer (1265) at the battle of Evesham. There, outnumbered and trapped against a river, Simon and his army were routed and killed, almost to a man.

Simon is remembered alternately as the "First Dictator of England" and the "Father of Parliament." He both epitomizes and defies the stereotype of the medieval nobleman.

[See also Britain, *subentries on* Sources (1000–1300) and Narrative (1000–1300); Evesham, Battle of; and Lewes, Battle of.]

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Christian Teutsch

MONTIEL, BATTLE OF

This decisive encounter was fought in 1369 at Montiel, just south of Toledo, between Pedro I, "the Cruel," of Castile (r. 1350–1366/69) and his rival for the throne, his illegitimate half brother Enrique II (r. 1366/69–1379). The battle ended a three-year Castilian civil war and led to Pedro's second and final overthrow.

Intent on relieving Enrique's ten-month siege of Toledo, Pedro marched north from Seville with an army said by the chronicler Pedro López de Ayala to number some three thousand lances and fifteen hundred Moorish cavalry supplied by his ally Muhammad V, the king of Granada. To oppose this force Enrique and his leading captain, Bertrand du Guesclin (c. 1320–1380), the future constable of France, led some three thousand lances in a night march southward, intercepting Pedro around dawn near the castle of Montiel, which belonged to the military order of Santiago. Despite fires lit by Enrique's advancing troops, they achieved a complete surprise, routing Pedro's spread-out forces and pursuing his Muslim auxiliaries with deadly effect. The king and many of his leading followers fled into the castle, to which Enrique immediately laid siege in hopes of capturing his hated enemy. A few days later, during a daring nighttime attempt to slip out of the castle, Pedro fell into the hands of Du Guesclin's Franco-Breton mercenaries, who turned him over to their employer. In a dramatic confrontation, after reputedly taunting Pedro with the words "Where's that Jewish son of a whore who calls himself King of Castile?" Enrique personally dispatched Pedro with a dagger. His body lay unattended for three days except for a file of his own subjects who came to mock their deceased sovereign. Despite its decisive nature, because of the sudden

flight that immediately followed the surprise attack the battle produced very few highborn casualties on either side.

[See also Enrique II; Iberia, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1500); Muhammad V; and Pedro I of Castile.]

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

MONTLHÉRY, BATTLE OF

This battle, fought south of Paris, was the major engagement of the war between King Louis XI of France (r. 1461–1483) and the French princes united against him in the “League of the Public Good.” In the summer of 1465, when the princes’ revolt broke out, the king was threatened on three sides. In the south-east were the troops of John II, Duke of Bourbon. In the northwest, François II, Duke of Brittany, was preparing to march on Paris. In the northeast a Burgundian army commanded by Charles, Count of Charolais (the future Duke Charles the Bold), was also ready to attack the capital. Louis XI turned his attention first to the Duke of Bourbon, who seemed to be the weakest of his adversaries. But after a short campaign, Louis had to return to Paris with his troops. He therefore took the northern road, trying to avoid an engagement with the Burgundians, who came out to intercept him. On 15 July the Count of Charolais ordered his army to take up a position on the outskirts of Montlhéry. When Louis XI was informed of this, he decided to fight.

The next morning the two armies took up combat positions. The French had divided their forces in three: the vanguard, led by Pierre de Brézé,

seneschal of Normandy, formed the right flank; the main division, in the center, was commanded by the king himself; the rear guard, placed on the left flank, was under the orders of Charles of Anjou, Count of Maine. Opposite, a Burgundian vanguard, commanded by Louis of Luxembourg, Count of Saint-Pol, was placed defensively, the men-at-arms and archers having dismounted, with the sides and rear of their line protected by wagons. The Count of Charolais positioned himself in support at the right of the Count of Saint-Pol’s formation. Seeing the royal army in battle order, he decided to attack and plunged into the French left flank. The Count of Maine’s soldiers took flight, pursued by the Count of Charolais and a portion of his mounted troops. At the same moment, from the French right flank Pierre de Brézé launched an attack in which he was killed, but his action repulsed the Burgundian left flank. When the Count of Charolais circled back after chasing the runaway French soldiers, he found the royal army still solidly occupying its positions. He was attacked by enemy fighters, wounded in the throat, and almost captured before he was able to return to his own lines. After these confused engagements, the French and Burgundians re-formed their ranks and exchanged some cannon fire. Since evening was falling, Louis XI decided to yield the field to his enemy, turn east, and return to Paris under cover of darkness.

At the end of this bloody battle, there were neither winners nor losers. The Count of Charolais had not been able to prevent Louis XI from taking refuge in Paris. The king of France had not succeeded in eliminating his adversaries and had suffered major losses; his capital was soon surrounded by enemy troops, with whom he was forced to negotiate. The treatises of Saint-Maur and Conflans (signed October 1465) weakened his political position for several years.

The battle of Montlhéry also represented the confrontation of two military systems: the king of France had at his disposal an army composed mainly of standing “ordinance companies” and *francs-archiers* (members of a type of organized national infantry reserve force), whereas the army of the Count of Charolais consisted of contingents levied on a feudal

basis from the Burgundian territories and of mercenary companies. It should be noted that the more "modern" system did not win out over the more "traditional" system. However, when he became Duke of Burgundy, the Count of Charolais endowed the Burgundian state with a permanent army organized in part on the French model.

[See also Charles the Bold.]

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Bertrand Schnerb

Translated from the French by

Johanna M. Baboukis

MONTREAL D'ALBARNO

(d. 1354), condottiere. The career of Montreal d'Albarno was by any account an extraordinary one. His lineage and youth are shrouded in tales, and it is unclear how exactly he became a soldier. Most authors think that he was born into a minor noble family of Provence and for a time was a knight-brother of the Hospitallers. The Italians called him Fra Moriale: "Fra"—short for *fratello*, "brother"—is a reference to his former status, and "Moriale" is the Italianized form of "Montreal."

It is possible that Fra Moriale started his Italian military career in the service of Pisa. From 1347 to 1351 he operated in southern Italy in the wars of Naples and belonged to the Great Company under the command of Werner of Urslingen. After Urslingen's return to Germany in 1351, Fra Moriale formed his own company in southern Italy. In 1353 he joined forces with Conrad of Landau. During the years 1353 and 1354, both were captains-general of the Great Company, which in those times held a monopoly of military power in central Italy and began dictating

terms to their employers—actions that caught the popular imagination. The Florentine chronicler Matteo Villani described the Great Company of these years as a group of several thousand well-organized mercenaries who were controlled by Fra Moriale. A major share of the rewards that Fra Moriale earned he invested in Perugia, Padua, Venice, and elsewhere. In summer 1354 he left the company and went to Rome to collect his earnings. Meanwhile, however, power there had fallen into the hands of the demagogue Cola di Rienzo, who had reestablished a republican government. By executing Fra Moriale in August 1354, Rienzo seized the opportunity to make himself popular and rich. An anonymous Roman chronicler described Fra Moriale's death as being the very model of a chivalrous way of dying.

Unlike for many other condottieri of his time and later, knowledge of the career of Fra Moriale is based not on administrative documents but only on chronicles. This makes an appreciation of his life and his merits quite difficult.

[See also Condottieri and Great Companies.]

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Stephan Selzer

MONTREUIL-BELLAY, SIEGE OF

The siege of Montreuil-Bellay is remarkable for two reasons: the first appearance of Greek fire in western Europe and the debate among historians as to just what use Geoffrey of Anjou actually made of Vegetius's manual *De Re Militari*. Whether or not Geoffrey really needed Vegetius's advice, the siege

demonstrates that tactics and technology had both advanced significantly.

Geoffrey's grandfather, Fulk Nerra, had built the castle on a terrace above the Thouet valley. Fulk's donjon was said to "reach the stars" and eventually was surrounded by a double set of walls and an outlying rampart. Natural features came into play as well: a sharp escarpment created the so-called Valley of the Jews at just the right distance, according to John of Marmoutier, to curtail the effectiveness of siege artillery. The Bellay family was then installed as castellans and soon began to exercise the independence typical of many powerful vassals.

In 1149 Geoffrey Plantagenet responded to the complaints of the monks of Méron against the abuses of Girard Bellay, and a three-year siege began. Upon arrival, Geoffrey reduced the market and homes outside the castle to ashes. Thereafter the siege settled into a monotonous phase since he could not use his siege weapons on the castle itself. Finally the count ordered the fairs of Saumur to be held instead at Montreuil; once the area was full of marketgoers, Geoffrey drafted them to fill the Valley of the Jews, all of which was accomplished in two weeks. This enabled the count to bring his siege engines into the fray. Geoffrey himself supervised the construction of two or more siege towers, which were then pulled into position against the castle. Thanks to the covering fire they provided, Geoffrey's troops were finally able to mount a successful assault, penetrating and destroying the outer walls. From the inner rampart, however, the defenders unleashed such a storm of stones, arrows, and other projectiles that any further assault was stymied. Geoffrey's archers in the siege towers responded with Greek fire, soon burning down the interior defenses save for the donjon.

A one-day truce ensued so both sides could recover the wounded and bury their dead. Girard rejected a call to surrender, hoping Louis VII would come to his aid. Geoffrey moved trebuchets, petraries, mangonels, and rams into position. Steady fire on one side against the donjon by the artillery and repeated ramming on the other side both created breaches that the defenders would fill at night with oaken tree trunks. At this point Geoffrey was reported to have

relied on Vegetius for his next move. He filled an iron pot with a volatile mix of oil of nuts, hemp, and flax seeds. Heated to boiling and then flung from a mangonel, it exploded on contact and incinerated the wooden reinforcements as well as three nearby homes. Losing hope in the face of such concerted efforts, Girard surrendered. Geoffrey demolished the castle sufficiently to render it useless but apparently left enough standing to testify to the strength of what he had overthrown.

[See also Greek Fire; Strategy; and Vegetius.]

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Steven Isaac

MONTSEGUR, SIEGE OF

Montségur was the last major siege of Cathars in modern-day southern France and broke the back of organized resistance there. Though some view the siege and subsequent execution of those who lived there as part of the Albigensian Crusade, the latter had ended in 1226. The site of Montségur itself, spectacularly remote atop a giant semicircular mountain called the Pog, had been used as a refuge by Cathars and their supporters before the Albigensian Crusade. Because of Montségur's inaccessibility, political authorities and the Orthodox Church left it alone for almost two decades after the crusade ended. In 1242 four inquisitors were murdered nearby, their deaths blamed on some at Montségur, so in early 1243 it was decided to take action against the refuge.

In April 1243 the seneschal of Carcassonne, Hugh d'Arcis, led a royal army of several thousand to the Pog, against no more than four hundred men, women, and children living a subsistence existence

in the fortifications. Montségur's rugged location made it impossible for Hugh's soldiers to get close enough to use siege weapons. Even though Hugh had many soldiers, he could not entirely prevent men and supplies from reaching the fortifications. The site, too, had several wells on it, so Montségur did not face surrendering because of lack of water, as had happened at Termes more than thirty years earlier. The siege remained a desultory blockade throughout the summer, with the defenders irrefutable, so the decision was made to continue into the winter. In late December or early January 1244, a small group of soldiers, guided by some locals, ascended the northeast side of the Pog at night and captured a small, lightly defended tower; no one in Montségur expected an attack from that direction because of the jaggedness of the ascent. In fact, at daybreak the volunteers were appalled at their own feat after they saw how dangerous the trek had been. Arrow fire from the captured tower confined the inhabitants of Montségur in the remaining fortifications. Soldiers from other directions could now draw closer, dragging siege machines within range. The defenders held out for another three months and even attempted to dislodge those who had seized the eastern tower. At the beginning of March, however, the garrison had had enough and requested terms.

In light of the long resistance, the terms offered were fair and resembled earlier agreements during the Albigensian Crusade. All those who would reconcile to the Church were given penances and allowed their freedom. Perhaps half took the deal—probably the majority of the garrison, who were not necessarily formally involved with heresy. The other half—around two hundred, including women, children, and some of the garrison, refused to reject their faith and willingly went to their deaths on 16 March in a huge bonfire constructed below the Pog. Montségur is usually remembered for the burning of the intransigent rather than the siege itself. The siege had lasted long, but the losers chose their own fate afterward.

[See also Termes, Siege of.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

MORGARTEN, BATTLE OF

Beginning in the late Middle Ages, the liberation tradition of the Swiss Confederation stylized the battle of Morgarten into a national myth. Swiss historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries viewed it as the first “freedom battle” of the Confederation, which began to form gradually in the early fourteenth century. More recent scholarship has refuted this myth, which is deeply rooted in national consciousness of the Swiss people.

The antecedents of the battle, shrouded in legend, are still not completely clear. Various causes led to the outbreak of hostilities between Schwyz and Habsburg. The Habsburg dukes were interested in keeping their possessions in Schwyz and Unterwalden. Meanwhile, a long-standing border dispute escalated between the Benedictine monastery of Einsiedeln, protected by the Austrian dukes, and the inhabitants of the mountains and forests of neighboring Schwyz. Schwyz attacked the Einsiedeln monastery on 6 January 1314; this violent assault was bound to provoke a reaction from the monastery's Austrian protectors. The struggle for the throne in 1314–1315 between Louis of Bavaria and Frederick the Fair of the house of Habsburg also played a role in these disputes. The Habsburgs'

interests in the county of Rapperswil were likewise a factor.

Few details are known about the course of the battle. Primary sources are almost nonexistent; the chronicles offer mostly contradictory reports. Neither the exact location of the battle nor the number of combatants on either side is known. Estimates are available: the Austrian duke Leopold was able to mobilize many lords and counts, as well as divisions from various cities, for his campaign against Schwyz. This fighting force of about two to three thousand set out on 15 November 1315 from the Habsburg city of Zug through the Aegeri Valley toward the Schwyz position. In the district of Schornen, near the 4,068-foot (1,240-meter), forest-covered Morgarten ridge, this army was attacked by about a thousand Schwyz soldiers, possibly reinforced by allies from the forest region, and put to flight after a short and bloody battle at close quarters. Several hundred knights, as well as numerous foot soldiers, were said to have fallen on the Austrian side. A number of them probably drowned in nearby Aegeri Lake in the panicked retreat. The losses on the Schwyz side were said to have been minimal.

Politically, this Austrian defeat should not be overrated; it had only local significance. The Austrians' sovereign rights in the rest of the territory of present-day Switzerland were undiminished. Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden formed a new and closer alliance by means of the "Morgarten Letter" of 9 December 1315 and united in a common "foreign policy."

In time, an annual celebration of the battle's anniversary was established in Schwyz, in gratitude for the victory. A chapel on the battle site is first mentioned in 1501.

[See also Switzerland, *subentry* on Narrative.]

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Oliver Landolt

Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis

MOVIES

See Film.

MUHAMMAD V

Muhammad al-Gani-Billah (he who is contented with God) was a Nasrid king of Granada (r. 1354–1359, 1362–1391). He was one of the Muslim rulers best able to preserve the peace among the Christian and Muslim states of the peninsula.

In a time of turmoil between the Castilian and Aragonese kingdoms, Muhammad V succeeded his father Yusuf I (r. 1333–1354). His first reign only lasted five years and was ended by a rebellion orchestrated by his younger brother's mother, Maryam, and his cousin, ra'is Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad, who eventually dethroned him in 1359. Muhammad V's *hajib* (governor), Ridwan, was assassinated, but he was able to escape and flee to Guadix. Abu Salim invited Muhammad V to travel to West Africa under his protection. With the help of Abu Salim and Pedro I of Castile (r. 1350–1366/69), the deposed king returned to al-Andalus to regain his throne in the summer of 1361. After a number of hard-fought and bloody battles against Muhammad VI (*el Bermejo*), he was able to do so in 1362.

Serving once again as king of Granada, Muhammad V would establish an alliance with Pedro I, loaning him three galleys to reinforce the Castilians' naval force in the long war against Pedro IV of Aragon (r. 1336–1387). A new challenge to Muhammad's power arose when Enrique II (r. 1366/69–1379) became king of Castile in 1366 and began a series of military offensives in Andalusia. Muhammad V broke ties with Pedro while allying

himself to Enrique with a truce that was signed in 1370. A few years before this, the Granada ruler had also signed a truce with Pedro IV. These truces remained intact until Muhammad V's death in January 1391. This great Granadan king remains best known for maintaining stability in the peninsula.

[See also Enrique II; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Pedro IV of Aragon; and Pedro I of Castile.]

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María Torres Merritt

MUHI, BATTLE OF

Thanks to the chronicles of Thomas of Spalato (present-day Split, Croatia) and Archdeacon Rogerius, an Italian eyewitness, the Hungarian campaign, with its decisive battle at Muhi, belongs to the best documented phases of the Tartar (Mongol) wars in Europe. Hungarian intelligence worked well, as Dominican friars informed the royal court by 1237 about the forthcoming Tartar attack against the Russian principalities. There was no panic in the country; no serious threat had arisen from the East since 1068.

With a marvelous strategy, the Tartars entered Transylvania from the East and South Carpathians. On 12 March 1241, the main army led by Batu Khan occupied the fortified mountain pass of Verecke (next to Verhni Vorota, Ukraine) in the border area, which was defended by only a small elite unit, and cleared the way with their engineering troops. Meanwhile, another army led by Kadan attacked Transylvania through different passes from the east, and by the end of April Orda and Baidar reached the northern frontier in the direction of Trencsén (Trenčín, Slovakia). The Hungarians were lucky that the Tartar forces were not united before the battle

at Muhi; only the army of Batu faced the Hungarian royal army of King Béla IV.

Evaluation of the mobilization, the battle tactics, and the outcome is still debated. Even though the Cumans—after bloody conflicts with Béla—had left the country, and the reorganization of the county system and the subsequent military buildup had strained relations between the nobles and the king, the Hungarian mobilization was successful. A strong Hungarian army gathered, perhaps more than twenty thousand men of an estimated total potential of some fifty thousand. This was probably equal to, or at least not far inferior to, the numerical strength of Batu's army. The core of the Hungarian army consisted of Western-style heavy cavalry units of the court, of the magnates, and of the military orders of the Knights Templars and Hospitallers. The contingents of the counties, led by their *ispans* (heads), were not uniformed in armor or weapons; most of the soldiers were equipped with bows but surely lacked military discipline or tactical proficiency comparable to that of the Tartar cavalry.

The royal army followed the high road to the east to the river Sajó, where the Tartar army was waiting for them. At a village called Muhi, some 106 miles (170 kilometers) from Buda, the Hungarians set up their camp, fortified by carts in the middle of marshy fields. They occupied the bridge, the only means of getting across the river. It is likely that the Hungarians intended to fight defensively; that is, they planned to prevent the enemy from crossing the river, while inflicting heavy losses. The Hungarians reached Muhi by 9 April, without knowing that on the same day the Tartars had annihilated the Silesian army of Duke Henry at Legnica (Liegnitz). On the eve of 11 April, the Tartars attacked the bridge, supported by the fire of trebuchets, but the Hungarians, led by Prince Coloman and Ugrin, Archbishop of Kalocsa, (a participant of the crusade of 1217–1218) defended it successfully. With this victory, perhaps supposing that the main enemy force had been defeated, the Hungarians grew overconfident. North of the bridge a body of Tartars, led by Seiban (Shiban), swam across the river; another body, led by Sabutai,

built a flying bridge farther south. The Hungarians' foes benefited from excellent military engineering, armor, and discipline, although their supposed use of firearms of Chinese origin has not been proved. By the early morning hours, the Hungarians suffered heavy losses, and their camp—where a large part of the soldiers were still sleeping—was encircled. The lack of reserve troops proved a fatal error. They defended the camp desperately for long hours, but without any hope of relief and without the possibility of developing a favorable tactical formation. Chinese annals have noted the numerical strength of the Hungarians and praised their perseverance, even stating that at some point the Tartars considered breaking off the fight. It is very probable that the Tartars intentionally opened a hole in their blockade, a well-known stratagem to cause turmoil in the enemy's line, to crush their fighting morale.

Finally, the Hungarians who were able to do so fled the field, including Béla and his brother, Coloman, although the latter died a few weeks later. The king rode in a hurry with his retinue practically through the whole country, getting to the city of Trau (Trogir, Croatia) on the Dalmatian seaside. He was pressed closely, but his escape thwarted the Tartars' plans to consolidate their power in Hungary, and contributed to their subsequent decision to withdraw.

The dimension of destruction caused by the Tartars is still an open question. Evidently a large part of the royal army was killed, including the two archbishops, three bishops, the count palatine (the highest-ranking nobleman of Hungary), and many other magnates. As a result of the Mongol invasion, the whole population of the country was diminished by some 15 percent—in the theaters of war up to 50 percent—but the Danube border was held until February 1242. In addition, more than a dozen castles, such as Esztergom and Székesfehérvár, were defended successfully against the Tartars. Perhaps it is a sign of limited military losses that by the end of 1242 the royal army was ready for action again and reconquered a recently lost border territory from the Austrians.

Much has been written about King Béla's responsibility for the defeat, but it is more than likely that even a more talented leader would have been unable to defeat the Tartars in an open battle. Still, the losses to the country could perhaps have been reduced. At any rate, after 1242 Béla successfully reorganized the military system of the country, supported the building of stone castles, settled and integrated the military contingents of the Cumans, and finally became truly worthy of the modern title "second founder of the country."

King Béla later complained that he had not received any crusaders' support from the West, although he asked for it several times. The question of a crusade became a political issue between the pope and the emperor in a time when their relations touched bottom. In Germany, by April of 1241, and in Rome by 1 July, a crusade was proclaimed, but an army, especially after the sudden death of Pope Gregory, was never mobilized. It was the Austrian Styrian duke, Frederick II, who led a significant contingent to Hungary, first before the battle of Muhi, later during the king's flight from Muhi to Dalmatia, blackmailing Béla and occupying some western territories by force.

[See also Béla IV; Cumans; Esztergom, Siege of; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Legnica, Battle of; and Mongols.]

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László Veszprémy

MÜHLDOF, BATTLE OF

The battle of Mühldorf settled the struggle for the throne that had broken out after the death of Emperor Henry VII in 1313 between Louis IV of the house of Wittelsbach and the Habsburg Frederick the Fair. Louis won the battle and was able to influence political quarrels in his own favor by taking his enemies captive. His victory at Mühldorf secured the power of the Wittelsbach king and forced the Habsburgs from the German throne until 1438.

There are numerous sources for this battle, meticulously edited by Wilhelm Erben. Despite the wealth of sources, most of the details of the battle cannot be definitively reconstructed because the reports are too distant from the event in time or subject matter, too obviously biased toward one side or the other, or simply too short.

This much can be confirmed: In the summer of 1322, Frederick and his brothers Henry and Leopold, dukes of Austria, launched a pincer attack against Louis IV, who was supported by King John of Bohemia. Frederick moved with his division along the Danube to Passau, and then farther along the Inn River toward Mühldorf. A division under the bishop of Salzburg awaited him there; another one, under his brother Leopold, moved in this direction from the west. Louis and his troops moved south from Regensburg toward Mühldorf. The decisive strategic factor in this conflict was the fact that the Austrian troops were unable to unite themselves prior to the battle. Louis reached Mühldorf at about the same time as Frederick, around 20 September.

The chronicler Peter von Zittau (Petr Žitavský), who wrote immediately after the event and favored Louis's side, gives the following figures: Louis led eighteen hundred cavalry and four thousand infantry and archers into the field; Frederick had fourteen hundred cavalry, five thousand Hungarians and "heathens," and "very many" foot soldiers. These data seem realistic, although the estimate of the Hungarians may be a bit high in view of the outcome of the battle. Duke Leopold's division is stated to have comprised twelve hundred cavalry and "numerous" infantry. Leopold and Frederick together thus seemed superior to Louis, both qualitatively and quantitatively. But Frederick, according to several of the sources, was unwilling to wait, wanting to end this wretched civil war as quickly as possible. His concern for the fate of the widows and orphans who were suffering in the war, as reported in the Austrian sources, was a strategic error. Battle was joined on 28 September.

According to an Austrian source—a work called "The Battle of Mühldorf"—Frederick's army was split into four divisions, with Frederick himself leading the second. This source reports nothing about the size, deployment, or weaponry of these divisions, nor is it clear where the Hungarians were positioned. Even less is known about the deployment of the Bavarian army. An issue that arises in several of the sources is the participation of the two kings in the battle. While Louis did not personally enter the battle, Frederick appeared prominently, bedecked with the royal insignia. Many pro-Habsburg sources go so far as to insinuate that the Bavarian camouflaged himself among similarly dressed knights, so as to avoid attempts on his person.

The battle lasted several hours, turning in Louis's favor with the intervention of the Count of Nuremberg and his men, who had held themselves back from the actual battle, coming in later to reinforce the Bavarian troops. Their arrival caused some confusion, since many of the Austrians took them for Duke Leopold's friendly troops. A large number of Austrians were taken prisoner, including the king himself. Austrian sources explain the defeat as the result of treachery: The king of Bohemia would have

been defeated, except that he received help from the Austrian side; when the Count of Nuremberg appeared, a number of knights from Louis's army had supposedly already been captured by the Austrians. The captives, they claimed, reentered the battle, causing the Bavarians to win.

Peter von Zittau gives the number of dead as eleven hundred, underlining the length and difficulty of the battle.

[See also John of Luxembourg and Louis IV, Emperor.]

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Martin Clauss

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

MUNTANER, RAMÓN

(1265–1336), author of one of the four great chronicles of the medieval Crown of Aragon. The scion of an important merchant family of the Pyrenean town of Peralada, he exploited a fine education and extremely fortunate connections to become an important literary, political, and military figure during the reigns of Alfonso III (r. 1285–1291) and Jaime II (r. 1291–1327). Muntaner entered Aragonese royal service as an attendant to the future king, Pedro III (r. 1276–1285) and in subsequent years followed the crimson and yellow banner of Catalonia first to the Balearics, where he became a Majorcan merchant in the 1280s, and then to Sicily, where in 1300 he was involved in the defense of Messina against a besieging Angevin army. After the Treaty of Caltabellota (1302) ended the Aragonese-Angevin conflict, Muntaner—although by now a mature man—sought adventure and profit in the Catalan

Company headed by his old comrade, the privateer Roger de Flor. In view of his commercial experience, he was called on to serve as quartermaster and chancellor in the mercenary company and, from 1302 to 1307, he gained the respect of his fellows when, as commander of Gallipoli in 1306, he defeated a furious Genovese assault, suffering five major wounds in the process. Muntaner's treatment of the defense of a besieged fortress, the distribution of food, and the stationing of both male and female defenders is a classic description of the experience of besieged populations. He was captured by Venetian corsairs at Negroponte in the following year while aiding his friend, the future Sicilian king, Fadrique III (1295–1337). Since he had lost much of the Catalan Company's treasury in this action and feared the internecine struggles that wracked the organization, Muntaner took his capture as an opportunity to leave service in Greece. For the next two decades, he served as a trusted agent for Aragonese, Majorcan, and Sicilian sovereigns. He died in 1336 as a "bailiff" (*batlle*) on the island of Ibiza for the Majorcan king Jaume III (r. 1324–1349).

His chronicle, consisting of 298 chapters, was written between 1325 and 1326 when he had forged yet another career, that of a successful cloth merchant in Valencia. Composed in a lively Catalan, it is an extremely personal retelling of military and courtly events between the last years of Jaime I ("the Conqueror," r. 1214–1276) and the accession of Alfonso IV. His description of the French crusade operations in Catalonia (1285), of the first years of the Catalan Company (1302–1307), of his subsequent political career (1307–1324), and of Alfonso IV's coronation (1328) are clearly the most important sections of his work. His style, similar to that of Jaime the Conqueror's *Liber dels Feyts*, focused more on the intimate details of his military career than on the larger geopolitical events of the day. As he declared in the prologue of his work, Ramón Muntaner had taken up his pen to chronicle "my escape from many perils . . . such as thirty-two battles on sea and on land . . . as well as . . . [the] many prisons and torments inflicted on my person."

[See also *Catalan Company and Iberia, subentry on Sources (1100–1300).*]

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Donald J. Kagay

MURET, BATTLE OF

In September 1213 Pedro II of Aragon entered southern France to defend his vassals and territories against Simon de Montfort, the leader of the Albigensian Crusade, most of whose forty-day troops had departed by summer's end. At Toulouse the king led a coalition army consisting of two to four thousand horsemen and two to four thousand Toulousain city militiamen. This combined army attacked the weak fortress of Muret, about eleven miles (eighteen kilometers) south of Toulouse. Pedro knew that Montfort would attempt its rescue, especially since the Frenchman had lost another small fortress to a Toulousain raid earlier that summer.

The Toulousain militia besieging Muret might have taken it but Pedro ordered them not to. He allowed Simon de Montfort into the fortress, where the king could cut off all escape routes and starve his enemy out, the most prudent course in light of Montfort's military reputation. But Pedro and Montfort both impatiently decided to end the contest more quickly, after an initial assault failed and unfruitful negotiations ground out. Pedro formed his mounted men into three ranks some distance from Muret while the Toulousain militia began to besiege Muret. Montfort and his horsemen left Muret in three ranks, by a side gate. The sources are fairly consistent as to his numbers; he commanded between 750 and 900 horsemen, while his infantry, numbering fewer than one thousand, stayed behind in Muret. Unmolested by the Toulousain militia or



Battle of Muret, September 1213. Illustration from the *Grandes chroniques de France*, MS Fr. 2813, fol. 252v, c. 1375. SNARK/ART RESOURCE, NY

Pedro's cavalrymen, the crusaders navigated various terrain features. At a short distance from the coalition horsemen, the crusaders charged. Reminiscent of what they had done at Castelnaudary two years before, the first two lines of crusader horsemen aimed for Pedro's center. Their momentum not only crumpled the first rank but pushed them through into the second. Commanding the third rank in reserve, Montfort maneuvered his men to Pedro's left flank and charged, the coalition horsemen already fleeing, with the first two ranks of crusader horsemen following closely behind. Maintaining unit discipline over his reserve, Montfort followed his other horsemen pursuing the coalition in case the latter rallied. He then collected his men and rode back to Muret to prevent its fall.

The militia of Toulouse was preoccupied assaulting the town. When the Toulousains realized the approaching horsemen were not Pedro's (the crusaders had captured some standards, adding to the confusion), it was too late. Montfort's cavalry charged the panicked militia, who ran for the Garonne River and their boats. Between the attack against Pedro, the surprise against the militia, and those who drowned, it was a complete disaster for

the coalition. Exact casualty figures elude us but hundreds, probably thousands died on the coalition side, including Pedro. He had been in the second rank in borrowed armor, a factor that may have led to his death because he was not recognized during the combat. The crusaders lost few; probably less than one hundred.

Muret was one of the most decisive tactical victories of the High Middle Ages. The victory showed Simon de Montfort had no equal as a battlefield commander. Strategically, Montfort was unable to exploit the victory because of lack of resources and men, though it further secured his own position and enhanced his military reputation. Perhaps the most important strategic consequence of Muret was that it removed the Aragonese crown from intervening in southern French affairs, since Pedro left a child as his heir, and the heavy loss of life among his nobles at the battle precluded any concerted effort in the region for long after. By then the Crown of France had asserted its own control in the south. Pedro should have won at Muret, although his loss is easy to understand. He commanded a disparate army, the Languedoc majority of which had consistently lost against Montfort. Pedro was overconfident, believing he could end the crusade in a single contest. By dividing his command he partially negated his numerical advantage. In fact, prior to the battle he had not waited for several units still making their way to southern France from Spain. Although Pedro was a highly experienced and successful general, Montfort had been fighting a tough conflict for four years, and his men, while small in number, were more professional and used to combat. Still, Montfort also took a great chance by facing Pedro in open battle. He could have chosen not to go to Muret's rescue or, once inside, simply waited out the coalition, which probably could not have sustained a long siege given the season. Both commanders, then, were guilty of recklessness at Muret, but one was luckier.

[See also Castelnau, Siege and Battle of; Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; Montfort, Simon (IV) de; and Termes, Siege of.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

MURTEN, BATTLE OF

This battle, fought on the shores of Lake Morat (Murten in German) on 22 June 1476, represents a decisive moment in the conflict between the Burgundian state and the Swiss Confederation, which began in October 1474. Having been defeated by the Swiss at Grandson on the shores of Lake Neuchâtel on 2 March 1476, Duke Charles the Bold rallied his army, brought in reinforcements from his principalities, requested troops from his ally, Yolande, Duchess of Savoy, and recruited English and Italian mercenaries. He concentrated his troops at the gates of Lausanne, intending to attack Bern. Reorganizing his army in accordance with an ordinance dated May 1476, the duke reinforced his infantry, part of which was equipped with long pikes on the Swiss model. He also reconstituted his artillery, having lost some of it at Grandson. To make his troops more maneuverable, he divided them into four corps, each of which was then divided into two battle lines; each line was composed of foot soldiers surrounded by contingents of archers, with a company of mounted men-at-arms on each flank. In total, his forces probably amounted to between fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men.

This army began to move on 27 May, taking the Bern road. Progress was slow, and it was not until 11 June that the Burgundians besieged Morat. This fortified town, backed up against a lake, was defended by a strong garrison. It was situated at the border separating the lands of the duchy of Savoy from the canton of Bern. From his camp, Charles the Bold launched a few attacks against Gummenen and Laupen, two crossing points on the Saane River, with a view to continuing his eastward advance. The threat that he thus posed to the Swiss Confederation's territory hastened the mobilization of the Swiss forces. In the latter half of June 1476, the Confederates and their allies were able to assemble an army of about twenty thousand fighters, composed chiefly of infantry and accompanied by a cavalry force of two thousand, provided by Sigismund, Duke of Austria-Tyrol, and by René of Anjou, Duke of Lorraine. By 21 June, the Swiss had advanced to the edge of a massive forest, the Galmwald, which separated them from the Burgundian camp set up in a semicircle around Morat. Charles the Bold set his army in battle order, ready to resist an attack. Since the enemy remained immobile, he canceled his orders, leaving only a thin line of troops covering the east, toward the forest.

The Confederates launched their attack the next day, surprising their opponents in their camp. Their army was formed into three corps: on the right flank, a vanguard (*vorhut*), with the cavalry near it; in the center, the main body (*gewalthaufen*), consisting of a large square of pikemen and halberdiers; and finally, a rear guard (*nachhut*), forming the left flank. After striking the outer defenses of the Burgundian position and breaking them, the Swiss vanguard and main body penetrated into the camp, while the rear guard executed a turning maneuver to cut off the enemy's retreat. In less than an hour, the resistance of the duke of Burgundy's troops was broken and they were completely routed. The battle was followed by a great massacre, since the Swiss did not take prisoners.

Charles the Bold, who had managed to escape, lost most of his army and all his artillery. Even more serious than the military consequences was the political

and diplomatic impact of the battle of Murten. The allies of the Duke of Burgundy—the Duchess of Savoy and the Duke of Milan—abandoned him, and King Louis XI of France would soon be able to take advantage of the weakening of Burgundian power.

[See also *Armies, subentry on Organization; Artillery; Charles the Bold; France, subentry on Narrative (1328–1483); Grandson, Battle of; Infantry; and Switzerland, subentry on Narrative.*]

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
Bertrand Schnerb

Translated from the French by

Johanna M. Baboukis

MUSTER AND REVIEW

The term “muster and review” was coined by Richard Newhall to describe the system adopted by the English during their occupation of Normandy from the mid-1420s onward. In order to ensure that garrison captains fulfilled the terms of their indentures of service by holding the right number of adequately equipped men, they were required to muster their troops before civilian officials every three months. The resulting muster rolls were returned to the *Chambre des Comptes* (Chamber of Accounts) and used to authorize payment of wages to the captain, who was then responsible for paying his men. The system was further improved in the late 1420s by introducing into each garrison a controller. He served as a footman-at-arms but was also required to keep a daily record of arrivals, departures, and absences of his fellow soldiers as well as of their gains of booty. These counter-rolls were also returned to the *Chambre des Comptes* every three months and deductions were made from the captain's pay for



Muster Roll. A list of troops under the command of the duke of Gloucester at Southampton, c. 1417. TNA E101/51/2, CROWN COPYRIGHT. IMAGE COURTESY THE SOLDIER IN LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND PROJECT (WWW.MEDIEVALSOLDIER.ORG). PHOTOGRAPH BY DR ANDY KING

days when the garrison was under-strength and for the crown's share in war gains.

This was an impressive system of military administration aimed at preventing fraud and ensuring military preparedness. It was, however, firmly based on previous practices in both England and France. The origins of the mustering system have not yet been explored fully, but English garrisons in Scotland and elsewhere from the early fourteenth century onward had a similar system in place, providing us with names and numbers of soldiers. For France, lists of men serving in garrisons and in various companies in the field are found from the 1370s onward and are usually headed "la revue. . ." For English expeditionary armies the stimulus seems to have been the increased use of indentures in the fourteenth century. First used for campaigns where the king was

not present in person, such as that led by Edward of Woodstock in 1355 and the armies of the 1369–1389 period, indentures had become standard practice by the fifteenth century for all captains providing troops to the king. So that the Exchequer could be reassured that the right number of men had been provided by the indentees, such armies were routinely inspected at the point of embarkation, based upon lists provided by captains of the men they had provided. Several of the resulting muster rolls survive, often, as in English-held Normandy, with dots beside soldiers' names showing how their names were checked during the inspection. Some rolls bear signs of being taken on campaign so that deaths, desertions, and changes of rank could be noted and pay deductions ordered. For the campaign of 1415, we have muster rolls for around two-thirds of the embarking army as well as retinue rolls returned by captains to the Exchequer after the campaign indicating which of their men had died in service, been detailed into garrison, invalided home, or had served at Agincourt. Following Charles VII's military reforms of 1445, the French expanded their use of muster-based inspections, blending their existing practice with aspects of English practice in Normandy.

[See also *Armies, subentries on Organization and Size.*]

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Anne Curry

MYRIOKEPHALON, BATTLE OF

Between 1158 and 1162, Manuel I Komnenos had undertaken a number of successful campaigns to the east, and obliged the sultan of the Seljuk Turks, Kiliç Arslan II, to recognize his overlordship in Anatolia.

Over time, however, the sultan had expanded his authority over the Danishmends, at the emperor's expense. Manuel determined, therefore, to eradicate Seljuk power and aimed at its center, Ikonion (Konya). In preparation, he rebuilt fortresses at Dorylaion, Soblaion, and possibly Kotyaion, and sent an expedition to Amasia to receive some Turks into submission. Panegyrics produced at the time emphasize the injuries that had been done to Christians and the need to drive the infidel from Christian lands.

In 1176 Manuel mustered a huge army, which he led through the Maiander valley toward the deserted fortress of Myriokephalon. He rejected an overture for peace, a delaying tactic from Kiliç Arslan who was awaiting reinforcements, before he learned that the expedition to Amasia had failed. The Byzantine army (estimated at twenty-five thousand men), with its massive baggage train with which the emperor traveled, stretched up to ten miles (sixteen kilometers). It was ambushed in a pass known as Tzivritze, and although the vanguard forced its way to higher ground, the baggage train was trapped as the main force of Turks fell on its right wing (under Baldwin of Antioch).

Manuel fought his way out to reach the vanguard and thought of abandoning the army. He was dissuaded by Andronikos Kontostephanos, and once the battle had concluded, in defeat he was offered and accepted generous terms. The only part of the imperial army to suffer heavy losses in the campaign was Baldwin's contingent, so the battle did not end Manuel's ambitions in the east. However, it greatly damaged the emperor's reputation, since he had gambled on a great victory. In 1177 the pope and the German emperor signed the Treaty of Venice, which made no mention of Manuel, reflecting how far and rapidly his influence had waned.

[See also Manuel I Komnenos.]

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Paul Stephenson

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NÄFELS, BATTLE OF

The inhabitants of the Glarus Valley, originally under the control of the Säckingen monastery and later of the Habsburgs, allied themselves with the Swiss Confederation in 1352 but soon left this alliance. Entering the battle of Sempach on the Confederation side in the war against Austria, they destroyed the fortress of Windegg near Niederurnen and conquered the town of Weesen along with Confederate troops in August 1386. Surprisingly, the Austrians retook the town and fortress of Weesen in February 1388. The town was a major hub on the economically important trade route over the Bündner passes, as well as a key entrance to the Glarn Valley. An Austrian army of about six thousand assembled here in late March 1388. Consisting of knights and contingents from the Habsburg cities of Winterthur, Frauenfeld, Diessenhofen, Schaffhausen, Radolfzell, Rapperswil, Bregenz, and Feldkirch, this army set out from Weesen early on the morning of 9 April 1388 to attack the Glarus Valley. The main body, under the command of Count Donat von Toggenburg, was assigned to break through the barrier, known as a *Letzi*, that reached from mountain to mountain across the Glarn Valley between Näfels and Mollis, and then to push farther into the valley. A smaller force of about fifteen hundred, led by Count Hans von Werdenberg, was to pass

Beglingen-Mollis, skirting the *Letzi* via Kerenzerberg, and attack the Glarn defenses from the rear. Glarn sent to Schwyz and Uri for help and evacuated its population into the mountains. The enemy attacked so quickly, however, that the *Letzi*, only lightly defended by Glarn, was quickly breached, despite heavy counterfire. Thinking that they had won the battle, the Austrian army continued carelessly down the valley, divided into groups, burning and pillaging.

The Glarn counterattack began from the Rautenberg, west of Näfels. This did not go unnoticed by the Austrian officers, and they drew into formation to attack uphill. Despite the unfavorable terrain, the cavalry attacked over the steep, rocky slope, followed by the infantry. The Glarn soldiers rained down rocks on the enemy; the knights and the infantry behind them were taken by surprise and fell into disorder. The Glarn fighters, taking advantage of this situation, plunged down the mountain in compact groups onto the confused Austrian army. The Austrians panicked and pushed themselves frantically through the Glarn troops, trying to flee. Reinforced by a small contingent from Schwyz and a few from Uri, the Glarn army found new courage, while the Austrians' will to fight was weakened. In hopeless flight, the remains of the Austrian army sought refuge behind the walls of Weesen. About seventeen

hundred Habsburg dead were left behind on the battlefield. According to the records, only fifty-five men from the Confederation side fell in the battle.

This battle did not end the war, which continued into the spring of 1389 with campaigns of looting and destruction. The Austrian duke Albert III concluded a seven-year peace treaty, which in 1394 was extended for another twenty years. With this battle, Glarus won its membership in the Confederation. To this day the battle is commemorated annually in Glarus canton with a formal procession.

[See also Sempach, Battle of and Switzerland, subentry on Narrative.]

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Oliver Landolt

Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

NÁJERA, BATTLE OF

Fought in 1367 on the Iberian Peninsula near the frontier between the kingdoms of Navarre, Castile, and Aragon, Nájera (also called Navarette) ranked among the fourteenth century's greatest battles. On one side stood an Anglo-Gascon army led by Edward the Black Prince (d. 1376), eldest son and heir of Edward III of England (r. 1327–1377) and his ally, the deposed monarch of Castile, Pedro I "the Cruel" (r. 1350–1366; 1367–1369). This force had crossed the Pyrenees at Roncevaux and invaded Spain to restore Pedro to the Castilian throne lost in 1366. English leaders included John Chandos; John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster; Jean III de Grailly, the Captal de Buch; and Hugh Calveley. After probing Castilian defenses around Vitoria, the prince swung south through Navarre along the traditional pilgrims' route to Santiago. At Logroño, he turned westward toward Burgos. Fighting began in the early morning of 3 April, when he came into contact with a large Castilian army drawn up just east of the Najarilla River, led by Pedro's illegitimate half-brother and rival for the throne, Enrique II "the Bastard" (r. 1366–1367;

1369–1379) and Enrique's leading general, Bertrand du Guesclin, future constable of France. This force contained much of Castile's upper nobility and its retainers, fighting primarily as light cavalry (*jinetes*, *geneteurs*) typical of medieval Spanish warfare. While there was also a large body of native infantry drawn from the northeastern region of the kingdom, it played little role in the battle, serving mainly to magnify numerical losses inflicted during the pursuit. Native Castilians were reinforced by a sizeable contingent of Aragonese volunteers and battle-hardened Franco-Breton mercenaries under du Guesclin. The question of numbers remains highly speculative, with contemporary estimates for the English force ranging from 7,000 to 40,000 and for the Castilian force from 4,500 first line men-at-arms to a total of 100,000 men. In combat effectiveness, however, the Anglo-Gascons seem to have enjoyed considerable advantage, having served in the cutting-edge conflict north of the Pyrenees, and brought with them into Spain their heavier arms and armor as well as numerous longbows. While heavier weaponry had impeded them during skirmishes fought around Vitoria, it would now prove a critical factor. The battle began with offensive movement by both armies as the English right wing and center pressed forward and the main Castilian cavalry attacked the English left. The English immediately won the battle on their own right when the Castilian left, commanded by Enrique's unreliable younger brother, Tello, fled without fighting. The English right then wheeled inward to join its own center in attacking the Castilian center where Enrique had stationed his best troops on foot: the Franco-Breton mercenaries accompanied by elite Aragonese and Castilian contingents—many of the latter members of Castile's chivalric Order of the Sash. Meanwhile, the Castilian right, commanded by Enrique, put up a spirited fight, rallying for several charges against the English left, which had occupied a slight rise. Here, the longbow made its contribution to the battle, driving the lightly armored Spanish cavalry from the field. When they too joined in the flight westward, Enrique and a few retainers escaped down a valley to the south. Having routed

both wings, the Anglo-Gascon army surrounded the hard-fighting Castilian center, either killing or capturing most of it. By day's end, the English achieved an overwhelming victory while their opponents sustained one of the century's most crushing defeats. Many highborn Castilians and Aragonese were taken prisoner. The capstone victory of the Black Prince's career, Nájera ushered in for du Guesclin another frustrating period of captivity. Various factors determined the outcome: the decision of the Castilian king to fight a set-piece battle against the English, despite cautions issued by his French advisers, all of whom preferred to wait out the enemy; a second decision by Enrique not to use the Najarilla River as part of his defensive stance, but instead to cross and fight on the plain east of the river; the superior fighting skills and heavier armor of the English; the flight of Tello and the Castilian left; and the English longbow, which was particularly effective against Spanish light cavalry. In this unequal contest, the defeated side suffered vastly greater losses than those of the victors, the majority incurred not on the field, but during the panicked flight that followed the collapse of both wings. Many drowned when this flight was funneled onto a single bridge across the flooded Najarilla River. Those who crossed over to the town of Nájera found escape all but impossible because of the surrounding steep cliffs.

[See also Chandos, Sir John; Edward III of England; Edward the Black Prince; Enrique II; Guesclin, Bertrand du; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300-1500); John of Gaunt; Pedro I of Castile; and Weapons, *subentry on* Missile.]

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

NAKŁO, BATTLE OF

Bolesław III Krzywousty (Wry-mouthed), Prince of Poland, marched to Nakło in Pomerania in August 1109 with about fifteen hundred cavalry. The stronghold was situated in a bend of the Noteć River. Because the Pomeranians had not destroyed the bridge on the river, the Polish army crossed it and approached the stronghold from the west. After the first assault failed, preparations for a siege were begun. The prince, however, agreed to a short truce, allowing the inhabitants to consult with the governor of Pomerania concerning the possibility of their surrender. The Polish army, which encamped near Nakło, was attacked, however, on 10 August, by a strong Pomeranian relief force. About four thousand infantry appeared from the woods, created a semi-circle, and, having stuck their spears in the ground, waited for the attack of the Polish cavalry. The Poles were surprised, as many of the warriors were at that time out looking for food for themselves or forage for their horses. Only a fraction of them were standing guard. In another version, the appearance of chaos presented by the Poles was a ploy to lure the enemy into a trap.

Bolesław created two detachments. The first one, under his command, hit the Pomeranians from the front and led a rapid simulated attack. The second one, under the command of Skarbimir, covertly circled to the enemy rear and attacked from behind. A part of the Pomeranian army tried to change

front, but Prince Bolesław attacked once again and the Pomeranian formations were broken. They started to panic. The Poles won the battle, and two-thirds of the Pomeranian army died either on the battlefield or in the nearby swamps. Nakło, unable to count on relief, had to capitulate.

[See also *Cavalry and Slavic Lands, subentry on Narrative (1000–1300).*]

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Jan Szymczak

NANCY, BATTLE OF

Defeated at Morat on 22 June 1476, Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, needed to maintain the cohesion of the Burgundian state. The most urgent matter for him was to secure the connections between his northern principalities (including Flanders, Brabant, and Luxembourg) and his southern ones (the duchy of Burgundy and Franche-Comté). The duchy of Lorraine, which he had conquered in the autumn of 1475 after driving out Duke René II of Anjou, had risen against him in July 1476. In August most of the Burgundian garrisons had been driven out of Lorraine. In September, Charles the Bold managed to reconstitute his armies, of which one part, coming from Luxembourg, entered Lorraine from the north, and the other part, coming from Franche-Comté, entered from the south. After a rapid reconquest of the country, the Duke of Burgundy besieged Nancy on 22 October.

René of Lorraine, who had tried in vain to oppose the Burgundian advance, left his duchy again to request help from the Rhine cities and the Swiss confederates, alongside whom he had fought at Morat. By dint of negotiation, he was able to recruit six thousand fighters in the confederated cantons. During the winter he assembled his army and advanced into Lorraine at the end of December. He headed toward Nancy to help the garrison, which had been resisting the siege in very difficult conditions for two months.

The Burgundians' situation was also far from good: forced to mount their siege in the dead of winter, they were suffering from the cold and from lack of provisions. Desertions drastically reduced their forces. At the end of December, the defections became ever greater, and the Italian captain Nicolas de Montfort, Count of Campobasso, who was no longer being paid, went over to the enemy and took his whole company with him.

On 4 January 1477 the Duke of Lorraine concentrated his army at Saint-Nicolas-de-Port, southeast of Nancy. Informed of the enemy's proximity, Charles the Bold decided to fight. His army, however, decimated by cold and desertion, by then was probably no larger than two thousand men. Despite this disadvantage, on the morning of 5 January he left his camp, headed southeast, and arrayed his troops in formation along the Jarville stream, which ran perpendicular to the road leading from Nancy to Saint-Nicolas-de-Port. Blocking a narrow passage, the Burgundian line was composed of three corps: the left flank, against the Meurthe; the main division in the center, commanded by the Duke of Burgundy himself; and the right flank, against the Saurupt forest. The artillery was placed in front of the battle line.

Opposite this defensive position, the Duke of Lorraine sent the Count of Campobasso's Italians to take up their position north of Nancy, at the Bouxières bridge, to cut off the enemy's retreat. He then divided his remaining troops in two: the main corps, composed of Swiss infantry, was to attack the Burgundians from the front, while a corps of mounted fighters executed a turning maneuver on the left, through the woods, to attack the enemy's right flank. This maneuver worked perfectly. The Burgundian army put up

only weak resistance before scattering. The fleeing soldiers were pursued, and their retreat was cut off by the Italians posted at the Bouxières bridge and by the garrison in Nancy, who made a sortie. Charles the Bold, in the rout, was caught and killed.

This battle was decisive. The death of Duke Charles and, three months later, the marriage of his sole heir, Marie of Burgundy, to Maximilian of Habsburg, Archduke of Austria, radically changed the balance of forces in Europe.

[See also Charles the Bold; France, *subentry* on Narrative (1328-1483); and Maximilian I.]

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Bertrand Schnerb

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NÁNDORFEHÉRVÁR (BELGRADE), SIEGE OF

When in 1453 the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444-1446, 1451-1481) conquered Constantinople—the seat of the thousand-year-old Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire—he succeeded in removing both the final obstacle to the territorial unification of his European and Asian provinces and the focus of anti-Ottoman Christian diplomacy and crusades. In taking Constantinople and making it the new capital of the Ottoman Empire, the sultan hoped to consolidate his rule over the empire's core provinces (the Balkans and Anatolia) as well as the adjacent Aegean and Black Seas.

Consolidating and expanding his rule in the Balkans meant an inevitable clash with the Hungarians, the region's strongest power, which had halted the Ottoman advance in the Balkans in the 1440s and made Serbia, a former Ottoman vassal, Hungary's ally. From 1454 to 1455 the Ottomans conquered several Serbian forts, including Novo Brodo, a major silver-mining center. Then, in early May 1456,

Mehmed II launched his largest campaign since the siege of Constantinople in 1453. This time the target was Nándorfehérvár (present-day Belgrade, Serbia), which had stood since 1427 as the key to Hungary's southern border defense system at the confluence of the Danube and Sava rivers.

Mehmed II's army reached Nándorfehérvár on 3 July 1456, with sixty thousand troops, twenty-two large siege cannons, seven large mortars, and several dozen smaller cannons and trebuchets. The next day, the Ottomans launched the siege against the fort's weakest southern walls. The Asian and European troops attacked from the left and right, respectively, while the Janissaries, the sultan's elite infantry, fought in the center with the artillery in the vanguard. The defense of Nándorfehérvár was coordinated by János Hunyadi, *voivode* (governor) of Transylvania, Count of Temes (1441-1446), and regent (1446-1453) of the kingdom. Hunyadi initially sent six thousand mercenaries to Nándorfehérvár under the command of Michael Szilágyi, his brother-in-law. Before the siege, these defenders were joined by 2,500 crusaders under the leadership of the Franciscan friar Giovanni da Capistrano, while the bulk of the crusaders, a large but inexperienced peasant force of perhaps as many as eighteen thousand men, was approaching Nándorfehérvár with Hunyadi's relief army of twelve thousand. Hunyadi arrived in the vicinity of Nándorfehérvár on 14 July and destroyed the Ottoman fleet of two hundred boats that blocked his way on the Danube near Zemun, northwest of Nándorfehérvár.

Hunyadi entered Nándorfehérvár with his relief troops the same day, sending the crusaders to the opposite (left) bank of the river Sava, below Zemun. The defenders of the castle repelled several Ottoman attacks over the next seven days, causing serious casualties among Mehmed II's Janissaries. Then, on 22 July, when the crusaders launched an unexpected attack on the besieging Ottomans' left wing, Hunyadi seized the moment, captured the Ottoman cannons left unguarded in front of the castle, and turned them against the besiegers. In the ensuing melee and flight more than thirty thousand Ottomans lost their lives.

Although Hunyadi planned further crusades against the Ottomans, he died of the plague only weeks after the siege of Nándorfehérvár, on 11 August 1456. His victory against the conqueror of Constantinople halted further Ottoman advances beyond the Danube until the early 1520s. However, it could not save Serbia, which was conquered and brought under Ottoman rule in 1459.

[See also Constantinople, *subentry* on Siege of (1453); Hungarian Defense System; Hungary, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1526); and Hunyadi, János.]

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Gábor Ágoston

NARSES

(c. 480–574), Byzantine general. Born in Persarmenia in 480, Narses was a eunuch charged with different court functions until the summer of 538, when Justinian sent him to Italy as head of an army of five thousand men, to help Belisarios in the action against the Ostrogothic kingdom. His title was *primicerius sacri cubiculi* (grand chamberlain of the emperor), but he was invested with military command as a trustworthy representative. After the landing at Picenum, his forces were united with those of Belisarios, but the rivalry between them undermined the unity of command and led to several defeats, the most important being at Milan. For this reason Belisarios requested the dismissal of Narses in the spring of 539.

For a long time, Narses did not receive any other military function (except a mission to the Heruls in

545), until April 551, when he was sent again against the Ostrogoths. The army arrived at Ravenna on 6 June 552. From there, Narses advanced south, along the Adriatic coast. At Taginae, he defeated the army of King Totila. After this, the army of Narses restored Byzantine domination over central Italy, including Rome, by several battles and sieges. Narses inflicted defeat on the Ostrogothic forces that escaped at Mons Lactarius (near Vesuvius), in October 552. Although the last Ostrogothic king Teias was dead, the war was not finished while various cities remained in Ostrogothic hands. Moreover, they sought help from the Frankish king Theudibald, who sent an army that, during summer and autumn 553, menaced the Byzantines in the central part of the peninsula. Wintering in Rome, Narses prepared his riposte, which came at Casilinum (Cassino) in autumn 554. When his enemies were exhausted by their march and the heat, Narses followed them and secured a major victory. The remnants of the Ostrogothic forces surrendered at Compsa (Conza, in Campania) at the end of the same year.

Victorious, Narses began to apply the new regulations decided by Justinian for the Byzantine administration in Italy and to restore the fortifications. He governed from Ravenna as *Praefectus* or *Dux Italiae*. In 562, in a campaign in northern Italy, Narses expelled the Franks who helped an Ostrogothic rebel. Likewise successful was the repression of the mutiny of the Heruls in 566. These achievements did not prevent the new emperor Justin II from dismissing Narses in 568, because the people of Italy accused him of being too oppressive. With the new title of *patricius*, Narses moved to live in Rome, where he died in 574.

His leadership capabilities and the concern to provide enough manpower and supplies explain why, without a military background, Narses achieved decisive victories. Narses was brilliant as strategist and as tactician. Contrary to Belisarios, he favored direct attacks instead of maneuvers. With his clever and flexible mind, he was able rapidly to find suitable responses to enemy tactics (for example at Casilinum, where he dismounted cavalry—an unusual action for his time).

[See also Belisarios; Casilinum, Battle of; Justinian I; and Taginae, Battle of.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

The character of national identity and the forms and effects of nationalism in the Middle Ages have been much debated by historians, some of whom have disputed whether national identity existed at all at this time. Such views miss the point that medieval political communities defined themselves according to different criteria from those that define the nation states of the modern era, particularly ones founded on the linguistic nationalism characteristic of the nineteenth century. Defining factors such as religious affiliation or allegiance to a monarch were often at variance with other badges of identity, such as language or ethnicity. National identity and its expressions were rarely a mass phenomenon encompassing all sectors of society; those who defined and upheld national identities tended to belong to restricted elites who controlled political, military, administrative, and ecclesiastical affairs: monarchs and their households, members of the nobility, jurists, and bishops and abbots.

It might seem that the Goths, Vandals, Huns, and other groups who invaded the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries constituted examples of entire peoples in arms. However, recent research has shown that these groups, which are described

as peoples or nations in the sources, were in fact coalitions of diverse ethnic elements focused on small nuclei of warrior elites who acted as bearers of tradition. In cases of defeat, the constituent elements might break away and reform in new permutations. The apparent disappearance of complete peoples or tribes from the historical record is thus the result of political disintegration rather than ethnic extinction.

In the Byzantine Empire, much like the Roman Empire that it developed from, allegiance to the emperor and adherence to the Greek Orthodox faith were more important indicators of identity than Greek language or Hellenic culture. By the central Middle Ages, Byzantine armed forces were even more diverse than the multiethnic empire itself, incorporating units of Varangians, Franks (especially Normans), Slavs, Armenians, and steppe peoples such as Pechenegs alongside Greek speakers. Similarly, after the initial period of Arab conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries, the settled Arab population became reluctant to serve as soldiers, and so Muslim armies came to have a quite different ethnic makeup from the countries they fought for, increasingly containing units of Slavs, Berbers, black Africans, Armenians, Kurds, and above all Turks, who formed the mainstay of the Seljuk, Ayyubid, and Mamluk regimes.

In most of western and central Europe, national identity was usually defined by allegiance to a monarch and shared customs and traditions. Most armies included units of professional mercenaries, often (like the ubiquitous Genoese crossbowmen) of alien origin, but the bulk of fighting was done by nobles and knights, recruited on the basis of feudo-vassalic ties. However, the multiplicity of feudal bonds sometimes led to conflicting loyalties, and a shared chivalric culture or even language (as in Norman England), meant that military castes often had more in common with their opponents than with their own subjects. It was only really in the later Middle Ages that national identity became a significant factor in the conduct of warfare. Invasions or prolonged occupations of national territory often led to situations where a wider spectrum of a given

community felt compelled to resist perceived oppression by an "other." Thus in the Anglo-Scottish wars of 1296–1328 a small elite group of largely French-speaking Scottish leaders welded Scots- and Gaelic-speaking yeomen into an effective, motivated infantry force; here, ideas of a community of the realm outweighed linguistic differences. By contrast, Bohemia's linguistic groups became increasingly divided at the beginning of the fifteenth century. The aim of the Hussite revolution was primarily ecclesiastical reform, but it also drew on resentment among the majority Czech population against the largely German-speaking nobility and bourgeoisie (which remained Catholic), and it grew into a Czech national movement as the surrounding Catholic countries mounted crusades against it.

The Hussite revolution was exceptional. Those countries where national identity had the most lasting effects on warfare were those which developed institutions that mobilized the wider population and lent cohesion to military efforts. Thus we can observe a proto-Flemish nationalism in the struggles fought by the combined town militias of Flanders against the king of France at battles such as Kortrijk (1302) and Cassel (1328). The most durable military manifestation of national identity was found in the communities of the Swiss Confederation, whose citizen soldiers wrested independence from their Habsburg overlords in the early fourteenth century and continued to trounce mixed feudal and mercenary armies employed by the Habsburgs and the dukes of Burgundy for more than a century beyond that, although their Swiss identity coexisted and sometimes conflicted with more localized, cantonal loyalties.

[See also Cassel, Battle of (1328); Mamluks; Seljuks; and Switzerland, *subentry* on Narrative.]

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
Alan V. Murray

NAVAL BATTLES

See Alghero, Siege and Naval Battle of; Chioggia, War of; Corfu, Naval Battles of; Dyrrachium, Naval Battle of (1081); Genoese-Venetian Wars, *subentries* on First War; Third War; and Fourth War; Hundred Years' War, *subentry* on Naval Raids on England; La Rochelle, Naval Battle of; Malta, Naval Battle of; Modon, Battle of; Porto Longo, Naval Battle of; Ruggiero di Lauria; Saltes, Naval Battle of; Seine, Naval Battle of the; Sluys, Naval Battle of; Zierikzee, and Naval Battle of.

NAVAL COMBAT AND TACTICS

There are problems in discussing naval combat and tactics in relation to the period from the sixth century to the fifteenth century in western Europe and the Mediterranean. One relates to the nature of the evidence. For details of battles we have to rely on chronicles and other forms of literature, the authors of which often had little, if any, knowledge of ships or the sea. Their works were produced for a variety of reasons—to show the workings of the divine will in human history, to glorify a patron, or to justify a ruler's actions—that did not necessarily put a high value on an accurate account of events, even if such was available. The great majority of contemporary readers of chronicles and the like, especially in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, had some knowledge of land warfare through personal experience or schooling in combat or the ideals of chivalrous knighthood. The same did not apply to battles at sea. Many of the writers and readers of the chronicles did, however, have knowledge of the most widely available "military manuals" of the period.




Sea Battle. "Castles" at sea, fore and aft, and at the masthead, are shown in this illustration of a battle at sea. Illustration from *De re militari*, MS Marlay Add 1, fol. 86, c. 1270. FITZWILLIAM MUSEUM, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

In the case of war at sea, this was *De re militari*, written by Flavius Vegetius Renatus (usually known as Vegetius) around the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth centuries. It was translated into English and French and other languages in the late medieval period and was also printed at least two decades before the end of the fifteenth century. Book 4 of the work includes the material about war at sea. Medieval descriptions of sea battles sometimes seem to reflect Vegetius's views rather than accurate contemporary information. There are also uncertainties about how medieval ships handled and how maneuverable they could be, particularly when under sail. Differences also existed between the tactics used in northern and southern waters.

Northern Waters. The earliest accounts of sea battles in northern waters come from the Norse sagas, originally composed to glorify the deeds of great men and to be recited or sung in their presence or that of their descendants. Yet beneath the colorful language and vivid images, certain principles of warfare at sea

undertaken by the Vikings before 1100 emerge. Virtually all fights took place in bays or estuaries, near the shore, and in shallow waters. The ships would maneuver under oars, with the aim being to board the enemy, whereupon furious hand-to-hand fighting would erupt. Sometimes this would be preceded by showers of arrows or stones. In many ways so-called sea battles during this period were often more truly amphibious engagements, with one group trying to get their men ashore while the other side fought to prevent this. Examples of this kind of engagement are the battle fought in 896 in an unnamed estuary on the south coast of England between the forces of King Alfred and the Danes and the battle in a fjord on the east coast of Denmark in 1062 between the forces of Harald Hardrada and Earl Swein Ulfson.

Between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries in both the English Channel and the North Sea, similar battles near the shore continued to be fought, most often between English and French forces. The battle of Damme, for example, came about when an



Naval Expedition. The Duke of Bourbon's departure on crusade to Barbary, 1390. Illustration from *Froissart's Chronicles*, volume 4, part 1, c. 1470. © THE BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD (HARLEY 4379, F.60V)

English fleet caught the French in the estuary of the river Zwyn near Bruges in 1213. Many of the French ships were beached on the mudflats without their crews, and this allowed the English to set fire to them and destroy them. Off Dover in 1217, an English fleet was victorious by taking advantage of a shift in the wind.

In the fourteenth century, boarding an enemy ship and the subsequent hand-to-hand fighting continued to dominate sea battles in these waters even though sailing ships were usually involved, with encounters

now taking place on the open sea. The battles of Zierikzee (French versus Flemings and Zeelanders, 1301), Sluys (English versus French, 1340), and Winchelsea (English versus Spanish, 1350, also known as the *Espagnols sur Mer*) all involved these tactics. At Zierikzee the continued importance of seamanship was illustrated by a mixed French fleet of large sailing vessels and hired Genoese galleys managing to avoid disaster even when the sailing ships ran aground when the tide turned. At Winchelsea, one

English ship rammed a Spanish vessel so hard that both ships began to sink. Jean Froissart's dramatic account also includes the cutting of the halyard of the mainsail on a Spanish ship. Another account describes a similar incident at the battle of Dover, and this method of attack is listed by Vegetius.

By the first half of the fifteenth century, sailing ships in northern waters carried gunpowder weapons, usually firing over the rails, either amidships or on the aft or fore castles. It is not clear how effective they were at sea, as longbows and crossbows, and also projectiles thrown down from the top castles on the mast, continued to be used. The English fleet in 1416 captured several Genoese carracks in sea battles, their emphasis remaining on boarding actions. Vessels were infrequently lost as a result of an attack and, when captured, were usually absorbed into the victor's fleet. The most successful form of naval war may well have been the semiofficial use of corsairs to attack enemy commerce and effectively disrupt trade. By the reign of Henry VII (r. 1485–1509), the English crown was building vessels carrying large numbers of guns. This pointed the way to the artillery duels that dominated war at sea in the sixteenth century.

Southern Waters. Large-scale encounters between opposing fleets of galleys were a feature of warfare at sea from Greek and Roman times. Battles of a superficially similar type continued to occur as the Byzantine Empire faced the threat of newly expansive Muslim powers in the seventh century. There were important differences, however, between the fleets of Classical antiquity and those of the Byzantine era. The principal weapon of the ancient galleys was the underwater ram sheathed in copper. Driven hard into the hull of an opponent by a crew of expert oarsmen, it not only destroyed the banks of oars but also opened a hole in the hull, leading to the sinking of the ship. There is no mention of the use of rams in chronicles after the mid-sixth century, nor are they described in the tenth-century Greek books on naval tactics by the Emperor Leo VI (r. 886–912) and Nikephoros Ouranos. Leo's *Tactica*, addressed to the commanders of a large state-owned fleet, advised them to prepare thoroughly for any battle by

collecting intelligence and holding councils of war. Full-scale battle should be avoided if possible, but if unavoidable, galleys should keep to their allotted station in the line of battle and to act together. Leo's preferred disposition for a fleet was a crescent shape, with reserves kept behind the main body of galleys in the center, a notion also found in Vegetius. The aim was for the horns of the crescent to move inward to surround attackers. The fleet would be armed with crossbows and even catapults, but in addition most galleys carried siphons to project against enemy ships the devastating weapon of Greek fire (a highly flammable mixture perhaps similar to napalm). If the opposing fleets did board each other, then hand-to-hand fighting would ensue between the two sides, much as in the north. In 717 the fleet of Leo III used these tactics to defeat an Arab fleet off Constantinople. In the ninth century, Arab fleets, similarly armed, were important in the Arab conquest of Crete (827) and Sicily (from 827).

The Rivalry of Genoa and Venice. From the eleventh century, the intense rivalry between Genoa and Venice for supremacy in trade in the Mediterranean led to several naval wars. The political struggle between Anjou and Aragon for control of Sicily and Naples in the thirteenth century also had a large naval element. Both Venice and Genoa preyed on each other's seaborne commerce, but there were also several encounters between fleets of galleys. Because of the regular seasonal patterns of winds and currents in the Mediterranean, galleys tended to follow well-known routes. This allowed opposing fleets to have a reasonable chance of encountering each other, often near the shore, in a gulf, or at similar pinch point. In 1263 the Genoese off Durazzo brought off the coup of capturing an entire Venetian *muda*, or trading fleet, an action they repeated in 1294, when the Venetian *muda* returning from Armenia suffered a similar fate. It is often difficult to get any clear idea of the events of any particular battle; the bald statement that galleys were taken by the enemy is all that the chroniclers provide. More is known about how the fleets were raised and organized and how the large quantities of supplies needed for the crews were obtained. Significantly, the campaign that really threatened

the security of Venice was the 1378–1380 Genoese blockade of Venice with the aid of Hungarian land forces. Venice emerged victorious when its attackers were themselves besieged on Chioggia. The crisis for Venice began when its fleet failed to deny its enemies access to the Adriatic, but victory was won with land forces and small-boat attacks rather than with galleys.

The War of the Sicilian Vespers. In the western Mediterranean, the naval campaigns during the war of the Sicilian Vespers between the Angevins and the Aragonese provide the best example of a sustained naval campaign during the medieval period. The Aragonese commander "Ruggiero de Lauria" has been described as on a par with Nelson on account of his tactical skills. His fleets were composed of galleys carrying a strong force of crossbowmen. The crossbow was effective in the preliminary bombardment phase of a sea battle, killing many of the enemy crew before boarding was attempted. Lauria's first engagement, in the Grand Harbor in Malta in 1283, began with a dawn attack. In others, like that off Naples in 1284, Lauria used the ruse of a feigned retreat to lure the enemy fleet to sea, where his vessels rapidly overcame the opponents. In several chronicle accounts of galley battles of this period, the galleys are described as being "bridled." This has been taken to mean that they were in some manner roped together to form a kind of fighting platform. This would have made handling the vessels extremely difficult, especially in a seaway. The term may in fact refer to how the oars were temporarily secured to make boarding easier.

War at Sea between the Ottoman Turks and the Venetians. By the fifteenth century, the most important naval engagements in the southern waters were between the Christian powers, especially Venice and the knights of Saint John on Rhodes, and the Ottoman sultans. The Turks had little, if any, experience of the sea before their conquest of much of mainland Anatolia and the Peloponnese. The defeated Greeks provided both mariners and shipbuilders, making the Ottoman fleet a formidable opponent in the eastern Mediterranean. The Ottomans were well aware that denying the Venetians access to bases on the shores of the Aegean made the operation of Venetian

galley fleets extremely difficult. Their first step was to seize Negroponte in 1470, which the Venetian fleet was unable to prevent. The battle of Zonchio in 1499 resulted in the Turks taking control of the vital Venetian bases of Coron and Modon. In this battle two large Venetian sailing ships and a Turkish one caught fire; the galleys were hardly engaged at all. The engagement was inconclusive and tactically mishandled, but Turkish control of mainland Greece ensured the Turks eventual success. In 1571 in the battle of Lepanto, successful handling of a mixed fleet of sailing ships and galleys armed with artillery enabled an alliance of European powers to defeat the sultan's fleet.

[See also Chioggia, Battle of; Constantinople, *subentry* on Siege of (717–718); Damme, Battle of; Dover, Battle of; Galleys; Greek Fire; Harbor Defenses; Malta, Naval Battle of; Manuals, Military; Ruggiero di Lauria; Sea Power; Ships and Sailing; Sicilian Vespers, The; Sluys, Naval Battle of; Vegetius; and Zierikzee, Naval Battle of.]

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Susan Rose

NAVIGATIONAL TECHNOLOGY

Early mariners navigated by using careful observation of natural phenomena coupled with their experience of the ways of the sea. Basic ideas like the division of the heavens into named sectors, now thought of as compass points, reach back into antiquity. The naming of winds blowing, for example, from the warm south (Notus) or the chilly north (Boreas) was usual in the Mediterranean world, which enjoyed regular seasonal wind patterns. The role of astronomy in early navigation was also developed by careful observation; the knowledge that the polestar, found with the help of the stars of the constellation of the Plow (in Ursa Major), indicated the north or that the ebb and flow of tides was linked with the phases of the moon, was not confined to learned men but part of the skills needed by any mariner. The idea that the height of the sun above the horizon at midday could be used to locate a place, to determine its latitude, also gradually became accepted by navigators during the fifteenth century.

The gradual development of a more scientific and mathematical approach to navigation stimulated the design and use of navigational aids and instruments. The most important of these was the mariner's compass. This seems to have come into use at the end of the twelfth century, developing fairly rapidly from the crude device of a magnetized needle stuck in a straw floating in a bowl of water (something that would have been very hard to use onboard ship), to a compass rose drawn on a card, attached to a movable magnetized needle, contained in a wooden box or binnacle. Ramon Llull, writing in 1286, described something very much like this. In the Mediterranean, compasses were used with portulan charts—the earliest surviving one, the *Carta Pisana*, is dated 1274—to

lay off courses from about 1300. This built on Greek and Roman use of written sailing directions.

Using latitude to determine a ship's position at sea was the next problem to be solved. Tables of the known latitudes of ports and similar places and of the declination of the sun, together with calendars, were drawn up for use at sea by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century. An adaptation of the astronomer's astrolabe was designed for mariners to measure the altitude of the sun or the polestar. The use of these tables and instruments involved some mathematical knowledge and training, not just the experience of earlier mariners. Improved instruments, the cross-staff and the backstaff, more suitable for use onboard ship, appeared later in the sixteenth century.

Other instruments included a lead ("armed" with grease to sample the sea bottom), and line (marked off in fathoms), to determine the nature of the seabed and the depth of the water. The determination of longitude remained very difficult. There were only crude devices to measure a ship's speed or the amount of time spent on a particular compass course. Dead reckoning—a best guess, in effect—was the only method available even to skilled seamen before the eighteenth century.

[See also Maps, Navigational Charts, and Itineraries and Ships and Sailing.]

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Susan Rose

NESJAR, BATTLE OF

Olaf Haraldsson's victory at Nesjar, off the coast of Norway, was decisive in his campaign to become

king of Norway and make his country independent of Denmark and Sweden. The battle took place on the Sunday before Palm Sunday, traditionally dated 1016; however, a date some four years later is required to align this battle with Olaf's earlier activities in western Europe.

Olaf sailed from Northumbria, England, to Norway with 260 chosen warriors in two merchant ships. In Norway he won the support of his relatives, and challenged Earls Hakon and Sven of Lade, who ruled as allies of the kings of Denmark and Sweden. First, Olaf surprised and captured Earl Hakon and forced him into permanent exile. Then, Olaf gradually increased his power in Norway by diplomacy and the threat of force until he had sufficient resources to bring a fleet against Earl Sven.

The battle of Nesjar was fought in shallow waters near the harbor. Sven took up a defensive position with his ships lashed together. Olaf's ships' crews grappled the prows of the enemy so they could fight hand-to-hand. Earl Sven had greater numbers but Olaf's men were better equipped. When Olaf's men began to gain the upper hand, Sven's ship was dragged out of the line and he escaped. Sven fled to Sweden, where he fell ill and died shortly after, leaving King Olaf in undisputed control of Norway. Olaf was a great king and was recognized as a saint after his death because of his adherence to the Christian faith.

[See also Olaf II Haraldsson and Scandinavia, subentry on Narrative.]

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Ian Howard

NEUSS, SIEGE OF

In 1473 Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, had tried, via direct negotiation with Emperor Frederick

III at Trier, to reinforce his political position in the empire and also to obtain a royal title. The failure of the interview at Trier led Charles to try to obtain his demands by force. During the year 1474, he decided to support his ally the Archbishop of Cologne, who at the time was in conflict with his subjects, who were being supported by the emperor. When Charles's services as arbitrator were refused, he entered the archdiocese of Cologne with an army of seventeen hundred "lances" (each one including one man-at-arms, one light-armed cavalryman called a *coustil-lier*, three mounted archers and crossbowmen, one mounted servant, and three footmen: one handgunner, one archer, and one crossbowman), four thousand archers, and nineteen hundred other infantry, for a total of about twenty thousand men, some of whom were Italian and English mercenaries. He also had impressive artillery and siege engines designed especially for the operation. His intention was to besiege and take the city of Neuss, the largest fortress in the area, a little more than forty kilometers (about twenty-five miles) north of Cologne. This city, on the left bank of the Rhine, was well fortified, protected not only by solid ramparts with moats, but also, on its eastern side, by an arm of the Rhine fed by a tributary called the Erft. The garrison was commanded by Landgrave Hermann of Hesse, "captain and protector" of the archiepiscopal principality. The troops he commanded, supplied partly by the city militias of Neuss and Cologne and partly by Hessian contingents, numbered three thousand to four thousand men, while the city itself had about five thousand inhabitants. A sizable supply of provisions and ammunition had been laid down in expectation of the siege.

At the end of July 1474, the Burgundians surrounded the city. The duke had divided his army into twelve corps, which he spread around the place to create a blockade. The siege artillery began to fire, and for months, impressive technical means were employed to try to take Neuss. Special siege engines were designed and built, including a "crane," which, according to the chronicler Jean Molinet, was a type of assault tower twenty feet on a side and sixty feet tall, and a "cat," which looked like a wooden castle

mounted on twenty-four wheels. Elsewhere, a bridge was built across the small arm of the Rhine (which the duke tried in vain to drain) to allow traffic around the city; a network of approach trenches was made; mines and sapping were dug. Large teams of miners and sappers were used to carry out this work, as well as female workers who were organized military style. In fact, if the German captain Wilwolt von Schaumburg, who served in the Burgundian army, is to be believed, the women were grouped into a work team with its own banner, and their movements around the camp were ordered to the sound of trumpet and fife.

Nevertheless, in spite of this series of ingenious inventions and great activity, Neuss held out. The besieged forces were quite active, repelling attacks, leading numerous sorties, and destroying saps and mines. The blockade was not complete, and several resupply convoys were able to enter on different occasions. Additionally, the city had very elaborately organized defenses: strict food rationing had been instituted, and the garrison's horses were progressively slaughtered and eaten. Also, to assure continuous manning of the ramparts, the fighting men were divided into three groups: while one rested, another ate, and the third stood guard against the besiegers. The latter were in a relatively comfortable position, and their camp resembled a wooden city, with streets, squares, and workshops. The duke, in a huge and sumptuous wooden pavilion that could be taken apart, continued to govern the Burgundian state, convening his council, legislating, and receiving ambassadors.

At the beginning of January 1475, Emperor Frederick III decided to help the defenders of Neuss, whom he had promised to support. However, it took him several months to make his preparations, and it was not until May that his army assembled in Cologne and pitched camp, on 22 May, on the bank of the Erft across from the Burgundians. The next day, 23 May, Charles the Bold, leaving only a thin line of troops around Neuss, led his division across the river in a surprise attack on the imperial camp. The "battle of the Erft" was hardly more than a sham fight. It was not in the interest of either party to inflict any great damage on the other. In fact, the Duke of Burgundy

had no wish to humiliate the emperor, with whom he still wanted to come to an agreement; Frederick III, for his part, was hoping to marry his only son, Maximilian, to Marie of Burgundy, Charles's sole heir. On 24 May, the two princes began negotiating and were reconciled. A treaty was signed, after which the Burgundians lifted the siege of Neuss (June 1475).

The overall effect of the operation was negative for Charles the Bold, who, after eleven months, had not achieved his goal and had lost some of his prestige. After the siege was lifted, his opponents claimed that he had lost three thousand men and twelve thousand horses in the operation, and that his artillery had used up 100,000 florins' worth of gunpowder.

[See also Charles the Bold; Frederick III of Habsburg, Maximilian I; Siege Warfare, *subentry* on Tactics and Technology; and Women as Combatants.]

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Bertrand Schnerb

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NEVILLE, RICHARD

See Warwick the Kingmaker.

NEVILLE'S CROSS, BATTLE OF

The battle of Neville's Cross took place outside Durham, England, on 17 October 1346 between an English force led by William Zouche, Archbishop of York, and a Scottish army under the command of King David II. It is sometimes called the battle of Durham because of its closeness to that city.

The victory of King Edward III of England at Crécy and his subsequent siege of Calais led King Philip

of France to seek aid and a diversion from David II, who proceeded to gather a large force and invade northern England in early October. He was, though, unaware of the advance of a comparably sized English army under the Archbishop of York, who had already begun assembling an army at nearby Bishop Auckland, with such experienced English warrior-magnates as Ralph Neville and Henry Percy.

The sizes of the armies vary in the sources, but it is agreed that the Scottish army was the larger, with perhaps twelve thousand men. Robert Stewart, nephew of David II and his heir-presumptive, and Patrick Dunbar, Earl of March, led a force of about two thousand to three thousand lightly armored men—mostly from the Highlands and Isles. A third commander, John Randolph, Earl of Moray, probably had a similarly sized division with Lowland cavalry and spearmen. King David's own division comprised cavalry, men-at-arms, and infantry. The English force was probably around ten thousand men, with twelve hundred archers from Lancashire and a large force of infantry.

In the early morning hours, the English force came upon a scouting party under the command of Sir William Douglas and put the Scots to flight toward Sunderland Bridge near Bearpark, where David II's host was camped. The main area of battle took place near the ancient Neville's Cross on a very narrow, but flat, ridge some 350 feet high, bordered on the west by the steep-banked River Browney and on the east side by a sharp, downward slope of 200 feet. The English approached from the south, placing them on this ridge, which was a thousand yards at its widest. This made maneuvering difficult, though the Scots—who advanced onto the north end of the ridge—were eventually funneled into the cramped space between the River Browney and the steep slope. The fighting that ensued highlights both the poor terrain and the organized tactics on the part of the English men-at-arms, who maintained their position against the Scots' advance.

A major setback for the Scots was the abandonment on the field by Stewart and Dunbar, who probably took most of the cavalry with them. On the Scottish side, two thousand to three thousand

men were either slain or captured, the most prominent losses being the Earls of Moray, Strathearn, and Menteith (the last of whom was captured and executed later), and the royal chancellor, constable, marischal, and chamberlain. The Earls of Wigtown, Fife, and Sutherland and William Douglas were captured. But the major victory for the English was the capture of King David himself, who had been taken only after sustaining two arrow wounds to his face and head and after punching out the two front teeth of his captor, John Coupland. David's release after a decade in English captivity was negotiated by the Treaty of Berwick in 1357.

[See also Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Crécy, Battle of; Edward III of England; and Philip VI of France.]


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Amanda Beam

NICOPOLIS, BATTLE OF

The defeat of the crusading army at Nicopolis (Nikopol, Bulgaria) on 25 September 1396 marks the last of the large-scale enterprises (*passagium generale*) when Westerners were in fact actively involved. After the battle of Kosovo Polje (1389) Hungary suffered a series of severe Turkish incursions. King Sigismund of Luxemburg (King of Hungary, r. 1387–1437) made all effort to win Latin Christendom for the ambitious aim of halting the Ottomans in the Balkans. He had formidable forces led by illustrious knights and professional captains joined the crusading banner (including the constable and marshal of France, Philippe d'Artois, and Jean I le Meingre, called Boucicaut; and John the Fearless, Count of Nevers, heir of the Duke



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of Burgundy; as well as Polish, Bohemian, German, and, as scholarship presumes, English knights.

In the summer the crusaders took the castles of Vidin and Rahova (Orjahovo, Bulgaria), then laid

siege to Nicopolis, the main stronghold on the Danube. They were blamed for not marching directly to force a battle but wasting time and supplies at siege while Sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402) assembled an

army and marched from Constantinople. However, the possession of a key fortress, from where the Lower Danube and invasion routes of strategic importance could be controlled, meant a lot for Hungary. They were in fact prepared for siege warfare: the king had ordered them to carry siege engines, cannons, and all necessary equipment, though the largely mounted aristocratic force was not adequate for protracted blockades.

The Ottomans' victory was not due to their numerical advantage. The forces were more or less balanced. The Westerners comprised about three to four thousand heavy men-at-arms, with some hundreds of archers and crossbowmen, an efficient force of substantial size as compared to any of the later medieval crusades. The host numbered between twelve thousand and fifteen thousand, completed by three thousand to five thousand Walachians from the pro-Christian prince, Mircea cel Bătrân ("the Elder"), who shook off Ottoman vassalage. King Sigismund was convinced that "if the French had obeyed my orders, we should have had enough men to fight" (de Thurocz, 203). The king had heavily armored knights in the paid Hungarian baronial *banderia*, but a good proportion of the nine thousand to eleven thousand men were horsemen in lighter armor. The Turks numbered about twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand. The elite infantry, the Janissaries (*yeni çeri*), had not yet played a crucial role, not amounting to more than two thousand. Most of them were bodyguards around the sultan, having no active and offensive role. The centrally trained standing household corps, the mounted *kapi kulu* regiments, did contribute to the victory. Anatolian and Rumelian *sipahis* were arrayed on the flanks and irregular, light-mounted archers, *akinjis* (*akinçi*), in the vanguard, also armed with swords for close combat. The Ottomans were aided by five thousand heavily armored Serbians from the despot Stefan Lazarević.

Bayezid consciously took up a defensive position on a ground crisscrossed by hills placing the center on a crest, watchfully selected in advance by reconnaissance parties, the only point offering a view of the field, forcing the adversary to fight uphill on sharp slopes. They prepared hedges of sharpened stakes like "a densely

sticked palisade" behind the *akinjis*, buttressed by foot archers also armed with swords for close quarters, partly irregular peasant infantry *yayas* and semiregular *azap* volunteers; partly some of the Janissaries.

Sigismund and Mircea, experienced in Ottoman way of warfare, planned to open the battle with a charge of light archers, to harass the front Ottoman lines out of their positions. For the heavy knights the plan was to bide their time and wait in array until the main Turkish body were scattered. There was no unity of command, as Westerners did not defer to Sigismund's authority as an irrevocable commander-in-chief. The formally agreed battle plan was brusquely rejected by the "flowers of chivalry," who, driven by "blind ambition" determined to lead the attack "as honour demanded." It is also possible that the Franco-Burgundians might have obeyed orders but unintentionally got caught in a trap of feigned flight. Positioned in the front of the main body, they thought the *akinji* attack was an overall assault of the main army. When the irregulars took to flight, they set out to pursue them before the main body was deployed but they were stopped at the stakes. Detached from the host, they were exposed to arrows from behind the stakes. They did not fight on foot intentionally, but were unhorsed or forced to dismount, though the few dismounted remainder may have taken up a defensive square formation, which they had been used to in the Hundred Years' War. Yet the charge was not doomed to failure: a number of the knights got through the stakes, dispersed the *azaps* and *yayas* then broke through the Rumelian *sipahis*. Finally, they were surrounded and overrun by the Anatolian *sipahis*, who had moved to the wings at their approach, and the rapidly reorganized Rumelians. These swift maneuvers and redeployment movements earned Bayezid a renown as Thunderbolt (*Yıldırım*). It was late when Sigismund learned of it and there was no way to aid them. Yet the second line, the main body, the rest of the crusaders, and the Walachian left wing pushed back the *akinjis* in a three-pronged attack and broke a hole in the foot archers. When they attacked the redeployed Anatolian *sipahis* from the back, who were still fighting the encircled Western knights, for a moment it seemed

that the course of the battle could be turned. The outflanked knights fought on bravely and inflicted losses on the Turks. Bayezid "was torn by great grief, seeing many of his people killed." It was the Serbs' attack—advancing to the left wing from the reserve behind the hills—that swung the battle in the Ottomans' favor. Bayezid encircled Sigismund's wings. Western sources criticize the back lines of the Hungarians, even Sigismund, for fleeing the field. They were confused by riderless horses rushing backward and after the main body was encircled there was no other way than to retreat. Many Hungarian and Western barons were killed and the most ransom-worthy taken captive (like Nevers and Boucicaut). Hundreds of prisoners were massacred, perhaps so as "not to leave their blood unavenged," the Turks were punishing the French for the killing of Turkish captives at Rahovo. The Ottoman victory was so disastrous that until the battle of Ankara (1402) central Europe was exposed to Turkish expansion. There was no chance to halt the Ottomans in the traditional way, not even with Western support. Hungary had to engage in constant borderline warfare along the lower Danube.

[See also Hungary, *subentry* on Narrative (1300-1526); Jean II le Meingre; Kosovo Polje, Battle of (1389); Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; and Sigismund of Luxemburg.]

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Attila Bárány

NIKEPHOROS II PHOKAS

(c. 912-969), Byzantine emperor (963-969). The emperor Nikephoros II Phokas was a scion of a wealthy Cappadocian family who boasted a number of high-ranking military officers. His grandfather served as a general officer, as did his uncle Leo; his father, Bardas; and his brother Leo, who achieved a significant victory over Saif al-Dawla. The future emperor was appointed commander of the army in 954 and by 957 had significant success against the Arab forces in Syria.

In 960-961 Phokas achieved the long-desired Byzantine goal of wresting back from the Arabs the island of Crete, which they had held since approximately 826. Two previous attempts to retake Crete had failed, but Phokas invaded the island in 960 and after a lengthy siege took Candax in the spring of 961. Leo the Deacon provides a detailed (and positively biased) description of Phokas's tactics, including an initial landing of mounted troops using special ramps, an assault that forced the defenders to retreat behind the walls, construction of a fortified siege camp, and use of *dromones*, the primary Byzantine warships equipped with "Greek fire" (an incendiary projected through tubes in the prows of the *dromones*) to control the sea. The eventual fall of the city resulted from successful deployment of antipersonnel stone-throwers, a battering ram, and primarily a sapping operation.

After significant military successes in Cilicia and Syria in 961-963 and the sudden death of the emperor Romanos II, Phokas was hailed emperor by the army,

defeated his political opponents, and entered the city as emperor on 16 August 963. In the spring of 964 he again took personal command of the army and marched first against Tarsos, which he found well fortified and provisioned, and then attacked instead a number of other cities, most notably Mopsuestia, captured in a sapping operation that included digging a lengthy tunnel. In the following spring he again marched on Tarsos, which finally capitulated in the face of a blockade and famine.

In 964 or 965 Phokas dispatched a fleet on an unsuccessful expedition against Arab forces in Sicily, and in a subsequent year, most likely 966, he personally led an expedition into Bulgaria. He is said to have taken a number of fortified locations along the border but decided in the face of difficult terrain not to further risk his troops. In 966 and 968 he led invasions of Syria during which he took Edessa, Mampetze, and Arka, but he failed to take Tripoli and Antioch. The latter eventually fell to Byzantine besiegers left there by Phokas.

Phokas himself (or an amanuensis) incorporated much of his knowledge of military theory and his expertise in two surviving treatises, the *Praecepta militaria*, which includes a discussion of cataphract tactics, and the *De velitatione*, on guerrilla tactics. An epitaph that describes him as "Conquerer of all but a woman" expresses the irony of his death. Betrayed by his wife, Theophano, who aided his estranged military comrade John Tzimiskes in gaining access to his private rooms, he was murdered in the early hours of 11 December 969.

[See also Greek Fire; John I Tzimiskes; Ships, Byzantine; and Siege Warfare, *subentry* on Byzantine Siege Warfare.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

NIKEPHOROS III BOTANEIATES

(1001/2–c. 1081), a leading general in the Anatolic *theme* (military district) from the middle of the eleventh century and a Byzantine emperor (r. 1078–1081). Botaneiates was one of the instigators of Isaac I Komnenos's coup in 1057. He was subsequently appointed *katepan* (military commander) of Paradounanon, a province south of the lower Danube. He was soundly defeated and captured in 1064 during an invasion of the Oğuz (Uzes), a Turkic-speaking people who had recently displaced the Pechenegs from the Black Sea steppes. Botaneiates was released when the Oğuz were eventually defeated.

In 1074 Botaneiates fought with Caesar John Doukas against the Norman Roussel de Bailleul at the Sangarius River in Bithynia. When John's Norman mercenaries switched sides and joined with Roussel, Botaneiates retreated, allowing John to be captured. Botaneiates resided on his estates in Phrygia between 1074 and 1078 when, since the emperor Michael VII Doukas (r. 1071–1078) was preoccupied with the rebellion of Nikephoros Bryennios, Botaneiates himself revolted against Michael VII and marched toward Constantinople with about three hundred men. Botaneiates formed an alliance with a Seljuk chieftain, Süleyman, the son of Kutlumush, who garrisoned the cities that acclaimed Botaneiates. Michael VII in turn called on alliances with other Seljuk leaders to oppose Botaneiates. Supporters within Constantinople were critical to Botaneiates's success, allowing him to enter the city on 3 April 1078. Botaneiates was crowned on 2 July.

As emperor, Botaneiates was primarily concerned with suppressing rebellions. Already in his late seventies at the time of his rule, Botaneiates was too

old to lead troops in person or to establish a stable dynasty. He patronized the future emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118) as his leading general. He sent Alexios to put down the rebellions of Nikephoros Bryennios and Nikephoros Basilakes. Nikephoros Melissenos led another major revolt in 1081. Finally the rebellion of Alexios Komnenos forced Nikephoros to abdicate on 4 April 1081. He retired to a monastery in Constantinople and died soon thereafter.

[See also Alexios I Komnenos; Bryennios, Nikephoros; and Isaac I Komnenos.]

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Leonora Neville

NINEVEH, BATTLE OF

The decisive battle in Herakleios's four-year expeditionary campaign against the Persians was described in the emperor's victory dispatches to Constantinople, and details were incorporated into the ninth-century account by Theophanes Confessor, probably through a lost "official history." Further information is provided by the Armenian historians Sebeos and T'ovma Arcruni. Freed by an agreement reached with Shahrbaraz, the Persian general who had rebelled against Khosrow II, to invade Persia, Herakleios set out in mid-September 627 from Caucasia with an army of perhaps 25,000 to 50,000 Byzantine troops and 40,000 Kōk Turk allies, taking a route that suggested he was returning to his own lands for the winter. Instead, he turned back toward Mesopotamia. A Persian force, probably considerably smaller, had been sent against him under Roch Vehan (Razates) and arriving by forced march

at his rear, it was confronted by a region denuded of provisions.

Herakleios crossed the Great Zab River on 1 December 627 and moved not south toward Ctesiphon, but northwest toward Nineveh, preventing a Persian army from blocking his route of escape, but also feinting once again to withdraw into his own lands. Roch Vehan moved to prevent this but was awaiting reinforcements before committing to battle. On 12 December Herakleios forced the pace, finding "a plain suited for battle" and arraying his forces in close order to make best use of his infantry in combat. Roch Vehan drew up his forces in three dense formations and advanced. Mist allowed the Byzantines to feign retreat, drawing the Persians on, and then to swing around and advance without heavy losses from Persian archers firing upon them. The Persians suffered heavy losses, but the Armenian sources probably exaggerate the scale of the defeat, since combatants from both sides remained on the battlefield afterward tending to their dead. Although the battle was not militarily decisive, Herakleios's further advance toward Ctesiphon forced Khosrow to flee his palace north of the city, at Dastagard, and he was killed shortly afterward.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900) and Herakleios.]

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Paul Stephenson

NINE WORTHIES

The Nine Worthies are a topos developed in the Late Middle Ages of nine great heroes, historical or legendary, who between them represented the epitome of chivalry and law. They first appear in

a fourteenth-century work by Jean de Longuyon. Three were pagans: Hector, Alexander the Great, and Julius Caesar, respectively, the hero of the Trojan War, the conqueror of the ancient world, and the greatest general and first emperor of Rome. Three were ancient Hebrews: Joshua, David, and Judas Maccabaeus, respectively, the winner of the battle of Jericho, the victor over Goliath and King of Israel, and the Jewish hero who threw off the rule of the Seleucid Empire. And three were Christians: King Arthur, Charlemagne, and Godfrey of Bouillon, respectively, the hero of medieval romances, the hero of medieval epics, and the leader of the First Crusade. All were great fighters; most were (or became) kings. The nine appeared in literary works, on tapestries, and even carved on the facades of public buildings. Although the group included no Muslims, this willingness to find heroic non-Christians admirable is reminiscent of the frequent indication in earlier epics that great Muslim fighters were chivalrous in everything but their religion. Hence, even though it was certainly best from the viewpoint of medieval thinkers for someone to be Christian, these thinkers could also find attributes worth emulating in pagan or infidel warriors. Sometimes the Nine Worthies were joined by nine worthy ladies, but this was fairly unusual, and the ladies chosen for the honor varied.

[See also Charlemagne; Chivalry; Godfrey of Bouillon; and Romances.]

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Constance B. Bouchard

NITHARD

(c. 790–844), Frankish historian. Nithard, a grandson of Charlemagne, was commissioned by Charles II, “The Bald” (King of France, 840–877; Holy Roman Emperor, 875–877), to write an account of the fratricidal war among the sons of Louis I, “The Pious” (King of France and Germany and Holy Roman

Emperor, 814–840). The history, in four books, recounts the background of the conflict in book one. Books two through four trace the conflict from 840 to March 843 thematically, emphasizing shifting alliances of the magnates and diplomatic exchanges of envoys. Nithard also recorded the vernacular texts of the Oaths of Strasbourg (Book 3, Chapter 5), in Old High German and Old French, among the oldest examples of these languages.

Nithard was a secular noble with military experience. Traveling in Charles’s retinue during the years narrated in his history, he was a participant in the military operations he described. His descriptions provide a depth of detail otherwise not found in most other contemporary sources, especially on the logistics of forced marches. Other valuable passages describe fluvial operations on the Seine such as filling with armed men twenty merchant ships that had drifted upstream on the Seine from the estuary to Rouen, and Charles’s measures to prevent Lothair I, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 840–855), from crossing the Seine at Paris in October 841. The latter is especially significant as one of several operations leading up to the construction of a fortified bridge on the Seine at Pont-de-l’Arche (862–869) by Charles.

Nithard is one of the best Carolingian sources for mounted operations; his numerous references to equestrian military activities indicate that horses were more important in warfare than has been argued in recent scholarship. Highly mobile operations, such as reconnaissance and forced marches, were more typical of Carolingian military activities than set battles. As an important example, Nithard’s account of Charles’s forced-march pursuit of Count Gerard II of Roussillon, a Burgundian magnate who became Count of Paris in 837 (siding with Lothair I in the fratricidal war) in March of 841 included dates, times, and places so that reliable information could be derived on the endurance capabilities of Carolingian warhorses. Nithard suggests that horses were instrumental in the success or failure of a number of operations. The operation of filling twenty ships with armed men at Rouen was delayed because of difficulties in getting the horses

across the river. How the horses got across the river (whether by swimming or being transported) was left unspecified. The horses were being pushed to the limit of their endurance on these forced marches and eventually needed rest, forcing Charles to give up the pursuit of Count Gerard. Later, Lothair had to set up camp and pause for two days to rest his worn-out horses; the army of Louis II, "The German" (King of Germany, 843–876), was worn out upon reaching West Francia, above all by the lack of horses.

Nithard's frequent references to arms and horses denoted far more than formulaic insertions; these were the principal markers of status. At the end of the pursuit of Count Gerard, Charles and his army had nothing except the rain-soaked clothes on their backs, their arms, and horses; on two occasions, Charles and Louis II offered all of the movable property in their armies as a peace offering to Lothair except their arms and horses, their indispensable possessions. Nithard's report of the equestrian games preceding the signing of the Oaths of Strasbourg in 842 provides important evidence for the maneuvers the horses were performing, which indicated a high level of training of these warhorses. Descriptions of the brandishing of lances indicate that lances were not held in the couched position at this time.

[See also Charlemagne; Charles the Bald; Horses; Lothair I; Louis I, Emperor; and Louis II of East Francia.]

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C. M. Gillmor

NOBILITY

The definition of "nobility" in the medieval period is not straightforward. It was not used in medieval sources as a collective noun for a specific social group until around 1300, when "nobility" became an essential prerequisite for knighthood. It is also in this period that we find the first evidence for the ennoblement of commoners in France, which opened up an additional avenue into the ranks of the social elite. In England, it seems that the bestowal of heraldic arms signified ennoblement. Before this time, the adjective "noble" could be used to acknowledge an individual whose ancestors had held high office, who had connections with royalty, or who was born free rather than in servitude. Additionally, "noble" could indicate someone's character or behavior. Although both men and women were identified as noble, the focus here in the context of nobility and warfare is exclusively on noble men.

In the early Middle Ages, the task of the aristocracy was to maintain justice and peace in local territories on behalf of tribal leaders and to organize military aid when needed. When central government failed, as in post-Carolingian France, local lords such as Fulk Nerra, Count of Anjou (987–1040), used warfare to consolidate and defend their territories. To be successful, kings and lords retained followers through a web of alliances and by offering lower-ranking men financial rewards for entering their service. These men became collectively known as knights. Military prowess was highly prized and from the twelfth century on formed the basis of aristocratic ideals as lords gradually appropriated the trappings of knighthood.

Largesesse was central to the lord's maintaining his political, social, and military position, as many

knights depended on their superiors for the supply of armor, weapons, and horses. For example, Richard I (r. 1189–1199) could successfully lead the Third Crusade in 1191–1192 because he was able to provide generous payments to his dependents and was successful in securing the resources to maintain his largesse through plundering and capturing enemy supplies.

The ideals of knighthood, celebrated in epics and romances, also consolidated the image of the aristocracy as military men, while it downplayed the pragmatic skills of strategic planning and efficient administration needed to win wars. Because of their social status and claim to military power, the decision to go to war and leadership during campaigns fell to the king and his nobility, although a good leader combined social status with military and administrative insight or surrounded himself with capable advisers. Nevertheless, the real-life exploits of individual noble knights continued to be celebrated: The actions of Richard I on crusade were praised in both Christian and Muslim sources. In 1375 John Barbour remolded the struggle of Robert Bruce, king of Scots (r. 1306–1329), against English occupation into an epic historical narrative. And the military efforts and “chivalric” behavior of Edward the Black Prince (1330–1376), were celebrated by his herald.

In the course of the thirteenth century as the number of knights decreased because of rising costs of equipment, nobility of birth became a prerequisite for entering the increasingly exclusive order of knighthood. Many men of noble birth, being satisfied with the right to bear heraldic arms signifying their elite status, declined to undergo the elaborate and costly entry ceremony. In addition, it became more common for nobles to pay off their military obligations to the king by hiring professional soldiers. During the fourteenth century the nobility increasingly provided a previously agreed number of soldiers contracted under specific terms. Those of high rank who did go to war were often required to fund themselves and their troops, although the English government had started paying its troops by 1350. Unsurprisingly, ransoming nobles and looting were common ways of maintaining financial resources during military campaigns and of providing the

means to uphold contractual arrangements such as compensation for the loss of horses (*restauratio equorum*). Although a noble was more likely to survive a war than his lower-ranking followers, being ransomed could mean the end to his fortune.

By 1500 “nobility” had come to refer to an elite group entitled to bear heraldic arms or holding hereditary titles and landed wealth. Attributes associated with knighthood, such as armor and arms, had come to signify status and lineage rather than actual profession. Similarly, nobility of character now implied gentility, civility, rationality, and judgment rather than personal prowess in battle, largesse, and other qualities associated with earlier chivalric behavior.

[See also Chivalry; Edward the Black Prince; Fulk Nerra; Knighthood and Knights; Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood; Prisoners and Ransoms; *Restauratio Equorum*, *Restor*; Richard I of England and Anjou; and Robert I (the Bruce) of Scotland.]

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Danielle Westerhof

NOCERA, BATTLE OF

The battle of Nocera or Scafati was fought on 25 July 1132 between the Count of Alife, Ranulf, and King Roger II of Sicily, who was defeated.

In 1132 Count Ranulf, in disagreement with the king of Sicily, concluded an alliance with the Prince of Capua, Robert II. The rebels besieged the city of Benevento (until then loyal to King Roger) and its people surrendered. Roger immediately directed his army against Nocera, his rival's second most important city. The troops advanced quickly through the mountains, but the rebels, led by Ranulf, moved with equal speed to face the enemy at Nocera. To counter their advance, Roger destroyed the only bridge crossing the River Sarno (near Scafati), but the rebels were able to reconstruct a provisional bridge and reached Nocera on Sunday, 25 July 1132.

When the rebels arrived, Roger raised siege, while Ranulf dispatched 250 knights against him to divert some of the royal troops. The rebel army was divided in two wings: Robert of Capua's on the left and Ranulf's on the right. Robert divided his wing into three elements, one behind another, as follows: cavalry, infantry, and a final unit of knights. Ranulf kept his troops in a line without divisions. King Roger arranged his army in eight divisions, one behind the other, lined up opposite Robert's army. One source describes Roger's army as having three thousand horsemen and forty thousand infantry, but this figure is surely exaggerated.

After crossing the river, the rebel army found itself in a risky position because their only possible retreat was across the provisional bridge. Roger attacked the rebels, defeating the first and second lines headed by Robert. The infantry of Capua fled in disorder over the bridge, which collapsed, claiming about a thousand victims. The third line under Robert's command, composed of cavalry, kept its position and attempted a counteroffensive. To destroy this resistance, Roger decided to send in his second division of cavalry, which began to push back the remaining Capuan knights across the bridge.

At this point, Ranulf got into the fray with five hundred knights and swept toward Roger's army, crushing it on one side. Before Roger could send reinforcements, Ranulf commanded his remaining troops to trap the royal troops in a pincer. Roger himself joined the battle to try to avert disaster, but his knights fled in a rout.

Many infantrymen were killed and seven hundred knights and twenty-four counts loyal to the king were captured. The royal camp was plundered and the very precious bull of Antipope Anacletus II, which had granted the title of king to Roger, was stolen. Accompanied by a small band of knights, the king was able to avoid capture and took refuge in Salerno. The battle of Nocera was the first great defeat of Roger II (the second occurred in Rignano in 1137), but lacking any further help, the rebels shortly lost what they had gained.

[See also Italy, *subentry on Narrative (1000-1300)* and Roger II.]

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Federico Canaccini

NONCOMBATANTS IN ARMIES

By definition, noncombatants were those who did not fight, but in fact anyone within an army could be called on to fight in cases of emergency. Even a priest such as Oliver of Paderborn, while on the Fifth Crusade, devised a siege tower that stood on two ships and was used to attack the city of Damietta from the water. Women in the army of the same crusade came under attack during a battle; they had been bringing water to the infantry, but had no protection from attack.

Military bands formed for short, fast-moving campaigns would probably contain no noncombatants. At the other end of the scale, crusading armies contained more noncombatants than the majority of armies, because the crusade was also a pilgrimage, and priests, women, children, and the elderly

traveled with the crusading host in order to visit the holy places. All of these played a support role, even if they were physically unable or forbidden to bear arms. Priests could lead religious devotion and bless the army as it set out to fight; women and children could throw missiles at the enemy, carry water to the fighters, and help to build or destroy siege defenses. 'Imad al-Din, Saladin's secretary and biographer, recorded that there were many elderly women among the army of the Third Crusade who stirred the crusaders up to fight for the sake of God and the holy sepulchre. On a less spiritual level, Ambroise d'Évreux described the old women in the camp as useful in picking fleas off the combatants.

Nicholas Wright has drawn attention to the involvement in armies, willing or unwilling, of some children during the Hundred Years' War in France. In around 1358, one Thenein Flamendreau, aged nine or ten, was captured by an English squire, Jack Spore, in a raid on his home village. Instead of killing or ransoming his prisoner, Spore made use of him, mounting him on a horse and giving him his lance and basinet to carry. Thenein traveled with the military companies in Burgundy, Brittany, Spain, and France for ten years before returning to his home village, which he no longer recognized.

Women were present in most armies as the partners of warriors, but chroniclers seldom mentioned them, except generally as "loose women." Presumably some had no permanent attachments and associated with any suitable warrior who would support them, but others were in more-or-less permanent relationships. Very little evidence survives for these women, but one was referred to in passing by the chronicler Jean Froissart, in his account of the murder of Aimery of Pavia, a Lombard knight who had been involved in the Anglo-French war and had incurred the wrath of Geoffrey de Charny and his friends. They spared Aimery's girlfriend (*amie*), an Englishwoman named Margaret. One of the group asked to be given custody of Margaret, who apparently went away with him willingly.

A military commander would prefer to limit women's presence in an army to a minimum, because their presence could lead to rivalry and arguments among the men. In his ordinance of 1473, Charles the

Bold of Burgundy forbade his troops to bring their own women to his army; instead, there were to be no more than thirty "common women" in each company, to be shared equally among the men. Charles was obviously unaware of the danger of venereal disease spreading among his troops, although the sexual transmission of certain diseases was known by the late fifteenth century.

Various other persons whose primary purpose was not fighting would travel with a large army on a long expedition. Merchants and tradespeople would assist with supplying the army; craftspeople such as smiths and carpenters would manufacture military equipment and everyday items. During the Third Crusade, the crusaders' siege camp outside Acre included a bakery and a tradesman selling beans and presumably other foodstuffs. An army that brought its own food "on the hoof"—pigs, sheep, or poultry—would also bring the people to care for these animals. Engineers with the skill to construct siege machinery would not necessarily be warriors themselves but could be well-educated priests, such as Oliver of Paderborn. Commentators occasionally mentioned that surgeons were present in medieval armies. All of these people could fight in an emergency, but on a day-to-day basis their function was to support, supply, and equip the army rather than to contribute to the fighting.

[See also Children; Clergy, Roles in Warfare of; Engineers and Architects; Immunity from War; Logistics and Transportation; and Women as Combatants.]

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Helen Nicholson

NORMAN CONQUESTS, NORMAN EXPANSION

The Normans took their name from the region of Normandy in northern France. Descended from

Viking settlers (Norsemen) who established Normandy under Rollo in around 911, the Normans became a distinct group of people (*gens Normanorum*) with common identity defined largely by military and political characteristics. The Normans were seen by their contemporaries as "a race inured to war" (William of Malmesbury). "Delighting in the pleasure of horses, and of all the weapons and garb of war" (Geoffrey Malaterra), the Normans were so fierce that their "bold roughness had proved as deadly to [their] softer neighbors as the bitter north wind to flowers" (Orderic Vitalis). Cavalry warfare and the use of castles were the hallmarks of Norman military activity, but they also used archers to good effect at the battle of Hastings (14 October 1066). (All three elements appear in the Bayeux Tapestry, for example.) But Norman military methods also changed: they fought dismounted at the battle of Tinchebrai (28 September 1106) under Henry I of England and at the battle of Lincoln (2 February 1141) under King Stephen.

Norman military conquest and expansion was characterized by large-scale construction of castles, which served as power bases for Norman rulers to control the native populations of the areas of Europe and the Near East that they conquered. The Normans began to replace wooden castles in Normandy under the rule of Duke Richard I (942–996), and built new fortresses such as the Tower of London (c. 1077) in England and Aluntium (1060–1061) in Sicily. As wood was replaced with stone, ringwalls, donjons, gatehouses, and towers increased in number. The concentration of castle building was higher in areas where Norman control was contested, such as in the Welsh Marches. Many of these castles initially reflected the Norman styles of architecture brought over by the conquerors, but over time local influences were brought to bear on castle design. Despite their impressive size, however, Norman castles were vulnerable to undermining and siege. In 1215 King John undermined the Norman keep at Rochester in England by tunneling beneath the southeast tower and lighting a fire using "fifty of the fattest pigs of the sort least good for eating" to burn out the wooden props supporting its roof.

The Conquest of England, Ireland, and Wales.

In October 1066, William, Duke of Normandy (c. 1027–1087), defeated Harold II, the last Anglo-Saxon king of England, at Hastings. William of Malmesbury, an English Benedictine monk writing in the early 1140s, described the military preparations of both sides in the conflict. He claimed that the Normans were orderly and efficient, the Anglo-Saxons drunk and disorganized. The Anglo-Saxons fought on foot behind a shield wall armed with spears and axes, while the Norman forces used archers and crossbowmen in the front ranks supported by heavy infantry and cavalrymen in the rear.

In the wake of the battle of Hastings, the Normans consolidated power by besieging the town of Exeter in 1068 and laying waste to the North of England in the winter of 1069/1070 (the Harrowing of the North), adopting a scorched-earth policy in retaliation for English rebellion. The Normans also expanded into north Wales, which was partially conquered by Robert of Rhuddlan between 1075 and 1093. With the death of William the Conqueror in 1087, his lands were split between his sons. It was not until the battle of Tinchebrai in 1106 that Henry I of England defeated his brother Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy, and kingdom and duchy were again united under one ruler.

During the civil war of King Stephen's reign (1135–1154), it was from Normandy that his rivals the Empress Matilda and her son Henry (later Henry II of England) drew their military support. Throughout the reign of Henry II, the Anglo-Normans partially conquered Ireland (1169). Henry also tried to expand his control into Wales (1165). According to the thirteenth-century Welsh chronicle *Brut y Tywysogyon* (Chronicle of the Princes), Henry, "oppressed by a mighty tempest of wind and exceeding great torrents of Wales," had to abandon his campaign. His successor, Richard I (r. 1189–1199), when not absent on crusade, spent most of his reign fighting on the Norman border against Phillip of France. The uncertain accession of King John in 1199, whose claim was weaker than that of his nephew Arthur, led to discontent among his French barons, and in 1202 they invaded Normandy. The provision of a navy for

the resulting cross-Channel war led to innovations in ship design, but the conflict was expensive, and this, coupled with John's military ineffectiveness at Château-Gaillard (1203), led to the loss of Normandy in 1204 and essentially ended the link between England and Normandy.

Southern Italy and Sicily. The Normans first fought in Italy as mercenaries against the Byzantines in 1017, but after victory over the Byzantines at the battle of Monte Maggiore under the leadership of Robert Guiscard, the "terror of the world," they began in 1041 to conquer lands for their own use. One of the last areas of southern Italy to fall was the duchy of Naples. In 1077 Naples was besieged and subjected to a naval blockade, but it was not until the last duke died at the battle of Rignano (1137) that the Normans gained power.

In May 1061 the Normans began the invasion of Sicily, another military enterprise that was to take several years. At the siege of Messina (1061), the Norman brothers Robert Guiscard and Roger Bosso attacked under cover of darkness, surprising their Saracen enemies. Their success gave them control of the Strait of Messina. Over the following thirty years, most sieges and battles for Sicily were indecisive. In 1064 Guiscard was driven back from the siege of the wealthy city of Palermo, reportedly by a plague of tarantulas, but the city was conquered in 1072. In May 1085 the brothers undertook their most organized military attack on Sicily, attacking Syracuse by sea and land. The emir was defeated in a battle in the harbor of Syracuse, and the city surrendered to its besiegers in the following year. In February 1091 Noto fell after a short campaign, and the island was finally conquered. In 1130 the Norman leader Roger II (1095–1154) was crowned king of Sicily, having consolidated all the Norman conquests of southern Italy and Sicily into one kingdom.

Antioch. Norman conquests also spread into the Latin East during the First Crusade. Two contingents were led by the Normans Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy (c. 1051–1134), and Bohemond of Taranto (1058–1111), Robert Guiscard's son and Prince of Taranto from 1088. According to the Byzantine princess Anna Komnene, who met Bohemond in 1097,

"He was so made in mind and body that both courage and passion reared their crests within him and both inclined to war." Bohemond led the crusaders from Constantinople to Antioch, which he began to besiege in October 1097. The besiegers suffered from starvation and disease, but Antioch finally fell to Bohemond on 2 June 1098. Soon thereafter Antioch was besieged by the Atabeg of Mosul, but under Bohemond's command he was repulsed in June 1098. Bohemond's nephew Tancred took the towns of Tarsus, Mamistra, and Adana from the Byzantines. After Tancred's death in 1112, Roger of Salerno (another Norman) consolidated power in Antioch, reaching the limits of Norman expansion, but the battle of the Field of Blood (1119) led to Roger's death and the destruction of his army. From 1119 to 1123 Baldwin II of Jerusalem ensured the principality's survival by restoring the castles beyond the Orontes River, and for the rest of its life Antioch was forced to rely periodically on outside aid for its own survival.

[See also Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Bohemond I; Castles; Château-Gaillard, Siege of; Crusades, subentry on Narrative (1095–1183); Hastings, Battle of; Henry II of England; John, King of England; Lincoln, Battle of; London, Tower of; Palermo, Sieges of; Richard I of England and Anjou; Robert Guiscard; Robert II Curthose of Normandy; Rochester, Siege of (1215); Roger II; Stephen of England; Syracuse, Siege of; Tancred; Tinchebrai, Battle of; Vikings; and William I of England.]

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Kathryn Hurlock

NORSEMEN

See Vikings.

NORTHALLERTON, BATTLE OF

In late summer of 1138, the civil war between King Stephen (r. 1135–1154) and his cousin Matilda saw King David of Scotland lead another invasion into England both to aid his kinswoman and to secure titles and liberties previously lost to the Anglo-Norman kings. The circumstances could have hardly been better: Stephen was committed in the south, and the northern barons were disunited.

The venerable Archbishop of York, Thurstan, stepped into the leadership void. Stressing the “barbarity” of the invading Scots, he painted the need for defense as nearly a holy war. Oaths of mutual aid were sworn and troops mustered; parish priests were sent to the front, bringing parishioners as well as holy emblems; Stephen apparently detached a part of the *familia regis* under Bernard de Balliol to bolster the effort. Actual numbers are elusive, but the exaggerated claims of chroniclers emphasize that the hodge podge of knights, levies, and auxiliaries assembled under Thurstan’s influence were vastly outnumbered.

Advised by scouts, the northern magnates moved up the Great North Road to block David’s advance. Thurstan was too old to join the expedition, so overall command of the defenders remains unknown. The Anglo-Norman knights dismounted and dispersed themselves among the front ranks, alongside the archers and in front of the shire levies, explicitly so their expertise would leaven the whole force’s resolve and performance. The famed standard that gave its name to the battle stood on high ground to the rear. A ship’s mast was mounted on a wagon and from it floated the banners of three regional saints. Crowning it was a silver pyx containing the host.

On the Scottish side, David prepared smaller units, ready to exploit the first advantage gained. He also kept a force of highlanders as a reserve. This tactical wisdom was undone, however, by the insistence of the Galwegians that they be given their traditional

honor of leading the attack. “Naked” and howling, they repeatedly charged but to no avail, as archers and then the dismounted knights took a terrible toll. At some point, King David’s son Prince Henry led a mounted charge that penetrated the defenders’ ranks, but, once through the formation, the Scottish cavalry went to capture the dismounted knights’ horses. The English re-formed and blocked the Scottish foot soldiers from exploiting the moment.

The final failure of the attacking infantry broke the Scottish morale, and a rout soon ensued. Although the defeat checked David’s ambitions, he gained much of what he sought in the negotiations that ensued.

[See also David I; *Familia Regis*; and Stephen of England.]

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Steven Isaac

NORTHAMPTON, BATTLE OF

See Roses, Wars of the.

NOTITIA DIGNITATUM

Notitia Dignitatum was a list of all military and civil officials of the eastern and western parts of the Roman Empire, along with their *officia* or departments. It was probably official and probably drawn up to set out the order of precedence in the imperial hierarchy. In fact, it appears to set out the offices and posts actually held rather than any honorary system of rank. The *Notitia* was meant to be revised at intervals by the chief notary (*primicerius notariorum*) in each part of the empire. Since changes were never

made consequentially and regularly, there are considerable contradictions in the information, as revisions seem to have been partial and inconsistent. Scholars disagree on the date of the extant version and its subsections. One theory argues that the military lists for the eastern part of the empire can be dated to the period 408–450, those for the western to the years 393–423. Another theory sees three layers, datable to c. 385–395, c. 400–408, and 425–429. The general consensus is that the eastern sections were kept up to date until about 395, while the western sections were regularly updated until c. 408.

The military information is presented under two listings, first with the units listed under their different divisional commanders (*magistri militum*, or masters of soldiers), and then listed by the regions in which they were based. This makes it possible to analyze at least partially how units survived the various wars of the late fourth and early fifth centuries or were replaced after them. The civilian apparatus of the empire is likewise presented so as to permit a partial reconstruction of provincial administration and

the processes of change that affected it across this period, including the state fiscal apparatus. Whatever its flaws and problems, the *Notitia* is thus a vital source for the history of late Roman civil and military administration.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Sources (500–900) and Italy, *subentry on* Sources (476–1000).]

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John Haldon



OBLIGATION, MILITARY

According to the medieval concept of military obligation, an individual owed specific kinds of military service to a socially superior person either because of the individual's status or because he possessed a specific piece of land, called a "fief," that had been granted as a form of economic compensation for military service. The latter situation was part of what is termed a "feudal relationship," although such relationships also involved political and social components, and the concept of feudalism is a subject of lively scholarly debate.

When considering medieval military obligations, it is important to think about them in practical military terms. Medieval rulers and commanders were pragmatic men with limited available economic resources. When facing military threats, problems, or opportunities, they wanted to spend these limited resources as efficiently as possible to support the types and numbers of fighting men needed to address the particular military situation at hand. If their societies maintained military customs that did not provide the needed manpower, they would strive to modify the customs or to develop new customs that might address their problems. In order to understand the military obligations that existed in a particular medieval society, one must consider the nature of the military threats, the society's reasons

for waging war, and the resources available to the ruler.

In many different regions of early medieval western Europe, political units were small tribal kingdoms whose rulers engaged in frequent raids and expeditions to gain both resources and also heroic honor and reputation at the expense of their neighbors. These rulers staffed their armies based on the idea that all freemen owed some form of service. For purposes of offensive raids against other, neighboring polities, a ruler could muster his own personal bodyguard: a select war band. In early medieval Welsh society, for example, this war band—called a *teulu*—was composed of young warriors who were unmarried and who were presumed always to be with the ruler for his personal protection. The young warriors were eager to fight in order to establish their own heroic reputations and to acquire wealth, usually granted by the ruler from the loot gained during raids. Because of their social status as warriors economically supported by their ruler, they expected to accompany the ruler on military raids and expeditions. Failing to do this would be an indication of cowardice.

To deal with situations requiring a larger force—for example, to defend a kingdom from attack or to mount a major extended campaign—medieval rulers could call upon all freemen. Thus traditional Welsh law included a provision for a larger force

based on service by all able-bodied freemen, an obligation called *llu* or *lluadd*. Not all freemen in a region would necessarily be summoned by a ruler to serve in his army, but military service of this type was a prized indication of free status.

The same basic pattern seems to have existed in other regions of western Europe during this period. In Ireland the war band of a ruler was called the *fianna*, whereas the larger host that included warriors who spent much of their time away from the king was called the *slogad*. Richard Abels has analyzed the military obligation in Anglo-Saxon England before 1066, which was termed *fyrð* service. Originally referring to the duty of the subordinate warriors of a king to accompany him on his journeys, the term later became specialized, referring to military expeditions. The military threat posed to multiple English kingdoms by the Viking raids and campaigns in the ninth and tenth centuries led to modifications to this military obligation.

As more estates were, by the terms of written documents, given to monasteries and other church bodies to hold permanently, English rulers developed the custom that elite warriors who had held such lands were required to provide military service by joining the king's army, by maintaining and garrisoning royal fortresses, and by repairing bridges. Because this military obligation seems to have been connected to a warrior's possession of lands worth a certain amount, rather than simply connected to his social rank and his personal relationship with his king, the circumstances associated with this type of service have a broad similarity to those associated with feudal military service, as described below. The concept that tenure of a certain amount of land included the obligation to provide an armed foot soldier to a royal army was taken to its logical conclusion in both Carolingian France and pre-1066 England. In France, Charlemagne and his successors decreed that a group of freemen whose holdings amounted to four mansi were required to cooperate, providing one such warrior. In England a similar system required groups of free tenants with landholdings rated at five hides to support a foot soldier.

Feudal Knight's Fief. Perhaps the best-known form of military obligation that existed during the Middle Ages was connected to a fief in a feudal relationship. In such a relationship an aristocrat who possessed a large amount of land gave a specific piece of property, called a "fief," to a subordinate called a "vassal." The fief contained enough resources to support the vassal and his military equipment as a knight—a mounted warrior with some form of armor including a helmet and a sword and other weapons. Use of the fief to compensate the vassal was especially effective when the lord had plenty of land but insufficient money to pay soldiers, and when he also anticipated a constant or recurring military threat. In classic definitions of feudalism, a twelfth-century knight who held one knight's fief was expected to provide his feudal lord with forty days of military service as a knight in the lord's army either by performing this service personally or by finding a substitute to do so. Since the 1980s many medieval scholars have debated whether feudalism existed and what the term "feudalism" actually means. Although no evidence exists that any medieval rulers used the specific term "feudalism" or one like it, there is abundant evidence that they did speak of fiefs. The famous English document called the Magna Carta, signed by King John in 1215, is but one example. And fiefs were such an ingrained part of military thinking that the annual payment of a large sum of money by a ruler to a noble to arrange for military service by the noble was described as a "money fief."

The classic definition of feudalism as involving a vassal owing the service of one knight in his feudal lord's army for forty days is too simplistic, however. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the armor, horse, and other equipment of a knight became heavier and more expensive. Armies included other types of warriors besides knights, and knights were not necessarily the type of soldier best able to deal with some sorts of military problems. In many areas fiefs were created to support more lightly armed mounted warriors, who were described by a variety of terms, including "sergeants," *servientes*, *vavassors*, and "mounted men." These men were less expensive to support, and their fiefs were often

described as being worth half a knight's fief. But these men were well suited to tasks in which rapid mobility was needed, such as patrolling the Anglo-Welsh borderlands during periods when raids were reported. In twelfth-century Germany a variant pattern developed for providing soldiers. Men who were not free—*ministeriales* who did not hold fiefs—were required to serve their lords as mounted soldiers. Eventually many of the families of such men rose in social rank to become aristocrats.

Castle-guard. Another military situation in which the fief and its associated military service requirement occurred was the castle. Castles were built to dominate, control, and protect their districts, but a castle needed a garrison of troops to fulfill these functions. If a noble had extensive lands near his castle, he could distribute fiefs to a number of warriors, who would then owe him forty days of military service guarding this castle—service that was termed “castle-guard” or “castle-ward.” The district was then termed a “castlery,” effectively organized to provide protection to the castle when needed. If a noble did not have enough lands available as potential fiefs close to his castle but did possess such lands farther away, he might establish what can be termed a “dispersed castlery,” with the fiefs providing castle-guards located perhaps a day's ride from his castle.

The owner of a castle could always resort to paid mercenary soldiers to staff the castle if feudal arrangements were not sufficient. Thus the castle tenant could pay his regular feudal castle-guard soldiers if he required their service beyond the forty days that they owed in return for their fiefs. He could likewise pay additional troops to staff his castle if the feudal castle-guard was insufficient to repel a major threat. And if the castle tenant had no lands available to bestow as fiefs upon potential providers of castle-guard service, he could simply hire as many soldiers as the military situation called for.

Because of the persistent pattern of raids and counterraids that existed along the Welsh marches, this region had one of the densest concentrations of castles in the British Isles. The garrisoning arrangements for these castles reveal a diversity of patterns.

Some castles had small permanent garrisons commanded by one feudal knight that could be supplemented by a group of approximately a dozen feudal tenants based on nearby fiefs. Other castles had feudal garrisons drawn from fiefs scattered over an entire English county. Still others relied on mercenary garrisons—either because the castles were newly built or because the military threat that led to their construction was so short-lived that a more permanent system was not necessary.

Another indication of the military pragmatism that underpinned feudal military arrangements was the existence of a number of specialized services associated with some fiefs. Many of these services are recorded in the thirteenth-century English government documents known as the “Hundred Rolls.” The tenants of several manors had to provide interpreters for negotiations between the English and the Welsh, or had to escort negotiators from one side to meet those from the other. During time of war other feudal tenants were required to provide a blacksmith at a castle or to run a lime-burning furnace for the repair of a castle's walls.

Castles were not the only significant type of medieval fortification requiring garrisons. As towns grew and built walls for their protection, their citizens developed systems to garrison those walls. In many French towns, for example, residents were required to provide *guet*—a watch on the walls at night—and *garde*—sentries at the gates during the day.

Military obligations endured only as long as the military threats that had led to their creation. Because a feudal tenant possessed a valuable economic asset in return for providing a specified type of service to his lord when this service was militarily required, if the need for his service no longer existed, then the feudal lord had a strong motive to convert the unused military service into a financial payment instead. The term for such a financial payment from a feudal tenant as a substitute for military service is “scutage” or “shield money.” A king who was planning a campaign that would likely last longer than forty days could find it convenient to collect scutage from all his feudal tenants and then use this money to hire mercenaries. Likewise, because of the

common view that feudal military service was owed to a ruler within his own kingdom, a ruler might collect scutage from his feudal tenants to pay for mercenaries to fight a war abroad.

Because feudal fiefs were generally manors that could be divided and subdivided among heirs, medieval records sometimes list fractional fiefs, which could be described as half, a quarter, or even some smaller fraction of a knight's fief. Such a fractional fief might be listed as owing the service of a knight for four or six days. Clearly such fragmented obligations were neither militarily useful nor convertible to financial payments. A desire to end any further fragmentation of fiefs led King Edward I in 1290 to issue the so-called *Quia Emptores*, a statute that forbade any more subinfeudation—that is, the division of an existing fief, with a portion of it granted as a fief to be held or sublet by a subordinate tenant. Instead, fiefs were now to be sold to new tenants.

Although war continued to be frequent during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, kingdoms were becoming more unified and financially efficient. Therefore, as the nature of wars and the financial resources available to rulers changed, military obligation also changed. Fighting during this period became increasingly the responsibility of mercenaries and less dependent on feudal tenants.

[See also *Recruitment and Watch and Ward*.]

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Frederick C. Suppe

OBRONA POTOCZNA

Obrona potoczna (permanent defense) was a long-lasting defense of the southeastern area of the Kingdom of Poland by mercenary troops. The mercenary troops were located in castles and towns in Red Ruthenia and Podolia. The permanent defense was created to warn the local people about forthcoming attacks and to hold back the Tartars and Moldavians, whose armies invaded the Ruthenian lands of the Polish kingdom in 1430s.

The permanent defense was organized in 1479 in Ruthenia and Podolia. Twelve hundred infantrymen and a thousand horsemen were recruited at that time. In the following years the number of soldiers ranged from 1,000 to 2,700 horsemen and a few hundred infantrymen. The first commander of the permanent defense was Jan Polak Karnkowski. At the turn of the 1480s the defense was under the command of Jan I Olbracht (John I Albert), King of Poland (r. 1492–1501), son of Casimir Jagiellonczyk. The permanent defense was supported financially by the royal treasury, and only occasionally did the nobility vote the taxes to maintain it. When there were difficulties with acquiring the financial support there was no army on the border, or only a small number of soldiers controlled the situation. The permanent defense became a sort of military school where soldiers acquired necessary war experience. Its soldiers were originally armed like typical heavy cavalry, but over time they began to use lighter equipment, which made it easier to fight the Tartars and Moldavians. The permanent defense soldiers took part in offensive attacks, and they were always the most valuable part of the Polish army.

[See also Cavalry; Mercenaries; and Slavic Lands, subentry on Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

OISSEL, SIEGES OF

See Oscelle, Sieges of.

OLAF I TRYGGVASON

King of Norway, (c. 968–1000; r. 995–1000). Olaf Trygvason was an adventurer who was recognized by his family as the long lost son of King Tryggvi Olafsson of Norway. Personal charm and military ability brought him command of King Vladimir's mercenaries at Hólmgarð (Novgorod, Russia). Olaf led Viking expeditions against Vladimir's enemies, and Olaf's military success and generosity rapidly increased his personal following. In c. 985, Olaf and his *lið* (a Viking force consisting of the crews of one or more ships) undertook a Viking expedition through the Baltic Sea to the British Isles. Because of his substantial following, he became one of the leaders of a Scandinavian army that raided the east coast of England and won the battle of Maldon in 991.

Olaf's invasion of Norway in 995 with a small *lið* was opportunistic. The people were in revolt against their ruler and readily accepted Olaf as king. He ruled as a Christian monarch and forced his subjects to submit both to him and to Christianity, using a mixture of diplomacy, low cunning, and military force. He was ruthless in exterminating opposition.

Having built or captured some large warships, Olaf led an expedition into the Baltic in 1000. He easily gathered a substantial fleet because of his authority as king, his military reputation, and his known

generosity to his followers. Initially successful, he established an alliance with King Boleslav I on the southern Baltic coast. However, he was outmaneuvered by a combination of Danes, Swedes, and exiled Norwegians and forced into a battle off Svold with only part of his fleet. Although Olaf's disciplined leadership and the technical superiority of his large ships almost compensated for numerical inferiority, he was defeated and killed. From mercenary commander to Norwegian king, Olaf epitomizes a Viking chieftain on a heroic scale, living for and by campaigning and dying in battle at the age of about thirty-two.

[See also Maldon, Battle of; Svold, Battle of; and Vikings.]

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Ian Howard

OLAF II HARALDSSON

(c. 995–1030), King of Norway (1016–1030), later known as Saint Olaf. Olaf Haraldsson was called "the Saint" soon after his death in the battle of earning himself the title of "rex perpetuum Norvegiae," and was the most influential king of medieval Norway.

Olaf was born around 995, after the death of his father, Harald Grenski, the ruler over the area around the Oslo Fjord. He grew up in Oppland, then entered upon a career as a Viking gangleader, plundering in England, France, Frisia, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, and received baptism in Rouen in Normandy. In 1015 he returned to Norway during the absence of the de facto ruler of West Norway, Erik Hakonarson of Hlaðir, and defeated Erík's brother Svein Hakonarson at the battle of Nesjar in 1016. After having proclaimed himself king of all Norway, he combined the unification of Norway with a

re-Christianization of Norway, as the Hakonarsons had favored heathen polytheism over the Christianity introduced by Olaf I Tryggvason twenty years earlier. Olaf II's methods of Christianization were no less drastic than those of Olaf I so he became increasingly unpopular. His major success in foreign politics was his marriage with Princess Astrid, daughter of the Swedish king Olaf I, former ally of Cnut the Great and thus the Jarls of Hlaðir. Cnut's policy of bribery and promises to Norwegian aristocrats led to success in 1028–1029, when Olaf II had to flee his country during an insurrection of most of the aristocracy combined with a naval attack on Norway by Cnut. Together with his son Magnus I Olafsson Olaf II sheltered at the court of his brother in law, Jaroslav I, in Novgorod (Russia).

Having received the news of the death of Erik Hakonarson of Hlaðir, who ruled Norway for Cnut, he returned with an army in summer 1030, but was defeated by an army of chieftains and farmers at the battle of Stiklestad, in which he was killed. However, as Cnut failed to honor many of his promises and the rule of his son Svein in Norway proved to be extremely unpopular, the rule of Olaf II soon became glorified in retrospect, and his death was seen as that of a martyr; the three wounds he had received were likened to the wounds of Christ, and within a year the popular veneration of Olaf as a saint had sprung up. His body was taken to St. Clement's in Trondheim the summer after his death, and on the spot of his original grave the Cathedral of Trondheim was erected a generation later by Olaf Kyrre.

[See also Cnut; Magnus I Olafsson; Olaf I Tryggvason; and Stiklestad, Battle of.]

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Rudolf Simek

ORDERS, MILITARY

[This entry contains three subentries, on Iberian military orders, on Levantine military orders, and on Northern military orders.]

Iberian Orders

The Spanish *reconquista* was a four-century crusade to conquer and exploit various Muslim populations in Spain. Much of the success of this venture was because of the Spanish military orders. The most important of these organizations—the Castilian orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alacantara, and the Aragonese order of Montesa—were founded in imitation of the Knights Templar and the Knights Hospitaller. With the Almohad invasion of Andalusia in 1147, the uneasy truce between Christians and Moors in Iberia was broken, and the Christian kingdoms of Aragon, Castile, Galicia, León, Navarre, and Portugal were forced to put aside their national differences to defend themselves against the new Almohad threat. With the assistance of the Knights Templar, the Christian kingdoms were able to check the Almohad advances. The Templars provided a crucial model for local military confraternities in the Iberian peninsula. These communities attracted significant royal and noble support as the Templar presence in Spain gradually diminished.

The Order of Santiago. Initially a small military confraternity, the Order of Santiago was established to protect pilgrims traveling to Santiago de Compostela, one of the most important pilgrimage sites in western Europe. In the period between 1164 and 1170, thirteen knights—the number was intentionally selected to commemorate Christ and his apostles—gathered together and promised to protect a community of Augustinian canons as well as the steady streams of pilgrims making their way to Santiago de Compostela. In 1171, an agreement between the knights and canons was approved by a papal legate (who later became Pope Celestine III [r. 1191–1198]); two years later, the Master of the Knights, Pedro Fernando de Fuentes, traveled to Rome where Pope Alexander III (r. 1061–1073) issued a bull recognizing the order in July 1175.

The Order of Santiago received significant support from Fernando II of León (r. 1157–1188) and his son, Alfonso IX (r. 1188–1230). The father granted them their first headquarters, Cáceres, in 1171; while his offspring bestowed on them the castle of Uclés in 1174. Here they established their headquarters in 1171 after Cáceres fell to the Almohad caliph Abu Ya'qub Yusuf (r. 1163–1184). Not exempt from the feuding among Christian kingdoms, the order allied itself in 1176 with Alfonso VIII of Castile (r. 1158–1214) against Sancho VII of Navarre (r. 1194–1234), and this allowed the Muslims to attack and severely damage the order's stronghold at Uclés. After the death of their founding master, de Fuentes, in 1184, feuding kings fomented a schism within the order. Its knights in Castile chose a master preferred by Alfonso, while those in León supported the candidate put forward by Fernando. A second schism occurred after their grand master and many of the order's knights were killed in the Almohades' crushing victory at Alarcos in 1195. The stability of the order was shaken in the succeeding era of war between Castile and León. Again, two masters were elected, and the schism was not resolved until 1203.

Despite their vow to fight only against the infidels, the order throughout the thirteenth century fought against both Muslims and fellow Christians. During this troubled period, Santiago supported the kings of Castile and Aragon against Navarre.

The Order of Calatrava. Perhaps the most unusual foundation for a military order was that of Calatrava. Diego Velázquez was a Cistercian monk from the abbey of Fitero in Navarre who convinced his abbot Ramón to allow a group of monks from his abbey to form themselves into a military confraternity. Their aim was to defend the strategically important town of Calatrava, which guarded the main road from Toledo to Andalusia. It had been granted to the Templars in 1147 but was later abandoned. In 1158 Sancho III of Castile (r. 1157–1158) turned over the fortified town of Calatrava to the monks from Fitero. With the support of the archbishop of Toledo, the monks, still wearing their Cistercian habit, garrisoned the fortress. Some took up arms as soldiers. After the death of Abbot Ramón in 1163,

the monks returned to their motherhouse, while the knights remained at Calatrava and became an exclusively military order, which was approved by Pope Alexander III in 1164. They formally became affiliated with the Cistercian order in 1187.

The Order of Calatrava lost its namesake headquarters after Alfonso VIII's disastrous defeat at Alarcos. Thereafter, they withdrew to the castle of Salvatierra, across the mountains from Calatrava, a site fully surrounded by Muslim territory. The loss during a Muslim campaign against Castile in 1211 of Salvatierra—a crucial post referred to by the Almohad Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur (r. 1184–1199) as "the right hand of the lord of Castile—was a great blow to the order as well as to Castile itself. The order was, however, able to reclaim Calatrava the next year in a crusade against the Almohades.

The Order of Alcántara. The Order of Alcántara began as a small military confraternity founded by two brothers in Extremadura, probably in 1167. It received papal approval in December 1177 as the Order of St. Julian del Pereiro under Pope Alexander III. By the time its founding master died in 1200, the order had expanded to include several fortresses and towns in the southern part of León. Its transformation into the Order of Alcántara began in 1213, when Alfonso IX of León captured Alcántara and presented it to the Order of Calatrava. Since the site was too far from Calatrava to conveniently provide an outpost, Calatrava abandoned its military presence in León in 1218. The deserted stronghold was transferred to the Order of St. Julian, which then, as the new Order of Alcántara, subordinated itself to Calatrava. In time, about half of Calatrava's estates in León came under Alcántara's control.

The Order of Montesa. The youngest, smallest, and militarily least important of the major Iberian military orders was the Order of Montesa, which received papal approval in June 1317 from Pope John XXII (r. 1316–1334). After the dissolution of the Templars in 1312, the kings of Aragon and Portugal, like other European kings, were reluctant to transfer Templar holdings to the Hospitallers. Instead, Jaime II of Aragon (r. 1291–1327) was able to persuade the pope to turn over the Templar properties to a new

order carved out of Calatrava. The papacy eventually granted the master of this new organization the right of visitation over the order in order to resolve disputes. Territorially limited to Aragon, Montesa's lack of military importance was in part because of the subsiding Muslim military power in Spain at the time of its foundation.

The military orders operating during the Iberian Middle Ages were essential cogs in a martial machine designed to wage unrelenting war on Spanish Islam but were also extremely important in the growing conflict between the peninsula's Christian states.

[See also Alarcos, Battle of; Iberia, subentry on Narrative (1100–1300); Mansur, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-; Reconquest, Concept of; and Santiago.]

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J. M. B. Porter

Levantine Orders

Religious-military orders can only be understood in the context of the crusading movement. On 15 July 1099 Jerusalem was occupied by crusaders. The term "crusaders" refers simply to the pilgrims who traveled to the Holy City, where Christ was crucified. The fact that they were first and foremost pilgrims explains why most of them returned to Europe once they had discharged their vow of pilgrimage. Even though the objective of the First Crusade was not to colonize Syria and Palestine, crusaders nevertheless founded four Latin states: the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and the county of Tripoli. These states were sometimes in conflict with the Byzantine Empire and with various

Muslim states. After 1099 it was immediately clear that the lack of armed men was a problem for the Latin states. Even the pilgrim road from the coast to Jerusalem was threatened by enemy raids. In addition, occupied territories needed to be defended, and there was hope of conquering new territories. In this context kings and princes, patriarchs and priors, pilgrims and new inhabitants, all required the presence of armed men. Religious-military orders arose from this situation.

The Templars. There were a number of such "orders," or organizations. The Templars, the Hospitallers, the Teutonic Order, and the Orders of Saint Lazarus and Saint Thomas of Acre are notable examples that originated in the East and inspired many imitators elsewhere, notably in Spain. The first religious-military order of the Latin church was known as the Poor Knights of Christ and the Temple of Solomon, later called the Templars. After 1099 the Canons of the Holy Sepulchre and the religious-charity order of the Hospitallers of Saint John asked various knights to protect the pilgrims and defend dangerous passes, in exchange offering the leftovers of their meals. These knights took a vow of obedience to the prior of the Holy Sepulchre and were therefore associated, as laymen, with the religious life of the community; they were called "renduz" or "donnez" (men who had "surrendered" or "given" themselves to the community). In 1120 the future Templars—nine knights from all over Europe according to some sources, thirty according to others—united and (according to Ernoul) declared,

We have left our lands and our friends and have come here to uphold divine law. We do not take up arms, even though this is necessary. We obey a priest and do not take up arms. Let us therefore elect one of us as master, who, with the permission of our prior, will lead us into battle when necessary! (pp. 7–9)

They then went before Baldwin II, King of Jerusalem, and requested his advice. The king—probably at the Council of Nablus in 1120—convinced the prior to dissolve their obedience to him and place them under the authority of the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem. In addition, he conceded to them the use



Seal of the Templars. CENTRE HISTORIQUE DES ARCHIVES NATIONALES, PARIS, FRANCE/LAUROS/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

of the Temple of Solomon, built on the remains of the palace of King Solomon (now the location of the al-Aqsa Mosque, the third most holy place in Islam), and consequently they adopted the name Knights of the Temple, later simply Templars. The king's intervention produced a radical shift in their activity: from protectors of pilgrims, a police function, they became a part of the king's army, which was of course a military function. The Templars immediately became the subject of frequent and virulent criticism. They themselves expressed doubts concerning the validity of their spiritual way of life. While remaining knights, they had entered religious orders without renouncing military activity. This was an utterly new development, especially for Christianity at that time. While the Templars were becoming established in Jerusalem, in Europe the modern institution of the Catholic Church that we know today centered around the pope in Rome. Separated from the Greek Orthodox Church, it was becoming a church of clerics that, following the Gregorian reform, excluded laymen from participation in spiritual and theological decisions.

The Templars, on the other hand, were simultaneously laymen and members of a religious order.

Christian society was conventionally divided into three orders: clerics (*oratores*), warriors and rulers (*bellatores*), and workers (*laboratores*). The Templars represented a new order uniting *oratores* and *bellatores*. Like the knight-friars the Templars recruited into their ranks sergeant friars, light cavalry (*turcoples*), infantry friar chaplains, and all sorts of other friars and even sisters. Until the seventeenth century kings and emperors enjoyed great spiritual authority and, once consecrated, became almost the equal of bishops. The Templars were revolutionary in extending a similar spiritual authority to simple knights. The Holy Land thus became a great political-religious laboratory.

Nevertheless, to ensure a future for the young community, it was necessary for the Church of Rome to take an official stand: was the route taken by the Templars holy? This difficult spiritual-diplomatic question was entrusted to the first master and founder of the order, Hugh de Payns, most likely a knight from Champagne. De Payns succeeded in convincing Saint Bernard, the powerful abbot of Clairvaux, who recognized the value of the new fraternity and decided to support it. It was still necessary to confront the issue of whether members of a religious order could officially be authorized by the Church to kill a public enemy without committing a sin. Bernard held that if there was no other solution, and if the act could be deemed malicide and not homicide—in which one kills evil, not the man—it was permitted to kill an enemy. Master Hugh, on the other hand, held that the sin rested in the intention and not in the act itself. Thus, the knight of Christ who kills an enemy in obedience to divine will sins only if at that moment he is filled with hate; if, instead, his heart remains untainted by passion, he does not sin.

Strengthened by these theological arguments, Saint Bernard organized a council at Troyes in Champagne on 13 January 1129 in the presence of the papal legate, at which the Templars received official authorization and their rule, the first religious rule containing a military code. Developed in the subsequent jurisprudence of the order, this rule was adopted by other military orders. The union

of friar and knight created a rule, containing both anti-ascetic elements for friars and antiheroic elements for knights. Among the anti-ascetic elements, Templars were enjoined not to fast excessively since they needed to be physically strong. To ensure that they did not clandestinely deprive themselves of food, two had to eat from the same plate. In addition, if they were very tired, they could rest in bed longer in the morning. And they were not allowed to remain standing too long during religious functions. As for antiheroic elements, Templars had to renounce largesse, in the form of excessive alms, one of the key qualities of the secular knight. They had taken a vow of poverty, so they were not to donate anything since they had already donated everything. They were not to boast about their military undertakings (*prouesses*) or their past amorous triumphs. They were not to succumb to desire for adventure or act on their own initiative, but to be obedient and disciplined. They could not go hunting or succumb to the ways of pagans—for example, by wearing pointed shoes. In a return to their original vocation of protecting pilgrims, the Statutes of the Order provided the commander of the City of Jerusalem with an escort of ten knights, a round tent, and a black-and-white gonfalon to protect pilgrims on their way to the river Jordan. With the 1139 bull, “*Omne Datum Optimum*,” the pope removed them from the authority of local clergy and became their direct and only superior. Their clothing consisted of a white cloak with a red Greek cross for knights; chaplains and all of the other friars (sergeant friars, married friars, working friars, temporary friars, sisters, etc.) were to wear dark, black, or ash-gray clothing.

Other Orders. In the 1130s the Hospitallers of Saint John of Jerusalem, subsequently called the Order of Rhodes and today known as the Order of Malta, headquartered in Rome, also became a military order. As the name suggests, this order, already active in the eleventh century, was originally a charity founded near the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem to care for pilgrims. In the beginning it was affiliated with the Abbey of Saint Mary of the Latins. After 1099 the administrator of the hospice, Gerard (d. 1120), who came from Amalfi in Italy, decided to

found another, much larger hospital and make it independent of Saint Mary. The first rule of this new confraternity dates from the rule of Gerard's successor, Raymond du Puy, and refers neither to knights nor to any military aspect of the order. Rather, it was inspired by the evangelical value of poverty. The order was recognized as an international religious-charity order in 1113 by Pope Paschal II. But in 1136 King Fulk of Jerusalem bestowed upon it the management of the castle of Bethgibelin. The first mention of a friar-knight dates from the year 1148. The militarization of the order was complete by 1157, a fact confirmed by the writer Ibn-al-Qualanisi, who, in his description of the defeat of the Latins near Banjas, could distinguish the troops of the Templars from those of the Hospitallers. The latter, who gradually diminished their charitable role in favor of their military one, wore black clothing with a white cross.

The Order of San Lazarus had emerged by 1234 from a leper hospital near Saint Stephen's Gate in Jerusalem, which housed numerous infirm Templar and Hospitaller knights and adopted the rule of Saint Augustine. At Acre they later assumed the duty of protecting the Tower of Saint Lazarus. They participated in the battle of La Forbie in 1244 and in the battle of Mansourah in 1250. After the fall of Acre and the Latin kingdom in 1291, the knights of Saint Lazarus returned to Europe and chose as their headquarters the monastery at Boigny, near Orléans, which was founded in 1154 with the aid of King Louis VII. Lacking a specific function, the order was suppressed by Pope Innocent VIII in 1489 and later reemerged as a charitable order.

All these orders were international and spread from the East into numerous European states, where the Templars and the Hospitallers continually received men and money, both from donations and from the revenues of their vast estates, which benefited from excellent innovative management methods.

Following the battle of Hattin (1187) and consequent loss of Jerusalem, two new religious-military orders were formed: the Order of Saint Mary of the Teutons and the Knights of Saint Thomas of Acre. Unlike the earlier orders, these were not

international but were tied, respectively, to German and English crusaders. The Teutonic order arose from the charitable organization of Saint Mary of Jerusalem, lost with the city in 1187. Having retaken Acre in 1191, several German crusaders then transferred the headquarters of the confraternity to Acre. The community was recognized as a religious-military order in 1199 by Pope Innocent III at the request of Emperor Henry VI. The story of its origin relates a meeting that took place in 1198 at the residence of the Temple of Acre in the presence of the king of Jerusalem, the barons of the Holy Land, the grand masters of the Templars and Hospitallers, and German notables. On that occasion it was decided that the Teutonic order would continue to care for the sick and poor according to the practices of the hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem, and that it would adopt the rule of the Templar knights for knights and other friars. Lastly, the grand master of the Temple gave the order a copy of the rule and, for knights, a white cloak. The headquarters, originally at Acre, was moved to the castle of Montfort in 1230. Unlike the Templars, who never aspired to create an autonomous state, in 1226 the grand master of the Teutonic order, Hermann of Salza, received from Emperor Frederick II the title of imperial prince for all of the order's future conquests in Prussia. This enfeoffment tied the order to the Staufien dynasty. From then on the Teutonic order also involved itself in European campaigns in Prussia and Livonia.

The military order of the Knights of Saint Thomas of Acre was founded between 1227 and 1228 on the initiative of the bishop of Winchester, Pierre des Roches, who militarized an old foundation of canons that King Richard the Lionheart wished to dedicate to Saint Thomas Becket. The canons also concerned the liberation of Christian prisoners. The English Order of Saint Thomas, which adopted the rule of the Teutonic knights, was recognized in 1236 by Pope Gregory IX. Following the fall of Acre in 1291, its members fled to Cyprus.

Border Defense. The religious-military orders were an innovative solution to the problems of the border society created by the Crusades in the East. The still extant Templar rule describes the duties of

the military and religious hierarchies and provides a portrait of a military code that regulated the lives of knights in the cloister and on the field in times of peace and war. The fact that members took the three monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience gave birth to the idea of permanent military service. In fact, beginning in 1129 for the Templars and the 1130s for the Hospitallers, the military orders participated in all the battles of the Latin army. The vow of obedience certainly strengthened military discipline, which on many occasions saved the crusader army. The sense of belonging to a common order and the monastic virtue of humility contributed to solidarity among the knights and the infantry, which was stronger among the orders than among the secular warriors of Europe. Their readiness to die as Christian martyrs rendered them courageous. Chroniclers often noted that they were the first to attack and the last to retreat, and that they were stationed at the front or rear guard of the army—the most vulnerable positions. The clothing that distinguished one religious order from another was the origin of military uniforms.

Living in a border society with the objective of pacifying and exploiting a territory already populated mostly by Muslims, with few men at their disposal, religious-military orders, tied to a non-clerical spirituality, developed their own conditions as religious laymen free to adapt to local habits and practices. Militarily these circumstances promoted the integration of the light cavalry of the turcoples (mercenaries from the local population who fought with Muslim equipment and were led by a turcopolier) with the traditional heavy cavalry. Also, knowledge of the Turkish and Kurdish tactic of exhausting one's adversary and of feigned retreat aided these orders on more than one occasion. Religiously their circumstances fostered a sharing of liturgical practices and devotions. For example, chroniclers recalled that the Templars participated, together with Muslims and Eastern Christians, in the pilgrimage to the sanctuary of Our Lady of Saydnaya, near Damascus, bringing back to Europe precious ampoules of the miraculous liquid gathered from the icon of the Virgin. Osama, emir of Shaizar,

considered the Templars as "my Templar friends," who permitted him to pray to Allah in the former al-Aqsa Mosque, then called the Temple of Solomon, headquarters of the Templars.

The End. The image of military orders in the East is undeniably tied to castles. Because of a chronic scarcity of men, castles were the principal means of defending the Latin states and controlling territory. The Templars and Hospitallers created a network of castles. Prominent examples were the Templar castles of La Roche-Guillaume, Baghras, Gaston, Tortosa, and Chastel Blanc, and the Hospitaller castles of Margat, Chastel Rouge, and the famous Krak des Chevaliers (1144). In the twelfth century the princes of Antioch and Tripoli directly entrusted to the military orders the organization of the defense of their lands, since they were subject to attempts at reconquest by the Muslims and the Byzantines. However, the king of Jerusalem, who had at his disposal a more articulated feudal structure, did not exclusively rely on the orders. After the first fortress of Destroit, constructed near Haifa in 1103, the principal Templar castles in that kingdom were Safed, La Fève, Casal des Plains, Toron des Chevaliers, La Quarantena, and the Tower of the Baptist. Hospitaller castles included Bethgibelin and Belvoir.

Following the battle of Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem, many castles were destroyed, with the Latin states thrown on the defensive. For this reason they constructed increasingly imposing fortresses, which were then entrusted to the military orders, the only institutions with the financial means necessary to maintain them. In the thirteenth century the new Teutonic order held Montfort, Château Neuf, and Castellum Regis. In 1220 the Templars were given Château Pélerin, and Safed passed to them following its reconstruction in 1240.

After the Mamluks conquered Acre in 1291, the function and utility of the orders ceased. The Templars and the Hospitallers established their headquarters at Cyprus. However, on 13 October 1307, on the order of Philip the Fair, King of France, all Templars of the kingdom were arrested and accused of heresy. After a long, agonizing period of trials, torture, and burnings at the stake across

Europe, Pope Clement V decided to suppress the order without condemning it. Jacques de Molay, the last grand master, and Geoffroy de Charney, preceptor of Normandy, died at the stake in Paris in March 1314. The burning at the stake of Jacques de Molay ended the Templar order, albeit not the many legends that surround it. The Templars' assets were given to the Hospitallers, with some exceptions, such as the Order of Christ, the Portuguese order that conserved the castles, cloak, and cross of the Templars and whose ranks included Vasco de Gama and Henry the Navigator. In 1309 the Hospitallers conquered the Greek island of Rhodes and made it an independent principality, until it was taken from them in 1522 by Suleiman the Magnificent. In 1530 the Hospitallers transferred to the island of Malta, and in 1571 they took part in the battle of Lepanto. The Teutonic order first established itself at Venice but quickly concentrated on Prussia and Livonia. In 1523 it embraced the Lutheran reform and became secularized. Currently both the Hospitallers and the Teutonic order are charitable orders.

[See also *Confraternities, Military and Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood.*]

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Simonetta Cerrini

Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

Northern Orders

The military orders played an important role in the conquest of the pagan lands along the southern and eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea during the Middle Ages. Among the first orders to arrive was the Knights Hospitaller, settling in the region in the 1160s, eventually followed by other military orders invited by secular rulers and local magnates.

The first military order founded in the Baltic region was the Sword Brethren (*Fratres Milicie Christi de Livonia*) established in Livonia in 1202 by Bishop Albert of Riga. The brethren lived according to the Rule of the Templars and played a decisive role in the conquest of Livonia and Estonia. The number of knightly brethren barely exceeded 120 in total, with some twelve hundred service brethren. The order helped introduce the military technology of the West into the region, with stone castles, siege engines, and heavily armored knights supported by foot soldiers and crossbowmen. In September 1236, the Sword Brethren and some crusaders suffered a crushing defeat by the Lithuanians at Saule


in Lithuania. The few remaining brethren were absorbed into the Teutonic Knights in 1237.

In 1228, the Order of Dobrin (*Milites Christi fratres de Dobrin*) was founded in the province of Mazovia, in northeastern Poland, on the initiative of Bishop Christian of Prussia, who needed a permanent military force that could support him against the pagan Prussians. This order also lived according to the Rule of the Templars, but their numbers were never high, perhaps as few as fifteen knight brethren and some 150 serving brethren and foot soldiers. In 1235, most of the brethren were absorbed into the newly arrived Teutonic Knights.

The Teutonic Knights were summoned to the region in the 1220s by Conrad of Mazovia, a Polish duke who needed military assistance against the Prussians, who were raiding his territories. In return for their military support he offered the Teutonic Knights Kulmerland in the southern part of Prussia (present-day Chełmno, Poland). The order had been founded in the Holy Land in the late twelfth century, but in 1211 it had been given some land in eastern Hungary, only to be expelled again in 1225 by the Hungarian king, who believed the brethren to be too powerful. Reluctantly the order accepted the offer made by Duke Conrad and was provided with substantial privileges by the German emperor and the pope.

The Teutonic Knights began the conquest of Prussia in 1230 with a series of northward attacks along the Vistula River. During these campaigns the brethren were supported by the annual arrival of crusaders. In 1283, all of Prussia had been conquered by the order, establishing what has been termed an "order state" (*Ordensstaat* or *Ordensland*) guarded by a network of strong castles. In 1309 the order transferred its headquarters to Marienburg in Prussia (present-day Malbork, Poland).

In Livonia the Teutonic Knights took over the castles of the Sword Brethren, continuing the expansion of the newly acquired territories and eventually purchasing the northern provinces of Estonia from the Danes in 1346. In the second part of the thirteenth century the brethren were opposed by the archbishop and burghers of Riga and the secular vassals, leading to a civil war in 1295. In 1242 the



Marienburg. Headquarters of the Teutonic Knights. Photograph by the Detroit Photographic Company, c. 1890. VIEWS OF GERMANY, PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

order was defeated at the battle of Lake Peipus by Alexander Nevsky of Novgorod. During the rest of the thirteenth and throughout the fourteenth century frequent wars erupted between the Livonian brethren and the Russian principalities of Novgorod, Pskov, and Polotsk.

In the 1270s the Teutonic Knights encountered a new and powerful enemy that would determine the course of the order's history for the balance of the Middle Ages. This was the expanding pagan Kingdom of Lithuania. Countering this threat, the Teutonic Knights instituted annual crusades and campaigns (referred to as *Reisen* in contemporary sources). These *Reisen* took place either during the dry summers or during the winters, when marshes and rivers had frozen, providing the raiding parties with passable routes into the enemy hinterlands. This type of warfare was typical of the Baltic region throughout the Middle Ages, with comparatively small armies plundering enemy territory, killing the men and enslaving women and children before returning to their homeland. Some of the *Reisen*, especially during the summertime, had the more

strategic aim of conquering enemy territory or erecting new castles. The Teutonic Knights were very successful in attracting crusaders from the larger parts of western Europe for these annual campaigns, celebrating the more prominent among them at a so-called *Ehrentisch* (Table of Honor) amid lavish banquets at their headquarters in Marienburg. This was a very brutal type of warfare requiring tremendous resources in money and manpower. It is estimated that, apart from their vassals, there may have been some six or seven hundred brethren in Prussia and some five hundred in Livonia in the fourteenth century, as well as an increasing number of costly mercenaries. Developments in military technology in the latter part of the fourteenth century also required the order to enlarge its castles, purchase canons, and expand its naval force.

During the fourteenth century tensions rose between the Teutonic Knights and Poland. In 1386 Poland and Lithuania were united when Jogaia, Grand Duke of Lithuania, accepted baptism and married Jadwiga, Queen of Poland. However, the order refused to accept this Christianization of their

longtime enemy, and the fighting continued. In 1410 the order was defeated by a Polish-Lithuanian army at the battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg). However, the order successfully defended its main castles in Prussia until the so-called Thirteen Years' War (1454–1466), when unpaid mercenaries surrendered Marienburg to the enemies of the order in 1457. In 1466 the order was forced to accept Polish suzerainty in the territories that had not been conquered by the Poles.

In Livonia the brethren faced the rising military power of Moscow, resulting in a number of wars throughout the fifteenth century that ravaged great parts of Livonia. Following the events of the Reformation in the early sixteenth century, the Teutonic Knights in both Prussia and Livonia were secularized in 1525 and 1561, respectively.

[See also Alexander Nevsky; Baltics, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Grunwald, Battle of; Peipus, Battle of Lake; Saule, Battle at River; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Carsten Selch Jensen

ORDERS OF CHIVALRY AND KNIGHTHOOD

The generic names "order of knighthood" or "order of chivalry" have been applied since the late fourteenth century to all forms of military, knightly, and noble bodies that even vaguely resembled the military religious orders associated with the Crusades.

Bodies of lay soldiers dominated by knights were first founded at about the same time as the earliest religious military orders and were constituted as lay devotional confraternities. They seem to have been unknown outside Spain and northern Italy before 1325 but flourished in growing numbers of kingdoms from about that date to 1520. The lay orders of that period were increasingly diverse in the size and nature of their membership, in their organization, and in their activities, because they were founded for very different purposes and drew upon a number of very different models:

- The religious orders of knighthood
- The fictional brotherhoods of the Arthurian and Greek traditions, especially the Round Table
- The professional confraternities or guilds
- The military brotherhoods formed to share the prizes and losses of war
- The military-political leagues established by the princes and barons of many regions of France, Germany, and Italy to promote their collective interests
- The bodies of retainers or clients maintained by kings and princes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to secure the loyalty and service of members of their own nobilities and of lesser princes and barons of their regions

While some of these orders were formal societies, with statutes and a corporate organization, others were simply groups of liveried retainers, lacking both. Even some of the societies founded after 1325 were intended to be temporary rather than permanent bodies. For example, the groups that may be referred to as "votal societies," whose members took a collective vow to achieve specified feats of arms, had a fixed term of existence of between one and five years. Such bodies—more like jousting societies than military organizations—were first established around 1390, when new tactics were emerging that required practice in the types of combat provided by these societies. They flourished for only a few decades after that date, especially in France.

Most lay noble societies were intended to be perpetual, however, and were confraternal in form.

Confraternities—lay equivalents to religious orders—were extremely common throughout Latin Christendom from the late twelfth to eighteenth centuries. They organized people of all ranks in society to carry out useful social functions, from providing insurance for funerals or raising ransoms for captives to regulating the standards of a craft or profession. Such societies normally had written statutes, were run by annually elected officers, and were dedicated to a patron saint associated with their purpose or locality. Each society would maintain a chapel dedicated to that saint, where it would hold annual general meetings, normally including a solemn mass and banquet, and often a memorial mass for deceased members.

Most noble confraternities were intended to serve the interests of the regional nobilities that created and maintained them. Some existed to organize regular tournaments or jousts for their members. Others were more political, serving to bind together the members of a regional middle to lower nobility. The most important class of noble confraternity, however, was distinguished by a close association with a royal or princely court. The first society of this general "curial" type was founded in 1325, and the first society of its "monarchical" subtype—whose presidential office was attached on a permanent and hereditary basis to the throne of the founder—was founded in 1330. Monarchical societies were always founded by kings or sovereign princes, who under such titles as "chief" or "sovereign" always played a dominant role in their activities. Most curial societies were monarchical, all were endowed with a badge and formal habit, and most were placed under the protection of a saint, though many of them took their name from the badge rather than from the patron. They were the only lay societies to approach their religious predecessors in wealth and influence, and the only ones that merited their corporate designation "order."

Among the more eminent of the thirty-nine known curial orders founded between 1325 and 1496 were the Hungarian Order of Saint George (1325), the Castilian Order of the Band (1330), the English Order

of the Garter (1348/50), the French Company of the Star (1351), the Sicilian Company of the Knot (1352), the Savoyard Order of the Collar (1364), the Sicilian Order of the Ship (1381), the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece (1430), and the French Order of Saint Michael (1469). They were intended not only to bind leading nobles of the founder's domain to him, to his house and throne, and to one another, through ties of clientship and fraternity, but also to present the prince-patron or prince-president and his "companions" as paragons of chivalric virtue by associating them with the fictional Round Table Society. Only a few of these orders—the Order of Saint George, the Company of the Star, and the Order of the Ship—were intended by their founders to serve as military units, and none of them seems to have done so very effectively in practice. Some curial orders were restricted to dubbed knights, but from 1330 some were also open to undubbed squires, and from 1379 growing numbers of orders admitted ladies and damsels as regular members. Inspired by Arthurian models, most founders imposed a fixed size on membership in their order—in one case as high as five hundred, but usually between fifteen and forty—making these orders both cheaper to maintain and more selective.

Though always intended to be perpetual, most curial orders founded before 1500 had relatively brief existences, owing mainly to inadequate endowment by their founders or the failure or expulsion of their founders' dynasties. Only twelve of them lasted more than fifty years, and only six more than a hundred. Four of the latter—the Order of the Garter, the Order of the Collar, the Order of the Golden Fleece, and the Order of Saint Michael—were monarchical orders, and they were the only lay knightly societies of any class to survive the beginning of the Reformation in 1517 by more than a few years. The first three still continue today.

[See also Chivalry, *subentry on* Overview; Knight-hood and Knights; and Orders, Military.]

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D'Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton

ORLÉANS, SIEGE OF


The siege of Orléans (12 October 1428–8 May 1429) was one of the most important turning points of the Hundred Years' War, reversing the English ascendancy won under Henry V and confirmed at the Treaty of Troyes in 1420. Orléans was a strategically placed city commanding the crossing of the river Loire nearest the Seine. It had been the political capital of the Armagnac faction in the early fifteenth century and the northernmost French city to remain loyal to the Dauphin, the future Charles VII. Thus, its capture would open central France to the English and was vital if they were to enforce the Treaty of Troyes and have King Henry VI universally recognized as king of France. The city was well fortified with its walls recently extended to encompass the western suburbs. The single bridge spanning the Loire and leading into the city was guarded on its southern bank by the formidable twelfth-century fortress known as Les Tourelles, while a further "bastille" was built on the mound of St. Antoine in the middle of the river. The city was guarded by a formidable array of gunpowder artillery (some throwing stones weighing almost two hundred pounds). The garrison itself was probably around five thousand strong, composed mainly of mercenaries. Its captains were also for the most part professional soldiers, many of humble origins (there were probably no more than forty knights in the entire army), although its leaders were noblemen, most notably

Jean, Count of Dunois, the illegitimate son of the captive duke of Orléans.

The English plan was simple: to quickly capture the city, allowing a swift assault through the Loire valley to link up with English-held Gascony to the southwest. The army was largely recruited in England and commanded by Thomas Montague, Earl of Salisbury. He was accompanied by William de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, who took over command of the siege when Salisbury was killed by a cannonball on 24 October 1428.

The English army arrived in Calais on 1 July. After discussing plans with the king's uncle and regent of France, John, Duke of Bedford, the army marched south, capturing the towns of Meung, Beaugency, and Jargeau, before arriving at the southern end of the bridge across the Loire at Orléans on 7 October. By this stage the English forces, joined by men from Burgundy, Champagne, Picardy, and elsewhere, probably numbered between four thousand and five thousand. On 21 October Salisbury assaulted the Augustinian monastery on the southern bank and Les Tourelles, capturing the fortress three days later but losing his life in the moment of victory. Command of the siege now passed to Suffolk, who established a series of field fortifications around the city from which he began a steady bombardment of the walls. The encirclement, however, was by no means complete and supplies and reinforcements continued to enter the city.

Supplying the besieging army, on the other hand, was also problematic, with supplies being brought from Normandy and the Paris region. On 12 February 1429 a Franco-Scottish force of some four thousand men attempted to intercept a large English supply column led by the experienced captain, Sir John Fastolf. At Rouvray, in what became known as the battle of the Herrings (so called because of the large number of barrels of salted fish in the English column), the French failed to break the English wagon laager and were then routed in a counterattack. The defeat led to several French commanders abandoning the city, while the Dauphin considered withdrawing to the Dauphiné in south-east France. The French commander, Dunois,



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argued against any further sorties and the citizens themselves approached Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, to ask the regent, Bedford, for terms.

On the same day as Fastolf routed the French at Rouvray a young peasant girl, Joan of Arc, met a local nobleman, Robert de Baudricourt, in Vaucouleurs and requested an interview with the Dauphin. Early the next month Joan met him at Chinon and, with royal and ecclesiastical approval, joined the relief army being assembled at Blois. It arrived outside Orléans on 28 April and, after much heated discussion with Dunois, she joined the assault on the English-held fortress of St. Loup six days later. On 6 May she led a successful assault against the Augustinian monastery, leaving the English garrison of Les Tourelles isolated. The following morning, against the wishes of Dunois, who had banned unauthorized sorties, she led the assault on Les Tourelles itself, guarded by between seven hundred and eight hundred Englishmen. Joan was wounded by an arrow in the shoulder, but by nightfall the English commander, Sir William Glasdale, was dead, and the garrison of Les Tourelles had surrendered. During the night the bridge over the Loire was repaired, and by the morning of 8 May the English had abandoned their remaining positions. For a short period

there was a standoff while the English, arrayed in battle positions, waited between the walls of the city and their abandoned siege-lines, but before long the English turned and marched away. One group, under Lords Scales and Talbot, retreated to Meung, while Suffolk led another contingent to Jargeau.

The siege of Orléans had lasted 210 days. The failure of the siege had been due in large part to the inspirational intervention of Joan of Arc, who had galvanized the cautious French captains and engendered a new enthusiasm among ordinary soldiers and citizens. The English underestimated the scale of the French revival under Joan and the energy that the victory at Orléans had given them. On 12 June, Jargeau fell and Suffolk was captured; three days later the fortified bridge at Meung-sur-Loire fell; and on 18 June the English garrison at Beaugency surrendered. On the same day the English field army, led by Talbot and Fastolf, was routed at the battle of Patay. Control of the Loire valley was thus assured, and within a month Charles VII was crowned at Reims.

[See also Charles VII of France; Hundred Years War, *subentry on* Causes; Joan of Arc; and Rouvray, Battle of.]

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David Grummitt

OSCELLE, SIEGES OF

"Oscellus" (probably Oscelle near Jeufosse) was an island site on the Seine that became a base of operations in 856 for a Viking fleet under the joint command of two chieftains, Sidric and Bjoern. Two sieges took place on this island. In 858 Charles II, "The Bald," King of France and Holy Roman Emperor, attempted to expel the Viking occupants with an unsuccessful amphibious assault on the island. In 861 Charles hired a fleet of Viking mercenaries under the chieftain Weland to expel the Vikings occupying the island.

In 858 Charles ordered the construction of a fleet to oppose the Vikings, but no information exists as to the number and type of these ships. The *Annals of St. Bertin* reports that Charles besieged the island during the summer of 858 but had to break off the operation upon receiving the news that Louis II, "The German," King of Germany, and his army were invading in order to depose him, a priority greater than the Vikings. What is puzzling about this siege is the account of the Frankish chronicler Aimoin of St. Germain-des-Prés (fl. 865) in his *Translatio SS. Georgii, Aurelii, et Nathaliae* (Translation [of the relics] of Saints George, Aurelius, and Nathalia), which says that the amphibious assault on the island involved only a single small ship containing the king and a few followers. Ropes were attached to the vessel and were being held by a group of the king's forces on the bank. According to Aimoin, after the ship had

moved away from the bank and out into the river, the crew on the bank cut the ropes attached to the ship so that the king could not receive military assistance and allowed the vessel to drift out into midstream. The magnates surely must have realized that casting the ship adrift and leaving the king stranded in midstream would expose him to easy capture by the Vikings. How the king managed to escape this danger is left unexplained. The crew subsequently joined the invading army of Louis the German, who had been invited by a large number of magnates who were organized into a revolt. The magnates of this era were not polite country gentlemen. A few months later, in 859, magnates slew locals for forming an organization for self-protection against the Vikings.

Mercenary Vikings in the pay of Charles the Bald carried out the siege of 861. The *Annals of St. Bertin* reports that the king requisitioned stores of grain and cattle to sustain the Viking forces during the siege, a logistically significant detail. Just as important is the maneuver executed by Charles's Vikings to expel the island group. The mercenary Viking fleet coming from the Seine estuary approached the island upstream. The narrow branches of the Seine on either side of the island prevented encirclement of the island. Charles's Vikings therefore took a detachment of sixty ships and rowed up the Epte, a tributary that runs nearly parallel to the Seine. The crew then carried out a portage operation and refloated the ships on the opposite end of the island, completing the blockade. This maneuver is presumably the "most keen subtlety" that Hildegarius, bishop of Meaux (fl. 862), in his *Vita Sancti Faronis* (Life of Saint Faron) mentioned was used to expel the island Viking reivers, who, after being cut off, were starved into submission.

[See also Charles the Bald; Louis II of East Francia; and Vikings.]

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C. M. Gillmor

OTAKAR II

See Přemysl Otakar II.

OTHÉE, BATTLE OF

At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the principality of Liège was, as it had been since its founding in 972, ruled by a prince-bishop. Part of the Holy Roman Empire, the prince-bishops had remained relatively free from imperial interference except when the death of a ruler, celibate because of his ecclesiastical office, meant that a successor must be chosen. However, with the increasing power of the Burgundian dukes during the late fourteenth century, the prince-bishops had found it more difficult to govern their lands and people without outside influence.

Their people were not always satisfied with the prince-bishops' governance, either. Frequently they rebelled, these uprisings sometimes lasting for several years. The rebellion that ended at the battle of Othée in 1408 had begun in 1390, with the citizens fighting with the principality's military—not the most powerful or numerous force of the later Middle Ages—on and off for almost all of the eighteen years in between. In August 1407 John of Bavaria, Prince-Bishop, felt forced to call on his most powerful relative, John "the Fearless," Duke of Burgundy, to intervene.

John "the Fearless" jumped at the chance to settle the Liégeois rebellion. Shortly after it became known that the prince-bishop had sought the duke's assistance, the rebels besieged Maastricht, where John of Bavaria had sought refuge. Between September 1407 and September 1408, the city of Maastricht faced constant gunpowder artillery bombardment

and increased deprivations. John "the Fearless" took his time gathering his forces, and even when he did enter the principality, in September 1408, decided not to try to relieve the siege of Maastricht directly, but instead to march against the town of Liège, which the rebels controlled. Nevertheless, this maneuver had the same effect, because it forced the rebels to raise their siege and to try to keep the invaders from Liège. The two armies met at Othée on 23 September.

For the battle there are several good narrative sources, including a letter from the duke to his brother Antoine that details the conflict as he saw it. The duke writes that once they had spotted the rebel army he—together with John of Bavaria, who was with the army—positioned their infantry in a mass, with wings on both sides consisting of cavalry and archers, because he thought this was the best way to oppose any charge sent against them. But instead of making this charge, the Liégeois stopped their forces—at about three bow shots' distance from his army, says the duke; formed them into position; and then fired their gunpowder artillery pieces at the Burgundians in an effort to drive them from the field without any hand-to-hand fighting. But the Burgundians stood firmly in position until the duke ordered most of them to advance on the rebels and attack them. He sent four hundred cavalry and one thousand infantry around the main bodies of both armies to attack the Liégeois in the rear. Both tactics worked, and after a relatively short battle the Burgundians prevailed.

Although the rebel leaders tried to regroup their forces, they could not do so. Only days after the battle of Othée, John "the Fearless" and John of Bavaria rode unhindered into the city of Liège.

[See also Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479).]

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Kelly DeVries

OTRANTO, SIEGE OF

After the Turkish capture of Constantinople in 1453 and Venetian Negroponte in 1470, Ottoman power extended itself toward Venetian territories, the eastern regions of the empire, the Balkans, and the Kingdom of Hungary. Venice had sustained by itself a great military effort and in 1479 was forced to buy peace, ceding various territories in order to assure rights of navigation and commercial exchange in the Mediterranean. Both the Venetians and Florentines were suspected of then directing Turkish attention toward the Kingdom of Naples, but the most convincing explanation may be found in the unceasing expansionism of Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444–1446, 1451–1481), and in the notion that, with peace, Ottoman might had accumulated an enormous military potential that was directed toward new conquests. Thus, in the summer of 1480, while the Turkish attack at the Isle of Rhodes was under way, the Ottomans landed in Apulia, thinking to perhaps invade the entire Aragonese kingdom. Already by May, hearing the news of Turkish mobilization in Albania, King Ferrante had sent a few weak reinforcements, underestimating the danger. Moreover, the Italian states failed to respond to the appeals of Pope Sixtus IV, who feared an assault on Rome. Thus, when Ottoman ships crossed the fifty miles of sea and landed in the area of the Alimini lakes, they met scant resistance and directed themselves immediately to Otranto, a city of roughly six thousand inhabitants, poorly defended and not much

looked after. The siege was brief: powerful cannons transported from Albania hurled a rain of heavy projectiles of stone and breached the weak city walls. The inhabitants attempted to organize a defense but were swept away by the Ottoman assault; many were massacred or deported as slaves; others endured the violence and fled to neighboring towns. The most ferocious act, of enormous symbolic significance, was the killing of eight hundred hostages, decapitated on 14 August on a hill in front of the city. At the end of the siege, the remains of the victims of Otranto were buried and venerated as relics of martyrs of the faith.

Relief forces arrived after some delay: the Neapolitan fleet arrived in the Ionian Sea only by September, while at the same time from Tuscany came the troops of Alfonso of Aragon, by which point the Ottomans had already fortified the region, dispersed the population fit for war, and sent back part of their ships and soldiers to Albania. Winter passed in continuous small-scale incursions for the provision and defense of the occupied city. Soon enough, Ottoman generals lost hope of using Otranto as a launching ground for the conquest of all of Apulia, and the Neapolitan reaction, though slow and initially weak, was reinforced thanks to the aid of Italian and European forces. Apart from slaves and spoils, the Ottoman undertaking concluded without profit: demoralized by isolation and the difficulties in acquiring provisions, the occupiers received news in May of the sudden death of their legendary sultan, and in September 1481, a negotiated agreement posed an end to the long occupation. The relief of the Neapolitan sovereigns, who had risked great defeat, was enormous, but the human loss and devastation had been great, and the events of Otranto left a powerful impression on all of Europe. Unique aspects of the armies of the Porte were confirmed: tactics based on speed and surprise, vast manpower, and the use of terror. The Turks demonstrated impressive logistics, deployed powerful artillery, and mustered large forces: from 15,000 to 20,000 elite soldiers, 600 warhorses employed on the raids, and a fleet composed of 150 to 200 transports and warships.

[See also Ottoman Armies and Military Methods.]

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Nadia Covini

Translated from the Italian by Joe Jackson

OTTERBURN, BATTLE OF

The battle of Otterburn was fought on 19 August 1388 (sometimes given as 5 August) near Otterburn, in Redesdale, Northumberland, between the Scots under the command of James, Earl of Douglas, and the English led by Henry "Hotspur" Percy, son of the earl of Northumberland.

Following the end of an Anglo-Scottish truce in the summer of 1388, the Scots decided to take advantage of the problems confronting England—Richard II faced internal discord, lack of popularity, and threats of invasion from France—and collected two armies to raid across the border while a third force attacked Ireland. A large army, headed by Robert Stewart, Earl of Fife, concentrated on Cumberland and Westmorland, while a smaller force led by Douglas, and including George, Earl of Dunbar, made its way south through Redesdale in Northumberland, laying waste to county Durham.

Hoping to take Newcastle, the Scots were driven out of the city, but Douglas managed to steal Percy's lance pennon in a scuffle outside the city gates and made off with it toward Scotland. Percy vowed to

get it back and set out in pursuit—according to the chronicler Jean Froissart. Though Douglas could have reached Scotland safely, he continued his raiding through Redesdale and set up camp near Otterburn Castle, awaiting Percy so that the young knight could have the chance to fight for his pennon. The following day, after the Scots had besieged the castle, Douglas made tactical plans for a flank attack, but as it was nearing dusk, it was expected that any engagement would take place the following morning. However, Percy's force of about two thousand men-at-arms and five thousand infantry arrived and advanced on the slightly smaller Scottish contingent of about six thousand. Here Percy divided his host; the second division was led by Thomas de Umfraville, who was to attack the rear of the Scots' camp; Umfraville would later rejoin the main battle. Douglas himself led his flanking march toward Percy's men. The ensuing fight took place in darkness and Douglas was killed, though his death would not be known until the morning. The remaining Scottish forces managed to bear down on the English, making it difficult for them to use their longbows and putting them at an automatic disadvantage. The English were also disadvantaged by the lack of reinforcements, which did not arrive until the following day with John Fordham, bishop of Durham.

Despite losing their commander, the Scots were victorious—the earl of Dunbar being credited for much of the success. Around two hundred Scots were captured when they pursued the fleeing host. Percy, his brother Ralph, and many others were captured, and between one thousand and fifteen hundred killed on the English side. For his rashness in pursuit and for not awaiting reinforcements, Percy was criticized by medieval writers despite receiving praise for bravery (and a ransom payment) from King Richard. Still, the loss was a blow to England and exacerbated disillusion with the government.

Though sometimes portrayed as a border raid, the campaign had royal approval from Robert II and has more recently been suggested as a true conclusion to the Scottish Wars of Independence, rather than the battle of Neville's Cross (1346). The battle

was popularized by the ballads "The Hunting of the Cheviot" and "The Battle of Otterburn."

[See also Neville's Cross, Battle of.]

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Amanda Beam

OTTO I

(912–973), German king (r. 936–973) and Holy Roman Emperor (r. 962–973). Otto was the son of the Roman king Henry I of Saxony. Otto's autocratic tendencies toward the nobility as well as his disdain toward his half brother Thankmar and his brother Henry (and later his son Liudolf) led to a sort of civil war and several sieges involving heavy losses (for example, the sieges of Mainz and Regensburg). In the first half of Otto's reign, these conflicts absorbed most of his military energy. But he found a strong ally in his belligerent brother Bruno, the archbishop of Cologne and Duke of Lorraine. For some scholars, this cooperation marks the beginning of the so-called Ottonische Reichskirche (Ottonian Imperial Church): the king strengthens bishops and abbots by donating them land and rights and in return demanding goods and troops. Without the support of the churches, Otto might never have been able to face his subsequent great military challenges.

Widukind of Corvey characterizes Otto as a victorious general and a firm combatant who could

sometimes also be a brutal avenger, slaughtering his enemies. After conducting military campaigns against Hugh the Great in France, Otto repulsed the Hungarian raid of 955, culminating in the great battle of the Lechfeld (10 August 955). He most successfully and—according to Widukind—personally commanded troops of Bavaria, Swabia, and Franconia and completely destroyed the Hungarian army.

The major results of this battle are three. First, there was never to be a Hungarian raid on the empire again. Second, Otto became some sort of a superior protector of Christianity. Third, he was in some way designated for emperorship. Earlier scholarship following the report of Widukind of Corvey insisted on the so-called Heerkaisertum (army-based emperorship). According to this, Otto had been proclaimed emperor by his army on the battlefield like a Roman emperor, and from this point on, he had claimed imperial dignity even though he was not crowned by the pope.

Notwithstanding some reasonable doubts about this thesis and Widukind's report, it seems to be certain that the victory of the Lechfeld enabled Otto to intensify a kind of "imperial policy." His marriage to Adelaide of Burgundy, Queen of Italy, had given him the right to claim the Kingdom of Italy. Having overcome some struggles, he was crowned Roman emperor on 2 February 962 by Pope John XII, and in this way Otto became—like Charlemagne—protector of the papacy. However, this coronation led to somewhat strained relations with Byzantium, in the form of the renewal of the so-called Zweikaiser problem (problem of the existence of two emperors), culminating in armed conflicts in southern Italy.

The balance of Otto's reign seems to be ambiguous. On the one hand, he guarded the empire against foreign raids, increased royal power, conquered Italy, and acquired emperorship. On the other hand, some indicators for "imperial overstretch" can be found; his successor Otto II would face catastrophic defeats in southern Italy and eastern Germany.

[See also Augsburg, Siege of and Lechfeld, Battle on the.]

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Stefan Burkhardt

OTTO IV

(1175/1176–1218), German king (1198–1215) and Holy Roman Emperor (1209–1215). Son of Henry the Lion and nephew of Richard I of England, in whose court he was raised and from whom he received the titles of Count of Poitou and Duke of Aquitaine, Otto received the best available training in the art of warfare, but his martial skills were not matched by his political ones. A tall, imposing figure, given to violence, Otto did not shy from the fray of battle—he was wounded in an engagement in 1206—where he showed some skill, but he was incompetent in diplomacy and realpolitik: the *Urspeg Chronicle* claims that he was "arrogant and stupid, but strong." Ultimately, though, it was military defeat that led to Otto's spectacular fall from power as Holy Roman Emperor.

Otto's vacillating military career made a promising start with his close alliance to Richard I, with whom he fought in successful campaigns against Philip II of France in the mid-1190s. In 1196, Richard made Otto count of Poitou; for the next two years he was, as one historian observed, "often in the camp of his uncle Richard or engaged in Poitevin affairs." His later career was set against the complex political backdrop of Germany's power struggles, the entanglements of which were intensified by the Welf-Hohenstaufen struggle and papal involvement. (Otto was the only Welf to take the imperial crown, but this, like his other achievements, proved temporary.) Otto's military campaigning in Germany began in earnest with his election as king of the Romans in 1198. The Hohenstaufen duke Philip of Swabia also contested the title, and a civil war ensued in Germany, protracted by the assistance of Angevin England on the Welf side and Capetian France on behalf of the Hohenstaufens.

Pope Innocent III, to prevent the so-called *unio regni ad imperium* (union of Sicily and the Holy Roman Empire, both dominated by the Hohenstaufens), also sided with Otto.

In late 1203 and early 1204, Otto proposed a truce with Philip of Swabia in order that he might be free to launch further attacks against Philip II in northwestern France. The Anglo-Welf alliance became devalued after King John's defeats by Philip II of France in 1204–1205 and the political tide, so important to military momentum, turned alarmingly against Otto. His subsequent success owed more to fortune than to his abilities as a commander: in 1208 his rival, Philip of Swabia, was murdered, leaving Otto clear to assume the mantle of Holy Roman Emperor. Bolstered by this, Otto seized his opportunity to renounce his oaths to Innocent III and launched an attack on Sicily in 1210. His large army successfully took control of all of southern Italy, but Sicily remained elusive; papal diplomacy rather than military factors proved his undoing, with Innocent now turning to the young Frederick Hohenstaufen (the future Frederick II) and causing dissent in Germany, which Otto had to quell in 1211.

The civil war, and, effectively, Otto's military career, were brought to a sudden end by the battle of Bouvines in July 1214, one of the most important battles of the Middle Ages and one in which Otto played a major, and his best known, part as a soldier. Here, the Anglo-Welf coalition which he co-led—there were issues of command—posed a mortal threat to Philip II of France. Otto was reluctant to join battle on a Sunday but was persuaded by the opportunity to catch the French rearguard at a disadvantage. The swiftness of the French response in turn took Otto by surprise. He quickly launched a bold but perhaps badly organized cavalry charge against Philip's main force, but this was countered robustly; Otto, in the thick of the melee, received serious blows and his horse was killed beneath him. His allies also met with defeat elsewhere on the battlefield, so Otto made his escape on a borrowed mount. Smaller defeats followed this great one, and by 1215 Otto was restricted to his family lands in Brunswick, dying ignominiously in 1218.

[See also Bouvines, Battle of; Frederick II; and Philip II of France.]

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Sean McGlynn

OTTOMAN ARMIES AND MILITARY METHODS

The Ottomans, named after the founder of the dynasty, Osman I (r. 1299–1326), were one of many Turkic principalities that emerged in the late-thirteenth-century power vacuum in Asia Minor or Anatolia (present-day Turkey) caused by the Mongols' destruction of the empire of the Seljuk Turks of Rum (Anatolia). From their bases in western Anatolia, by the mid-fifteenth century the Ottomans defeated and incorporated into their growing empire most of the neighboring Muslim Turkic principalities, and subdued most of the Orthodox Christian Slavic states of the Balkans and the remnants of the thousand-year-old Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire. While the Ottomans achieved their successes through a combination of military conquest, diplomacy, and dynastic marriages, it was the Ottoman army—perhaps the best-organized, best-supplied, and best-trained military machine in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe and the Middle East—that accomplished the conquests.

The Ottoman forces under Osman consisted principally of mounted archers and excelled in raids and ambushes rather than formal battles and sieges. However, by the reigns of Orhan (1324–1362) and Murad I (1362–1389), the Ottoman military had been transformed from the ruler's raiding forces into a disciplined army, and was capable of conducting regular campaigns and sieges.

In the fourteenth century young volunteer peasants were recruited for the infantry *yaya* (footman) and cavalry *müsellem* (exemptee) corps. Paid by the ruler during campaigns, they returned to their villages after campaigns, and were exempted from certain taxes in return for their military service. Under Murad I, the *müsellems* were gradually replaced by the salaried palace horsemen, and the *yayas'* place

was taken by *azab* infantrymen—a kind of peasant militia originally composed of unmarried (*azab*) young men—and by the Janissaries. The *yayas* and *müsellems* became auxiliary forces, transported weapons and ammunition, and built and repaired roads and bridges during campaigns.

Organized similarly to the Janissaries, and armed with bows and swords, infantry *azabs* were expendable conscripts who fought in the first rows of the Ottoman battle formation, in front of the cannons and Janissaries. Although their number was significant in the fifteenth century (twenty thousand at the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, and forty thousand in the 1473 campaign), the Janissaries gradually overtook their role, relegating them to garrison and navy duties.

The Janissaries (from the Turkish *yeni çeri*, meaning new troops) were established in the 1370s as the sultan's guard. In the 1380s the *devşirme* or child levy system was introduced to recruit soldiers for the Janissaries. Under this system, Christian youths between eight and twenty years old were periodically taken at varying rates. After conversion to Islam and seven to eight years of service in Anatolian peasant farms, the boys joined the ranks of Janissary novices, began their military training, and worked in the imperial dockyards or in the cannon foundry. After several years of such service, they became Janissaries or joined the corps of gunners, gun carriage drivers, bombardiers, and armorers. The Janissary corps numbered approximately 2,000 men at the battle of Kosovo (1389), 5,000 men in the mid-fifteenth century, and about 10,000 men by the end of Mehmed II's reign (1444–1446, 1451–1481), remaining 10,000 to 12,000 strong until the end of the sixteenth century.

The bulk of the Ottoman army, however, remained cavalry. Along with the standing infantry forces, the sultans also paid six cavalry units whose number doubled between 1527 and 1567, from 5,088 men to 11,251. An even larger cavalry force was maintained through the military fiefs known as *timar* that were similar to the Seljuk *iqta* and Byzantine *pronoia* fiefs. In return for the right to collect revenues from his assigned villages, the Ottoman provincial cavalryman (*timariot* or *timariot sipahi*) had to provide for his arms (short sword and bows), armor (helmet and

mail), and horse, and to report for military service along with his armed retainers when called upon by the sultan. The *timar* fiefs provided the Ottoman sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with a provincial cavalry of 50,000 to 80,000 strong, while relieving the central Ottoman bureaucracy of the burden of revenue-raising and paying military salaries.

In addition, until the beginning of the sixteenth century the freelance light cavalry, *akıncıs* or raiders, remained militarily significant. In 1475 Mehmed II mobilized 6,000 *akıncıs*, whereas Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566) brought 20,000 of them to his 1521 campaign against Hungary. With vassals, Mehmed II, Selim I (r. 1512–1520), and Süleyman I could and did mobilize 70,000 to 80,000 men or more for major sultan-led campaigns, greatly outnumbering their opponents.

The bulk of the Ottoman army (infantry *azabs*, cavalry *timariots*, and *akıncıs*) used swords and bows. The Ottomans adopted firearms in the latter part of the fourteenth century, and established a separate artillery corps as part of the sultans' standing army in the early fifteenth century, well before their European opponents. In 1514 the Ottoman treasury paid 1,171 men of the artillery corps (artillerists, gun carriage drivers, and armorers), 2,162 men in 1527, and 2,671 in 1567. Initially, the Janissaries were equipped with bows, crossbows, and javelins. Under Murad II (r. 1421–1444, 1446–1451), they began to use matchlock harquebuses, and by the mid-sixteenth century most of them carried firearms, but the Janissaries' traditional weapon, the recurved bow, remained a formidable weapon well into the seventeenth century. The Ottomans also established cannon foundries and gunpowder works throughout their empire and remained self-sufficient in the production of cannons, hand firearms, gunpowder, and ammunition well into the eighteenth century.

Under Mehmed II and Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512), the Ottomans acquired the common naval technology of the Mediterranean, adopting the galley as their principal vessel. The size of the Ottoman navy was already impressive under Mehmed II, who employed 380 galleys in his naval expeditions against the

Genoese-administered Crimean port town of Caffa in 1475. During the 1499–1503 Ottoman-Venetian war, Bayezid II considerably strengthened the navy, ordering the construction of no less than 250 galleys in late 1500 alone. The reorganization of the Ottoman navy under Bayezid II transformed the originally land-based empire into a formidable naval power. The navy was instrumental in halting Portuguese expansion in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf and in the Ottoman conquest of Mamluk Egypt in 1516–1517 under Selim I.

[See also Constantinople, *subentry* on Siege of (1453) and Galleys.]

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Gábor Ágoston

OTTO OF FREISING AND RAHEWIN

(Otto, c. 1112–1158; Rahewin, c. 1120–1170/1177). The *Gesta Frederici* (Deeds of Frederick), the collaborative effort of Otto and Rahewin, is central to the early history of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa. It offers a wealth of information on many aspects of twelfth-century warfare; it is also a multi-layered literary masterpiece of medieval historiography that must be used judiciously.

Books I and II were written by Otto, Bishop of Freising in Bavaria, a half-brother of King Conrad III (r. 1138–1152). Otto had acquired military experience on the Second Crusade. He was also a Cistercian monk and one of the most learned people of his time. The work was written at the request of his nephew, the emperor Frederick, and is clearly biased in his favor. Otto treats the early Hohenstaufen struggle for power and the first military deeds of Frederick

as duke of Swabia, as king, and finally as emperor up to the summer of 1156. Very interesting on the subject of warfare is the report of Frederick's first Italian campaign (1154–1155), with detailed accounts of the siege of Tortona, the street fighting at Rome during Frederick's coronation, and the abortive invasion of Norman Sicily. A rare firsthand account of war from a leader's point of view is a letter by Frederick recounting his deeds that Otto put at the beginning of the *Gesta Frederici*.

After the bishop's death in 1158, his work was continued by his secretary Rahewin, a Freising cleric from a family of servant-knights (*ministeriales*), who lacked Otto's deep political insights. He relied on official documents furnished by the imperial court and on veterans' accounts. While Otto's approach to history was basically theological, Rahewin was interested more in the events as such. His books, III and IV, of the *Gesta Frederici* narrate Barbarossa's war against Milan up to the spring of 1160. They give great detail on the sieges of Milan and Crema and illuminate the mechanisms of small-scale attrition warfare in a country dominated by cities as well as Frederick's strategic decisions in this context. There is also an account of Frederick's campaign against Poland in 1157, based on another imperial letter. Unfortunately, Rahewin's accounts are difficult to evaluate, as he employed entire passages from classical Greek and Latin authors for describing current events. For example, the siege of Crema in 1159 is largely described with quotations from Flavius Josephus's account of the siege of Jerusalem in 70. There is a lot of valuable material in Rahewin's text, but it is difficult to identify the reliable portions. The reader cannot rely on translations, but must resort to the Latin original. In 1187 a poet named Gunther

completed an adaptation of the *Gesta Frederici* in Latin verse, called the *Ligurinus* (Conqueror of the Italians). This epic contains minute but significant alterations concerning military events that might be related to additional oral sources.

[See also Conrad III; Crema, Siege of; Crusades, *subentry* on Narrative (1095–1183); Frederick I Barbarossa; Germany, *subentry* on Historiography (1125–1250); Italy, *subentries* on Sources (1000–1300) and Narrative (1000–1300); Milan, Sieges of; and *Ministeriales*.]

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Holger Berwinkel

P

PACIFISM

While pacifism in its modern form did not exist as a concept in the Middle Ages, peace ideas flourished and extended their meanings in the wake of ongoing cultural changes. Due to the prevalence of a strictly articulated just-war ideology (*jus ad bellum*), at no time did medieval Europeans consider all wars evil, only those that were fought outside accepted moral boundaries. Taking as their foundation the Augustinian belief that true peace can be achieved only in the "city of God," most commentators held that in a sinful world violence could be mitigated but not eliminated, with true peace being a spiritual state of full reconciliation with God, through Christ. Thus, around the first millennium the Church fashioned a series of rules to regulate warfare, from the early penitentials that provided expiation for those who shed blood, to restrictions on when and how to fight (the Peace of God and Truce of God). With the emergence of the "Law of Arms" in the High Middle Ages, chivalric codes came to identify an even larger number of behavioral violations of just-war requirements, stipulating that all combat result from a just cause, right motive (i.e., love for the enemy), and a proper authority. Within the feudal relationship disagreements over whether these criteria were met led often to confusion and did little to inhibit wars. In addition, discussions over

behavior in wars (*jus in bello*), especially the treatment of noncombatants, became a common feature among the more popular books of arms by writers such as Christine de Pizan, Honoré Bouvet, Ramon Llull, and Nicholas Upton.

At the same time, events and wars such as the Crusades, and those between the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy, and England and France, produced an outpouring of didactic, moralistic literature by the fourteenth century that condemned the practice of warfare. The chaos inherent in late medieval wars led theologians and other writers (John Gower, John Bromyard, Philippe de Mézières, Jean de Venette) to call for peace, which in their case meant a return to order, tranquility, and adherence to the rule of law. Some (John Wycliffe, Geoffrey Chaucer, Dante) went further in positing peace as a Christian idea that was reflected in Christ himself (*imago Christi*) and thus should be the goal of all the godly, both in the temporal as well as the spiritual realm. In this context, peace became associated more with mercy, charity, sufferance, and holy living.

Finally, within the crucible of the Hundred Years' War, with its great and seemingly interminable destruction, peace became linked more with its practical benefits (John Lydgate, Thomas Hoccleve), as described in the anonymous *Libelle of Englyshe Polycye* (c. 1436), the argument being that peace

engendered prosperity and the furtherance of learning and the arts while alleviating poverty and animosity toward the king and one's neighbor. Such a pragmatic approach undercut the just war, and by the time of the Renaissance, humanists such as Erasmus and Thomas More castigated war as a primitive social custom that was rarely if ever fought out of love, and thus should be eradicated among rational humans. Humanists and later Anabaptist pacifists reiterated early Church teachings against war that stressed this gospel of love, which meant never doing physical harm to others. The medieval expansion of the vocabulary of peace made possible later pacifism with its repudiation of all wars.

[See also Christianity.]

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Ben Lowe

PADUA, SIEGE OF

By 1404 the expansionist efforts of Francesco Novello da Carrara, Lord of Padua, caused Venice to take action. On 25 April the city of Vicenza, besieged by the Paduans, allied itself with the Venetians, who also demanded from Carrara stiff territorial and monetary compensation for alleged damages to their domains. Confident in his network of alliances, Francesco refused and in June declared war on Venice. Venice reacted by sending an army to invade Padua's territory.

Although victorious in a number of engagements, the Paduans proved unable to stop the Venetian juggernaut, aimed at reducing Carrara's strongholds

according to a well-planned strategy. Systematically raiding the enemy countryside to deprive Padua of victuals, the Venetians also sought to isolate Carrara politically, bringing Mantua and Ferrara into their camp; neither Florence, at war with Pisa, nor Milan, in turmoil after the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti, was in a position to help. Despite starting the war with eight hundred knights and twelve thousand infantry, Carrara made the mistake of dispersing his forces across the length of Paduan territory. In addition, deprived of external aid and unable to compete with Venice's financial resources, Padua had to rely more and more on its militia, rather than on professional soldiers.

Starting in March 1405, Venice began to tighten the noose around Carrara's neck, occupying in succession—using a combination of force and treachery—the fortresses of Stigliano, Castelcaro, Bovolenta, and Pendice, thus cutting off Padua from its supply routes and allowing the invaders to encamp at the city's gates. In June, Verona capitulated to a joint Mantuan-Venetian effort. By dispersing their forces into too many garrisons and devoid of a field army to back this strategy, the Paduans had doomed themselves.

Placing their main camp at Bassanello, at the beginning of July the Venetians started probing at Padua's defenses. The besieged answered with sorties; one particularly successful engagement against the Bassanello camp on 25 August forced the Venetians to ask for a ten-day truce. At the end of the truce Francesco considered surrendering on terms, but the news of possible aid from Florence stiffened his will to resist. Time was running out fast, however, because Venice was completing the conquest of the remaining Paduan fortresses in the countryside. To make matters worse, in September the Venetians managed to divert the course of the river Bacchiglione, depriving Padua of its main source of water and aggravating the plight of the civilian population decimated by famine and pestilence.

At the beginning of November the besiegers conducted a series of assaults against the city, coupled with sapping operations against its walls. On 16 November, Carrara accepted the clamoring

populace's decision to surrender within ten days. He did not have to wait that long. The following evening the Venetians stormed the gate of Santa Croce, pouring into the city. Carrara surrendered on the condition that Padua not be sacked by the victors. Taken to Venice, a year later he was strangled in jail together with two of his sons by order of the Venetian authorities.

[See also Italy, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1493).]

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Niccolò Capponi

PAGANS

"Paganism" is a late-antique social concept and neologism from the fourth century pertaining to people believing in primitive religion outside the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. Classic Greco-Roman paganism was a threat to early Christianity, but after the emperors themselves became Christians, paganism was declared illegal in 391.

The Germans who migrated into imperial territory in the fifth century were a mixture of pagans and Arian Christians, mostly the latter, and early medieval kingdoms such as Visigothic Spain, Ostrogothic and Lombard Italy, and Francia were Christian rather than pagan. Pagan lands farther north and east became military frontiers in the expansion of Europe; their paganism and resistance to Christianizing missions were used to justify war against the inhabitants of the Scandinavian north (Icelanders, Norse, Swedes, Finns, Danes); along the Baltic (Saxons, Wends, Lithuanians); and further east (Slavs, Rus'), including the Balkans (including the Turks, although against Muslims, the term was misapplied). Germanic paganism is documented by archaeology, some inscriptions, and oral traditions

recorded (when they were almost lost under the pressure of conversion), afterward seen as mere myth and superstition. The Celtic and Druidic underlayer remained in areas Christianized in late antiquity, when gatherings, rituals, and nature veneration occurred in sacred woods, springs, and hilltops rather than in temples until later, under the influence of Mediterranean forms. Such places remained sacred, and many were subsequently overbuilt by churches.

The real conflict came after 782, with the expansion of the Carolingian realm against the Saxons. Numerous German missionary bishops after Saint Boniface were martyred in 754, and Christian writers railed against adversaries, who were described as especially ferocious, tribal, and animalistic. The Franks dealt with pagan rebellions in 792 and 870, Viking raiding, and other setbacks, while Christian missionary martyrs replenished the pantheon of saints created in the persecutions of old. The Ottonian dynasty faced uprisings by the Slavs in 963 and established Poland as a march by 992. In addition, they dealt with rebellious Wends from 1018 to 1066, long after their supposed conversion. Despite the conversion of the Swedes in the 1120s and Pomeranians by 1128, the pagan Baltics proved so intransigent that in 1147 a crusade was declared against them. Old Prussia became a crusader state by 1198, and thereafter a military order, the *Fratres Militiae Christi*, ensconced itself in pagan lands by 1202. Hospitallers from Acre brought crusading ideas into play with the founding of the Teutonic Order in 1225, but in 1260 during the "Great Apostasy," pagan revivals seemed to undo previous Christianization. Brandenburg was established as a militarized state in the crusades of the 1280s to subdue the pagan North once and for all, leading to a drive into Lithuania and its conversion in 1387. Even so, pagan practices continued through and after the Reformation era. Pagan horse sacrifices have been dated to as late as 1499.

Pagan resistance in the North lasted for five centuries. There, pagan tribesmen formed war societies whose warriors wore bear, boar, wolf, and stag shirts and horned or antler headdresses in keeping with

the prevalent animalism of their paganism. Bear clansmen (berserkers) fought in squads known for their frenetic charges, and Wolfmen were feared for their stealth and cunning ambushes and Boar fighters for their deadly wedge formations, likened to the jaws of the boar's head. The hunting-gathering tradition that fostered long-distance raiding for spoils of war (for which the Vikings were most infamous) reinforced piracy, marauding, and savage warfare. Forays were replete with bravado and status-building with plunder. Male bonding reinforced a mythology of festive camaraderie in the afterlife, rewards, and continuous recognition through praises in fight-song and sayings (the oral saga tradition), often set in great festival halls of trophies and souvenirs such as Valhalla. These behaviors survive today in the form of sports rivalry and fan antics, as well as in halls of fame. Nature gods fused into more organized pantheons through contact with southern paganism, such as Thor taking on attributes of Jupiter but still known best for his war hammer, which when clapped against his shield produced thunder. Dead heroes such as Saint Olaf, killed in battle in 1030, were afterward confused with Thor. Dual religions existed side by side or as the old under the cloak of the new.

Paganism is usually viewed in Western scholarship as a cult rather than a religion, characterized by various pantheons such as extolled in Icelandic and Norse mythology; nature worship and dualism; and magic, sorcery, and shamanism. It is often connected to an underworld. Relying on charismatic leadership in some cases, or a priesthood almost like a caste system in others, it seems particularistic and chaotic because pervasive generalized criticism from Christian sources was not particular enough to be ethnographically meaningful. Warfare against common enemies (i.e., Christian forces), was a catalyst for religious syncretism as one means of greater solidarity. Paganism was thus linked to the underlying cause for resistance. Such traits and lack of complete systemization contrast paganism to official, textual, and more organized religion as developed by Peoples of the Book (Jews, Christians, and Muslims). Their confrontational approach in condemning all

differences as pagan in origin has never served them well in understanding other peoples and their religions, as when non-Christian peoples in Africa are decried for primitivism, in Asia where Hinduism seems especially pagan, or in the New World where extermination became policy in the European conquest. For medieval Christian rationalism, paganism defied understanding, which led to the reduction of its practitioners to subhuman status and the justification of violence against them.

[See also Christianity.]

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Lawrence J. McCrank

PAKOURIANOS, GREGORY

(d. 1086), eastern Byzantine aristocrat and military leader. Gregory Pakourianos (Bakurian) practiced Chalcedonian Christianity and spoke Georgian, Armenian, and Greek. He is first known as one of the leaders of the unsuccessful defense of the city of Ani in Armenia against the Seljuk Turks led by Alp Arslan in 1064. He was subsequently appointed to defend the city of Kars, which was ceded to the Byzantine Empire in 1065 by its Armenian ruler.

At some point after Kars was conquered by the Seljuks, Gregory was appointed *doux* (duke) of the strategic city of Theodosioupolis. Gregory was resident in Constantinople by 1081, when he became one of the key supporters of Alexios Komnenos's rebellion. Once emperor, Alexios appointed him *megas domestikos* (supreme military officer) of the West, with the high rank of *sebastos*. Gregory commanded the left wing of Alexios's forces at the disastrous battle of Dyrrachium in 1081 and led the remnants of the army after the Byzantine defeat. Alexios granted him vast estates in the vicinity of Philippopolis (modern Plovdiv, Bulgaria) in the Balkans, on which Pakourianos founded the Petritzos monastery. He was charged with combating rebellions by Paulicians and raids by Pechenegs (Patzinaks) in the region between the Danube and the Haemus Mountains. In 1086 he brought the Pechenegs to battle at Beliatoba, which guarded a pass through the Haemus. In the midst of a cavalry charge his horse hit an oak tree, killing him instantly and leading to a Pecheneg victory.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentries* on Narrative (900–1204) and Military Ranks, Army and Navy; Dyrrachium, Battle of (1081); Dyrrachium, Siege of (1081); and Patzinaks.]

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Leonora Neville

PALERMO, SIEGES OF

In 1059 Pope Nicholas II recognized the Norman leader Robert Guiscard as future duke of Sicily. Any meaningful attack on the Muslim-ruled island, however,

had to wait until the Normans first conquered the mainland port cities that could provide both sufficient ships and experienced crews.

The first attempt to take Palermo, by far the largest city of Sicily, in 1064 failed because the Normans had neither enough troops to invest the city by land nor enough ships to blockade it. Count Roger, who had held Messina since 1061, could provide only about two hundred cavalry. Robert Guiscard transported another five hundred mounted troops (*miles*) across the straits. After three months at Palermo, harassed by tarantulas on land and lacking the capacity to blockade the city by sea—no action by the fleet is mentioned by historians—the invaders departed for the south of the island, probably using the Roman road to Agrigento, which they found too well defended. They instead carried off the inhabitants of nearby Bugamo to resettle in Calabria.

In the intervening years, Roger won some notable victories, including Misilmeri (in 1068), less than ten miles from Palermo. Carrier pigeons bearing blood-soaked snippets of cloth announced the disaster to the city. When the last Byzantine stronghold on the mainland, Bari, fell to Robert Guiscard in 1071, he had an adequate fleet and experienced crews, and had successfully blockaded a major port. He gathered a fleet of fifty to sixty ships and crossed the straits from Reggio in early August. Meanwhile, Count Roger sailed south to take Catania, a move that may have been intended to signal an attack on Malta and divert attention from Palermo, which seemed ill prepared when the siege began. Duke Robert landed his troops at Catania; then Roger marched the bulk of the army overland in August, by way of Troina, which was held by his wife, Judith of Évreux, while Robert took the fleet to Palermo.

Each of the three main sources highlights different events of the second siege of Palermo (1071–1072), which lasted five months. The city was attacked by both land and sea. On land, the Norman archers and slingers deliberately provoked sorties by the defenders. In one of these, the onset of the Norman cavalry was so fast that those inside shut the gates before their fellow citizens could regain the safety of the walls, and all were killed. A relief fleet, including

North African ships, arrived; the ships were covered with red felts as protection against missiles. After a sharp battle, the Muslim fleet advanced to the harbor and raised the chains, but the Normans somehow broke through and captured or burned most of the ships. The result was that the Norman fleet stayed, and Palermo could expect no further relief by sea.

Amatus of Montecassino reports that some were lured by bread left outside the city walls, and were taken and sold as slaves. In order to prevent relief forces coming overland from the south, the Norman leaders sent their nephew, Serlo, to Castrogiovanni in central Sicily. As the siege wore on, both sides suffered from hunger. Word of unrest in his mainland territories reached Duke Robert, who decided that the situation at Palermo had to be resolved at once. The Normans had built siege engines and ladders. In Geoffrey Malaterra's version, Robert and three hundred men hid themselves in the orchards on the seaward side. Roger attacked vigorously from the landward side; this diverted enough defenders that Robert's men were able to scale the outer wall and open the gates. William of Apulia describes a straightforward, hard-fought assault. When the lower city was entered, the people fled to the heavily walled inner city. A surrender was negotiated that spared their lives and guaranteed their right to live as Muslims. The formal Norman entry into Palermo took place on 10 January 1072.

[See also Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion and Robert Guiscard.]

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Valerie Eads

PARABIAGO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Parabiago was one of the most violent and bloody of the fourteenth century. It pitted the Milanese exile Lodrisio Visconti against his nephew Azzo Visconti, the lord of Milan. Lodrisio's intention was to wrest Milan from his nephew, who was supported by Lodrisio's brothers, Lucchino and Giovanni. In 1339, Lodrisio formed an army from the veterans of the recently concluded della Scala wars. As was unfortunately often the case in Italy, the wars were complex and involved leagues. The della Scala wars began in 1337 (or perhaps earlier), when a league consisting of Florence, Venice, Milan, the Este family, and Gonzaga family (and some more minor players) formed to oppose Mastino della Scala of Verona, who had moved aggressively to increase his state in northern Italy. The league eventually won in 1339. The army comprised some three thousand cavalrymen and one thousand infantrymen, many of whom were German and Swiss mercenaries. It took the name the Company of Saint George, the first of several of that designation that would be formed in Italy in the middle years of the fourteenth century. The appellation suggests that Lodrisio presented his army as a free company, perhaps to release it from any direct connection to Mastino II della Scala of Verona, at whose court Lodrisio stayed and who supported his activities. The band included Werner of Urslingen and Rainald Frenz (known as "Malerba"), two of the most prominent German mercenary captains of the era.

Azzo Visconti prepared to defend Milan by stationing troops in several places outside of the city, including at Sempione, Parabiago, and Nerviano. Azzo's uncle Luchino (Lodrisio's brother) served as captain general of the Milanese army, which consisted of approximately three thousand horse and two thousand infantry, the latter mostly crossbowmen.

In the early hours of a snowy Sunday morning, on 21 February 1339, Lodrisio and the Company of Saint George launched an attack against the advance guard of Milanese troops at Parabiago, to the northwest of Milan. The offensive surprised Luchino's men, who were, according to the chronicle

description, still in their beds. Lodrisio defeated the advance guard, sending them back toward the city. Luchino, however, rallied his men and engaged the enemy in intense battle. Lodrisio nevertheless gained the advantage, and Luchino, who had dismounted to fight, was captured and tied to a tree. The tide of the battle turned in favor of the Milanese with the arrival of seven hundred cavalry reinforcements led by Ettore da Panigo, a Bolognese exile. The advent of this contingent gave impetus to the Milanese army, which, after a long battle, emerged triumphant. Lodrisio and his two sons were captured. Losses on both sides were very high, perhaps as many as four thousand men overall.

According to Milanese legend, the victory resulted from the intercession of the city's patron, Saint Ambrose, who appeared in the sky over the battlefield, clad in white. City officials commemorated the battle with a procession in honor of the saint, held yearly thereafter on 21 February.

Milan emerged from the battle more consolidated and ready to embark on its most prolonged campaign of expansion in Lombardy and northern Italy. The battle was significant militarily because it marked the first time that a large band of mostly foreign soldiers served as an army for a major battle in Italy. Contemporary writers throughout Italy saw the Company of Saint George as marking the beginning of the so-called "era of the companies."

[See also Italy, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1493), and Werner of Urslingen.]

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
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William Caferro

PARIS, SIEGE OF

The siege of Paris by a Viking fleet in 885–886 occurred during a period characterized by political and military instability. The organization of defense against the Norsemen was rendered much more difficult by the biological instability of the ruling Carolingian dynasty. Especially, the situation in the West was extremely difficult. Here, the western branch of the Carolingian family was reduced to only one surviving member of the dynasty, the young son of Louis III, who became known as Charles III the Simple (879–929; r. 893–923). Since the legitimacy of Charles was contested and a five-year-old boy was not able to rule, the high nobility of the West Carolingian Empire decided in 884 to confer the government on Emperor Charles III the Fat (876–887; r. 881–887), who ruled the East Carolingian Empire alone after the death of his two brothers in 882 and 884. Unfortunately, Emperor Charles, hindered by poor health, was not able to act as a successful defender of the empire against the Norsemen. His only strategy was ransoming his subjects from the Vikings, such as in 882, when he paid off Gottfried, who was besieged by a great army of Italians, Eastern Franks, Bavarians, and Swabians at Asselt. Instead of crushing the enemy, Charles gave the Norseman leader Gottfried a large amount of gold and silver as well as an added gift of several counties in Friesland. Personally, the emperor never dared attack the Norsemen offensively.

Therefore, it is no surprise that there was no help coming from the emperor when the Norsemen sailed up the Seine and besieged Paris starting in November 885. At that time, Paris consisted only of the nine hectares of the Île de la Cité. The island with its Roman walls offered space for about five thousand people and was connected with the mainland by two bridges, the Grand Pont on the right bank and the Petit Pont on the left. The siege lasted until October 886, when Charles appeared before Paris. As at Asselt previously, he did not fight against the enemy; instead, he ransomed Paris by giving the Vikings permission to plunder the area of Burgundy as they wished. Although Charles's most effective



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military commander, Count Heinrich of Babenberg, had tried to deliver Paris from the Norsemen the previous summer, he was defeated by the Norsemen, who had excavated ditches three feet deep around their camp. When attacking the enemy, Heinrich did not recognize the ditches, which were filled with straw. He fell with his horse into one of the ditches and was killed and stripped by the Vikings.

The defense inside Paris was organized by Bishop Gauzlin, who died during the siege (886), and above all by Odo, the son of Robert the Strong, Count of Anjou, who was the ancestor of the Capetian dynasties. His successful defense of Paris legitimized his accession to the West Frankish throne, after the emperor Charles the Fat had been deposed in late 887/early 888. In the eyes of his contemporaries, Odo was legitimized as a successful military leader against the plague of the late ninth century, the Vikings.

A poem by the eyewitness Abbo of Saint-Germain provides many details about the siege in two books totaling 1,278 hexameters. It was the express intent of the author to inform other members of the nobility how to defend successfully a besieged town, making the poem a sort of a handbook of military knowledge. Therefore, it can be assumed that many details in the poem are anchored deeply in the reality of the ninth century (for example, the key tactical importance of the tower on right side of the Seine, which hindered the Vikings from going over the Grand Pont into the Île de la Cité). The Norsemen tried to demolish the tower by battering rams,

by driving burning ships against the tower, by filling up the ditches with the corpses of the prisoners, and so on. Only after the bridge was broken down could the tower be conquered by the Vikings. Of course, the number of the Vikings given by Abbo (forty thousand men with seven hundred ships) is extremely exaggerated. Modern historians (such as Carroll Gillmor) estimate the Viking forces at two hundred ships or so, and about five to eight thousand men.

[See also Vikings.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

PARMA, SIEGE AND BATTLE OF

In the early thirteenth century, Parma had been a pro-imperial Ghibelline city, but the pro-papal Guelphs coveted it for its wealth and for its strategic location on the Via Francigena, which was heavily traveled by pilgrims and merchants bringing economic fortune to the city.

After his election in 1243, Pope Innocent IV set out to convert Parma to the papal faction. He removed the bishop, replacing him with his nephew and loyal collaborator Alberto Sanvitale, and then renewed alliances with various Guelph towns, while he encouraged Franciscan friars to preach resistance to Frederick II, King of Germany and Sicily and Holy Roman Emperor, portrayed as the Antichrist. These papal alliances soon began to bear fruit locally, but in 1245, Innocent IV interrupted diplomatic negotiations with the empire and fled to Lyon, where he pronounced the excommunication

of Frederick II. The emperor answered with a violent attempt to capture or kill the pope, which failed on Easter 1246.

On 15 June 1247, a number of exiled Guelphs seized Parma in a surprise attack, throwing out the Ghibellines. Some relatives of the pope had an important role in this upset, including Ugo Sanvitale and Bernard of Rolando Rossi, both former allies of the emperor. Frederick, who was on his way to Lyon to meet or perhaps to attempt to capture the pope, moved quickly toward Parma, determined to reoccupy it, and besieged the city, immediately asking for reinforcements from his allies.

Not far from the rebel city he built a new town, which he called Victoria. With its moats, fences, and towers, Victoria was founded to replace Parma once Parma had been destroyed and its ruins sown with salt. The pope immediately dispatched the legate Gregory of Montelongo, a shrewd and fierce prelate who had grown up in Rome and was a diplomat capable of complex negotiations. Innocent IV also mobilized all cities loyal to him to submit soldiers and military equipment.

The tactics of both contenders seemed immediately clear. Frederick was determined to isolate the city and force it to surrender or to starve, while the Guelphs, counting on supplies from their allies, were prepared to resist until the moment seemed opportune for attack. The defenders of Parma had endured a siege of more than eight months when, on 18 February 1248, Gregory of Montelongo decided on a risky sortie in hopes of breaking the siege or, at least, of restoring the lines of supply to the city.

Having received intelligence that Frederick was leaving Victoria for a hunt on the river Taro, the defenders attacked. With the benefit of surprise they succeeded, despite being outnumbered three to one: Victoria was conquered, looted, and burned, and, in an even more serious symbolic blow, the treasure of the emperor and his crown were captured. Frederick II learned of the disaster by the smoke issuing from the ruins of Victoria and fled to Cremona.

[See also Frederick II and Italy, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300).]

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Federico Canaccini

PATAY, BATTLE OF

This battle, one of the most important defeats suffered by the English during the Hundred Years' War, marked the culmination of the successful French campaign in the Loire Valley in 1429, which had begun with the relief of the siege of Orléans in May of that year. Rather than retire to Normandy, the English commanders (John, Lord Talbot; Thomas, Lord Scales; and William de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk) decided to split their forces and attempt to hold the remaining bridgeheads on the Loire at Jargeau, Meung-sur-Loire, and Beaugency. However, they underestimated the scale of the French revival under Joan of Arc and the energy that the victory at Orléans had given the French soldiers. On 12 June, Jargeau fell and Suffolk was captured; three days later, the fortified bridge at Meung-sur-Loire fell; and on 18 June, the English garrison at Beaugency surrendered.

Meanwhile, another English army, commanded by Sir John Fastolf, moved from Paris to meet Talbot and Scales on 16 June at Janville. Dissension between Talbot (who argued for marching to the relief of the English garrison at Beaugency) and Fastolf (who urged a cautious withdrawal) meant that they were too late to save any of the bridgeheads, and eventually it was agreed they should retreat northward. At midday on 18 June, the French cavalry, under the command of Joan's lieutenants, Étienne de Vignolles (known as La Hire) and Jean Poton de Xaintrilles, caught up with the disorganized English army. The English force, some five thousand strong and mainly consisting of archers, attempted to construct a defensive position using the tactic of driving wooden stakes into the ground

in front of the archers' positions. Their preparations, however, came to the attention of French scouts, and the cavalry (perhaps fifteen hundred strong) charged the English, completely routing them. Both Talbot and Scales were captured, and about twenty-five hundred Englishmen were lost. Fastolf with his vanguard escaped the slaughter. But his conduct at the battle was soon in question, and he was temporarily stripped of his membership in the Order of the Garter by the regent of France, John, Duke of Bedford, pending investigation. The accusation of cowardice was repeated by Talbot on his release from captivity in 1434 and only resolved in Fastolf's favor in 1442.

French casualties were minimal (perhaps a hundred men lost). The victory allowed the French to march northward and for Charles VII to be crowned king of France at Reims cathedral on 17 July 1429.

[See also France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); Hundred Years' War; and Joan of Arc.]

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David Grummitt

PATZINAKS

By the end of the ninth century, as the Khazar Empire declined, the Patzinaks (or Pechenegs, Byzantine *Patzinakoi*, Latin *Bisseni*) a nomadic people of probably Kipchak-Turkic origin, controlled the steppe region (called the Patzinakia) between the Don and lower Danube. The tribal confederation, formed of the remnants of diverse nomadic Turkic tribes on the Pontic steppe, led slave- and tribute-taking expeditions to the Rus' and Byzantium. The Greeks were defeated frequently before 970

when they first managed to repulse a joint Patzinak-Hungarian assault at Arcadiopolis (now Lüleburgaz, Turkey, about sixty-two miles [one hundred kilometers] west of Constantinople). Serial attacks by the Oğuz (Oghuz, Uzoi, Ghuzz) from the mid-eleventh century gradually weakened Patzinak power east of the Dnieper. Patzinak-Oğuz raiders were defeated by the Hungarian prince Saint Ladislav at Chiraleș (Romania) in 1068. To annihilate them Byzantium ultimately needed to hire the Cumans, who aided in the final destruction of the Patzinaks at the battle of Levounion (1091) on the Maritsa River, west of Constantinople. Their dispersed remnants were absorbed as border- and bodyguards in Hungary and the Byzantine Empire.

The tenth- and eleventh-century Arab-Persian historian-geographers al-Mas'udi, Gardezi, and Ibn Rustah, as well as the Byzantine Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (913–959) record the Patzinaks' battle array and tactics. As al-Mas'udi relates, "The king ordered that several cavalry regiments of 1,000 archers each be placed on either wing"; then they assaulted the Greeks from both flanks in alternation, "constantly firing arrows while they swept across to the opposite flank. They circled in this manner like a mill wheel," a tactic that called for a high degree of practice and discipline (*Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems* [*Muruj adh-dhahab wa ma'adin al-jawahir*]). The "countless hosts of Patzinaks" (Anna Komnene), estimated at four hundred thousand horsemen, were organized in a decimal system of a hierarchical territorial divisions (forty kindreds) that dominated the field for two centuries, although it was only three or four *tumens* (thirty thousand to forty thousand men) that effectively fought. In addition to the composite recurve bow, they used such close-combat weapons as sabers, battle-axes, spears, and four-spike iron maces to penetrate armor; they wore iron helmets and leather or quilted cuirasses. Their field communications were versatile: "They raise up flags and pennants in battle; have bugles of horns of oxen."

[See also Arcadiopolis, Battle of (970); Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204); Cumans; and Levounion, Battle of.]

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Attila Bárány

PEACE AND TRUCE OF GOD

Known collectively as the peace movement, these two largely continental ecclesiastical initiatives sought, between 975 and 1139, to curb violence and organize authorized martial activity primarily to serve the interests of the church, thus paving the way for legitimizing the Crusades. After the Norse invasions and the breakup of the Carolingian Empire, disorder prevailed in the region of West Frankia (France), even as the Capetians attempted to solidify their fledgling dynasty. The Pax Dei (Peace of God) emerged from a series of assemblies or councils, beginning with Le Puy (975), which tried to keep the peace and protect church property from pillagers, while reducing the overall level of regional violence. Local nobles were invited to the

councils, where bishops attempted to dissuade warriors from robbing local churches and monasteries by persuading them to swear oaths on collected relics. Some scholars (e.g., Landes) believe that the popular and millennial elements of these assemblies were significant in bringing greater cohesion to medieval society.

Such unity of purpose in facilitating peace and order soon led to legislation. As large numbers of people gathered at the synod held near the Benedictine abbey at Charroux (989), area bishops issued three canons that threatened excommunication for anyone who attacked or plundered a church, harmed or robbed an unarmed priest, or stole peasants' goods or livestock. By making compensation for wrongs done, the wrongdoer could avoid the harshest penalty. Additional regional assemblies were held throughout France and Flanders. At the Council of Verdun-sur-le-Doubs (1016), peasants were protected from attacks during legitimate wars. Further councils soon expanded these protocols throughout most of western and southern France, the areas least under royal control, and came to encompass all levels of civilian noncombatants and their property, even merchants and their goods.

On the occasion of the celebration of the millennium of Christ's Passion in 1033, the French king called for councils to be held throughout his realm. The height of popular enthusiasm and expectation was reached at this time, when the crowds attending called for peace with God and among all people. It soon became apparent, however, that most nobles were not ready to keep such oaths, and so leagues were formed beginning in the mid-1030s that swore to uphold and enforce the peace. In Bourges, such a pledge was required of all men over the age of fifteen. Peace leagues still existed in southern France as late as the thirteenth century.

Such efforts were not directed against wars themselves, which were to be fought in accordance with just-war principles, but to reduce the number of private feuds and vendettas that often erupted into open conflict. The Treuga Dei (Truth of God) pursued a similar agenda, when first, at the Council of Toulouges (1027) it attempted to restrict fighting

to particular days and times of the year. At first, the prohibitions lasted from the end of vespers on Wednesday until sunrise the following Monday, but they were soon extended to entire holy seasons, such as Advent, Christmas, Lent, Easter, Pentecost, and Rogation Days, along with various feast days. While the Pax Dei dealt with harm done to the church and to the innocent, the Treuga Dei focused on preventing violence among Christians.

The peace movement soon came almost entirely under the aegis of the church. Cluny's abbots played a leading role in fostering the twin initiatives, and after the Council of Anse (994), the monastery and its affiliates were granted special protections and immunities, while their sponsorship helped extend the movement into Italy and Germany. In its earliest form, the peace movement saw the church encouraging peasant militias to keep the peace and protect its property from reckless nobles at a time when lay rulers were either unable or unwilling to do so. These "robber lords" who preyed on ecclesiastical property became targets at first, but soon many were convinced to channel their propensity for warfare into just wars that church leaders believed could be better organized and fought for the glory of Christendom. By increasingly equating just wars with holy causes, canonists and theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, actually facilitated greater warfare, while at the same time confining its practice within certain legal boundaries. The Peace of God and Truce of God had become largely inseparable by the time of the assembly at Norbonne (1054), when it was pronounced that murdering a Christian was the same as killing Christ. In the last quarter of the century, peace assemblies were being held all over Europe, the most notable at Liège, Cologne, and Bamberg and in Swabia and Bavaria.

The peace movement's standards for protecting noncombatants—including children, women, farmers, clergy, and pilgrims—also contributed to the emerging chivalric code, which tended to portray knights as fighters for a cause higher rather than personal gain. The culmination of this approach came with Urban II's call at the Council of Clermont (1095) for a group of trained knights, loyal to the pope, not

only to maintain order in the absence of monarchical power but also to take up the cross and fight as "knights of peace" in the defense of Christendom itself. Thus the crusader had become a *miles Christi* (knight or soldier of Christ), whose war-making to reclaim the Holy Land was likened to the making of a pilgrimage. At the same council, Urban further declared the perpetual status of the Truce of God, thereby turning knights away from conflict with fellow Christians to fighting against the infidel.

The decline and demise of the peace movement can be dated not only from the launching of the Crusades but also from the Second Lateran Council (1139), which tried unsuccessfully to outlaw weapons, such as the crossbow, often used by lawless mercenaries. (Any weapon, however, might be used against heretics or infidels.) The plenary indulgences offered to crusaders also weakened threats of excommunication and interdict against those who refused to abide by the rules adopted at the councils.

In the end, the peace movement harnessed martial energies at a crucial time, when private warfare was a significant threat to peace and order, around the time of the first millennium. Although it led to the growth and intensification of "just wars" in several ways, its greatest achievement was the conflation of church interests with the emergent "law of arms" (*jus armorum*), in which the knights were cast as protectors of the weak and innocent. And by directing martial activity into "legitimate" outlets, it soon followed that privileges and immunities would be extended to those who fought accordingly. While the peace movement had a substantial impact on continental European warfare, it had little effect in England (except during the anarchy of the reign of King Stephen of England, 1135–1154), where there were fewer problems with warring families carrying out indiscriminate violence in the countryside.

[See also Chivalry; Christianity; and Just War, Just Motive.]

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Ben Lowe

PEASANTS

See Immunity from War and Noncombatants in Armies.

PECHENECS

See Patzinaks.

PEDRO III

(1240–1285, crowned King of Aragon 1276), called "the Great," was the second son of the warrior-king, Jaime I of Aragon (r. 1214–1276). Pedro became crown prince in 1260 and spent much of his early adult life as an administrator for his father whose martial glory he constantly attempted to equal. He also emulated Jaime's love of chivalry and troubadour culture, becoming something of a poet in his own right.

Never "unworthy of his ancestors" (*San Juan de la Peña*, chap. 36), Pedro gained extensive military experience in the last two years of his father's life when the Muslim population of Valencia rose in rebellion (1275–1277). With Jaime's death in 1276, he emerged as a supreme commander endowed with great courage and ability. His "reconquest" of Valencia made the king a formidable besieger of castles, a talent he would display in 1281 and 1284 when he sacked several fortresses in putting down baronial rebellions.

Pedro's ambition soon brought him into conflict with the French prince, Charles of Anjou. When the citizens of Palermo ousted Anjou as their leader in favor of him in March 1282, Pedro diverted a large

crusading force from Tunis to Sicily where he roundly defeated the French. His triumph made him a marked man with both the French monarchy and the Papacy. With his realms put under interdict in 1283, he attempted to personally settle his dispute with Anjou on the dueling field, but when this nod toward chivalry proved unsuccessful, he was forced to endure a French invasion of Catalonia in 1285, finally defeating the invaders, but at the cost of his own life, on 11 November 1285. Ironically, Dante (*Purgatorio*, canto XII) placed both Pedro "the large-limbed one who wore on his life the seal of every merit" and his Angevin arch-enemy in the same precinct of Purgatory.

[See also Charles of Anjou; Iberia, *subentry* on Narrative (1100–1300); and Jaime I of Aragon.]

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Donald J. Kagay

PEDRO IV

El Ceremonioso ("the Ceremonious") (1319–1387). Crowned King of Aragon 1336. Pedro (Pere, in Catalan) was the first son of the Aragonese king, Alfonso IV (1327–1336) and spent his adolescence under the tutelage of his hated step-mother, Leonore, who shamelessly pressed the royal claims of her sons for her entire life as queen. The crown prince received an excellent education, but came to manhood as a person with few scruples who often used cruelty as a political tool. He seemed driven to equal the glorious record of his great-grandfather, Jaime I (1214–1276), but his failure to do so led to feelings of inferiority that explain his career as a military leader. Unlike his famous ancestor, the king

was not moved by chivalric altruism, but rather a kind of commercial realism that demanded good return for martial effort. Thus, though Pedro's reign was marked by one military crisis after another, the king largely eschewed the battlefield for the role of military executive.

Inheriting a Mediterranean viewpoint, Pedro consistently acted to strengthen Aragon's hold on Sardinia while maintaining an undeclared war against the Genoese. The king was quickly enmeshed, however, in several conflicts that his own policies had caused. The first of these struggles commenced in 1341 when he fell out with his cousin, Jaume III of Mallorca (1324–1349). Relations had been sour between the two dynasties since the late thirteenth century, but when Pedro wrongly accused his relative of treason, the two houses entered into a fatal conflict. Leading a small armada against the Balearics in 1343–1344, he reconquered the archipelago almost without a fight and then spent the next few years in quashing rebellions fomented by Jaume III and his son. Despite these triumphs, Pedro spent much of this period in putting down domestic and foreign discord—namely, the insurrections of the Aragonese and Valencian *Unión* (1346–1350) and of the Sardinian rebels (1354–1355)—connected in some way with the war on his cousin.

The most dangerous military challenge Pedro faced was the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366) that pitted him against Pedro I of Castile (1350–1366/69). In the first years of this far-ranging border conflict, the Castilian king took the offensive, winning a number of Aragonese and Valencian border outposts. Though loudly proclaiming his intention of challenging his “principal adversary” on the battlefield during the war's first years, Pedro did not do so until 1364–1366 when Castilian forces seemed poised to take all of southern Valencia. Though he never engaged in a pitched battle, Pedro showed himself to be a competent commander who shadowed enemy troop movements while keeping his own army safe and well-supplied. His greatest advantage in the conflict proved to be his cunning, which he used to good effect in tempting two of the Castilian king's main captains, Enrique de Trastámara and

Prince Fernando, to defect. By facilitating a civil war between the former agent and Pedro of Castile, the Aragonese king spent the last tumultuous years of his life in saving his lands from foreign domination.

[See also *Iberia, subentry on Narrative* (1300–1500); Jaime I of Aragon; and Pedro I of Castile.]

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Donald J. Kagay

PEDRO I

(1350–1366/69), King of Castile and León, known as “the Cruel” (but also “the Just”), occupies a niche in Spanish history that the English reserve for Richard III. For the most part a successful and courageous though brutal war leader, his political and diplomatic policies led to his downfall.

Born around 1334, he was the only surviving legitimate son of Alfonso XI (1311–1350), Europe's highest-ranking victim of the Black Death. Offspring of a loveless royal marriage, he experienced a troubled childhood arising from the king's indifference to his mother, María of Portugal, and close attachment to a royal mistress, Leonor de Guzmán, who provided Pedro with a flock of half-siblings (three of whom he later murdered).

In 1350, at the age of sixteen, Pedro came to power when plague killed Alfonso during the siege of Gibraltar. For a half dozen years, the young king was dominated by competing aristocratic factions, after which he took control of the kingdom; in the decade after 1356, his power reached its zenith. An increasingly murderous purge of all internal

opposition, real or imagined, drove growing numbers of Castilian aristocrats into the camp of his slightly older, but illegitimate half-brother, Enrique, Count of Trastámara (future Enrique II), who in 1363 laid claim to the Castilian throne.

Pedro might have weathered this internal opposition had it not been for the collapse of Castile's radically revised foreign policy. His father had thrown Castilian energies into the reconquest (*reconquista*), carrying on a war against Moslem Granada while fostering good relations with Christian neighbors, including Aragon, France, and the Papacy. Faced with the Hundred Years' War, Alfonso had followed a mildly pro-French policy, taking care to avoid an irreparable break with England.

Pedro abandoned the war with Granada, even forming an alliance with that state. In 1356, he redirected Castile's military efforts eastward, launching the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366) against Aragon. He progressively broke with France and, in 1362, signed an alliance with England.

Despite military success leading to extensive Castilian gains along the Aragonese border, Pedro alienated his Christian neighbors. In 1366, Count Enrique successfully invaded Castile, backed not only by his Castilian following and Aragonese volunteers but also by the "free companies" from beyond the Pyrenees whose services were bought and paid for by France, Aragon, and the Papacy. The invasion touched off a civil war (1366–1369).

Although Pedro temporarily regained his crown after a victory at Nájera (1367), the conflict ended in his dramatic death at age thirty-five following the battle of Montiel (1369).

[See also Montiel, Battle of and Nájera, Battle of.]

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

PEIPUS, BATTLE OF LAKE

Lake Peipus is located on the Estonian-Russian border. In the thirteenth century it formed the western frontier of Novgorodian territory. The Russian name of the lake, Chud, comes from the East Slavonic name of the Estonians (*Chud*); the name Peipus comes from the Estonian name of the lake: Peipsi. To the south it is connected to Lake Pskovskoe (in Russia) by a narrow channel; to the north the river Narva links the lake to the Gulf of Finland. The surface of Lake Peipus, which is usually covered by ice for six months, is 3,550 square kilometers (1,373 square miles).

In autumn 1240 the Teutonic Knights occupied Pskov and Izborsk, intending to expand farther into the territory of Novgorod. The knights were strengthened by the fact that in 1237 the Order of the Knights of the Sword, founded by the bishop of Riga in 1202, united with the Teutonic Order, settling down in the Baltic area in 1226. When Alexander Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod, was informed about the strength of the invasion, he found the Novgorodian army insufficient. He asked his father, the prince of Suzdal, for aid. He sent his other son, Andrey, with an army from Suzdal. The combined army moved to the Novgorodian border, recapturing Pskov and then retreating. The Teutonic Knights—led by Bishop Hermann of Dorpat—launched a counter-attack, moving on the narrow strait between Lakes Peipus and Pskovskoe. Alexander retreated and summoned his troops on Lake Peipus at Uzmen' by Raven's Rock, in a place of his own choosing.

The battle began at sunrise on Saturday, 5 April 1242. Alexander arrayed the left and right wings of his troops. The army of the Knights of the Sword moved forward in a wedge formation. The narratives relate that the battle was so sanguinary that blood

prevented the ice from being visible. Alexander's troops put the knights to flight and pursued them on the ice seven versts (about seven and a half kilometers or eight miles) to the Subol (northwestern) shore. It was probably because of the spring weather that the ice was not thick enough to bear the burden. "The ice started to move" the chronicler says. It even broke under the armored knights before they could reach the shore. The troops of the princes of the Rus' were not heavily armed. The chronicle of Novgorod says there were about five hundred German and numerous Estonian casualties, most of whom drowned. Fifty Germans were taken captive and brought by the victorious commander to Novgorod. In the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle only twenty casualties and six captured persons are mentioned.

Even if the numbers in the narratives are not fully reliable, the defeat of the order was evidently grave since they did not attack Novgorod again. The victory fortified Alexander's position as a prince. The battle has major significance in Russian history. Some historians argue it was less important than the glorification of Alexander—canonized as an Orthodox saint on the basis of his legend—implies.

[See also Alexander Nevsky; Orders, Military, *subentry* on Northern Orders; and Slavic Lands, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300).]

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Márta Font

PELAGONIA, BATTLE OF

The Laskarid dynasty had established the leading Byzantine government-in-exile in Nicaea after the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade. After the death of Theodore II Laskaris in 1258, his young son, John IV, was pushed aside by the ambitious Michael VIII Palaiologos. His hold on the throne still insecure, Michael VIII (r. 1259–1282) also faced an international coalition determined to destroy the surging Nicaean state. King Manfred of Sicily had formed an alliance with Michael II, ruler of the Despotate of Epiros (Nicaea's bitter rival as a Byzantine successor-state) and with Prince William II de Villehardouin, the Latin prince of Achaia, a crusader enclave in the Peloponnesos, with the Serbian king as an additional ally. This coalition's forces marched into present-day northwestern Greece in 1259. Alert to the danger, Michael VIII sent an army under his brother, John Palaiologos, to face it. Contact was made near the town of Pelagonia in western Macedonia, in the autumn of 1259. John Palaiologos provoked dissension within the Epirote command, causing Despot Michael and his son Nikephoros to flee the field before the battle, while Michael's bastard son John joined the Nicaean forces. Under John Palaiologos, they fell upon the depleted allies and utterly defeated them. Michael VIII's star was now ascendant in the Balkans, even though Despot Michael II was able partially to restore the Epirote situation thereafter. Taken captive, William of Achaia won release only by surrendering some of his fortresses to Michael VIII as footholds for Byzantine reestablishment in the Peloponnesos. Above all, the path was cleared for the recovery of Constantinople itself, two years later, as the Byzantine capital; secured by his success, Michael VIII finally eliminated John IV Laskaris as colleague or rival.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry* on Narrative (1204–1453), and Crusades, *subentry* on Narrative (1180–1245).]

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John W. Barker

PELAYO

(d. 737) was the first king of Asturias, an honor he received for his bravery in the struggle against the Muslim army in the battle of Covadonga around the year 722. He was the son of Duke Fáfila, who was killed by the Visigothic king, Witiza (r. 702–710). Don Pelayo himself was an *espatario* (royal guard) for King Witiza, the same person who expelled him from Toledo after his father's death. He traveled north to the village of Túy with his sister and other relatives. According to the legend, Munuzza, the governor of Gijón, fell in love with Don Pelayo's sister. Munuzza captured him and sent him to Córdoba, but he managed to escape from his Muslim captors. He traveled north to Asturias, where he hid at Mount Auseva, particularly in the Cave of Santa Maria. Don Pelayo was joined by the sparse group of people who were also living in the caves, hiding from the Muslims. These comrades chose him as their leader before the battle of Covadonga.

In the city of Córdoba, the Wazir of Al-Andalus, al-Kalbi (r. 721–726), knew about the rebels hiding in the mountains. He sent a Muslim army led by 'Alqama'r' and accompanied by one of Witiza's sons, Oppas. Oppas could not convince Don Pelayo to make peace with the Muslims, and this set the stage for the battle of Covadonga. Pelayo and his followers fought with tremendous courage. They used the rugged terrain and their surroundings to their advantage, and eventually the Muslims fled the region. After the battle, Don Pelayo established the capital of his kingdom in Cangas de Onís, where he reigned until his death in 737. Future generations of Christian warriors would forever be inspired by Don Pelayo's courage and leadership.

[See also Al-Andalus; Covadonga, Battle of; and Iberia, *subentry on Narrative* (500–1100).]

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María Torres Merritt

PÉPIN THE SHORT

(c. 714–768), Mayor of the Palace (741–751) and King of the Franks (r. 751–768). Regarding his numerous victories, there can be no doubt that Pépin, one of the sons of Charles Martel (d. 741), inherited the outstanding military abilities of his father. Like Charles, Pépin was almost always engaged militarily; there was practically no year without an expedition against his enemies. In the West, his enemy was the Hunoald, Duke of Aquitaine. In the spring of 742, in the beginning of his rule, Pépin initiated an expedition together with his brother Carloman against Duke Hunoald to enforce the Frankish claim of superiority and supremacy over Aquitaine, the region south of the Loire. The Frankish mayors of the palace were following the tradition of their father when demonstrating the military capacities of the Frankish war machine.

In 743 Pépin and his brother Carloman undertook military expeditions against forces in Bavaria, where their sister Hiltrud had fled to Duke Odilo. The brothers won a victory at the Lech against the Bavarians and could go over the river. In 744, Pépin led an army against Theudebald, a brother of the former Duke of Alamannia and an ally of Odilo. In 745, Pépin and Carloman were again marching together into Aquitaine, where Duke Hunoald had to capitulate. His son Waifar was installed as new duke with the permission of the two mayors of the palace. In 746, the last resistance of the Alamanns was broken. In 747, an expedition into Saxony was started where Grifo, the half brother of Pépin and Carloman, had fled. In 747, an expedition into Bavaria began one more time.

In a certain sense, Pépin was fulfilling the legacy of his father when by the end of the 750s, he had conquered the whole coastal region of the Gallia Narbonensis, where his father had previously fought brilliantly against the Muslims. The Arabs were now driven by Pépin southward over the Pyrenees. In the 760s, Duke Hunoald and Aquitaine were the object of a systematic, year-by-year warfare by Pépin. The last resistance ended in 768 with the murder of Duke Hunoald, for which Pépin was held responsible.

In autumn 747, Carloman, with whom Pépin had cooperated, retired into Monte Cassino, the famous mother-abbey of the Benedictine order. The fact that Pépin was now the only accepted leader of the Franks allowed him to pursue a new policy. Pope Stephen was calling for help against the Lombards and the Mayor of the Palace wanted a new legal basis for his governance over the Franks; therefore, the pope and Pépin formed a coalition, which was directed against the former brothers-in-arms of the Franks, the Lombards. It was a profitable deal for both sides. Pépin was elected *rex Francorum* by the Frankish nobility and received the title "king" by permission of Pope Stephen, and the last Merovingian king had to go into the cloister (in 751). The pope received military help from Pépin, whom he anointed in 754 after traveling over the Alps. In the late summer of 754, Pépin went with his comparatively small army over the Alps. He defeated the Lombard army of King Aistulf and besieged him in his capital Pavia. Two years later, in 756, Pépin, repeated his expedition to the South. One more time, Pavia was enclosed, and Aistulf had to accept an unfavorable treaty. With this new aggressive policy against the Lombards, Pépin was responsible for the *renversement des alliances*, at the end of which the conquest of the Lombard kingdom by Pépin's son Charlemagne in 774 was the logical consequence.

[See also Charlemagne and Charles Martel.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

PEREIASLAVL, BATTLE OF (1149)

Pereiaslavl played an important role in border defense, and the issue of who controlled it was critical from a Kievan point of view.

Mid-twelfth-century Kievan Rus' was torn by internal power struggles. The retinues of the contending princes were not strong enough to decide the outcome, so many princes formed alliances among themselves or asked their neighbors for aid. In 1146 Kiev was seized by Iziaslav Mstislavich (r. 1146–1149, 1150–1154), whose right to the principality was challenged by Yuri Dolgoruki (Prince of Vladimir-Suzdal, r. 1132–1154, Kievan Grand Prince, r. 1154–1157). Yuri was Vladimir Monomakh's youngest son and Iziaslav Mstislavich his grandson, so in order of precedence Yuri preceded Iziaslav. Iziaslav was the eldest son of Vladimir Monomakh's eldest son, so he too had a good position in the precedence order, though he belonged to a younger generation than Yuri.

Iziaslav became the Grand Prince in 1146, and in the summer of 1149 Yuri launched the first significant attack against him. Both tried to enter into alliances with other princes. Chernigov's princes sometimes supported one, sometimes the other. Not even direct kinship determined who backed whom. Yuri's son Rostislav, for example, long supported Iziaslav. In the summer of 1149, probably on about 24 July, Yuri began his march on Kiev. On 6 August he encamped at Yarishevo, on the border of the Pereiaslavl district, where he negotiated with Sviatoslav, Prince of Chernigov. On 8 August Yuri and Sviatoslav tried to win over the princes living along the Desna River to their campaign against Iziaslav, but the princes supported Iziaslav. Yuri crossed the Dnieper at Kanev accompanied by only two others and went on to Kiev. Yuri entered Pereiaslavl unopposed. According to Berezhevskii's analysis of the dating of the Kievan Chronicle, the capture of Pereiaslavl traditionally

dated to 23 August actually took place between 21 and 23 August.

The outcome of the capture illustrates well the key position of Pereiaslavl in the defense of Kiev. After the capture of Pereiaslavl, Yuri's route to Kiev was clear. There was no resistance in Kiev, and the defenders of the city joined the victor of Pereiaslavl, forcing Iziaslav to leave the city and leaving Yuri to become Grand Prince. Iziaslav's defeat was also due to the fact that, unlike in earlier and later years, he received no help on this occasion from his brother-in-law, the king of Hungary.

[See also Pereiaslavl, Siege of (1096), and Slavic Lands, *subentry* on Narrative (1000-1300).]

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Márta Font

PEREIASLAVL, SIEGE OF (1096)

The medieval fortress of Pereiaslavl was built south-east of Kiev at the confluence of the Trubezh, a left tributary of the Dnieper and the Al'ta, most likely in the second half of the eleventh century when

Kiev had to assure the defense against the Cumans (Russian: *Polovtsy*) from the steppe. The same was the aim of the "snake ramparts" (Russian: *zmievyyaly*) built to the south and east of Pereiaslavl along the Dnieper and joining the Sula River.

The Cuman attacks against the Kievan Rus' started in the mid-eleventh century and were reinvigorated in the 1090s. Their victories were facilitated by conflicts among the princes of the Rus' in which the grandsons of Yaroslav the Wise struggled for dominance. The Kievan grand prince, Sviatopolk (1093-1113), and Vladimir Monomakh of Pereiaslavl (prince 1094-1113; and later grand prince in Kiev 1113-1125) drove away their nephew Oleg. Oleg first took possession of Tmutarakan and tried to seize Chernigov with Cuman help. The two other princes and Sviatoslav, the son of Vladimir, who had even married the daughter of a Cuman leader (Tugorkan), negotiated with the Cumans, yet the attack could not be averted.

On Saturday, 3 March 1096, Sviatoslav and Vladimir chased Oleg away from Chernigov. He found refuge in a smaller fortress, Starodub, which was besieged for thirty-three days before Oleg finally surrendered. Meanwhile, on Sunday night, perhaps on 4 May, the Cuman troops, commanded by Khan Boniak, looted Kiev's neighborhood, setting fire to Berestovo, the princely court. Khan Kurya sacked the surroundings of Pereiaslavl on 24 May. Oleg left Starodub for Smolensk and then for Riazan. Another troop of Cumans attacked Pereiaslavl, but they could not enter the city because all the gates were closed. Military aid was provided by Sviatoslav and Vladimir, who moved along the right side of the Dnieper, to attack the Cumans from the rear. Finally they reached the ford at Zarub, to the south of the mouth of the Trubezh. The Cumans did not realize they had crossed the river. Moving along the Trubezh, Vladimir's troops moved behind the Cumans and even crossed the Trubezh. The troops of Pereiaslavl left the city and joined them. After crossing the Trubezh, Vladimir tried to re-form his troops, but without delaying to form up, they spurred their horses and attacked the Cumans. Thus they achieved a great and unexpected victory,

leaving Tugorkan, his son, and many Cuman leaders dead on the battlefield.

The day of the victory is dated 19 July in the *Primary Chronicle*. This is probably incorrect, however, as the course of events makes 19 June more probable. The two princes may have turned against Tugorkan, who attacked on 30 May, after the siege of Starodub. Based on this date the battle probably took place on 19 June.

The victory at Pereiaslavl provoked a new Cuman attack. This time Boniak's troops looted the monasteries close to Kiev: the Cave Monastery, the Vydu-bich Monastery, and the Saint Stephen Monastery of the Klov district of the town. The grave situation led the princes of the Rus' to regulate the *volost'* system among themselves. In the following year (1097) they gathered in Liubech with this in mind and declared that everyone could retain the *volost'* he had inherited from his father. This did not come true, although in 1100 and 1103 they tried again to reach an agreement.

[See also Cumans; Pereiaslavl, Battle of (1149); and Slavic Lands, *subentry on Narrative* (1000–1300).]

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Márta Font

PEREIRA, NUNO ÁLVARES

(1360–1431), constable of Portugal and one of the greatest Portuguese military leaders. He was the son of the prior of the Military Order of the Hospital and grandson of the archbishop of Braga, and his family was of Galician origin: there is documentary evidence of the Pereiras' presence in Portugal from the twelfth century, and by the end of the fourteenth century they had become one of the most distinguished families in the Portuguese court.

With the succession crisis that erupted in October 1383 upon the death of Fernando I, whose only daughter was married to the king of Castile, Nuno Álvares (himself an illegitimate and second-born son) chose to support the claims of João, Master of Avis (and bastard brother of the deceased Fernando I).

At the beginning of 1384 the Master of Avis made Nuno Álvares commander (*fronteiro*) of the Alentejo border region, with orders to check the movements of Castilian troops in the southern part of the country and prevent them from reaching Lisbon. On 6 April 1384 Nuno Álvares had his first great military victory at the battle of Atoleiros (near Estremoz), defeating a cavalry force sent by Juan I of Castile with a small army; according to the fifteenth-century Portuguese chronicler Fernão Lopes, he was the first in Portugal to wage battle on foot successfully.

In 1385 the Master of Avis was crowned king in the courts of Coimbra and immediately appointed Nuno Álvares as constable. In this role, he played a decisive role in the battle of Aljubarrota (14 August 1385), when the kings of Castile and Portugal came face to face. With the support of an English contingent, the Portuguese won a spectacular victory, using tactics that, in several respects, resembled the model developed by Edward III and Edward the Black Prince during the Hundred Years' War: defensive tactics involving the use of a narrow fighting position, the flanks of which were protected by natural barriers; the creation of camouflaged artificial obstacles such as ditches and pits; and the use of archers and cross-bowmen on the wings, slightly forward of a central base of dismounted men-at-arms. In October he won another victory over the Castilians in Valverde, in a battle near the Guadiana River, after a devastating incursion into Castilian territory.

Following these victories and others (including the capture of many castles), the king rewarded Nuno Álvares with titles (he became Count of Barcelos, Ourém, and Arraiolos), properties, and endowments that made him the most prominent lord of the realm. His daughter, Beatriz, married an illegitimate son of the king, receiving a dowry that would ultimately give rise to the mighty House of Bragança.

In 1415 Nuno Álvares also took part in the conquest of Ceuta, the first Portuguese offensive in North Africa. Seven years later, he entered the Carmo Monastery in Lisbon, which he himself had ordered to be built with great pomp and ceremony, offering it to the religious order of the Carmelites. In April 2009 he was canonized by Pope Benedict XVI.

[See also Aljubarrota, Battle of, and Ceuta, Siege and Battle of.]

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João Gouveia Monteiro

PERO NIÑO

(c. 1378–1453), Count of Buelna, warrior knight known for his skill in jousting and with a crossbow. Pero Niño's chivalric deeds place him in the tradition of William Marshal. Raised in the royal household with the future king Enrique III of Castile (r. 1390–1406), he took up arms at fifteen, first fighting rebels against the crown, then serving in a war against Portugal. In 1404 he obtained his first independent command of a squadron of galleys sailing the western Mediterranean in pursuit of corsairs. During this period he raided Muslim principalities in North Africa that regularly sent their corsairs against Christendom.

In 1405, Pero Niño brought three ships north to aid France in operations being conducted against the English, despite the existence of a truce. Over the course of nearly two years his squadron fought off Gascony and Brittany and north into the Channel, where he raided England's south coast from Cornwall to Plymouth and led a successful amphibious attack on the island of Jersey. Returning to Castile, he

was knighted in 1406, became commander of the royal bodyguard, and fought in a campaign against Moorish Granada. After being briefly exiled for marrying into the royal family without permission, he continued serving the Castilian crown for several decades, rising to become Count of Buelna in 1431.

Pero Niño is best remembered as the subject of *El victorial*, a chronicle account of his career written by his standard bearer, Gutierre Díaz de Gamez, that survives in several manuscripts and has become a classic of knightly literature. The first printed edition appeared in Spanish in 1782. It has subsequently been published not only in Spanish but also in French and, in an abridged version, in English. Most of the chronicle's text, including its most vivid military passages, detail Niño's activities during the opening decade of the fifteenth century.

[See also Iberia, subentry on Sources (1300–1500); and Marshal, William.]

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

PETER OF ARAGON

See Pedro III of Aragon and Pedro IV of Aragon.

PETER I OF CASTILE

See Pedro I of Castile.

PETER I

(b. 1329; r. 1359–1369), King of Cyprus and titular King of Jerusalem. Throughout his reign, Peter adopted a policy of aggression toward his Muslim neighbors, and this has traditionally been regarded as reflecting

his pious and adventurous personality. However, it was probably also motivated by economic concerns and intended to counter Turkish raids against Cyprus in the 1360s and to prevent Muslim ports from luring away trade from Famagusta, which was in economic decline. He therefore occupied the Anatolian ports of Corycus (in 1360) and Satalia (Antalya; in 1361) to prevent their use by Turkish raiders and to carry out counterattacks against adjoining Turkish settlements, including Anamur. The fortifications of these sites were strengthened and in 1367 Corycus successfully withstood a Turkish siege, aided by a Cypriot relieving fleet. Indeed, this port remained Christian until 1448, although Satalia reverted to the Turks in 1373. Meanwhile, on a visit to Avignon, Peter took the cross (in 1363), and in 1365 he led a predominantly Cypriot crusade against Egyptian Alexandria, which was temporarily occupied and partially destroyed. Peter had probably hoped to keep Alexandria, further weakening Muslim trade in the region and raising hopes that Jerusalem itself could be regained, but without additional Western support he had to withdraw. His aggression also raised fears of an imminent Muslim counterattack on Cyprus, where the construction of urban defenses around the capital city of Nicosia began. Moreover, in 1369 Peter's increasingly dictatorial attitude, his crippling taxes, and a growing weariness with the war caused his assassination.

This notwithstanding, Peter's military exploits and fund-raising visits to western Europe gained him a reputation as a chivalric figure. Indeed, Guillaume de Machaut's rhymed fourteenth-century chronicle portrays him as a paragon of late-medieval knight-hood, ranking him as the "Tenth Worthy" alongside figures like Charlemagne in the chivalric hierarchy. This description clashes with Peter's supposed willingness to slaughter Turkish civilians and to maltreat members of the Cypriot nobility, leading some historians to argue that Machaut was being ironic. However, contrasting portrayals of bravery and cruelty are not uncommon for other mid-fourteenth-century chivalric heroes, including the Black Prince. Indeed, Peter enjoyed links with many such figures participating in the Hundred Years' War,

and some even joined his crusade. His somewhat neglected career therefore provides us with a good example of the chivalric culture and crusading activities of the period.

[See also *Chivalric Biographies and Chivalry, subentry on Sources.*]

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Kristian Molin

PETER II

(d. 1382), King of Cyprus and titular King of Jerusalem (r. 1369–1382). Peter's reign was overshadowed by the Genoese invasion of 1373, which was triggered by a desire to gain greater control over the island's trade. Arriving with a force that one source claimed contained more than fourteen thousand troops and forty-three galleys, the Genoese tricked their way inside the walled port of Famagusta before briefly occupying the inland capital of Nicosia and laying siege to the powerful northern coastal fortress of Kyrenia. Stalemate then ensued, as Cypriot forces were too weak to regain Famagusta (which remained Genoese until 1464), while the Genoese lacked the resources to hold Nicosia, and in March 1374 the siege of Kyrenia ended after failed attacks by land and sea. Thereafter Peter focused on building

up Cypriot defenses to prevent the Genoese from expanding beyond Famagusta. At Nicosia he strengthened the urban defenses begun by his father Peter I (r. 1359–1369). He also replaced the latter's citadel (probably a large solitary tower built on a hill outside the city) with a fortress near the Paphos gate large enough to contain royal apartments. These defenses were also intended to deter attacks by the Mamluks of Egypt, who had conquered remaining crusader territories on the mainland in 1291, using armies that rarely contained fewer than ten thousand troops. To meet the continued threats of Genoese and Mamluk aggression, Peter II's fortifications were improved further by his successors James I (r. 1382–1398) and Janus (r. 1398–1432), who also strengthened strongholds elsewhere on Cyprus. However, structures dating from Peter II's reign are no longer extant, as they were replaced by artillery defenses during the period of Venetian dominance over Cyprus in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry* on Narrative (1204–1453), and Mamluks.]

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Kristian Molin

PFEDDERSHEIM, BATTLE OF

The battle of Pfeddersheim was the first military culmination of the Süddeutscher Fürstenkrieg (South German Princes' War, 1460–1461) between two noble factions, the followers of Emperor Frederick III on one side, and the House of Wittelsbach with its allies on the other. In the western theater of this war

the Wittelsbach elector Frederick I of the Palatinate faced an imperial alliance of southwest German princes led by the archbishop of Mainz, Diether of Isenburg; Count Palatine Louis of Veldenz; and Count Ulrich V of Württemberg.

The elector Palatine had since 23 June 1460 besieged the small town of Kleinbockenheim (near Worms, west of the Rhine) with 2,339 cavalry, three hundred Swiss mercenaries, and about twelve thousand infantry. But in early July the archbishop of Mainz and Louis of Veldenz approached with eight thousand men in order to relieve the hard-pressed town. Elector Frederick left just a few infantry to maintain the siege and advanced quickly to meet the enemy.

On 4 July the armies made contact near Pfeddersheim and immediately established wagon fortresses to secure their positions. The elector soon had a small detachment of three hundred knights assault the archbishop's cavalry. Commanding about four thousand men-at-arms, Diether of Isenburg easily repelled this attack and began to pursue the fugitives. Elector Frederick had, however, been lying in wait with the bulk of his cavalry, and he made a flank attack on the surprised enemy, who took flight, while their wagon fortress was overrun by the Palatine infantry.

Casualties among the defeated amounted to several hundred, many of whom were killed as they fled. At least two hundred men-at-arms, including four counts, and 370 foot soldiers were taken prisoner by the Palatinate's forces, who also captured approximately six hundred horses, ten guns, and more than nine hundred wagons with their loads. As a consequence of this crushing defeat, the archbishop changed sides and allied himself with Elector Frederick on 18 July 1460.

[See also Frederick III of Habsburg.]

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Uwe Tresp

PHILIP II

(1165–1223), King of France (r. 1180–1223). Fat, prematurely bald, duplicitous, and a reluctant commander in the field, Philip Augustus was hardly the epitome of chivalrous knighthood. During the Third Crusade at the siege of Acre (1189–1191), he and joint leader King Richard I both suffered from an obscure disease called arnoldia. Philip used this as an excuse to scurry back to France, where he broke his word and crusading convention in order to attack Richard's French lands, much to the scorn of contemporary chroniclers and the embarrassment of French ones. When Richard returned from captivity to fight in France, he would gleefully challenge Philip to single combat, a deliberate taunt that he knew the less aggressive French king would reject. Yet Philip was one of the greatest and most successful military commanders of the entire Middle Ages.

On succeeding to the throne in 1180, he doggedly consolidated the crown's position. He defeated his chief enemies, defeating the English to win Normandy, Maine, Anjou, and Touraine, thereby establishing Capetian dominance in France and smashing the Angevin Empire. At the battle of Bouvines in 1214, one of the most important battles of the Middle Ages, he defeated an invading coalition of English and Germans, thereby securing his throne for the last decade of his life. He achieved all this not by prowess on the battlefield (where he remained in the shadow of Richard for ten years), but through a combination of less showy but no less important attributes of good generalship. One of Philip's greatest strengths was to acknowledge his own limitations and act accordingly: he was happy to delegate command to more able field commanders, such as the colorful William des Barres, and was wise enough to ignore Richard's personal challenges.

Historians have considered Philip lucky in that Richard, his most formidable opponent, who regularly trounced him in the field (as at the humiliation of Fréteval in 1194), had his reign cut short by his own death in action at Chalus-Chabrol in 1199. However, this can be interpreted as an affirmation

of the wisdom of Philip's innate caution: his aversion to personal risk wherever possible saw him die of old age, having faced no fewer than four Angevin kings and leaving his inheritance secure without the troubles that beset England. Richard's death meant the accession of the incompetent John, who was no match for Philip, leading directly to Philip's great territorial triumph in the annexation of Normandy in 1204 and the collapse of the Angevin Empire. Longevity and the stability it provided proved real military assets.

Philip owed his success above all to his mastery of poliorcetics (the art of siege warfare and fortification): he was a castle-breaker almost without parallel. Dogged determination and attention to logistical detail ensured that vital strongholds fell into his hands after epic sieges. Investitures of up to six months at Château-Gaillard, Loches, and Chinon from 1203 to 1205 were pivotal in his great conquests. At the winter siege of Château-Gaillard, Philip revealed his steely ruthlessness and single-mindedness when he refused any assistance to the noncombatant refugees trapped between the castle and French lines: most died of starvation or exposure. Following his close brush with death at the battle of Bouvines, where he was saved only by the sacrifice of his personal bodyguard, Philip largely retired from military campaigning. The military accomplishments of this unlikely warrior have ensured Philip's place as one of France's greatest kings.

[See also Bouvines, Battle of; Château-Gaillard, Siege of; Fréteval, Battle of; and Richard I of England and Anjou.]

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Sean McGlynn

PHILIP VI

(1293–1350), King of France from 1328 to his death. When Charles IV of France died, the throne passed to his cousin Philip, Count of Valois, Maine, and Anjou, despite the arguably superior claims of Edward III of England, Charles's young nephew. To strengthen his political position as the first ruler of a new dynasty—the Valois—Philip immediately undertook a military campaign in support of his vassal the Count of Flanders, culminating in a hard-fought but definite battlefield victory at Cassel. Philip's martial ambitions next turned to the organization of a great crusade to the Holy Land, on which he hoped to be joined by Edward. But his efforts in this direction foundered on the rock of conflicting English and French policies regarding Scotland. Edward, aiming to reassert English sovereignty over Scotland, backed his protégé Edward de Balliol in a war to overthrow David Bruce, son of Robert I, whom Philip was unbendingly determined to support. In combination with disputes over the Agenais and Gascony, this led to the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War in 1337.

In the first phase of the war, Philip led major armies against the Anglo-imperial invaders of his realm in 1339 and 1340, but both times he chose not to risk a decisive battle. Although many of his own subjects decried this "foxy" (overly cautious) behavior, strategically it was a wise application of Vegetian defensive strategy and was quite effective. It was politically impossible, however, for Philip to ignore the larger-scale devastation inflicted by Edward III's *chevauchée* of 1346, including the sack of Caen and many other towns. When efforts to pin the English army against a river failed, King Philip resolved to attack. His management of the ensuing battle of Crécy was poor, and the French were crushingly defeated despite their much superior numbers. Philip himself fought bravely, reportedly being unhorsed twice and wounded three times. After his banner-bearer was killed at his side, he was drawn off the field. The next year Philip declined to do battle again with Edward's army and so failed to break the siege of Calais. This was characteristic of Philip's

military record: he was generally cautious, but considering his adversaries, sensibly so.

[See also Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Cassel, Battle of (1328); Crécy, Battle of; Edward III of England; France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); and Hundred Years' War.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

PHILIP THE BOLD

Philip II, Duke of Burgundy (1342–1404), younger son of John II, King of France, was born in Vincennes in 1342, and in September 1356, at the age of fourteen, he took part in the battle of Poitiers at his father's side; it was there, for his refusal to flee with his older brothers, that he earned his sobriquet. He became duke of Burgundy in 1363–1364 by royal grant; in 1384, through his wife, Margaret de Male, daughter of the count of Flanders, he received the counties of Flanders, Artois, Burgundy (Franche-Comté), and Nevers. He was thus the founder of the political and territorial power of the Valois dukes of Burgundy.

During the reign of his elder brother Charles V (1364–1380), as a "prince of the fleurs-de-lys," Philip had military responsibilities, as did his brothers Louis I, Duke of Anjou and Count of Provence, and John, Duke of Berry. Thus, Philip was a commander against the mercenary "great companies" from 1365 to 1368 and, above all, against the English and the partisans of Charles II, the Bad, of Navarre from 1369 to 1380. In particular, during this period Philip directed guerrilla operations against the English *chevauchées* (specific planned raids into French territories) conducted by Robert Knolles in 1370, John of Gaunt, the Duke of Lancaster, in 1369 and in 1373, and Thomas of Woodstock, the Earl of Buckingham, in 1380.

He also took part in campaigns of reconquest involving sieges of forts, such as those against the English on the Guyenne border in 1372 and against the Navarrais in Normandy in 1378. He received some important delegations in his capacity as king's lieutenant in the regions of Burgundy, Lyon, Champagne, Laon, and Soissons in 1364; king's lieutenant in Picardy in 1369; and captain-general of the entire kingdom in 1380. These titles and functions should not mask the fact that Philip never distinguished himself as a great war leader. He occupied posts where his authority and prestige as "prince of the blood" of France were necessary, but it was up to the king and his council to lay out the strategic lines, and it was the less prestigious but more skillful captains who oversaw the successful execution of tactical operations.

After the death of Charles V, Philip and his brothers dominated the royal council between 1380 and 1388, and Philip was able to control military operations more directly than before. Although he was not the official head of the royal armies, he was the actual organizer of the expeditions undertaken against the Flemish revolts of 1382–1385, marked by the French victory at the battle of Westrozebeke (27 November 1382) and the siege of Bourbourg (September 1383). Philip was also the originator of an aborted plan to invade England in 1386, and of the campaign against the duchy of Gelderland in 1388, a costly and fruitless operation. That was the end of his role as a maker of military policy for the royal government. Thereafter, he formed part of the vast diplomatic undertaking that aimed, during the 1390s, to settle peacefully the conflict between the kingdoms of France and England. He died in Hal, in 1404.

[See also *Great Companies and Westrozebeke, Battle of.*]

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Bertrand Schnerb
Translated from the French by
Johanna M. Baboukis

PHOKAS

(547–610), Byzantine emperor (r. 602–610). When Maurice ordered a corps of the Byzantine army to winter north of the Lower Danube, some officers led by the centurion Phokas mutinied. They perceived this order as an unjustified punishment. The same Phokas was involved in a protest against the misconduct of General Komentiolos, in 598. The rebellious soldiers advanced on Constantinople, where a civilian revolt had already begun. Phokas seized the throne on 23 November 602 and killed the former emperor and his relatives. This was the first military usurpation in Byzantine history.

The rebellion left some parts of the Danube frontier undefended, and this allowed the Avars and Slavs to invade. The Persian emperor Khosrow II, formerly an ally of Maurice, resumed the war to avenge the usurpation. All Byzantine troops were moved from the Danube to the eastern front, and a burdensome treaty peace was made with the Avars in 604. Yet the Persians obtained victory after victory during Phokas' reign, sometimes helped by provincial rebellions. Initially a war of attrition, successes came in 609–610 when Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine were conquered by the Persians. A mutiny started by the commander of the African province, Herakleios, in the spring of 608, helped by other enemies of Phokas in Constantinople and in the provinces, ousted Phokas. In October 610, Herakleios's army entered the capital and executed Phokas.

Phokas was a rough military man without a strategic vision who became emperor accidentally. He followed a brutal policy against hostile generals and aristocrats to obtain internal stability but failed to repel external threats.

[See also *Herakleios and Maurice.*]

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Alexandru Madgearu

PICCININO, NICCOLÒ

(c. 1386–1444), commander and innovative tactician. Although Braccio da Montone is rightly considered a major innovator in the field of Italian Renaissance warfare, it fell to his pupil and fellow citizen of Perugia Niccolò Piccinino to refine and perfect his master's teachings. Piccinino was the son of a solid upper-middle-class Perugian family. After Braccio's death at the battle of L'Aquila in 1424, the thirty-eight-year-old Piccinino served under Braccio's son and heir, rising after the latter's untimely demise to the leadership of the Bracceschi. In the service of Florence until 1426, Piccinino subsequently entered the pay of the Duke of Milan, Filippo Maria Visconti, and remained in his employment for the rest of his life. Piccinino's loyalty stemmed partially from his becoming the duke's main condottiere, but also from a lifelong hope of eventually acquiring some kind of territorial lordship—a desire that the wily duke exploited to the utmost by pitting Piccinino against the rather more politically astute condottiere Francesco Sforza. Visconti's scheming increased the enmity between the two men, both leaders of rival schools of military thinking.

Visconti gave Piccinino secure employment, while keeping him constantly active through an expansionist policy. Milan was one of the great centers of arms production in Europe and a hub of technological development, and both these factors allowed Piccinino to perfect his fighting techniques. A daring commander with a knack for military inventiveness, he added the shock of firearms to Braccio's fast-rotating cavalry squadron tactic. Handgunners played a prominent role in his tactical outlook, working alongside the traditional infantry armed with shield and staff weapons. Believing speed and surprise to be the key to success, Piccinino introduced a novel, synergistic use of horse and foot. His armies always contained contingents of mounted infantry, and by putting his handgunners in the saddle, he pioneered the concept of dragoons. The battle of Anghiari (1440), although ending in Piccinino's defeat, is a good example of the Milanese condottiere's tactics. Piccinino launched an attack with

a relatively small force, intending to charge the Florentine camp with his cavalry once the enemy forces had been disrupted by small-arms fire.

Audacity became Piccinino's trademark, and sometimes it was his undoing. By abandoning his post at L'Aquila to help Braccio da Montone win the day, he eventually caused his mentor's defeat and death. Although Piccinino usually managed to outmaneuver his enemies through speed and strategic surprise, this worked only with adversaries prepared to play such a game. Francesco Sforza, for instance, refused to be lured, and Piccinino barely escaped capture when surprised by Gattamelata (Erasmo da Narni) while sacking Verona. Likewise, by attacking an alerted enemy, he met defeat at Anghiari. Against these defeats he could boast a string of victories and, more important, the capacity of attracting to his banners some of the most distinguished captains of the time, including Federico da Montefeltro.

Moreover, Filippo Maria found Piccinino useful not just as a field commander, but also as a pawn of an elaborate political game intended to contain Francesco Sforza's ambitions. Both Sforza and Piccinino had territorial aspirations—ultimately the duchy of Milan itself—and even after Francesco married the duke's daughter, his wily father-in-law used Piccinino as a counterpoint to contain Sforza's ambition.

[See also Braccio da Montone and the Bracceschi; Condottieri; Erasmo da Narni; and Federico da Montefeltro.]

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Niccolò Capponi

PILLAGING

See Devastation and Ravaging and Plunder, Division of.

PILLENREUTH POND, BATTLE OF

When Albert (Albrecht) Achilles, third son of Frederick, elector of Brandenburg, inherited Ansbach in 1440, he immediately attempted to enlarge the territory, with the aim of creating a "Frankish dukedom" and increasing his political influence. This inevitably brought him into conflict with the strong and financially powerful free imperial city of Nuremberg, which controlled the important Main River crossing at Schweinfurt, and hence posed a threat to Margrave Achilles's plans in the region. After the settlement of disputes broke down because of Albert's excessive demands, with him contesting some of Nuremberg's essential rights and requesting considerable territorial concessions, both sides armed for war. The conflict began in July 1449 and lasted until 27 April 1450.

In 1443 Albert Achilles had allied himself with the Archbishop and Elector of Mainz, Dietrich von Erbach, and with Bishop Gottfried of Würzburg against a league of forty-four south German cities. Nuremberg joined this league a year later. The margrave created a public feud with Nuremberg with his *Veyndbriff* (letter from an enemy) of 29 June 1449. Nuremberg's *Absagebrief* (letter of refusal) of 2 July on behalf of the league led to a major military clash, which is recorded in the annals as the "War of the South German Cities." Characteristic of operations on both sides was the avoidance of direct confrontation in open battle in the summer and fall of 1449. Instead, each side devastated enemy territory, plundered and burned villages and towns, and seized a few strongholds: the margrave took the small fortress of Lichtenau on 13 August, and the Nuremberg forces stormed the city and castle of Windsbach on 20 September.

The final, decisive meeting of the two armies occurred on 11 March 1450 near the fishpond next to the Augustinian monastery of Pillenreuth, both of which belonged to Nuremberg. Albert Achilles pitched camp here, started to plunder the fishpond, and sent a message to the Nuremberg city council inviting them to come and dine on their own fish. A Nuremberg contingent of five hundred cavalry,

fifty handgunners, and four thousand foot soldiers responded immediately to this brash invitation and proceeded to Pillenreuth Pond under the leadership of Kunz von Kaufungen and Heinrich Reiss, knights in the service of the city. By his own report, the margrave had at his disposal more than 350 horsemen and fifty foot soldiers; however, according to the mayor of Nuremberg, Erhard Schürstab, who himself fought as a captain, Albert commanded over five hundred cavalry and many foot soldiers.

The battle formation of the cavalry was similar on both sides, consisting of a front line and several lines behind it. The lords in the Nuremberg front line are listed by name in the conflict's chronicle. The infantry formation is unclear, but the battle was decided quickly. Kunz von Kaufungen pressed forward with mounted handgunners and ordered them to fire their weapons and then feign flight. Margrave Albert's horsemen pursued them in disorder and in this loose formation ran directly into Heinrich von Plauen's firm battle line of Nuremberg forces. These troops easily withstood the scattered attacks of Albert's knights and launched a counterattack. Albert Achilles himself fought bravely on the front line but could not hold his ground and, in desperation, called for a retreat. His men fled from the field, abandoning weapons and armor. The Nuremberg troops pursued them as far as Schwabach. The margrave's losses are said to have been considerable: eighty dead, 120 captured, and two hundred horses. The Nuremberg army seized three banners, including Albert Achilles's standard, and hung them as trophies in the city's Church of Saint Mary.

Albert did defeat another Nuremberg contingent on 14 April near the Sulz monastery, but this did not outweigh the Pillenreuth defeat. Both sides were weary of war, and on 27 April 1450 they agreed to a peace mediated by Duke Ludwig of Lower Bavaria. Nuremberg retained the rights and possessions that Albert had disputed. The margrave, however, was awarded damages, which the wealthy city of Nuremberg had no difficulty paying.

[See also Albert III Achilles.]

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Volker Schmidtchen

Translated from the German by

Johanna M. Baboukis

PIPO OF OZORA

(1369–1426), Hungarian statesman, financier, one of the most faithful supporters and successful generals of King Sigismund of Luxemburg, known also as Filippo Scolari. Born into the family of an impoverished burgher in Tizzano (near Florence), Filippo came to Hungary as an apprentice trader. A man of great talent and intelligence, Filippo advanced quickly under various patrons. In 1399–1400 he received from King Sigismund—whom he then supported during the antiroyal uprisings (1401, 1403)—important offices in the financial administration, and he contributed greatly to the military and political consolidation of Sigismund's power. In 1399 he married the daughter and heiress of Andrew of Ozora; thereafter he was known as Pipo of Ozora, and, unlike most of Sigismund's foreign supporters, he consciously strove to become a Hungarian. By 1415 he was one of the most powerful men in the kingdom, governing seven southeastern counties, with more than thirteen royal castles under his control, and heading the entire financial administration.

As count of Temes from 1404, an office Pipo considered his most important, he had his seat in Temesvár (Timișoara, Romania), and he was put in charge of the military organization of southern

Hungary, even holding the banate of Szörény (1408–1409), adjacent to the county of Temes. It was in this capacity that Pipo had to contend with the Ottomans, whose increasing activity on the southern borders of Hungary had become a constant menace. Following Italian practice, Pipo greatly improved the fortifications of the southern border and contributed significantly to the establishment of the two lines of fortifications that were built from the lower Danube to the Dalmatian coast. It was Pipo, among Sigismund's generals, who led the most campaigns to different countries and who achieved the greatest successes.

Pipo was a brave, determined, highly intelligent man who was able not only to read and write but also to reckon, a rare skill among the nobles of his time. It is highly probable that his successes were due rather to his personal qualities and skills than to his military expertise. According to his biographer, Poggio Bracciolini, Pipo was most successful against the Turks, although there is no documentary evidence of the details of these campaigns. Pipo's expeditions to Bosnia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Walachia between 1406 and 1426 were carried out in order to realize King Sigismund's plan concerning the creation of a buffer zone with vassal princes along the southern borders of Hungary, in order to ward off Ottoman attacks.

After Venice refused in the early 1400s to pay the annual tax to King Sigismund and began a large-scale expansion on the Italian mainland and the Balkan coast of the Adriatic, Pipo was sent with an army to Italy in 1411. The main theaters of war were to be Istria and Friuli. In December 1411, near Conegliano, Pipo triumphed over the Venetian army and occupied almost all of Friuli. Despite these initial successes, King Sigismund in April 1413 agreed to a five-year armistice and a few years later accepted the loss of Dalmatia. The only theater of war where Pipo proved unsuccessful was Bohemia, where, during Sigismund's second Bohemian campaign, Jan Žižka's Hussite army defeated him in January 1422. In addition to his independent military activity, he participated in all the campaigns led by King Sigismund himself and was an important diplomat.

[See also Banate; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Sigismund of Luxemburg; and Žižka, Jan.]

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István Petrovics

PISA, SIEGE OF

On 6 September 1405 a popular uprising expelled all Florentine forces from Pisa, six days after they had taken possession of the city, sold to Florence by its *signore* Gabriele Maria Visconti through the mediation of Jean le Meingre (known as Boucicaut), the French governor of Genoa.

Determined to annex its ancient rival, Florence proceeded with the complete diplomatic isolation of Pisa, while its forces conquered most of the castles and towns of the Pisan domain, and Genoese and Provençal galleys in its service blockaded the mouth of the Arno River. Siege operations began in earnest in March 1406, after a new authoritative Florentine political leadership had entered office and the water level of the Arno permitted the execution of a complete blockade of Pisa.

The Florentine forces—fifteen hundred lances of heavy cavalry and five thousand infantry—camped on the left bank of the Arno about 4 miles (about 6.4 kilometers) downstream of Pisa and started building two *bastie* (bastions) on the banks of the

river, connected with a pontoon bridge and an iron chain that interrupted the flow of victuals into Pisa from the sea. As the construction of the *bastie* neared completion despite a flood and an unsuccessful Pisan sortie, on 21 June part of the Florentine army was sent three miles (almost five kilometers) upstream of Pisa on the right bank of the river to camp. Later the rest of the army proceeded up the left bank to the same level to complete the encirclement of Pisa.

Despite the heroic resistance of the citizens of Pisa, on whose shoulders the defense of the city had rested almost entirely, the situation of the city was desperate by mid-September, and the Pisan *capitano del popolo* Giovanni Gambacorti began secret negotiations, allowing Florentine forces to enter the city on 9 October unopposed by its starving defenders.

[See also Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493), and Jean II le Meingre.]

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Maurizio Arfaio

PLANS, MILITARY

Written military plans were rare during the medieval period. Proposals for specific campaigns were drawn up from the late thirteenth century on, but these were usually composed by theorists or religious writers to make a political or moral point. Very few of these plans were put into practice.

The bulk of military plans aimed at the recovery of the Holy Land from the Mamluks of Egypt. Some were prepared for the Second Council of Lyons (1274), and plans continued to appear after the loss of Acre in 1291. Writers included: Ramon Llull, Majorcan knight-turned-mystic, who wrote at least seven plans of varying levels of detail; Charles II, king of Naples; and Pierre Dubois. Their major concerns were that the Christians of Europe should be at peace with each other before the campaign

started, and that there should be an embargo on trade with the Muslims. Most writers also believed that the various military religious orders should be unified to form a single military force. These prerequisites reflect the perceived reasons for earlier failures against Islamic forces. Planners also suggested a two-stage campaign: a small raiding expedition to soften up the enemy prior to the major campaign. Because Palestine, the heart of the Holy Land, does not have easily defended frontiers, some suggested that the planned crusade should invade Egypt or farther west on the North African coast, and then march east to Palestine, so that the region's southwest frontier was secure. One problem these plans never fully solved was how the Holy Land should be ruled once it was conquered. The Kingdom of Jerusalem, which fell to the Mamluks in 1291, had been governed by a hereditary lay monarchy relying on lay nobles and military religious orders for its combat strength. One suggestion was that the new kingdom should be governed by the master of the new, unified military religious order, along the lines of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. But was that master to be chosen by the brothers of the new order or by the kings of Europe from among their own sons? Clearly no king would be happy to see the son of a rival gain control of a powerful military force and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, so this question remained unsettled.

A military plan was produced in France at the end of the thirteenth century by Benedict Zaccaria, admiral of Castile, who advised King Philip IV of France on how best to invade England. He specified precise numbers of men, horses, and ships, plus the total cost. Although (in the judgement of J. F. Verbruggen), this was a feasible plan, it was never used. Similar documents were prepared in the French court for offensives against Gascony in 1327 (envisioning a cost of 866,700 livres) and 1329. A decade later Nicholas Béhuchet wrote up a plan for Philip VI to strike a blow at England by intercepting its merchant and fishing fleets and destroying them, thus depriving Edward III of the sailors and revenues he needed to wage the Hundred Years' War. Much narrower in scope was a plan drawn up in 1347 by Hugues de

Cardailhac for the defense of Bioule, and another in 1325 by John of Namur for the defense of the city of Ghent against Flemish rebels. Verbruggen argues that this latter plan was responsible for John of Namur's subsequent success against the rebels. Perhaps such a limited plan was more practicable than the far-reaching plans for major expeditions.

[See also Strategy; Tactics, Battle; and Theory, Military.]

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Helen Nicholson

PLEICHFELD, BATTLE OF

In the final major battle Henry IV fought in Germany, his attempt to relieve the siege of Würzburg failed when rebel forces drove the imperial army from the field. The city then surrendered, but Henry later reconquered it and the rebellion gradually lost strength.

Anti-king Hermann von Salm and Welf IV of Bavaria, the rebel commanders, sought to regain control of the Main river route and restore Adalbero as bishop of Würzburg. Henry assigned Frederick of Swabia and Bishop Meinhard to defend the city and gathered a large army, reportedly more than twenty thousand effectives. The rebels intercepted him northeast of Würzburg with about ten thousand troops divided into three contingents: Duke

Welf's, the Magdeburg contingent (perhaps commanded by Hermann), and the "vassals of Saint Peter" (probably Swabians under ecclesiastical leadership). When the battle began, some imperial troops (including those commanded by the bishops of Cologne and Utrecht) immediately left the field, and those remaining fled or were defeated. One report claims the rebels lost thirty men, while the imperial dead were heaped in mounds. Würzburg was important strategically because it controlled communications between Saxony and Swabia (the main areas of rebel strength) and politically because Adalbero was a significant leader among the ecclesiastics opposing Henry. Both sides showed operational mastery: Henry IV raised a large force in just a few weeks, whereas the rebels successfully concentrated units from Saxony and Swabia. The large contingent of foot soldiers in Henry's army might have been expected, as much of his force would have been raised from local levies, yet the emperor was able to rely on his infantry to maintain discipline and fight long enough to cover a successful retreat. A significant proportion of the rebel force also fought on foot, having left their horses at the siege, possibly as a ruse to deter a sortie by the defenders. The rebel vassals of Saint Peter used a wagon-standard, similar to the Italian *carroccio*, either for additional command and control or perhaps as propaganda to suggest they fought on behalf of the church. Pro-imperial sources naturally blamed the retreat of some of Henry's forces at the outset on treachery, though there is some room to think of it as a feigned retreat gone bad. Since the wing of the imperial army that initially fled was opposite the vassals of Saint Peter, it is equally plausible that its commanders, as at Mellrichstadt, did not want to fight against fellow churchmen on the rebel side.

Most importantly, Pleichfeld demonstrates the limits of decisive battle in medieval warfare. The rebels achieved almost every tactical result they could have desired—Henry's army defeated, the emperor forced to flee, and Adalbero restored to his see in Würzburg. Yet in the long run, they still lost the war. Once the rebel army had to disperse because of logistics, Henry raised another army, recovered

Würzburg, and captured Adalbero. Henry's military and political position as emperor was too strong. When his treatment of Adalbero indicated conciliation was possible, rebel leaders began to negotiate instead of fight.

[See also Henry IV, Emperor and Mellrichstadt, Battle of.]

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Edward Schoenfeld

PLISKA, BATTLE OF

Determined to conquer the Bulgarian khanate and its capital, Pliska, the Byzantine emperor Nikephoros I (802–811) gathered an army of some seventy thousand near Adrianople (Edirne) in May 811. A special unit, the Tagma of the Hikanatoi, headed by the emperor's son Stavrakios, was formed, and the emperor's son-in-law Michael Rhangabe also participated in the campaign. Nikephoros's easy advance from Adrianople to the stronghold of Markellai (Marcellae) (now Karnobat, Bulgaria) surprised the Bulgarians. Khan Krum (802–814) sent envoys to the emperor with a proposal for peace, which was rejected. On 11 July 811 the Byzantine army successfully negotiated the unguarded passes and gorges of the Balkans and entered mainland Bulgaria. Information concerning the Bulgarians' counteraction is contradictory. An account in the mid-ninth century *Pippo Spano* (see Nemeth Papo), the most detailed source on this campaign, compiled from participants' testimony, states that before entering Pliska the Byzantines fought "an army of selected armed Bulgarians," about twelve thousand strong, all of whom died. Thereafter they were opposed by a fifty-thousand-strong army that shared the same fate. A message was sent to Constantinople in which the victories

were attributed to Stavrakios and the Tagma of the Hikanatoi. The Bulgarian khan relinquished the defense of Pliska and retreated with the remnants of his army to the Balkan mountains. The Byzantines destroyed and set fire to Pliska. The Byzantine army was planning to withdraw through Serdica (Sofia, Bulgaria), but the road was blocked, and the army was forced to go through the pass of Vărbitza, where the Byzantines walked into a trap and were completely encircled. There, in the early morning of 26 July 811, the army was utterly defeated, and Emperor Nikephoros I was killed, the first time since 378 that an emperor had fallen in battle. His severely wounded son Stavrakios and son-in-law Michael I Rhangabe managed to escape. The Bulgarians were favored by the new situation, while the prestige of Byzantium declined.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on Narrative* (500–900), and Slavic Lands, *subentry on Narrative* (500–1000).]

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Vassil Gjuzelev

PŁOWCE, BATTLE NEAR

During the Polish-Teutonic War of 1326–1332, the Poles won a major victory in 1331 over the Teutonic Knights under Otto von Luterberg, commander of Chelm. It was one of the biggest medieval battles between Poland and the Teutonic Order. The Order's army consisted of six to seven thousand men, including about two thousand knights. The Polish army of King Władysław Łokietek (the Short) consisted of about four to five thousand warriors.

After occupying Radziejów in Cujavia (central Poland), the Teutonic army divided into two groups

on 27 September in order to accelerate the occupation of nearby Brześć Kujawski. The first group was protected by an advance guard under the leadership of Henry Reuss von Plauen, commander of Bałga. It was followed by a large force of mounted troops led by Otto von Luterberg. These units constituted two-thirds of the invading army. Grand Marshal Dietrich von Altenburg commanded the other force, which consisted of about two thousand combatants, including the most prominent officials of the Teutonic Knights and their foreign allies. The latter included the English knight Thomas Ufford, son of the earl of Suffolk. Both parts of the Order's army were supposed to march on the east. The Polish advance guard, led by Vincent of Wielen, governor of Poznań, headed after the tracks of the Teutonic armies. Unexpectedly, in a dense fog, they met the rear guard of the Teutonic army before it left camp. Dietrich arrayed his forces in five divisions. Opposite them were five Polish divisions. The Teutonic Knights' formations were broken at around noon, after the third attack, when the flag of the grand marshal of the Order fell. Many knights were taken prisoner. One of them was the wounded grand marshal. The Polish army was victorious in this phase of the battle, which probably took place south of Radziejów.

After a short rest Władysław Łokietek set off to the east to Brześć Kujawski to attack the Teutonic Knights. But Otto von Luterberg, who had been informed about the day's events at Radziejów, ordered his troops back to the battlefield. The Polish army, having marched about four miles (six kilometers), was attacked at about 2:00 PM near Płowce by the Teutonic army. It is this second phase of the battle that is known as the battle near Płowce. At first the Poles were successful. About 4:00 PM, however, another Teutonic detachment arrived, led by Henry von Plauen. Some Polish troops abandoned the battlefield with Prince Casimir at that time. At the same time, the Poles in another part of the battlefield captured some prisoners, including Henry von Plauen. Nevertheless, the Teutonic Knights slowly gained the advantage. They captured many Polish knights and managed to rescue the grand marshal. The king's army withdrew at about 5:00 PM.

The Teutonic Knights, however, did not triumph completely; many of their warriors had been killed or taken prisoner. Therefore, Otto von Luterberg ordered his men to withdraw immediately, without burying the dead. Chronicles report 4,187 bodies abandoned on the battlefield. This loss was about 40 percent of the combined armies, with the majority of the casualties on the Teutonic side. The Teutonic advance into Poland had been checked.

The defeat of the Order made the job in Brześć and the occupation of Kuyavia impossible in 1331. The fact that the Order suffered heavy losses received a lot of publicity in Poland. As a result, people in Poland think of the battle near Płowce as a victory. The battle showed that Poles were able to put up an effective opposition to the outstanding Order's army, showing that it might be possible to defeat the Order in the future.

[See also East Central Europe, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern Orders; and Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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
Jan Szymczak

PLUNDER, DIVISION OF

Ravaging of enemy territory, looting, and plundering were almost always present in warfare in this period.

In societies in which rulers could seldom cover soldiers' costs and expenses, it was necessary to allow them to seek recompense in other ways. Population centers, monasteries, and churches, where money and valuable possessions tended to be concentrated, were particularly vulnerable to the designs of passing armies. The motive of compensation could easily turn into one of profit, and arguably for many—particularly mercenaries and younger sons with no lands to support them—war was a business in which plunder was the primary objective. But the pursuit of plunder by individual soldiers could, by its nature, undermine an army's organizational cohesiveness and discipline. To prevent such unfortunate eventualities and to seek material advantage for themselves, commanders regulated the division of plunder in their armies. An official gloss was thereby added to a process of wholesale appropriation that could seldom be avoided in armies comprising thousands of soldiers.

The need for discipline and organization was as strong in a mercenary army as elsewhere, but here the desire for profit was more blatant. Among the most famous of these armies in the later fourteenth century were Roger de Flor's Catalan Company, which operated primarily in Sicily and Greece, and John Hawkwood's White Company, which operated in Italy. The Free Companies often employed officials known as *butiniers* (from the French *butin*, "booty"), who would gather the spoils of war and auction them, before dividing the proceedings among the soldiers. In armies such as these, profit-seeking soldiers were at a particular advantage, because they did not need to surrender a half or a third (or, as was the case in Castile, a fifth) of their takings to a ruler or prince. The main English and French armies during the Hundred Years' War also employed *butiniers*, on land and at sea, but here the ruler's claims to a share of the spoils made the process more legalistic, with less of a free-market character. The ruler's right to a portion of the spoils was expressed in the late fourteenth century by the military theorist Honoré Bouvet, who argued that an army in the pay of a ruler owed all of its profits to him. In reality, such a system would have been unworkable, and a fair division was required.



Looting. A group of soldiers plunder a house in Paris. Illustration from the *Chroniques de France or Chroniques de Saint Denis*, MS Roy 20 C VII, fol. 41v, fourteenth century. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

In Iberia, during the wars of the *reconquista*, elaborate procedures for the distribution of spoils were developed. In royal armies, an official known as the *mayordomo mayor* was responsible for dividing the spoils, with those who had contributed most in terms of men, arms, and animals obtaining the largest share. The wars in Iberia consisted largely of border raids, meaning that much of the booty ended up in frontier towns. There it was regarded as communal property and divided up by municipal officials known as *quadrilleros*. Families that had suffered losses were compensated, and townsmen who had served with the militia were rewarded; a fifth of the spoils, however, went to the king. The rank and file received their own share only after these other claims had been satisfied, with the men who had performed special services, such as chaplains and surgeons, receiving the most.

In England, there is evidence from the reign of John (often called John Lackland; r. 1199–1216) of regulations for the division of spoils of war, but it is only during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when indentures of war and military ordinances were made, that such procedures appear more clearly. During most of the reign of

Edward III (r. 1327–1377), it was customary for the captain to take a half of the gains made by his subcaptains, and for the captain in turn to surrender a half of all his profits—his own plus the halves from his subcaptains—to the king. At the beginning of the 1370s, however, the portion claimed by the superior contracting party was reduced to a third. This was done to compensate men-at-arms for the fact that they were no longer being compensated for the loss on campaign of their main mount. It is therefore a system of “thirds,” rather than that of “halves,” that is seen in extant English military ordinances dating from the 1380s onward.

[See also Chivalry; Laws of War and Just Conduct of War; and Raids and Raiding.]

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David Simpkin

POITIERS, BATTLE OF (732)

See Tours, Battle of.

POITIERS, BATTLE OF (1356)

The Black Death struck France and England shortly after the surrender of Calais in 1347. Because of the plague and the peace negotiations sponsored by the pope, there were no full-scale campaigns in the Hundred Years' War from then until 1355, when Edward, the Black Prince, led a devastating *chevauchée* (mounted expedition) from Bordeaux to Carcassonne and back.

The next year, following up on the success of that expedition and several smaller-scale operations over the winter, the prince collected an army of three thousand men-at-arms, two thousand longbowmen, and one thousand other mounted infantry, and set off toward the Île-de-France, where he hoped to link up with separate forces under his father, Edward III of England, and his cousin, Henry of Grosmont. This proved impossible, as the king's expedition never got under way, and crossings over the swollen Loire were in any case too strongly fortified.

Jean II of France advanced toward the prince with approximately ten thousand men-at-arms and four thousand infantry. Complicated maneuvers ensued as Jean tried to trap and starve the Anglo-Gascon army, while Prince Edward invited battle but avoided being pinned. After a skirmish on 17 September, in which Edward's men struck and defeated the rear guard of Jean's army, the two main forces faced off in the fields of Maupertuis, a few miles outside Poitiers. Papal legates failed to secure a truce. Edward, seeing French reinforcements pouring in and his own men unable to forage, ordered his baggage train over the little Miosson river, intending to fight if the French would attack or return to Gascony if they would not.


After quarrelling with Marshal Clermont over the meaning of this movement, Marshal d'Audrehem, with half the cavalry of the French vanguard, rushed to attack the prince's division, which was positioned to cover the road leading south to the ford west of

the Nouaillé woods. The English vanguard, under the earl of Warwick, had crossed south of the river, but now recrossed to support the prince. Once these forces were engaged, Marshal Clermont sent a column charging toward a gap in the hedge that protected Warwick's front. The earl of Salisbury brought up the English rear guard just in time to block the gap and prevent Clermont from falling on Warwick's flank. Salisbury's archers wreaked havoc on the French horsemen. The archers on the other flank were initially ineffective because of terrain, but once they moved to a better position, d'Audrehem was also quickly defeated, as were the dismounted men-at-arms led up by Constable de Brienne.

The English re-formed their lines as the second French division, some four thousand dismounted men-at-arms under the Dauphin, advanced. Although the English men-at-arms were tired and outnumbered, they benefitted from a hedge to their front, from holding a defensive position, from the support of their archers, and perhaps also from low morale among the Dauphin's Normans. After a tough fight, those of Charles's men still able to do so retreated.

Although the sources are unclear, it appears that at this stage part of the third French division—commanded by the Duke of Orléans—unsuccessfully attacked the English line, while the duke himself, possibly at the command of his royal brother, escorted the Dauphin and his other nephews away from what was beginning to appear a losing fight.

The English, having defeated three waves, believed the battle was over, and some had begun a pursuit when a very large French division, spearheaded by the king's elite reserve but formed largely of men rallied from the first three defeats, appeared on the slope above the English. Edward's situation was desperate. Many of his men were wounded, most were near exhaustion, and the archers were nearly out of arrows. Rising to the occasion, he dispatched 160 mounted men under the Captal (Lord) de Buch to circle around toward the French rear, while he himself led his main line directly forward in a surprising counterattack. The Captal's small detachment managed to strike the French rear before the



SHELLEY REID

prince's line was overwhelmed. This unexpected blow shattered the French formation, which collapsed in panic. King Jean was captured, along with eighteen counts or viscounts and nineteen hundred other men-at-arms. Nearly twenty-five hundred French noblemen were slain.

After this defeat, King Jean was ready to seek peace with Edward III. It took several years of negotiation and another major English invasion of France before terms were agreed to in 1360, but the battle of Poitiers was the principal cause of the Treaty of

Brétigny, by which Edward was to receive a third of France in full sovereignty.

[See also Calais, Siege of (1346–1347), and Henry of Grosmont.]

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Clifford J. Rogers

PONT-AUDEMER, SIEGE OF

In September 1123 Henry I, King of England and Duke of Normandy, acted forcefully against a cabal of discontented Norman magnates who were plotting to rebel against the king in favor of his nephew William Clito. Henry's sudden attack against the fortresses of Montfort, Brionne, and Pont-Audemer stole the initiative from the plotters. Pont-Audemer in particular was valuable to the king because it commanded the lower Risle valley, and its loss seriously diminished the prestige of Waleran of Meulan, one of the young ringleaders of the rebellion, and his ability to assemble other disaffected Normans.

The castle itself sits on a bluff just northeast of the town, which lies on a small island in the river. Waleran had already improved the defenses of both castle and town in the preceding two years, destroying a number of homes in order to push through new ditches and embankments. As part of his ongoing plan, he had also reinforced the garrison with his own troops as well as with a contingent apparently lent from the French king's household. The English chronicler Simeon (or Symeon) of Durham reports a garrison of 140 who resisted Henry, and the Anglo-Norman chronicler Ordericus Vitalis names several of the more prominent French defenders, including the French king's own butler and cook.

The siege began with the blockade of the town, which quickly fell to the English king's troops. The usual price of defeat was exacted, as Henry's Breton troops ransacked the town, discovering the hiding places throughout where the burghers had secreted gold, spices, fine fabrics, and other wealth. As the siege of the castle dragged on for seven weeks from late October to mid-December, Henry's forces

exactd a further price from the surrounding land, despoiling everything within a twenty-mile (thirty-two-kilometer) radius.

Although—or perhaps precisely because—he was worried about loyalty within his own camp, Henry pressed the siege with enthusiasm, jesting with his troops even as he personally directed his carpenters on how to build a moveable siege tower. Once the tower was maneuvered before the walls, it overtopped them by twenty-four feet, enabling Henry's troops to blanket the battlements with missile fire. Simultaneously, other engines lobbed boulders into the castle. This pressure eventually wore down the garrison, and they asked for terms. Henry was generous, letting the defenders depart honorably with their weapons. He may soon have regretted his kindness, as many of the soldiers rejoined Waleran and his allies at Beaumont.

The castle at Pont-Audemer now became a royal outpost, one that drew the attention of the rebels. This was unfortunate for the townspeople, who had begun rebuilding their town and lives. Waleran himself led a raid that reduced the town to ashes.

[See also Britain, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300), and France, *subentry* on Narrative (900–1328).]

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Steven Isaac

PONTLEVOI, BATTLE OF

Odo II, Count of Blois (996–1037), and Fulk Nerra, Count of Anjou (987–1040), both worked effectively to expand their territories, and as their spheres of influence grew closer, they came increasingly into conflict, especially as Fulk came to control Maine on Odo's western frontier. By 1016 Fulk was moving into the Touraine, Odo's last remaining territory between Anjou and Blois itself. Although Odo still held Tours, Fulk had already established a number of strongholds nearby, including Amboise about halfway between Tours and Blois. Fulk's ambitions to the east were a clear threat to Odo's western borders. When Fulk and his ally, Count Herbert Wake-Dog of Maine, entered the Touraine in 1016 and besieged Tours, Odo responded by raising a large army of knights and foot soldiers and moving to counter Fulk. But Fulk learned of Odo's approach, decided his position near Tours was too dangerous, and withdrew to his castle at Amboise. Instead of attacking Fulk directly, however, Odo moved to capture Fulk's castle at Montrichard a few miles southeast of Amboise. Fulk learned of Odo's movements and assembled a mixed force of mounted and foot soldiers to block Odo's route, setting up his forces at Pontlevoy (south of Blois and east of Montrichard) and sending Herbert of Maine several miles away to make camp and serve as a reserve.

On the afternoon of 6 July, Odo arrived at Pontlevoy only to find Fulk already lined up for battle. Odo was caught completely off guard, and Fulk launched a surprise attack with his cavalry, but Odo's infantry held, and the initial attack ended prematurely when Fulk himself was unhorsed and injured. The Angevins withdrew, and in light of Odo's superior numbers and Fulk's injury, the situation must have seemed grim. A messenger was sent to summon Herbert. Rumors spread among the Angevin army that Fulk had been captured, but before Odo could press his advantage, Herbert's troops attacked, coming out of the setting sun. The Blésois were again caught off guard, and this time they were routed after fierce fighting. Odo's mounted soldiers fled, abandoning the infantry; his baggage train was lost;

and according to one account, six thousand of his infantry were captured or killed. Fulk's intelligence-gathering capabilities and careful planning enabled him to overcome both a numerical deficit and a serious initial setback to achieve a crushing victory over his rival, and although Fulk did not directly threaten Tours again in the 1016 campaigning season, he did spend time further strengthening his holdings in the area. It would take years of military and diplomatic activity before Tours finally fell into Angevin hands, but after Pontlevoy the Angevin heartlands would be free of danger, as the conflict between Anjou and Blois settled firmly on Blésois lands and became increasingly diplomatic rather than military.

[See also Fulk Nerra.]

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Robert Helmerichs

PONTVALLAIN, BATTLE OF

The battle of Pontvallain took place on 4 December 1370 in the department of Sarthe, in the arrondissement of La Flèche. It followed Robert Knolles's *chevauchée* that devastated Picardy, Champagne, and the Île-de-France and threatened the suburbs of Paris. This raid had been designed to retake the strategic initiative and distract the French from attacks on the principality of Aquitaine. Knolles and his co-captains, Sir Alan Buxhull, Sir Thomas Grandison, and Sir John Bouchier, led two thousand men-at-arms and two thousand archers. The leadership, however, was divided from the start, and the campaign ended in disaster for the rear guard at Pontvallain.

The English army rode from Calais by 22 July and over a period of five months inflicted a great deal of damage, although much of it was superficial. After threatening Paris, the army marched toward Vendôme. Following the usual practice, Knolles avoided sieges of major strongholds while trying

to bring the French to battle on several occasions. Knolles's presence north of the river Loire, compounded by the additional threat of English mercenary companies under the command of Hugh Calveley and others, caused Charles V to summon Bertrand du Guesclin from Spain to take charge of the situation. He returned, apparently reluctantly, with a number of soldiers and was appointed constable of France on 2 October 1370.

Du Guesclin had orders to protect the borders of Maine and Anjou, and to strengthen his position, he concluded an alliance (and perhaps a brothers-in-arms arrangement) with Olivier de Clisson. Du Guesclin initially shadowed the English army, picking off stragglers while avoiding a full-scale encounter. Such a risk, in any case, soon became unnecessary. As the campaign progressed, the English commanders became seriously divided among themselves—many felt socially superior to Knolles—and the army began to disintegrate. Du Guesclin and Clisson took the initiative: they left Caen on 1 December and proceeded on a forced march, covering some 240 kilometers (149 miles) in four days. Knolles took refuge in his castle of Derval in Brittany, and some troops made their way back to England through the Breton ports. Du Guesclin and Clisson, making an all-night march, caught up with the rear guard, consisting of no more than six hundred troops (including approximately two hundred men-at-arms) led by Sir Thomas Grandison, at Pontvallain, thirty kilometers south of Le Mans. Although surprised, the English managed to form up on foot and march toward the French, who likewise dismounted and advanced. With the benefit of superior numbers, the French prevailed in a long and hard-fought struggle. Nearly all the defeated were killed or captured. Du Guesclin's forces then pursued the remnants of the English army into Anjou and Poitou.

On 1 January 1371 Grandison and more than eighty valuable prisoners—including Gilbert Giffard, Geoffrey Worsley, Philip Courtenay, William Neville, and Hugh Despenser—were delivered to Charles V. Pontvallain was one of the few set-piece battles du Guesclin fought during his tenure as constable. Although not of great strategic significance,

the French response to Knolles's *chevauchée* showed the success of the Fabian tactics that would be used by Charles V and his constable to such good effect in the next few years to recover most of the territory lost through the Treaty of Brétigny.

[See also Guesclin, Bertrand du.]

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David Green

PORTO LONGO, NAVAL BATTLE OF

In 1354, after a crushing defeat at Alghero the year before, the Genoese were still able to equip a fleet of twenty-five galleys under Paganino Doria. With this fleet Doria raided along the coast of Catalonia. He even entered the Adriatic and burned the Venetian port of Parenzo (Poreč), in Istria. He then sailed east into the Aegean to continue his *guerre de corse* against the Venetians. A Venetian fleet of some thirty-five galleys and a number of smaller vessels and sailing ships commanded by Niccolò Pisani pursued him to Chios, where Doria took refuge and refused a challenge to come out and fight. Pisani then began to raid Genoese shipping in the Aegean.

In October Pisani made land in the southwestern Peloponnesos, at the Venetian ports of Methóni and Koróni. There he learned that Doria's fleet had been reinforced with a further ten galleys under Visconte Grimaldi. At the same time, orders came from Venice that, since peace negotiations were under way, he was to avoid battle. With winter coming on, Pisani settled into the small harbor of Porto Longo on the island of Sapienza, just south of Methóni. Knowing that the Genoese fleet was still at sea, he disposed his vessels defensively. Five large ships equipped with castles and strongly manned were chained together in the harbor mouth. Some

twenty galleys were detailed to support them. Inside the harbor were the remaining fifteen galleys and other vessels.

When intelligence regarding the Venetian fleet's location reached Paganino Doria, he brought his fleet to Porto Longo, arriving on 4 November 1354. He immediately challenged Pisani to battle. In accordance with his orders, the Venetian admiral refused, as had Doria earlier in a similar situation. After the Genoese had demonstrated outside the port for a time, Giovanni Doria, the admiral's nephew, took one galley and slipped past the harbor guard into the port. When there was no reaction from the guard at the entrance to the port, a dozen other Genoese galleys followed in single file past the Venetian guard and fell on the beached and anchored Venetian galleys and ships in the port, meeting little resistance. According to the Florentine chronicler, Matteo Villani, more Venetians drowned trying to escape than were killed by the Genoese. When the Venetian forces inside the port were subdued, the Genoese signaled to Paganino Doria, who held the remaining twenty-two galleys of his fleet outside. The two divisions of the Genoese fleet moved to attack the remaining Venetian vessels. The Venetian ships and galleys at the harbor mouth, surrounded and outnumbered, quickly surrendered. Villani gives the Venetian casualties as more than four thousand dead and 5,870 taken prisoner. The Genoese chronicler, Giorgio Stella, reported that fifty-four hundred prisoners, including Nicolo Pisani, were imprisoned in Genoa. Both agree that Genoese casualties were negligible. These reported Venetian casualties are very believable figures for a fleet of thirty-five galleys, five ships, and a number of smaller vessels. Doria and his fleet, with the captured Venetian galleys and ships, returned to a hero's welcome in Genoa. Paganino Doria was rewarded with enough money to build a fine home near the church of San Matteo.

[See also Alghero, Siege and Naval Battle of.]

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John E. Dotson

POSADA, BATTLE OF

See Walachia, Battle in.

PŘEMYSL OTAKAR II

(c. 1230–1278), King of Bohemia from 1253 to his death, Margrave of Moravia, and Duke of Austria. Son of King Wenceslas I (r. 1230–1253), Přemysl Otakar married Margaret, the sister of the last of the Babenberg dukes of Austria, Frederick II, "the Quarrelsome," which gave him a claim to the duchy of Styria. In 1260 he defeated a stronger army under the Hungarian king Béla IV in the battle of Kroissenbrunn. Béla had to give up Styria, but later Přemysl proclaimed his previous marriage invalid and married Béla's granddaughter, Kunigunde. This cleared the way for his coronation as king of Bohemia in 1261.

When the Duke of Carinthia died in 1269, Přemysl claimed his lands: Carinthia, Carniola, and the Windy March. In 1266, Přemysl occupied the imperial city of Cheb (Eger). The Bohemian kingdom reached its territorial peak at this time.

The unification of the Bohemian kingdom, Austria, and the Alpine Lands occurred more or less by chance. Přemysl merely seized opportunities offered to him by circumstances. For many years he relied on the support of the papal court. He campaigned twice (1254–1255, 1267–1268) against the heathen Prussians to aid the Teutonic Knights. When Přemysl wanted to assert his rule more forcefully,

however, he faced resistance from the nobility, both in the Alpine Lands and in Bohemia. More and more dukes, counts, and bishops grew discontented with Bohemian influence, but they did not dare to challenge Přemysl openly.

The unstable situation in the empire enabled Přemysl Otakar II to pursue his politics of expansion. But when Rudolf I of Habsburg was elected king of the Romans (r. 1273–1291), he was watchful for opportunities to harm the King of Bohemia. The duchies of Austria and Styria had been confirmed to Přemysl by the previous German king, but Přemysl's rule over Carinthia, Carniola, the Windy March, and the Cheb region lacked such formal support. Rudolf put Přemysl under interdict in June 1275 and again in 1276. The Hungarian king Ladislav IV (r. 1272–1290) allied with Rudolf. Přemysl's power in the Alps collapsed under the pressure of his enemies late in the summer of 1276. The nobility in Styria and Carinthia supported Rudolf. At this time part of the Bohemian nobility also turned away from the king.

In 1276, Přemysl was forced to recognize Rudolf as Roman king and to give up Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, the Windy March, and Cheb. But the fragile peace began to crumble. The final fight began two years later. Rudolf's forces were joined by Hungarian troops under the leadership of Ladislav IV. The armies met in a massive cavalry battle at Dürnkrut (Marchfeld) in late August 1278. The Bohemian army was attacked decisively from the flank by Rudolf's reserve. Přemysl fought bravely until the last moment. Contrary to the customs of the time, he was killed by a group of Austrian noblemen when he was about to surrender after being knocked down from his horse.

In Bohemia the name of Přemysl Otakar II became a symbol of the dynamic epoch of the thirteenth century. Many towns were founded, colonists streamed into Bohemia and Moravia, and the mining industry prospered. Chroniclers called him "the Iron King" and "the Golden King."

[See also Béla IV; Dürnkrut, Battle of; Hungary, subentry on Narrative (1000–1300); Kroissenbrunn, Battle of; and Rudolf I.]

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Josef Žemlička

PRINITZA, BATTLE OF

The battle of Prinitza took place between the knights of the principality of Achaia in the Peloponnesos and the Byzantine army, consisting of Byzantines, Turkish mercenaries, and residents of the southern Peloponnesos. The battle was one episode in the Byzantines' attempt to eliminate Frankish rule in the Peloponnesos after their recapture of Byzantium in 1261. In 1261–1262 the Byzantines succeeded in recapturing the fortresses of Mistra, Monemvasia, and Maina. In 1262 the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos strengthened the Byzantine garrison in Mistra with additional troops, commanded by his brother, the sebastokrator Constantine Palaiologos. He was assisted in the command by Michael Kantakouzenos and Parakimomenos Makrinos. In Mistra the Byzantine commanders regrouped their six thousand troops and, exploiting the absence of the Achaian prince William II de Villehardouin from his capital, Andravida, marched on it and conquered it. The Byzantine army then passed from Mistra through the Chelmos mountain range, entered the valley of the river Alpheios, and made camp near the fortress of Prinitza, located near the modern towns of Vyliza and Olympia.

The Frankish knights—about three hundred of them, commanded by a certain Jean de Catavas—passed through Krestena and entered the valley of the Alpheios on the heels of the Greeks. The two armies met at dawn in the gorge called the Agridi

of Kounoupitsa. The Greeks attacked with a thousand cavalymen and managed to unsaddle half of the knights, but without wounding any of them seriously. The Franks remounted and attacked the Byzantine camp. The battle lasted until noon, with the knights succeeding in reaching the tent of Sebastokrator Constantine and forcing him to flee the battlefield. His army dispersed in the surrounding forests and mountains and thus escaped slaughter. The sources do not give the number of casualties and mention only that the Franks took a thousand horses.

The battle of Prinitza marked the end of active Byzantine attempts to destroy the principality of Achaia and conquer the Peloponnesos. On the other hand, the Byzantine offensive of 1262–1263 forced William de Villehardouin to accept the sovereignty of the ruler of southern Italy and Sicily, Charles of Anjou.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry* on Narrative (1204–1453), and Charles of Anjou.]

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Christo Matanov

PRISONERS AND RANSOMS

Derived from concepts in Roman law, the custom of ransoming captives taken in battle—as opposed to enslaving, mutilating, or simply killing them—developed alongside notions of knighthood and chivalry in early Capetian France. As chivalry became a dominant cultural ethic across western Christendom, ransoming prisoners became a standard practice, provided always that they were of a certain social standing.

On surrendering, a captive pledged himself to his captor to pay a ransom to secure his life, in return for which the captor was pledged to protect him. The treatment that the prisoner could expect varied according to the prisoner's status and the captor's

whim, though the treatment was increasingly governed by customary law. It was considered legitimate to keep prisoners in irons if it was feared they might escape or as a means of persuading them to reach a quick agreement. Few, however, went so far as Thomas de Marle, Lord of Coucy (d. 1130), who was reputed to hang prisoners by their genitals as an inducement toward higher offers of ransom. Chivalric convention demanded that prisoners be treated honorably, and serious maltreatment was considered a breach of the captor's contract with his captive. Indeed, there was an obvious financial incentive for captors to look after their prisoners, or at least to keep them alive, for there was little prospect of extracting a ransom from a corpse.

Although a degree of negotiation was involved, the final price of the ransom was at the discretion of the captor, and levels varied enormously, from the king's ransom of £500,000 sterling required of John II of France, captured at Poitiers in 1356, down to the 44 marks (£29 6s. 8d.) paid by the lowly squire Luke de Warton, taken by the Scots around 1319, or the 10 livres tournois (about £2 10s.) paid for a *sirvent* of the town of Agenais in 1350. Custom held that a reasonable ransom was equivalent to one year's income from the captive's lands—a custom that was widely ignored in practice, as many captors demanded the maximum that they thought their prisoner capable of scraping together. Though originally a purely personal obligation between captor and captive, by the fourteenth century prisoners' ransoms were generally recognized as a form of heritable property. As such, the ransoms could be sold to third parties, and the trade in ransoms could be a profitable business for those with the right international connections.

Despite such hard-nosed approaches to the business of ransoms, concepts of chivalry and honor remained absolutely central to its practice, for to a great extent the system relied on trust. It was common to allow a prisoner to go free on parole so that he could organize payment of his ransom, though he would usually be required to provide pledges as a safeguard against bad faith. There were some avenues for obtaining legal redress against those who absconded, such as the wardens' courts on

the Anglo-Scottish marches, which had jurisdiction on both sides of the border. Nevertheless the most effective sanction was the dishonor and notoriety that accrued to defaulters. So when Sir John de Lilleburn, captured by the Scots in 1377, failed to pay his ransom, he was accused by one of his pledges of acting "contrary to the order of chivalry which all knights and gentlemen ought to have inviolable, by reason whereof there is risen a scandal and infamy to the English nation by the Scots." The effectiveness of honor as a constraint is best demonstrated by John II of France. Released on parole in 1360, he returned to England in person four years later when one of his replacement hostages absconded and it had become clear that he could not pay the next installment of his ransom.

There was an obvious tension between the private interests of captors and the public interests of their lords. Captors would be anxious to see a quick return by ransoming their captives as soon as possible, whereas their lords might be less anxious to see their enemies freed to continue fighting against them so soon. It was customary for lords to have the right to keep important prisoners who had been captured by their followers, and as armies became increasingly contractual, so these lords' rights became part of the standard terms of service. The overriding control of the lord is demonstrated in its most extreme form by the infamous order of Henry V to kill the French prisoners at Agincourt to prevent them from taking up arms again. Nevertheless those required to hand prisoners over to their lords could reasonably expect to be compensated for their loss.

The practice of ransoming served to provide defeated combatants with a means of preserving both their lives and their honor, for staying on the battlefield to be captured was regarded as an entirely honorable alternative to the dishonor of flight. Ransoms had the effect of making warfare a much safer occupation for the chivalric classes, substantially reducing their chances of being killed—although the deployment of increasing numbers of bowmen and then gunners in the later Middle Ages made battlefields increasingly dangerous for the man-at-arms. Ransoms also made warfare a

potentially much more profitable business. But for all those who made their fortune from ransoms, such as William Marshal in the twelfth century or Sir John Fastolf in the fifteenth, there were others who were ruined by them or who spent decades in confinement before being able to purchase their freedom.

Finally, it should be noted that although the customs surrounding prisoners and ransoms acted effectively as a medieval equivalent of the Geneva Convention (albeit on a thoroughly pecuniary basis), the system was confined only to the chivalric classes, the men-at-arms. The niceties of chivalric custom were not extended to ordinary foot soldiers, most of whom were too poor to be worth the trouble of ransoming anyway. Occasionally a lord might act with clemency, as when Edward I freed three hundred Scottish footmen taken at the battle of Dunbar in 1296. All too often, however, the common soldiers on the losing side of a battle were simply slaughtered out of hand.

[See also Atrocities; Chivalry: *Comitatus*; Knight-hood and Knights; Plunder, Division of; and Slavery.]

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Andy King

PRIVATE WAR

In a society in which the networks of horizontal and vertical ties of a private, personal, and contractual nature were dominated; in which the lineages, ties of kinship, and family strategies played a fundamental role; in which the *potestas publica* tended toward fragmentation and the *auctoritas*, though recognized in theory, was not always accepted in practice; in which royalty was the maximum expression

of noble blood and therefore the kings often found themselves obligated to enter into a vortex of competition in order to achieve and sustain their status; and in which the society's elite was made up of warrior aristocracies that used the act of practicing war for the purpose of validating and sustaining their domination position; in such society, the concept of *pro patri mori*—to fight for a secular monarchical state—had serious problems in taking root and did not take full form until the late medieval period.

Thus it was that the armed conflicts, disputes, hostilities, and wars of the Middle Ages included a high percentage of "private" initiatives. In fact, for medieval society the language of violence was something intrinsic and natural and formed part of a widespread quotidian reality. The historian Daniel R. Lesnick describes this as "a world of thin skins, short fuses, and physical violence." "People carried knives to eat with—and to stab with," as Michael A. Mullet has noted.

As a consequence, there are at least two important problems to understanding what constituted "private wars" in the Middle Ages. In the first place, it is difficult to distinguish what would be considered a "private war" versus a vendetta, a blood feud, or a *faida*—various names for codified violence between kin groups that varied in intensity, reiteration, and duration. Some anthropological viewpoints treat private wars and *faida* as one phenomenon, as in the work of Jacques Le Goff and Dominique Barthélemy.

Second, there is the question of the scale of conflict and its political-military dimension. Contemporary sources usually used the word *werra* to describe violence (including raids; ravaging of lands, estates, or settlements; destruction of homesteads; siege and capture of castles; and even, rarely, pitched battles—involving sometimes significant numbers of armed men) used to obtain a political advantage over rivals. These conflicts, which might be carried out over a protracted period of time, were directed toward political and territorial advancement with a specific goal in mind, and they ended either with victory for one side or with a negotiated peace. Yet they were still considered distinct from *bellum*, or external foreign war. Because this type of

medium-intensity warfare was more common on a kingdom's domestic political front, especially when the monarchical institution proved to be weak, historians have opted to designate the term "private war" for classification purposes.

In order to define what constituted a "private" or a "public" initiative during this period, therefore, and to determine the perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy of war or episodes of organized violence (by the standards of the era), it is important to differentiate between warfare within and warfare between political bodies. Sometimes major differences existed between wars waged among enemies of the same sociocultural class or political sphere and those waged against rebels, pagans, infidels, heretics, and groups of different ethnicity—that is, those waged in the absence of the moderating elements that could help keep the fighting under some control. This contrast explains, for example, the difference between the relative restraint displayed during the long struggles among the territorial principalities of Western France or of the Anglo-Norman and Angevin monarchs with the French Capetian dynasty, and the almost all-out war waged against the Muslims, Celts, or Albigensians, to name but three prominent examples.

Medieval internal warfare was almost always distinguished from external warfare by its relative adherence to certain limits and rules of engagement. Contemporary sources used the term *bellum civile* (civil war) to describe this sort of campaign. Thus, although in modern times "civil war" is understood as a general war involving the whole of a polity, reaching down through all levels of society, it still might be more satisfactory than the term "private war" as a descriptor for these types of hostilities. But that usage still leaves questions. For instance, were the armed conflicts between the counts of Anjou and Blois "private wars" or "civil wars," in that both were (nominally at least) subjects of the king of France? Or were they external wars, in that the counties of Anjou and Blois could in many ways be seen as independent polities?

Last, there remains to be addressed the problem of what has been called "presentism." Historians tend

to view the nature and development of events of the Middle Ages from the perspective of modern nation-states, in which peace is assumed to be the status quo and warfare reflects a breakdown of normal political relationships. But without a powerful central authority, warfare in the medieval context was the status quo, endemic among those lineages or confederations of lineages capable of exercising a military force. Pragmatic politics required leadership from men who had the ability to use force effectively. War was merely one type of dispute resolution, to be tried along with many others, and it was one that the military classes found congenial. In the absence of a proactive superior authority capable of resolving, or at least assuaging, a dispute, recourse to violence or "private war" was a common occurrence. Just as kings often used "public" war to resolve disputes with other rulers, so too did their subjects use "private" war, conducted in much the same manner, to settle their own differences.

[See also *Blood-Feud and Laws of War and Just Conduct of War.*]

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Manuel Rojas Gabriel

Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

PROKOPIOS OF CAESAREA

(fl. sixth century CE), last great historian of the ancient world. Prokopios was born in Palestine in the late fifth century and received a juridical education. In 527 he was made legal adviser (*consiliarius*) to the Byzantine general Belisarios, thereby acquiring much military experience. He accompanied Belisarios on the Persian front (527–531), in the campaigns in Africa (533) and Italy (536–540), and again in the east (541–542). His position gave him knowledge of the events described in the eight books on the wars of Justinian's reign (*The Wars* was complete in 550, except for the final book, which was written in 557). He was not an eyewitness to the Ostrogothic war after 541 but relied on official reports and oral testimony. Other useful information, on fortifications, is found in *The Buildings*, written probably around 558–560, a short time before his death.

In *The Wars* Prokopios followed the illustrious model of Thucydides in writing the history of his time. With historical fact he sometimes mixes descriptions of battles copied from Thucydides. Because *The Wars* is in many cases the only comprehensive source describing events, there is no way to check its reliability. The work is shaded by bias regarding Belisarios, favorable for the period up to 540, negative thereafter. The manpower of the Byzantines' enemies is usually exaggerated to overstate the importance of Byzantine victories. Despite such shortcomings, *The Wars* contributes much to our knowledge of sixth-century Byzantine, Persian, Vandal, and Ostrogothic warfare. Prokopios asserted that his writing would provide useful examples for future military commanders and so provided great detail about battles, including their evolution, manpower, weaponry, and the heroic deeds of some participants. This did not mean that Prokopios was simply a war correspondent: he expressed value judgments on warfare, such as the role of chance in the course of the war, the importance of the logistics in a campaign, and the primacy of the infantry over cavalry in the art of war. In many cases he criticized the strategic and tactical mistakes made by Byzantine commanders or by their enemies.

He believed that the reconquest of the West endangered the security of the eastern part of the empire because resources were wasted in the West, and he believed that the increasing number of barbarian mercenaries undermined the fighting capability of the army because of their potential disloyalty. Such thoughts about the deficiencies in Justinian's wars are largely presented in the *Secret History*, completed in 558, which aimed to reveal the real causes and negative aspects of the events described in *The Wars*. The works of Prokopios remain one of the richest sources for our knowledge of late ancient warfare.

[See also Belisarios; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500-900); and Justinian I.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

PROKOP THE BALD

or Prokop the Great (d. 30 May 1434), Hussite priest and leader of the Taborite army.

Almost nothing is known of Prokop's youth; he probably came from a noble Prague family. He was active as a preacher in the southern Bohemian city of Soběslav in 1417-1418, in Tábor (the center of Hussite radicalism) in 1420, and in the New Town of Prague in 1421. Here he was suspected of belonging to the most radical Hussite sect in southern Bohemia, the Picarts. After the coup in Prague on 30 June 1421 that brought the Hussite preacher Jan Želivský to power, Prokop was on his side. Prokop also supported the Taborite military leader Jan Žižka. Prokop acquired his nickname, "the Bald," at this time, because, in contrast to the Taborite priests, he shaved his head and celebrated Mass in full vestments. He returned to Tábor as a prominent priest.

After Žižka's death on 11 October 1424, Prokop was among those who worked to consolidate the situation in Tábor and in Žižka's army, the Taborites.

In 1425, probably, he became the most important captain of the Tábor brotherhood. Prokop was occupied chiefly with spiritual and political matters. He encouraged collaboration with the eastern Bohemian brotherhood of the Orebiters, known as "Orphans" after Žižka's death. Soon Prokop also began to concern himself with the organization of the armies and take part in their military activities, later becoming chief captain of the Taborites. His strategic talents helped the Taborites and the Orphans to defeat the Prague faction to secure control of Bohemia. On 16 June 1426, Prokop led the Hussite army to victory against the Electors of Saxony and their allies at Ústí nad Labem (Aussig an der Elbe) in northern Bohemia. This led him to a position of leadership in the battle of Tachov (Tachau) on 4 August 1427, in which the fourth crusade against the Hussites, organized by the German king Sigismund, was crushingly defeated.

Thereafter, Prokop changed the Hussites' military strategy. As their enemies launched more and more attacks from neighboring countries, he preferred to send Hussite troops across the Bohemian and Moravian borders. By so doing, he wanted, on the one hand, to weaken the foreign troops and force their political leaders to negotiate, and on the other, to acquire goods by plundering the border regions of his neighbors. Between 1428 and 1433, Hussite armies traveled several times through Upper Hungary, Silesia, Austria, Bavaria, Lusatia, Saxony, and Brandenburg as far north as Pomerania. They acquired a great deal of booty while achieving their political goal: negotiations with the Catholic Church and the royal powers between 1429 and 1433, culminating in union at the Council of Basel. Prokop played a decisive part in all of these activities, and was therefore called Prokop the Great (Veliký). In 1433-1434, the Taborites came into conflict with moderate elements in Prague and a coalition of noblemen. The Taborites lost the battle of Lipany, where Prokop met his death.

[See also Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1245-1500); East Central Europe, *subentry on* Narrative (1300-1500); Sigismund of Luxemburg; and Žižka, Jan.]

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Miloslav Polívka

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukiss*

PRONOIA

Pronoia, literally “forethought,” “care,” or “provision,” was the common Byzantine theological term for divine providence. To speak of imperial *pronoia* was to liken the emperor’s care for his subjects to God’s care in creation. The term came to acquire a fiscal meaning, referring to a way of provisioning select supporters of the emperors, most commonly soldiers, in the form of a conditional grant from the emperor of revenue from imperial property or territory.

The development and chronology of the system of granting *pronoia* are obscure. At issue is the transformation from a metaphorical use of the word to a more technical, fiscal meaning. In the eleventh century imperial churches, monasteries, or fortresses could be held conditionally by individuals appointed to administer them who were allowed to retain some benefits from the asset as payment for their administrative duties. The individuals were entrusted with caring for the imperial assets in question and so held them “in *pronoia*” (in “provision” or “care”). This early use of *pronoia* as a means of administering imperial assets developed into a system of providing provisions to those who did

so, and then evolved into a means of payment. The technical meaning of *pronoia* as a fiscal resource for soldiers or others on the imperial payroll seems to have been in place by the end of the reign of Alexios I Komnenos in 1118, but only became common in the thirteenth century after the Latin conquest of the empire. It never became the dominant means of paying soldiers.

Thirteenth-century Western settlers in the Aegean occasionally used the term *pronoia* to translate *fief*. Some early- and mid-twentieth-century historians took up the analogy and considered the increasing use of *pronoia* as constituting the “feudalization” of the Byzantine Empire under Western influence. Scholars also developed the term *pronoiar* to refer to the person who held a *pronoia*. Despite the apparent exchange of land for service, the *pronoia* were fundamentally different from fiefs in several key ways. *Pronoia* were all held directly from the emperor with no subinfeudation; they were not heritable and were distinct from outright gifts of imperial estates, which were permanently separated from the fisc (imperial treasury). They were defined by the amount of revenue generated rather than by the extent of land controlled. Unlike serfs or vassals, the occupants of the land providing the revenue stood in no special legal relationship with the holders of the *pronoia*. The occupants simply paid their taxes to someone designated by the emperor instead of directly to the imperial tax collectors.

From a military standpoint, the institution of *pronoia* gave the emperors increased flexibility in the management of imperial resources. Although the imperial government never ceased to collect money taxes and pay most military salaries in cash, the *pronoia* system relieved some of the pressure of large-scale monetary fiscalization. While some scholars have decried the development of the *pronoia* as a lessening of imperial control over assets, others have credited it with creating a more efficient military system.

[See also Byzantine Attitudes toward War and Recruitment, *subentry* on Byzantine Recruitment and Conscription.]

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Leonora Neville

PROPAGANDA

It is only in relatively recent times that the term "propaganda" has taken on a largely negative sense, implying deceit. In the Middle Ages, the meaning was more positive: the main purpose of propaganda, created by those already committed, was to inform, to persuade, and to involve political communities in wars, which, with time, were often becoming more national in character. Because of the importance attached to the increasing influence of public opinion in time of conflict, propaganda is now regarded as an essential aspect of the study of war in the Middle Ages.

Depending on whom it was intended to influence, propaganda assumed different forms. The tapestry at Bayeux was created to present a particular visual interpretation of events surrounding the Norman conquest of England in 1066. The spoken word, uttered from the pulpit, and the singing of specially composed songs urged men to take an active part in the crusades or to support them through financial donations. From the pulpit the clergy would report on the progress of military campaigns or announce victories won against a country's enemies, congregations being urged to pray harder for further successes, seen as signs of divine approval of the cause for which a war was undertaken. The pulpit was used also to urge men either to remain faithful or to change their political loyalties. In other circumstances, church doors could serve as public-notice

boards to which political statements might be attached.

Carefully described by the chroniclers for the benefit of future generations of readers, ceremonial processions, an important part of communal life, could be used to inform and influence popular opinion, emphasis being placed on the public emotion generated by such occasions. Reminiscent of the triumphs once granted to victorious Roman generals, the formal procession organized to mark the return to England of King Henry V, his army, and a number of notable French prisoners after the victory achieved at Agincourt in 1415 was used by the guilds and citizens of London to heap praise on the king and to involve onlookers in an emotional and triumphal celebration of an enterprise successfully concluded against an obdurate enemy. The need to keep alive memories of past successes was also an important aspect of propaganda.

The reporting of war was often done more in the spirit of accentuating victories than of recording events in an objective manner. Military commanders, aware of the importance of good preparation for battle, might use orations to emphasize previous successes against the same foe so as to encourage their men to greater efforts. Victory achieved, the part played by divine assistance might be recognized by the foundation of a religious house to serve as a physical memorial of the event, where prayers would also be offered for the dead. The abbey of Battle, in England, and of Batalha, at Aljubarrota in Portugal, each tell the same story. In some instances, a commemorative stone or plaque was set up on the battlefield as a reminder of the significance of past events. Victory achieved by a nation with the help of God, who recognized the justice of the cause for which it had fought, thus became part of that nation's history, to which appeal might be made in the future.

Public opinion could also be formed and influenced through more literary means. Tracts urging the adoption of a particular political stance or policy, some of which survive to this day in many copies, became increasingly important in the late Middle Ages. Although usually addressed to men at court

(where policy was decided), such tracts—like the *Libelle of Englyshe Polycye*, a political poem written in verse in 1436 to influence the formation of English commercial policy in time of war—also reflect the importance of gaining moral and financial support from the wider public in order to implement the policy. Such tracts betoken the growth of an awareness of war being undertaken for the advancement or defense of the good of society as a whole. The educated and the literate might be persuaded through reading the political tract, the illiterate by the spectacle or the ballad. Both media emphasized the need for a country to be united in its desire to defeat the common enemy. Thus, by the end of the Middle Ages, propaganda was widely used to encourage the development of a greater sense of common purpose and nationhood in time of war.

[See also *Chanson de Roland*; *Comitatus*; and *Epic Poetry*.]

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Christopher Allmand

PSIE POLE, BATTLE OF

The Polish defense of Głogów was the most significant and crucial military event during the expedition of Henry V, Holy Roman Emperor, to Poland in 1109. After their unsuccessful siege of that stronghold, the German and Czech armies marched southeast along the Oder toward Wrocław on 15 September. Duke Bolesław III Krzywousty (the Wry-mouthed) did not fight openly. Instead he conducted guerrilla warfare and eliminated the smaller detachments of the enemy. Wrocław was never attacked, because as Henry's forces decreased, his warriors' morale was weakened. He tried to negotiate, demanding only a tribute and recognition of his authority. Prince Bolesław refused once again and fought a successful battle near Wrocław. Later that battle became the source of the legend of the battle of Psie Pole. Gallus Anonymous, the main contemporary chronicler, did not mention this battle in his account, even though he otherwise described even the smallest achievements of Bolesław. He merely wrote that Henry achieved nothing near Wrocław except to replace the living with the dead.

Eighty years later Vincent Kadłubek, bishop and historian, created a story of a huge battle that he called the battle of Psie Pole (in German, "Hundsfeld," or "Dog's Field"). In reality that place-name had nothing to do with dogs, but rather indicated infertile and poor land. Vincent, however, wrote that a great number of dogs descended on the battlefield, devoured many corpses, and became rabid, so that nobody dared pass through the vicinity—and that that is why the battlefield was called "Psie Pole." The name "Psie Pole" used by Kadłubek also appeared in separate historical sources as early as 1218.

Kadłubek's version, including his account of the name, was repeated by other chroniclers, including Jan Długosz—the most significant one—in the fifteenth century. Długosz described the fight in some detail as lasting from morning to midday. Henry had more warriors, and at first the clash went in his favor. Bolesław, however, sent in his reserves, and these finally defeated the German king's knights.

Bolesław's enemies were put to flight. Many Germans were killed, and many were taken captive.

After 21 September the Czechs returned home. A few days later the Germans also decided to withdraw. Nothing is known with certainty about the last days of Henry's expedition. German sources mention that the retreating German army plundered Silesia. The Gallus Anonymous wrote that the emperor had come back home "carrying only the troop with himself as the tribute." The expedition of Henry V, who had planned to offer the Polish crown to an exiled stepbrother of Bolesław, had failed. The legend of the victorious battle of Psie Pole (today a part of Wrocław) persists to this day.

[See also Głogów, Siege of; Henry V, Emperor; and Slavic Lands.]

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Jan Szymczak

PSILOI

The term *psilos* (from the Greek, "bare") referred in the classical period to skirmishing troops with

minimal defensive armor, and Byzantine usage is similar. The *Strategikon* of Maurice (c. 600) indicates that *psiloi* should be trained in rapid firing of the bow while carrying a shield, and in the use of the javelin and the sling. They were to have quivers holding thirty to forty arrows, small shields, and crossbows with short arrows. They should also carry lead darts in leather cases as well as slings. The *Strategikon* indicates that they were to be deployed in various ways in combination with the heavy infantry and cavalry: one at the rear of the file for each heavy infantryman, within the files alternating between the heavy infantry, or in other formations with the cavalry.

The tenth-century *Praecepta militaria* of Nikephoros Phokas (c. 965) gives a similar view of *psiloi*, but specifies additional equipment. They are referred to as archers (*toxotai*) "whom the ancients called *psiloi*" and said to have two bows, two quivers with a total of one hundred arrows, four bowstrings, small shields and slings, but notably also swords and axes. They were to be deployed between the files of heavy infantry in the intervals of the "infantry square" to repel the enemy when the cavalry is returning to the protection of the formation under pursuit. The tenth-century historian Leo the Deacon refers to a *psilos* who dropped his shield from exhaustion while on the march; it was ordered that he be flogged, that his nose be slit, and that he be paraded in front of the troops in public humiliation.

[See also Manuals, Military; Maurice; and Nikephoros II Phokas.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

PULA, BATTLE OF

See Genoese-Venetian Wars, *subentry* on Fourth War.

R

RABAN, BATTLE OF

Occurring between 18 October and 15 November 958 near Raban (northern Syria), the battle of Raban was a decisive Byzantine victory over Saif al-Dawla. After installing himself at Aleppo, Saif al-Dawla unleashed large-scale raids on Byzantine territory from 950 onward, while retaining links with fellow members of the Hamdanid dynasty, based in Mosul. He sought to legitimize his regime and to remunerate local desert Bedouin by championing "holy war" against the Byzantines, reversing their recent advances. With his hosts of light cavalry, he kept the Byzantines uncertain as to where the next blow would fall. The Arab horsemen moved fast, twice reaching Charsianon in central Asia Minor, devastating churches and suburbs. Spectacular as they were, Saif's expeditions did not capture fortified positions, and the Byzantines' vigilance over the Taurus and anti-Taurus mountain passes made him vulnerable to ambushes when homeward-bound. However, neither entrapment in the passes nor counter-raids to damage Saif's Syrian economic base curbed his belligerence or stemmed the jihad.

Toward the mid-950s Emperor Constantine VII determined on a forward strategy, aiming to disable or eliminate Saif. Heavy cavalry units received elaborate equipment and practiced charging in wedge-shaped formations. Nikephoros Phokas, appointed

commander in chief, supervised training. In 957 he led Byzantium's armed forces—augmented by Rus, Khazars, and other foreigners—to Hadath, a key pass, capturing and razing the fortress there. In June 958 the general John Tzimiskes led forth a huge army, while Saif was away helping his brother. Tzimiskes besieged and captured Samosata on the Euphrates, and then besieged Raban, a fortress south of Hadath that Saif had recently repaired. Saif sped to its relief, and in the ensuing battle Abu Firas, one of Saif's poets, broke two lances in the first charge. The Byzantines defeated the Muslims, killing many of Saif's companions and guardsmen during their pursuit. They capitalized on Saif's humiliation, parading seventeen hundred captive cavalymen through Constantinople's streets. Saif intercepted a Byzantine expedition to Qurus in the spring of 959 and was still capable of raiding Byzantine territory. But the battle of Raban had shown up his weakness, and the Byzantines remained in Samosata. Saif, defeated outside Aleppo in December 962, fled and Nikephoros Phokas sacked his palace and burned much of the town before withdrawing.

[See also John I Tzimiskes and Kourkouas, John.]

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Jonathan Shepard

RABANUS MAURUS

See Hrabanus Maurus.

RAHEWIN

See Otto of Freising and Rahewin.

RAIDS AND RAIDING

Raids are temporary military or naval expeditions into enemy territory. They were one of the staples of medieval warfare, hence the distinctive terminology: *reise*, *razzia*, *chevauchée*. Their frequent use was encouraged by two constricting conditions: weather, which could restrict campaigning to short seasons, and the inability of monarchs to extract from their subjects the lengthy periods of military service or levels of taxation required for continuous warfare.

Medieval raids fell into two broad categories, private, and state organized or sponsored. The former were generally smaller in scale, local in extent, and of short duration. Although more numerous, their unofficial nature renders accurate numbers incalculable, and at times they were indistinguishable from mere banditry and piracy. They were most prevalent in areas where government was weak. In these areas, which were generally less advanced socially and economically, raiding was mainly in pursuance of feud or theft of livestock. Such areas contracted as state authority increased and as the principle that war was a state monopoly gained acceptance. However, at times strong states tolerated (or promoted) private raiding for tactical reasons.

With state-organized raiding, strategic and political considerations were paramount. Most basic was defense: counterraids in response to cross-border incursions sufficiently savage, hopefully, to deter further aggression. Raids could also be used to destroy the enemy's border fortresses or alternatively to occupy them to create a protective buffer zone. The aim of these actions was to protect an existing frontier and its hinterland. Other raids were expansionist in intent. All raids were destructive of human life and property, but many were purposely so to induce acceptance of a change of lordship. At their most ambitious, state-organized raids aimed at devastating the enemy state sufficiently to drive its monarch to make a humiliating peace involving major territorial or political concessions.

As well as political and strategic aims, raiding had a financial dimension in that all participants expected raids to be profitable. The importance of "spoils of war" is underlined by the elaborate rules adopted in all societies to govern their division between commanders and their troops. Spoils were primarily of two sorts: portable objects of high value and ransoms exacted from high status prisoners. As regards the latter, political considerations dictated that they should be at the disposal of the state, with suitable compensation for the captors. Frequently in early medieval centuries, the consequence of a successful raid was the imposition of annual tribute on the defeated king to mark his subservience and to diminish his military potential. A weak king could also be driven to make annual payments to secure immunity from raids. Although most raids took place on land, those by sea were equally capable of inflicting damage to property and demoralizing coastal populations as well as disrupting enemy trade and logistical capacity.

All parts of Europe and the Near East experienced raiding at some time, but it was frontier areas that suffered most. State-organized raids were part of a strategy aimed at replacing the overlordship of one monarch with that of another, but where Christianity interfaced with Islam and heathendom, there was an additional ideological dimension.

[See also Plunder, Division of; Prisoners and Ransoms; and Tribute.]

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Richard Lomas

RAMÓN BERENGUER I

(1035-1076), Count of Barcelona, called "the Old," was a leader whose determination and adaptability helped convert Catalonia into a single polity and establish conditions allowing its expansion. Ruling a portion of the Spanish March, the old Carolingian enclave between the Pyrenees and Barcelona, Ramón Berenguer was one of eleven leaders ruling counties stretching from Ampurias on the Mediterranean coast to Pallars on the Aragonese border. Surviving the disastrous Muslim raids of the late-tenth century that destroyed part of its capital, the county of Barcelona of the early eleventh century fell into dynastic discord that made the dowager countess, Ermessinda, the power behind the throne. The great nobles took this weakness as a sign to extend

their dominance over the Barcelonan count and his judicial functions. Neighboring Muslim *taifas* took advantage of the situation to recover lands lost in the previous century.

Coming of age in 1041, Ramón Berenguer survived the "new militarism" that marked his society as a neutral in the internecine struggles of Cerdanya, Pallars, and Urgel. This politic attitude was soon offset by fresh dynastic troubles. Quickly reconciling with his grandmother, Ermessinda, he faced an even greater challenge from his cousin, Mir Geribert, who challenged the count's ruling prerogative by asserting his own title, the "prince of Olderola." Only after two decades of patient encirclement was Ramón Berenguer able to force his cousin's total submission. Asserting his domestic power, the count then renewed the war against Spanish Islam by encouraging Christian resettlement toward Tarragona and forcing neighboring *taifas* to pay annual tribute. Though his title "defender and wall of the Christian people" was added by a later era, Ramón Berenguer's career as legal reformer and military executive made possible a unified Catalonia and set the stage for its great expansion.

[See also Iberia, subentry on Narrative (500-1100).]

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Donald J. Kagay

RANSOMS OF PLACES

In Europe, from the earliest times, invading armies would exact tribute in the form of slaves, moveable goods, or treasure from a subject population. This characteristic of warfare was particularly evident in the centuries following the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. Warfare between the successor states formed by barbarian peoples settling

in western Europe, as well as external attacks by Moors, Vikings, and Magyars, resulted in many defeated peoples paying various levies. In Anglo-Saxon England, in response to frequent Viking assaults, *danegeld*—money purchasing immunity from attack or furnishing the means of defense—was collected on numerous occasions until the early eleventh century; in contemporary Christian Spain, payments that bought such protection were known as *parias*. During the anarchy of King Stephen's reign (1135–1154) in England, *tenseria/tenserie* were levied for the same purpose. There was thus little unusual in the same practices emerging during the fourteenth-century phase of the Hundred Years' War, when English forces or those of their allies, like the unreliable Charles II of Navarre (1349–1387), occupied large areas of Valois France.

What is more remarkable is how some exactions were systematized to the extent that they became tax supplements devised to meet the financial needs of legitimate governments. Much ransoming of places, both rural and urban, was specifically designated for maintaining occupying garrisons employed by kings and princes. But the system was also used (and abused) by individual freebooting captains owing only the loosest allegiance, or none at all, to sovereign authorities, especially in remote, inaccessible regions of central France (Auvergne, Limousin, Quercy, Périgord). Such ransoms were known by a variety of names, such as *rançons*, *appâtis*, *patis*, and *souffrances de guerre*, or in fifteenth-century Maine as *bullettes* and *sauegardes*. They were paid at set times throughout the year, often over long periods (as for almost fifty years at Brest in Brittany, first occupied by the English in 1342). In return, protection was usually promised to the indigenous population against rival potential ransomers, whether of the same allegiance as the occupier or from enemy forces. In this way, important fortresses sometimes came to control extensive districts. In the 1370s the English at Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte in the Cotentin, for example, collected ransoms from around 260 parishes.

Geographically, from around 1350 to the late fourteenth century, ransoming was most prevalent in

a broad swath of territory from Normandy, Maine, and Brittany through Poitou, Saintonge, and Guyenne to the foothills of the Pyrenees. But it was also common in the Limousin, Auvergne, and the Massif Central. Few areas of the kingdom escaped unscathed. In the late 1350s and early 1360s, the Ile-de-France and neighboring regions were most affected, while parts of Burgundy, the Rhône Valley, and, in the 1370s, even eastern France, the duchy of Bar, and the county of Alsace were intermittently affected. Ransoming remained endemic in much of southwestern France for the rest of the century, and it also recurred on a more limited scale following Henry V's occupation of Normandy and other western provinces after 1417.

In the most developed form, levies of cash, of labor services, or in kind (particularly of foodstuffs, fodder, and drink) were raised parish by parish, following assessment of community wealth and resources. This was clearly done, in the case of villages, after discussion with local leaders, though there is little to show how actual amounts were fixed. In the case of larger urban communities, notably in zones of disputed allegiance like the eastern marches of the duchy of Guyenne, there is ample evidence of negotiations with town councils over what might be paid. Because of their strategic position on a hotly contested frontier, some towns might be forced to pay ransoms to two or more rival garrisons to purchase immunity. In some provinces, most notably Brittany, Normandy, and Poitou in the 1350s and 1360s, ransoms represent the first regular form of taxation of those communities. During a civil war between contenders for the duchy of Brittany (1341–1364), the English Exchequer even exercised some administrative oversight in the parts controlled by Anglo-Breton forces, since Giles de Wyngreworth, treasurer of Brittany (1358–1362), was accountable to it for what was raised from three major ransom districts, Vannes, Ploërmel, and Béchereel, which between them controlled over four hundred parishes, almost one third of those in the whole duchy. Elsewhere, other English captains in Brittany and Normandy agreed directly with the chamber of Edward III what they would pay for the privilege of

ransoming parishes. A memorandum of 1352 shows the king's council taking steps to reduce the arbitrary nature of their exactions. Those ignoring royal orders were summoned to England, and some captains were even dismissed from their posts. If this degree of control was exceptional, the charges in the Good Parliament of 1376 against William, Lord Latimer and his subordinates, for recent maladministration at Bécherel, show that there was a general expectation that English garrisons in the field would deal fairly with local people. But systematic or intermittent ransoming of places at the behest of state authorities or individual captains would remain a major feature of waging war in France even after the Hundred Years' War.

[See also Hundred Years' War, *subentry on Costs and Tribute*.]

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Michael Jones

RAT, DIEGO DE LA

(d. 1325), Catalan mercenary captain. Diego de La Rat came to Italy in 1297 during the War of Sicilian Vespers (1282–1302) and remained on the peninsula until his death. Little is known of his background and early years. In Italy, he worked for several employers, including Naples, Bologna, Florence, and the papacy. He made his reputation in the employ of the Tuscan Guelph league, headed by Robert of Anjou, for whom he worked from 1305 to 1313. Robert bestowed on Rat the title of vicar general of the Romagna and Provence in 1310, prior to the Holy Roman emperor Henry of Luxembourg's invasion of

the peninsula that year. In 1314 Rat was elected *gran camerario* (literally, "great chamberlain," but the role is unclear) of Naples.

Rat's career is most associated with the city of Florence, where he also took up residence during service to the Guelph league. Rat defended Florence against the initial advances of the Ghibelline tyrant Uguccione della Faggiuola (in 1308–1310) and against the Holy Roman Emperor Henry (in 1312–1313). During his employ, he became a conspicuous and well-known figure in Florence. Giovanni Boccaccio included Rat in the *Decameron* (c. 1350), portraying him as a handsome, conniving individual who gained the favor of the niece of the bishop of Florence by paying her husband five hundred counterfeit florins.

The details of Rat's fighting methods and technique are unknown. While working for the Guelph league, he commanded a personal contingent of two to three hundred Catalan and Aragonese horsemen and some three to five hundred Almogavar infantrymen. The combination of cavalry and infantry was relatively uncommon at the time. Contemporary Italian and German mercenary units were generally composed of cavalry alone. Almogavar infantrymen had a reputation as soldiers of outstanding skill and ability. It is not clear, however, how Rat deployed these troops, if at all. His military performance was in fact uneven. His historical importance derives in large part from the stability of his band and its obligation to him directly as opposed to any Italian state. In this, Rat is seen as a precursor to the great condottieri and companies of the middle of the fourteenth century.

[See also Condottieri; Leagues, Italian Military; and Mercenaries.]

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William Caferro

RAYMOND OF ST. GILLES

(1042–1105), the most powerful noble in eleventh-century southern France, and the foremost leader of the First Crusade (1095–1099). He laid the foundations for the county of Tripoli, one of the four crusader states in the Latin East.

Raymond had been involved with ecclesiastical plans to relieve the eastern Christians as early as 1074, and he may well have been the very first layperson to “take the cross.” His contingent was the largest of the First Crusade, and was well prepared and provisioned. Despite initial friction with the Byzantines, Raymond and Emperor Alexios I Komnenos became friends and allies.

Raymond played a key role in most of the battles of the First Crusade. During the siege of Nicaea in 1097, when the Turkish sultan Kilij Arslan I attacked Raymond's troops from the rear, Raymond and Robert II of Jerusalem, Count of Flanders, drove them off, contributing significantly to the crusaders' ultimate victory. At the battle of Dorylaion, 1 July 1097, when Kilij Arslan ambushed the forces of Bohemond I, prince of Antioch, only the timely arrival of Raymond saved the day, which ended in a Turkish rout.

At Antioch, in 1098, friction developed between Raymond and Bohemond over who should gain possession of the city. After its capture, Raymond left Bohemond and proceeded with the other crusaders southward to Jerusalem, where his forces besieged the south and west of the city. Raymond accepted the surrender of the citadel after Godfrey de Bouillon's troops broke into Jerusalem from the north on 15 July 1099; after the battle he escorted the Muslim garrison safely through the crusader lines.

Disillusioned at the way the Kingdom of Jerusalem was set up after 1099, Raymond returned to Constantinople, where he joined the Crusade of 1101. After this expedition foundered in Asia Minor, Raymond sailed to Antioch; from there he moved south, helping in 1102 with the capture of Tortosa, which became his. The following year he set up a permanent blockade outside the city of Tripoli. In 1104, he captured Jubail.

Raymond died on 28 February 1105.

[See also Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Crusades, subentry on Narrative (1095–1183); Dorylaion, Battle of; Jerusalem, Siege of (1099); and Tortosa, Siege of.]

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Paul F. Crawford

RAYNALD OF CHÂTILLON

(c. 1125–1187), French crusader. This Burgundian nobleman went on crusade in 1148, and he married Princess Constance of Antioch in 1153 and ruled in her name. From 1161 to 1176, he was held prisoner by the Muslim rulers of Aleppo, and during that time his wife died and his stepson, Bohemond III, became prince of Antioch.

After his release in 1176, Raynald was appointed Lord of Montreal and Hebron by Baldwin IV, King of Jerusalem. These lands controlled communications between Damascus and Sultan Saladin's dominions in Egypt, and Raynald endeavored to prevent the sultan from extending his power in northern Syria and encircling the Crusader States. On 25 November 1177, at the battle of Mont Gisard, Raynald led the king's forces to victory against Saladin's much larger invading army. In 1181, Raynald raided Tarbuk, on the pilgrimage route from Damascus to Medina. No crusading force had penetrated so deeply into Arabia before. In 1182, he launched a fleet of five galleys in the Gulf of Aqaba; two blockaded the port of Eilat, while the rest attacked shipping in the Red Sea and sacked Aidabh in Nubia. This initiative failed because Al-Adil, governor of Egypt, reacted swiftly and transferred part of his Mediterranean fleet to the Red Sea. Saladin then sought to hem in Raynald by building fortresses at Qalat Guindi (Qalat al-Jundi) in the Sinai in 1183 and at Ajlun to the north of Transjordan in 1184–1185, and in 1183

and 1184 he unsuccessfully besieged Raynald's fortress, Kerak.

The chronicle attributed to Ernoul, written after 1192, claims that Raynald's failure to observe the truce negotiated by Guy of Lusignan with Saladin in 1186 led to Saladin's invasion in 1187 and the loss of the kingdom, but Arabic sources show that Saladin was intending in any case to attack when the truce ended and that Raynald's intervention merely gave him the pretext. Raynald fought bravely at the battle of Hattin on 4 July 1187 but was taken prisoner and executed by Saladin himself.

[See also *Crusades, subentries on Narrative (1095–1183) and Narrative (1180–1245); and Saladin.*]

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Bernard Hamilton

RECONQUEST, CONCEPT OF

As one of the principal themes of Spanish historiography, the "reconquest" (*reconquista*) has long underpinned the structure of Iberian national identity. Defined by Joseph O'Callaghan as "a war of both territorial aggrandizement and religious confrontation," the reconquest can hardly be seen as a

continual conflict, but rather as long years of stasis between the populations of Muslim and Christian Spain interrupted by intense periods of warfare that shifted geographical and military dominance from one side to the other.

Despite its intermittent nature, the reconquest began to be viewed as a single coherent event (at least from the Christian side) from shortly after the stunning destruction of Visigothic Spain in the early eighth century. Christian chronicles of this era converted the tale of the Visigothic noble, Don Pelayo, who defeated a hugely superior Muslim force at Covadonga, into the beginning of a national epic in which God or his saintly minions intervened to either punish his own people for their sins or bring about the ultimate Muslim defeat. Even in the face of constant defeat by the Caliphate of Córdoba, Christian chronicles, Mass rituals, folklore, and legal decrees all proclaimed that the people of Christian Iberia were involved in a just war to reclaim lands long stolen by enemies of the Cross, to restore the rightful position of the Spanish Church in those territories, and to convert the Muslim population to the "true faith" while renewing the religious devotion of Iberian Christians themselves. These true believers maintained the reconquest eschatology until the eleventh century, when it was seemingly borne out by the caliphate's collapse and the emergence of the stable Christian states that were increasingly supported by papal crusading efforts. When these states completed the conquest of neighboring Muslim territory between the thirteenth and fifteenth century, the long-held view of a unitary reconquest was now seen as the primary development propelling Spain toward nationhood while reinforcing its drive to become the first European world power.

The effect of the reconquest on modern historiography, Spanish and otherwise, has been immense. Though many historians follow the line of Ramón Menéndez Pidal that the reconquest was a true historical movement that defined Spanish statehood growing out of the Middle Ages, other scholars, such as Peter Linehan, look on the reconquest, as a myth that owed its existence more to modern historians than to any primary evidence. The pros and cons of the link between crusading and the reconquest have

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Donald J. Kagay

RECRUITMENT

[This entry contains two subentries, an overview of recruitment and on Byzantine recruitment and conscription.]

Overview

In the Middle Ages, rulers' power rested on their ability to defend themselves and their people. To do this, they needed to recruit soldiers. The fragmentation of the Roman Empire during the fifth century had created an unsettled environment in which warlords and peoples struggled for supremacy. In this environment, the successful recruitment of armed warriors was critical to the survival of kings and kingdoms.

The core of most medieval armies was formed from the ruler's household retainers. During the second half of the eighth century, Pépin III ("the Short," r. 751–768) and Charlemagne (r. 768–814), Carolingian rulers of the Frankish Empire, maintained permanent bodies of warriors known as *scarae*. The troops serving in these were young royal vassals. The housecarls, or bodyguards, introduced to England by the Danish conqueror Cnut (r. 1016–1035) served on foot, though evidence for their deployment is thin. Royal household warriors remained crucial to military recruitment throughout the high and later

Middle Ages. In 1300 Edward I of England could rely on the service of thirty household bannerets, fifty household knights, and their retinues. In Germany a similar role was performed by some of the imperial *ministeriales*. These unfree knights served in garrisons and on campaign in Italy.

To recruit much larger expeditionary armies, rulers needed to reward, or at least compensate, their peoples with money or lands in return for military service. More often than not, they also had to recruit two types of soldiers: horsemen (usually from the landed elites) and foot soldiers.

Armored service, in particular, was so costly that few men could afford to perform it without receiving some form of remuneration. In the mid-eighth century the cost of equipping a single mounted warrior in the Frankish Empire was equivalent to the cost of fifteen mares or nearly twenty-three oxen. Costs continued to rise throughout the Middle Ages as more elaborate equipment and armor were sought. The costs of service weighed especially heavily on the leaders of retinues, and such men as these usually received personal summonses to serve. Indeed, members of the aristocracy were responsible for recruiting their own soldiers, and maintained large followings.

The payment of wages was an important inducement to serve. Henry I, King of England between 1100 and 1135, sometimes hired large numbers of mercenaries for his campaigns in Normandy. Wages were customarily paid to foot soldiers and were also widely accepted by members of the aristocracy throughout Europe toward the end of the period. Such payments were often designed to cover losses, however, rather than to serve as rewards. During the fourteenth century, contracts (and subcontracts) for paid service known as "indentures of war" were used to recruit royal forces. Toward the end of the fifteenth century, King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (r. 1458–1490) became one of the first rulers in Europe to establish a large standing mercenary army.

Although soldiers often expected to receive pay for service outside the realm, in defensive wars they might be motivated by other factors. In frontier societies, such as Ireland following the

Anglo-Norman invasions of the 1160s, defensive duties were often carried out by local men acting out of self-interest. Such men as these were willing to serve without pay. In the Italian city-states, foot soldiers—such as the Milanese who played the leading role in the defeat of Frederick Barbarossa's army at Legnano (1176)—served from a sense of patriotism and communal responsibility, as did members of the Flemish and Brabançon urban levies during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Like foot soldiers, mounted armored warriors often served for pay, sometimes gratuitously, but rulers might also obtain their service by granting lands to them. Following his conquest of England in 1066, William, Duke of Normandy, rewarded his followers with lands. These were to be held in return for the performance of military service whenever the royal host was summoned. Each fief was expected to sustain a certain number of knights. There was nothing unusual about this method of recruiting soldiers. Even in Germany, where knights (*ministeriales*) owed military service because of their unfree status, it was customary for lords to grant lands as rewards. For most of the Middle Ages, rulers used a combination of grants of land, cash payments, and pleas of necessity to recruit large armies; seldom was one form of recruitment dominant.

[See also *Comitatus*; *Familia Regis*; Household Knights; Mercenaries; and *Ministeriales*.]

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David Simpkin

Byzantine Recruitment and Conscription

The soldiers of the middle Byzantine world were drawn from several sources: regular *thematikoi*, soldiers entered on the *kódikes* (registers), along with their *strateia*, their obligation to serve. Within this group were those who could afford to appear for duty properly equipped and provisioned; those who could pay for their service, but preferred not to serve in a personal capacity; and those who had to be maintained by the thematic administration. Thematic troops served on a seasonal basis. During the tenth century this system was increasingly fiscalized—military service was converted into a cash payment, households paying according to the type of service they were obligated to support. The government could vary the demand: a particular cash sum from each registered household, or a contribution in livestock, cavalry mounts and equipment, and so on, could also be required. Each *thema* also had a contingent of full-time, core troops based in key fortresses and with the *strategos* (general) or *doux* (duke) in his headquarters, made up from registered holders of a *strateia* serving on a permanent basis and from nonregistered indigenous volunteers supported by the state from tax income. From the mid-tenth century commutation of military service became normal, the state investing instead in professional units. There were also “mercenary” units, hired for a particular period or campaign, and various foreign units serving under their own leaders, such as Franks, Alans, and Varangians. From the twelfth century the emperors began to issue grants of state revenue to individuals, referred to as *pronoia*, to finance soldiers. But regular recruitment on the basis of bounties and salaries or annual payments remained the norm. Only after 1261, and the recovery of Constantinople from the Latins, did the use of *pronoia* become both more widespread and, eventually, semihereditary.

[See also Byzantine Attitudes toward War and *Pronoia*.]

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John Haldon

RELIGIOUS SERVICES, BYZANTINE

In 313, Constantine and Licinius devised a monotheistic prayer to be intoned three times while kneeling on the field of battle. Lactantius, who provides the words, notes that it was “distributed to the officers and tribunes, so that they could all teach them to their own troops.” Constantine taught his soldiers to revere Sunday, as the *dies solis* (day of the sun) and the Christian Sabbath. All were required to join in a communal Latin prayer to a singular deity, the words of which Eusebius of Caesarea preserves (VC IV.20). Constantine traveled with a tent chapel, and by the fifth century military chaplains also accompanied the troops.

Priests are listed among nonmilitary personnel in Maurice’s sixth-century *Strategikon*, and regular services were clearly conducted then, although little evidence exists before the tenth century, when liturgical books were taken on campaign (Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, *De ceremoniis*, 467.4). Troops were required to participate in all services, and shirkers were humiliated by demotion, beating, or forcible barbering (Nikephoros II Phokas, *Praecepta militaria*, VI, 2). Each soldier had to be pure for his own salvation, and also for the collective efficacy of the fighting force. Thus three-day fasts were observed before engagements, with only a dry meal to be taken in the evening. Troops were required to pray for the courage to fight to the death, were ordered to cry out “*Kyrie eleison*” (Lord, have mercy) up to one hundred times on both the evening before and the morning of battle, and at the very moment of engagement to cry out “*Stavros nika*” (“The cross conquers” or “Let the cross conquer”).

Kantatores, heralds and chanters, reminded soldiers of their duty to God, and assured them that their sacrifice would be commemorated forever. A unique tenth-century document at Saint Catherine’s Monastery, Mount Sinai, contains such a commemoration, a service to be performed on Meatfare Saturday before Lent. Unlike other All Souls’ services, this one was devoted exclusively to those who had died in battle.

[See also Byzantine Empire, subentry on Sources (900–1204); Christianity; Treatises, Byzantine; and Nikephoros II Phokas.]

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Paul Stephenson

RENNES, SIEGE OF

Led by Henry, Duke of Lancaster, the siege of Rennes was, after that of Calais in 1346 and 1347, the longest undertaken by English forces in the Hundred Years’

War before the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360. Beginning on 2 or 3 October 1356, it was not lifted until 5 July 1357, when the duke, in addition to receiving a large cash indemnity from the town "for his costs," was briefly allowed to enter to place his standard symbolically on its walls before returning the town again to its Breton captain. Lancaster's failure to take Rennes, which would have delivered a severe blow to the cause of Charles de Blois, Duke of Brittany, ensured that the Breton civil war would continue until resolved by the battle of Auray on 29 September 1364.

At the time of the siege, the fortifications followed the polygonal trace of Roman walls built in the third century C.E., enclosing about nine hectares. Situated at the confluence of the rivers Ille and Vilaine, which provided additional depth to defenses on the south and west, there was also a modest motte and bailey castle protecting the town's northeastern flank. Existing suburban development south of the Vilaine or associated with the major Benedictine abbeys of St.-Mélaine and St.-Georges to the east was not enclosed until the fifteenth century. By then the population was around fourteen thousand. During the siege it may have been higher, since Brittany had escaped relatively lightly from the Black Death. Jean de Penhouët, captain of the castle, and Bertrand de Saint-Père, constable of the town, led the defense; the size of the garrison is unknown. Thébaud de Rochefort, with around one thousand men based at Dinan or Vitré, provided external aid by continuously harassing the besiegers.

Lancaster had been appointed captain-general in Brittany for Edward III and his ward, John de Montfort (the other claimant to the ducal title), on 14 September 1355, but only arrived after campaigning in Normandy in June and July 1356 with around one thousand men-at-arms and fifteen hundred archers, accompanied by Montfort. Another brief sally took him into the Loire Valley, where a rendezvous with Edward the Black Prince was planned but thwarted by failure to cross the river, so that Lancaster was not present at Poitiers. He laid siege to Rennes, the main eastern stronghold of Blois, on his return. Following a general Anglo-French truce agreed to at Bordeaux in March 1357, the siege

should have been lifted, but Lancaster continued to press on despite at least two direct orders from Edward III to withdraw. The Anonimale chronicler suggests probable grounds for this uncharacteristic disobedience: since Lancaster had laid the siege on behalf of Montfort (not mentioned in the Bordeaux terms), raising it prematurely would have impugned his honor.

Most modern descriptions draw heavily on Cuvelier's verse life of Bertrand du Guesclin, written in the mid-1380s, since contemporary accounts are laconic. Although undoubtedly recalling eyewitness evidence, the *chanson* is colored by the legendary reputation of the constable, who is depicted performing numerous heroic deeds. Efforts at mining, assaults using towers, ruses to revictual the town, and tourneying interludes, all found their place as Lancaster stubbornly tried to starve the town into submission. Initially operating outside, perhaps with Rochefort, du Guesclin eventually joined the garrison and was rewarded for his part in the defense by the Dauphin Charles, marking the true beginning of his rise in royal favor.

[See also Auray, Battle of; Edward III of England; Guesclin, Bertrand du; and Henry of Grosmont.]

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Michael Jones

RENSSEN, BATTLE OF

The exact date of this battle is unknown, but the most credible dates recorded are 15 June 1243, 21 September 1243, and 25 February 1244. The Teutonic Order (1242–1249) evidently participated in the battle, but the identity of their opponents is uncertain. Some sources indicate that the forces of the Pomeranian prince Swantopelk (Świętopelk), the Prussians, the Yotvingians (also called the Suduvians, or German Jatwinger) and the Lithuanians opposed the Order,

whereas later works claim that the Lithuanians and Yotvingians were the only opponents.

The objective of the invaders was to destroy Celmno territory (Kulmerland). After plundering the land, riders arrived at Chelmno (Culm), where they stopped. Just before twilight, they moved along the right bank of the river Wisła (Vistula) toward the northeast in the direction of Grudziądz (Graudenz). The Order's scouts observed their movements. After marching for five hours, the invading units reached Rządskie Lake (Rensen), a swampy area. They could not find a passage in the dark, so decided to continue the march on the following day. The Order's scouts informed Berlewin von Freiberg, the Order's new marshal, about the invaders' sojourn. He immediately ordered his troops to march from Chelmno. He also called men-at-arms from Toruń (Thorn). Both squads were instructed to meet near the enemy's camp. The unit of four hundred knights from Chelmno was the first to arrive at the designated place. The invaders heard the Order's unit in the darkness, and started to cross the swamp. The Teutonic Order's scouts informed their commanders about it.

The Order's commanders held counsel and vigorously debated how to proceed. Dietrich von Bernsheim, former marshal of the Order, suggested that they attack the rear part of the troop as the enemy crossed the swamp. Bernsheim wanted to wait for the detachment from Toruń to arrive, too. Freiberg believed that such a plan would not allow for the liberation of prisoners of war, who were at the head of the column. He suggested that the Order should go around the swamp and attack the forefront of the column. Finally, the leaders agreed to Freiberg's plan. The Order's men-at-arms moved past the forest, around the lake and swamps, and met the enemy. The vanguard of the invaders escaped, but most of the invading group waited behind a hill for the Order's troops. The fight began. During the battle, many Teutonic knights, including both marshals, fell. According to the sources, only "tens" survived.

Just after the fight on the battlefield, a force from Toruń made up of some two hundred men-at-arms arrived. The invading troops attacked them and won again. The question of whether the battle was one

of the first episodes of Prussian revolt against the Teutonic Order is debated.

[See also *Baltics, subentry on Narrative (500–1300)*; *Orders, Military, subentry on Northern Orders*; and *Swantopelk*.]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

REPARTIMIENTOS

An essential phase of the Spanish *reconquista* was the Christian repopulation of lands conquered from the Peninsula's Muslim rulers, a process aided by the distribution (*repartimiento*) of reconquered land by royal decree. From the ninth century onward, a mass movement southward from the Asturian and Pyrenean highlands was carried out by small groups, sometimes no more than a few families. These independent activities were eventually recognized through royal settlement norms such as the *pressura* and *aprisio* that granted legal ownership to those who engaged in the dangerous activity of occupying land in the no-man's-land between Christian and Muslim control. While this dynamic of individual settlement continued throughout the *reconquista*, more organized settlement forms under clerical, baronial, and urban auspices came to the Christian frontier during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

With the reconquests of the thirteenth century, Aragonese and Castilian sovereigns took advantage of the great victory at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) to break the Almohad stranglehold on the Peninsula and to conquer in an amazingly brief period (1230–1250) great swaths of central and southern Spain bounded by the Duero, Ebro, and Tajo rivers. To bring effective Christian settlement into the regions

of Cordova, Seville, the Balearic Islands, Valencia, and Murcia, these sovereigns appointed commissions of royal officials known as "dividers" (*divisores*, *partidores*) whose principal duties were to remove Muslim populations from the largest urban sites of a conquered district and replace them with Christian settlers. The divisions allotted to the new settlers were by no means equal, with the Church, the nobility, and the larger town councils gaining the lion's share of the captured property. The written record of this process, the registers known as the *libros de repartimiento*, are essential for the understanding of how Christian polities with their own class divisions were grafted on to societies that had been Muslim for six centuries.

The *repartimientos* provide a societal photograph of sorts for the reconquest armies that brought the Balearics, Murcia, Seville, and Valencia under Christian control. From the initial grants, one can easily perceive that at least two-thirds of the royal donations were made to members of the upper classes—most especially the great clergy and the military orders as well as the barons and other prominent nobles. The sovereigns, as the leaders of reconquest armies, issued the bottom third of these grants to lesser clergy and monastic houses as well as to simple knights and townsmen. Despite the class differences of their recipients, *repartimiento* grants were parceled out to members of the same army division (*quadriella*). Thus, upper- and lower-class men might be settled at least initially among their old military comrades.

The crisp social image apparent from the immediate *repartimiento* grants soon faded as the king—the greatest holder of lands reconquered from Spanish Islam—bestowed almost every element of the urban and rural landscape of defeated Andalusia on a great number of clerical institutions and on individuals ranging from house painters to troubadours. Many of those graced by such royal largesse had not served in the reconquest army, and thus within a few decades the military origins of the *repartimiento* were covered by an economic and commercial patina. This process was accelerated by the continuous trading of *repartimiento* grants at all levels of society.

The career of one reconquest warrior, Prince Pedro of Portugal (1187–1258), is typical of many recipients of *repartimiento* grants who used them as leverage for even more land or finally cashed them in. Pedro, son of Sancho I of Portugal (r. 1185–1211), had fallen out with his brother, Alfonso II (r. 1211–1223), and offered himself as a military supporter to his cousin, Jaime I of Aragon (1214–1276). Fighting in the Aragonese crusade against the Balearics, he received sizable estates on Majorca and then proceeded to trade these for even larger parcels of territory in Valencia, where he also served. Cashing in his Valencian lands, the royal condottiere returned to Portugal a much wealthier man than he had set out. In addition to such military entrepreneurship, many clerical and baronial beneficiaries enriched themselves and greatly changed their *repartimiento* holdings by breaking them into smaller plots that they populated with many lower-class settlers who owed them some brand of feudal allegiance.

Rather than remaining landed reflections of the armies that conquered great swaths of Muslim *Hispania*, the societies that sprang from the bedrock of the *repartimiento* were anchored by increasingly dynamic and cosmopolitan cities such as Murcia, Palma, Sevilla, and Valencia and scattered across a countryside dominated by the great estates of landlords served by sharecroppers and slaves.

[See also Jaime I of Aragon; Reconquest, Concept of; Seville, Siege of; and Valencia, Siege of (1238).]

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Donald J. Kagay

REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES

As the waging of war became more complicated during the later medieval centuries, representative assemblies across Europe increasingly came to aid and even dominate the military endeavors of their sovereigns. This development, which points squarely toward the relationship of war to government in modern times, reached its zenith with the British Parliament, the French *Estates General*, and the *Cortes* of the Iberian realms.

Origins. All great assemblies of the Middle Ages sprang from barbarian institutions such as the Germanic or Icelandic *thing*, the Anglo-Saxon *wite-nagemot*, and the Visigothic *aula regia*, in which kings assembled their great nobles and churchmen for consultation and assent. Since all medieval kings were migratory beings who depended on their scattered holdings and those of their subjects for sustenance and basic support, they often found large and extraordinary meetings difficult to arrange and maintain. Sovereigns therefore normally relied on the clerical and lay retainers and servants who traveled with them for all types of aid. This body of royal supporters eventually came to be called the "king's court" (*curia regis*). Even with the constant presence of such advisers, kings, especially those involved in war, found that they needed a wider band of support from their greatest subjects and so occasionally summoned large meetings to deal with whatever

emergency faced the crown. To differentiate such a gathering from the king's court, it was referred to as *colloquium*, *conventus*, *curia plena*, or *curia generalis*. From these transitory assemblies that owed their existence to the royal summons, all of the parliamentary institutions of the later Middle Ages were to spring.

Institutional Developments. These true parliamentary bodies eventually moved from their temporary status to a permanent one recognized by the sovereign and national law. This drive toward a lasting institutional existence was due to the crown's growing need for money and the rebirth of Roman law studies that allowed parliaments to better define themselves. Utilizing the concept of legal personhood for organizations like universities and craft and religious guilds, representative assemblies fashioned for themselves a national mission and virtually forced their sovereigns to accept it. This institutional emergence was underpinned by the concepts of representation and consent that were initially tied to the sending of procurators: *plena potestas* and *quod omnes tangit*. The first allowed a person to send an agent who was fully enabled to act for him; the second bound a person to accept all arrangements agreed to by his agent. When these terms grew to apply generally to the parliament, kings could turn to national assemblies with the confidence that agreements hammered out in them would bind an entire realm. As the thirteenth century passed into the fourteenth and then the fifteenth, parliaments routinely came to approve laws and treaties, regulate the national economy, and support royal warfare in all of its many aspects.

As T. N. Bisson long ago pointed out, medieval representative institutions had a great deal in common with royal armies of the same era. Both were assembled in the same way: those tied to the sovereign as vassals and subjects were notified by royal messengers to assemble at a certain location on a certain day to further the king's political or military goals. These meetings normally took place in large towns or royal palace complexes. The opening dates for parliaments, like much else in medieval life, overlapped with the ecclesiastical calendar, thus taking

place during important seasons such as Christmas and Easter or on holidays such as Michaelmas. In France and in the Iberian realms, the traditional membership of the great assembly was fully in place by the mid-thirteenth century and included various grades of clergy (the first estate); barons, nobles, and knights (second estate); and the representatives of the towns (third estate). The French and Spanish assemblies remained unicameral institutions. In England, however, urban participation in the great assemblies was much later in coming. This slower development led to a unique institutional solution: an upper house for the clerical and greater noble "lords" and a lower one for the urban "commons" and the "knights of the shire," representing the gentry and common freemen of the counties.

No matter how these great meetings were configured, however, they all opened with a formal speech from the king, who told the members what he wanted of them and then stirred them to carry it out in terms similar to those with which he might address an army on the battlefield. In both cases, the king urged his subjects to do their duty to crown and country by rendering selfless "help" (*auxilium*), "counsel" (*consilium*), and "service" (*servitium*).

Parliaments and Warfare. Every medieval British, French, and Castilian ruler who was successful in military affairs would have agreed with the great Aragonese king Jaime I (1214–1276), who declared that he could not engage in successful military operations without his parliaments. To put armies in the field, a sovereign had to appeal to the nascent "patriotism" and greed of his great men, who stood symbolically for the entire realm. In the early phases of the Hundred Years' War, English and French monarchs used their assemblies as sounding boards for the creation of public opinion in support of the war. Within their parliaments, kings made a national case for the war they were engaged in by claiming it was a just conflict and had been forced on them by the evil ambitions of their adversaries. In states with strong mercantile communities, kings made straightforward commercial offers by promising parliaments that the military funds they approved would return a handsome profit.

As long as the war news was good, parliaments proved an effective way to pump funds into military campaigns. When, as during the middle decades of the fourteenth century, such operations settled into stalemate, however, representative assemblies stopped the flow of money into military coffers until the sovereigns accepted the strict restrictions put on them by their great assemblies. When war took place on a domestic level, as during the Barons' War, with the deposition of several English kings, and during social conflicts such as the Peasants' Revolt in England and the *Jacquerie* in France, parliaments often threw in their lot with one side or another, even when this led to true civil war.

The most important function of parliaments for royal warriors of the later Middle Ages was that of paymaster and quartermaster. In England, France, and the Iberian realms, war funding consisted of customary imposts and emergency donations (called a *fouage* in France and a *fogatge* in the Crown of Aragon) assessed at a set rate on urban households. The money collected from such grants guaranteed—at least, theoretically—that the royal war effort would not require more money from the parliament for a specified period. Though the fiscal work of the great assemblies normally ended with their agreement to provide the war subsidy, members of parliaments in France and the Crown of Aragon refused to stop solely with the grant of such taxation and insisted on controlling a part of the military administration for which this money was intended. The example of this unprecedented drive for power soon faded in France, but it formed the foundation of parliamentary development in the realms of eastern Spain by guaranteeing royal recognition of their permanent institutional existence.

In the throes of one of the most destructive conflicts of the Iberian Middle Ages—the War of the Two Pedros (1356–1366)—Pere III (Pedro IV of Aragon; r. 1336–1387) soon ran through all his ready cash in the fierce border war with Pedro I of Castile (r. 1350–1366/69) and repeatedly turned to his Aragonese, Catalan, and Valencian parliaments for help. In 1362 he summoned representatives of all his lands to a general *parlamentum* in Monzón. Expecting to

gain a simple military subsidy as he had before, the king soon found that the assembly had other ideas. Eventually agreeing to a large war grant, the Monzón assembly then acted to remove from the royal government control of the collection of the subsidy, the recruitment and stationing of troops, and the paying of their salaries. Since the parliament was essentially a temporary occurrence, it appointed a standing committee of deputies to carry out its military work even after it had been adjourned by the king. From this clever solution, the parliaments of eastern Spain developed permanent executive committees (*Generalitat, Diputacio del Reino*) that assumed many parliamentary functions while never going out of session.

War Outgrows Parliament. The functions of European parliaments as military financiers and administrators continued through the later Middle Ages, but began to falter with the emergence of the "new monarchs" in the early modern period. When French and Spanish sovereigns found new means of general taxation, the parliaments of their realms suddenly lost a fiscal monopoly in regard to royal warfare. New forces, such as the *francs-archers* of Charles VII of France (r. 1422–1461) and the *guardas viejas* of the Catholic Kings of Castile and Aragon, started the trend toward permanent professional armies supported by tax receipts rather than by subsidies. Because of the loss of this crucial role, Spanish and French parliaments slowly withered away. Only in England did the parliament remain as an essential element in military financial support and administrative planning.

[See also *Mercenaries and Recruitment*.]

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Donald J. Kagay

RESTAURATIO EQUORUM, RESTOR


The warhorse was one of the most important and expensive pieces of equipment in medieval warfare. From around the tenth century, the mounted armored warrior was arguably the preeminent type of soldier in armies operating throughout Europe. Out of these facts grew the desire to ensure that those who fought on horseback did not suffer financial losses because of their service. *Restauratio equorum* (literally, the restoration of horses), a form of compensation granted to warriors whose horses had been maimed or killed while employed in royal armies, was designed to meet this need and to

enable soldiers' continued service. It followed the initial horse-appraisal process, whereby the quality of soldiers' main mounts was checked.

The English crown had been compensating its household soldiers for horse losses since at least the reign of Henry I (r. 1100–1135). Moreover, in the mid-thirteenth century Henry III sometimes granted gifts to soldiers to assist them in obtaining new warhorses. Yet it is only from the reign of Edward I (1272–1307) that the English crown can be found systematically compensating *all* paid soldiers for horse losses. It is possible that in this way Edward was attempting to encourage more men to serve for crown pay. In France widespread use of *restauration equorum* goes back to at least the reign of King

Louis IX (1226–1270). For Philip III of France's expedition to Aragon in 1285, compensation was paid for the loss of some eleven hundred horses. Evidence for its widespread practice in English armies dates exclusively from the years between 1282 (the second Welsh war of Edward I) and 1370–1371 (the Duke of Lancaster's service in Gascony).

For the crown to compensate for lost horses, it was first necessary for horses to be valued. Horse appraisal took place during muster at the beginning of royal campaigns, and the documents drawn up during the appraisal process, the horse inventories, were later used as a guide to the sums owed. During the muster process the horses were branded. An ordinance of King John II of France, dating from



Horse Inventory. A list of men-at-arms and their horses recruited for the Scottish campaign of Edward I in 1298. The left margin records the dates of horse appraisals and equine casualties suffered. The right margin records the value of each man-at-arms's main mount. The name of each man-at-arms is followed by a description of his horse. E 101/6/39 (A), CROWN COPYRIGHT. IMAGE COURTESY THE SOLDIER IN LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND PROJECT (WWW.MEDIEVALSOLDIER.ORG). PHOTOGRAPH BY DR. DAVID SIMPKIN

1351, shows that in French royal armies, horses were branded on the thigh. In Italy the condottiere's emblem was used. Presentation of the dead horse's branded hide was often required before compensation would be granted. This reduced the number of fraudulent claims.

In England, royal clerks made notes on the horse inventories, beside the names of the relevant soldiers, of mounts that had been killed or injured. Each man-at-arms could have only one of his horses evaluated and thus eligible for *restor*. The clerks' notes usually record that the horse had died or had been sent to the baggage train (*karvannum*). Such marginal notes on the horse inventories were later summarized in the postcampaign *restauratio equorum* accounts. These follow a format similar to the horse inventories, being lists of men and their mounts arranged by retinue, but here only horses killed or withdrawn from service were recorded.

It often took months or years for soldiers to obtain compensation payments for lost horses. The system was thus imperfect and was abandoned across Europe during the 1370s and 1380s. The cumbersome administrative practices required and reform of terms of pay and reward probably account for its demise.

[See also Horses.]

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David Simpkin

REUTLINGEN, BATTLE OF

On 14 May 1377, an envoy from the imperial city of Reutlingen (now Baden-Württemberg), and Count Ulrich of Württemberg, son of Count Eberhard II of Württemberg (with his allies), faced each other at the gates of Reutlingen near the St. Leonhard chapel. The Reutlingen forces came away victorious from this encounter. On the count's side, eighty-three

men are said to have fallen, of whom seventy-three are known by name, including three counts and the Württemberg standard-bearer. Reutlingen reportedly lost thirteen men—one citizen and twelve servants.

In 1376, fourteen Swabian imperial cities, led by Ulm, had banded together to form a league of cities, the so called "Schwäbische Städtebund" in order to protect their interests against the king and the counts of Württemberg. The victory at Reutlingen secured the league's position militarily and thus laid the foundation for its increasing importance. The sources of the battle are dominated by reports of the victorious Reutlingen citizens to the allied cities. They describe the conflict, name the dead on the Württemberg side, and offer a look at their behavior after the battle. These letters are contradicted by a variety of chronicle writers; however, the credibility of the latter has been judged rather harshly by modern scholars. In the end, nearly all of the military details remain unclear. The Reutlingen letters report the battle itself only sketchily: "We joined battle, and fought with one another, and with God's help we won." They support the suspicion that the events have been simplified in favor of the victors and their propaganda purposes. The Reutlingen casualty count, with exactly one citizen lost, seems so low as to be anecdotal. The letters also take pains to explain the Württemberg losses; they point out the merciless acts of their enemies, whom the Reutlingen forces, in turn, mercilessly killed. The violent behavior of the Reutlingen soldiers is made to appear as a reaction to the battle conduct of their opponents.

Certain facts can be confirmed. During the night of 13–14 May, the Reutlingen army sent out a division of about seven hundred men from the city to loot the territory of the counts of Württemberg. The next morning, this group was on its way back with about 250 head of cattle. To protect them, Reutlingen sent out a second division of unknown size to meet them. After the two groups had met, the count of Württemberg blocked their way to the city with 232 "spears." It is unclear what the actual numbers of fighters were, but the Württemberg

group was certainly outnumbered by the Reutlingen forces. Nothing definite can be said about the positioning of the fighters or the length or progress of the battle. Evidently the Württemberg troops were on horseback and the Reutlingen men were on foot. Having sustained heavy losses, including the wounding of young Count Ulrich, the Württemberg army fled. The Reutlingen fighters brought their booty—the reports mention in particular forty-four live horses—into the city. During the following days, the Württemberg dead were handed over, and the squires of the fallen nobles were allowed into the city to identify their dead lords.

[See also Germany, *subentry* on Narrative (1250–1415).]

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Martin Clauss

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

REWARDS FOR MILITARY SERVICE

So ought a young man to compass by noble deeds, by liberal gifts in his father's possession, that afterwards, in later years, willing companions may stand by him—that men may do service when war comes.

(*Beowulf*, translated by John R. Clark Hall [London: Sonnenschein, 1911], lines 20–25)

Even in epic poetry men did not fight for nothing, and in this as in much else epic poetry reflects medieval reality. Medieval kings were, first and foremost, warriors, because above all they needed to satisfy their chief men, whose power rested on control of armed retainers. These bullyboys ensured that peasants paid their dues and kept their noble enemies at bay. The medieval king was the manager of such people, and war was a primary tool of his trade. The Merovingian and Carolingian kings of the Franks raided the lands of their neighbors for loot, which they distributed among their followers.

Clovis (r. 481–511) is said to have wished to restore to a Christian bishop a vase seized in war, but one of his followers smashed it with an axe, declaring that the king should have only his “fair share.” This appeal to some principle of division of spoils forced Clovis to back down, although he later killed the man. But the point is made: the successful war-leader must reward his great men, who in turn pay their military retainers.

This need to satisfy the military nobility was one of the driving forces of the Carolingian conquest of Europe. Kings much preferred to agree on tribute with a defeated enemy, because then they controlled the distribution. The Vikings forced their enemies, and in particular the Anglo-Saxon Kingdom of England, to pay *danegeld*, which became a regular tax on England. Within Europe, land was the primary form of wealth, so kings and lords made grants of land to support their military followers, commonly the heavy cavalryman whom we call the knight. But there was a limit to the numbers who could be given land, and the holders provided only forty days of service per year, so if more troops were needed, and were needed for a longer time, then leaders had to pay. These men were probably recruited from the landless sons of the petty nobility and knights because their wages—about one shilling per day under Henry I of England (r. 1100–1135), rising to double that by the end of the century—would hardly have paid for expensive horses, arms, and armor, which presumably came from their families.

These swords for hire were even willing to serve for no more than food in the hope of gain—for rather than kill their enemy, soldiers preferred to capture him and take both his equipment and a rich ransom from his relatives. In fact the casual pickings of war, from looting and ransom, were an important part of soldiers' rewards, and wise commanders made careful provision for their fair distribution. The word “mercenary” is rarely applied to soldiers from the gentle classes because of its derogatory sense in John 10:12–14. The high aristocracy usually served their kings freely, but the costs of war were high, and they, too, looked to their superior to offset costs. In 1101 the Count of Flanders agreed, by



Looting of Jerusalem. A group of soldiers plunder Jerusalem after its capture in 1099. The spoils of war, obtained from looting and ransom, were an important part of soldiers' rewards. Miniature from a chronicle by Jean de Courcy, MS Fr 20124, fol. 331, 1440. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

the Treaty of Dover, to provide Henry I of England with one thousand mercenary knights in return for a pension of £500. Gradually even the greatest men were drawn into the cash nexus. Humble men had a place in war—petty landowners, for instance, were sergeants who sometimes acted as cavalry or infantry—but they were few. A mass levy of peasants would raise poor soldiers, so there was a preference for paying mercenaries who were effective soldiers, generally called after the areas they came from—such as the Brabançons from Brabant—or by some generic name like “Coterellis” (throat cutters). Paying wages was expensive, so these men were paid for the duration of war and then were dismissed. As a result they became a real threat to social order in areas of frequent warfare, like southern France in the 1170s; this is why the Fourth Lateran of 1179 condemned them.

But because mercenaries were an essential part of warfare, such condemnations had little effect. In the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, warfare in Italy became endemic, and the richer cities recruited mercenaries very frequently to supplement—and later to replace—their native forces, both cavalry and infantry. So continuous was the demand that permanent mercenary companies arose and were very effective military units. In 1310 the Grand Catalan Company seized the duchy of Athens, which it ruled until 1388, whereas in Italy groups such as the White Company ravaged the land and mercenary leaders such as John Hawkwood played cities against one another for their own profit.

In England the demands of the Hundred Years' War produced a rather different solution. In time of need the crown could call all freemen to serve in the county train-bands. These groups were regularly paraded, and professional captains recruited archers and others from their ranks, and then signed written agreements—indentures—with the crown to provide a specified number of soldiers of specific types.

One of these military men, Sir Edward Dalyngrigge, profited from the war to such an extent that he was able to build the luxurious and beautiful Bodiam castle from the proceeds.

By the later Middle Ages, leading soldiers were generally referred to as "men-at-arms," and this colorless title reflects the professionalization of war, which increased because the new gunpowder weapons needed specialists as operators. War had always been expensive, and kings could not afford standing armies. Various ways were found to hire short-term forces that could be paid off when war ended, but this gradually created professional warriors. Ultimately this led in the fifteenth century to standing forces, but they were so expensive that for long they formed only the nucleus of the royal armies of the early modern period. The link between war and finance was always evident, and it is no accident that our word "soldier" is derived from French *soulde*, meaning "pay," a word itself having its origin in the name of the Roman gold coin, the *solidus*.

[See also Mercenaries; Plunder, Division of; Prisoners and Ransoms; and *Repartimientos*.]

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John France


RHODES, SIEGE OF

By 1480 the most important holdout against the Ottoman advance into the Aegean was the island of Rhodes, occupied since 1309 by the knights of the Order of St. John (the Hospitallers). When news came in early 1479 of peace between Venice and the

Ottomans after sixteen years of war, the expectation at Rhodes was that it would be a matter of time before the Turks attacked. The Order had built a network of fortifications on the surrounding islands and on Rhodes itself, which boasted at least thirty castles maintained by the knights. The main port of Rhodes was protected by walls of Byzantine vintage, high and with square towers; much of the circuit had been thickened to as much as 4 meters (13 feet), and additional angled bulwarks were added to the towers during the course of the fifteenth century, mostly under the guidance of the grand master of the Order, Pierre d'Aubusson (1423–1503).

The Ottomans sent a reconnaissance party to raid the island and scout its defenses in late 1479. In the spring of 1480 d'Aubusson oversaw defensive preparations, denuding the countryside of fruit and grain, tearing down churches that might serve as shelter for the Turks, and moving the inhabitants of Rhodes inside the walls of the port city. The port was defended by about four thousand men—only six hundred of whom were members of the Order—divided into eight different "nations," each responsible for a section of the city's walls. The remainder of the defenders was mercenaries and militia. It was said that the defenders had stocked sufficient provisions to hold out for two years if necessary.

The Ottoman fleet bound for Rhodes, numbering between ninety and 130 ships, left Gallipoli in early May. The Ottoman force, led by Mesih Pasha, landed on the island's northern beaches unopposed on 23 May and immediately occupied the acropolis of the old city of Rhodes, using it as their base for the siege of the port. The bombardment was initially concentrated on the strategic Tower of St. Nicholas, which dominated the harbor from the end of a mole (breakwater) projecting into the water. Setting up a battery of three large cannons to the north of the city, the Turks subjected the tower to ten days of incessant bombardment, inflicting serious damage on its walls. The defenders, however, worked around the clock to plug the gaps with timber ramparts and constructed a trench that ran the length of the mole. They also mounted guns along the city's



Siege of Rhodes, 1480. Defeat of the Turkish attack on Rhodes. Illustration from *A History of the Siege of Rhodes* by Guillaume Caoursin, MS Lat 6067, 1483. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

northern walls, offering protective fire to the mole and subjecting the Turkish batteries to bombardment.

Two amphibious assaults on the tower were turned back. The second assault on the tower, launched in the night hours of 18 June, was the more ambitious of the two. The Turks constructed a pontoon bridge spanning the gap between the shore and the mole. They managed to land a number of men on the mole, but the tower's garrison was able to destroy the bridge and sink several troop transports, as well as set fire to a number of Turkish ships taking part in the assault.

During the attempt to take the St. Nicholas Tower, a parallel effort was made against the section of the wall called Italy, which guarded the southeast of the port and behind which lay the city's Jewish quarter.

The attackers managed to set up their artillery close to the walls and the bombardment here was, if anything, more intense; most of the wall was reduced to rubble by the second half of July. Mortars pounded the city behind the walls, causing significant damage to the buildings within; the knights operated fire brigades to put out fires set by flaming arrows. The Turks in this sector excavated trenches by which to approach the walls and unsuccessfully sought to fill in the moat—the defenders had constructed their own tunnel from which they removed stones from the fosse and launched a series of counterattacks that ruined several Turkish guns. D'Aubusson also readied an interior defense in the form of hastily constructed timber ramparts.

After thirty-seven days of struggle before the walls, the final Turkish assault came on 27 July. A force of Turkish irregulars, augmented by Janissaries, entered through breaches in the ruined walls. In many places, there was bitter hand-to-hand combat. Those who did manage to penetrate the outer walls were subject to counterattacks on their flanks in front of the new interior defenses, suffering heavy losses. The sultan's standard was captured in the Turkish retreat.

By August Mesih Pasha conceded defeat. He laid waste to all the vineyards and fields that remained, gathered up all the available livestock, and withdrew his army and fleet. The number of Turkish dead remains a matter of conjecture, but refugees among the Turks reckoned that as many as nine thousand of the forty thousand attackers may have perished.

[See also *Orders, Military, subentry on Levantine Orders and Ottoman Armies and Military Methods.*]

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Paul M. Dover

RHUDDLAN CASTLE

See Welsh Castles of Edward I.

RICHARD I

(1157–1199), King of England and Count of Anjou from 1189. More than any other monarch of the Middle Ages, Richard I exemplifies the chivalry and heroism of the medieval knight and personifies the role of military commander. His larger-than-life character is reflected in his historical reputation and his hold on the popular imagination, both with his contemporaries and in the present. He was a brilliant general and inspired leader of men, but his military achievements, impressive as they were, do not match his perceived status as one of the most outstanding soldiers in history. These achievements are notable more as feats of military prowess and execution than for their long-term legacies.

Richard's renown derives foremost from his role in the Third Crusade (1188–1192). He emerged as sole leader when the emperor Frederick Barbarossa died on his way to Palestine and Philip II Augustus of France returned home ill. Richard suffered the same deadly local disease, known as *arnoldia*, as Philip but he chose to remain at the crucial siege of Acre and conduct operations from his sickbed. The city soon fell (not least due to the hammering it received from French siege machines), and the glory of the victory went to Richard. His victories against the odds over Saladin, at Arsuf and Jaffa in 1192, consolidated his legendary status in Europe. (His massacre of over twenty-five hundred Muslim prisoners at Acre did nothing to dent his reputation.) But Jerusalem, the ultimate objective, was not taken. Richard had the wisdom not to besiege it. He accepted that the problems of supplying and supporting the city could not realistically be resolved. Yet the capture of Cyprus, the Palestine coast, and key fortresses kept the crusader states supplied and viable for decades to come. The expedition, an enormous undertaking, revealed Richard's mastery of logistical detail, strategic awareness, and control of his men (the latter shown by a written disciplinary

ordinance to regulate the conduct of his troops while they were being transported to Palestine).

Back in France, Richard habitually bettered his Capetian opponent Philip II Augustus, as at Fréteval (1194) and Gisors (1198), thereby regaining territory lost in his absence. On the Franco-Norman frontier he built the spectacular (and spectacularly expensive) castle of Château-Gaillard. A symbol of the latest military technology, the castle was so well designed that Richard boasted he could defend it even if it were made of butter. Richard is often criticized for being away from his Kingdom of England for well over nine-tenths of his reign. However, his political arrangements with Scotland and his choice of regents meant that his country was relatively secure, stable, and well governed in his absences. Richard could thus, crucially, exploit its wealth to fund his permanent campaigning and military expenditures.

Richard was a consummate general who spent his whole life actively engaging with and enjoying



Richard I (1157–1199). PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

the military life. By the time he became king, he was already an experienced and skillful soldier: at fifteen he served with the renowned veteran Count Philip of Flanders; in the 1170s he was suppressing revolts in his county of Poitou; and by 1173 he was rebelling against his father, Henry II. His generous treatment of his knightly circle and his embodiment of chivalrous values display his understanding of martial mentality; there was no shortage of knights attracted to his entourage. Extroverted, gregarious, athletic, and energetic, he excelled as a leader of men, inspiring by his example and leading from the front: at Acre, one account tells of him being carried on a litter while very ill to shoot a crossbow at the walls of the city in full view of his troops; at Limassol in 1191 he leapt into the shallow waters and stormed the beach at the head of his men. One contemporary source wrote that thirty knights under Richard were worth forty of the best under anyone else. While Richard's tendency for such exploits created a real military advantage by spurring his men on to great deeds in battle, it also proved his undoing: at the siege of Chalus-Chabrol in 1199 he was killed by a crossbow bolt.

With no son as heir, he was followed on the throne by his younger brother John. Richard was everything that his successor was not; John's incompetence led directly to the collapse of the Angevin Empire, which Richard had so skillfully preserved. Had Richard been a little more cautious, his long-term legacy might have been more tangible than that of a great romantic hero famous for his military feats. But that was not his style.

[See also Acre, Siege of; Crusades, *subentry* on Narrative (1180–1245), and John, King of England.]

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Sean McGlynn

RICHARD III

(1452–1485), King of England from 1483. Like his elder brother Edward IV, Richard of York was born to the soldier's life. Also like him, he was considered a skilled, brave, and intelligent general. At only eighteen, he established a name for himself in action during the Yorkist victories of 1471: at Tewkesbury, Edward gave him command of the vanguard, where he performed with distinction, leading a decisive flanking movement. Grumbling that the king was too ready in coming to terms with the French in the treaty of Picquigny in 1475, he eagerly played a major role in Edward's expedition to France in that year. He welcomed the collapse of Anglo-Scottish relations in 1480 and immediately embarked on a series of incursions into Scotland, regaining Berwick in 1482 and reaching Edinburgh. His campaigning style was aggressively provocative and popular, boosting his military reputation. His more substantial military operations, however, were not always as effective, as seen in his major combined land and naval operation on the east coast of Scotland, which was not well executed. This operation, together with his decision not to press Edinburgh, led to some criticisms from leading nobles. At Bosworth in 1485 Richard also fatally failed in his first major battle as commander.

In common with most leading generals, Richard enjoyed the camaraderie of the soldier's life, earning loyalty and admiration from his men not only for his martial ability but also for his generosity and personal concern for them. His military patronage extended to the literary sphere when he commissioned a copy of Vegetius's *De re militari*, a military manual from classical times. Despite nods to chivalry, Richard learned from his brother how to be unrelentingly ruthless in crushing his enemies. As a king who seized power, he shocked public opinion with the executions of Earl Rivers and Lord Hastings. Understandably, suspicion soon fell on him for the disappearance of his young nephews and Edward's heirs to the throne, the famous princes in the Tower. Richard's positive military reputation, then as now, has thus been overshadowed by his notorious

political one. The effect of this was immediately disastrous for Richard and was to play a part in his downfall. Where once men flocked to his banner on the strength of his charisma, now their loyalty could no longer be assured. At the battle of Bosworth in August 1485, this questionable loyalty came to a head. Richard had more than sufficient forces to defeat Henry Tudor's challenge to the throne with ease, but when the Earl of Northumberland, one of Richard's leading commanders, betrayed the king by failing to engage the enemy, the battle was lost. Typical of his character, Richard made a brave attempt to save the day by a death-or-glory charge at Henry Tudor, only to be cut down himself in the process. This action earned Richard praise from all sides, one source declaring, "He defended himself as a noble knight with great courage to his last breath." It was a heroic end for a warrior sullied by politics.

[See also Edward IV of England and Roses, Wars of the.]

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Sean McGlynn

RIVER DEFENSES, CAROLINGIAN

River defenses presuppose river invaders. During the Middle Ages, Viking fleets exploited the fluvial systems of Europe, especially West Francia and Anglo-Saxon England, in the ninth century. Charles the Bald of West Francia built bridgeworks to stop the advance of the Viking fleets and prevent their crews from disembarking. The Frankish sources distinguished a fortified bridge—one with wood and stone bridgeheads built to house a garrison—from a bridge whose span was prepared on an impromptu basis to defend against the advance of Viking fleets and facilitate mobility of landed forces. Charles the Bald built two fortified bridges, the first at Pont de l'Arche on the Seine in 862–869, and the second at Ponts de Cē on the Loire at Angers in 873. According to the *Annals of Saint Bertin* (869), the bridgeheads

of a fortified bridge were constructed of wood and stone, reflecting a similarity to Charlemagne's construction of a fortified bridge on the Elbe in 789. Bridges were rebuilt (but not fortified) to stop the advance of Viking fleets.

As a result of a successful operation against a Viking band on the Marne in 862, which combined the positioning of troops along the banks with the barrier of a hastily repaired bridge, Charles the Bald was inspired to build the permanent fortified bridge on the Seine at Pont de l'Arche to block the upstream access of Viking ships. Two other bridges, at Auvers and Charenton, were repaired in 865, but their purpose was not explicitly stated in the *Annals of Saint Bertin* and has to be inferred from the historical context. In 865 a Viking fleet successfully bypassed the bridgeworks at Pont de l'Arche and raided Saint Denis. Referring to the "current crisis," the *Annals of Saint Bertin* strongly suggest that these repairs were intended to stop the advance of the Viking fleet. These bridges were repaired so as to permit the insertion of timbers along the span to stop the advance of Viking fleets temporarily and their removal afterward to restore the passage of commercial traffic on the river. Repaired spans could be maintained by local forces, inserting or removing barriers as needed. Royal decisions to fortify or rebuild bridges appear to have been made in response to emergencies, rather than as an initial strategic decision to construct a network of five or six bridges. Once in place, these bridges may have functioned as a network, acting as a deterrent to Viking incursions on the Seine from 866 to 876, a period of Viking inactivity on that river. During these years Viking raids increased noticeably in Anglo-Saxon England, as Viking bands sought easier lucrative raiding opportunities.

Fortified bridges were the principal defenses of Count Odo during the Viking siege of Paris in 885–886. Ninth-century Paris occupied the site of the Ile-de-la-Cité. The Grand Pont connected the island to the north (right) bank; the Petit Pont crossed the Seine to the south (left) bank. Both structures had fortified bridgeheads with spans that could interdict passage on the river. Abbo of Saint

Germain-des-Près, an eyewitness, wrote a poem recounting the events of the siege. After unsuccessfully attacking the tower on the right bank of the Seine, the Vikings launched fire ships against the Grand Pont, which remained intact. In February 886 a flood swept away the span of the Petit Pont, exposing the left bank to attack. Regino of Prüm reported that, after negotiating their passage past Paris with Charles III the Simple, the Vikings portaged some of their ships overland and refloated them upstream of the Ile-de-la-Cité. The operation was necessary because of the wrecked fire ships backed up against the Grand Pont.

In response to the Viking raids in England Alfred the Great ordered the construction of some thirty fortified burghs. A number of Alfred's burghs were situated on rivers so as to interdict transit by vessels and river crossings via bridge or ford. Alfred is generally thought to have borrowed from the Franks the fortified-bridge concept for one of these burghs. In 895 the double burgh bridge on the Lea successfully repelled a Viking attack. Alfred's system for the maintenance and permanent garrisoning of these sites is documented in the *Burghal Hidage*.

[See also Alfred the Great; Charles the Bald; Paris, Siege of; and Vikings.]

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C. M. Gillmor

ROBERT GUISCARD

(c. 1015–1085), Norman military leader. Robert de Hauteville, the knight dubbed "Guiscard"

(the Cunning), was a prominent figure of the Norman military conquest in southern Italy after 1047, and of Sicily after 1061; he was the youngest of Tancred de Hauteville's sons.

Guiscard, together with five horsemen and thirty-five sergeants, valorous soldiers trained from a very early age in the use of arms and bent on the conquest of land and wealth, decided that they would settle in Italy after 1046, in territories subject to political unrest, where they could capitalize on their military experience as mercenaries. The cavaliers he recruited, who had fled a population explosion in Normandy and William the Conqueror's repressive policies, sought their fortunes in Italy, where in a series of operations undertaken on their own behalf, they distinguished themselves by their audacity and utter dedication. A coalition of pontifical and imperial forces attempted to stave off the advance of Guiscard's soldiers, but he won an outstanding victory in 1053 at Civitate. In 1056, he recruited other Norman adventurers into his army and gained recognition as a wise and determined leader who could support his men from his castle in San Marco Argentano.

According to eyewitness accounts, Guiscard had limited troops: only sixty knights fought under him in Calabria, whereas during the campaign in the Balkans, thirteen hundred horsemen were supported by a troop of brave soldiers who followed on foot, most of whom were Slavic deserters from the Byzantine army. Although his soldiers were not numerous, they were heavily armed with metal hauberks; nose-guard helmets; almond-shaped wood and leather "kite" shields; and swords and long lances, with mounts well protected by leather trappings. In 1057, after a period of bloody attacks, Guiscard was appointed Count of Apulia before settling in Calabria the following year, where he commissioned the construction of several castles—Scribla, Malvito, Cervinara, Troia, and Gerace—yet failed to take over the corresponding towns.

However, Guiscard did manage to defeat many of his enemies on the battlefield. On 23 August 1059, the clerics who participated in the Council of Melfi persuaded Pope Nicholas II (1059–1061) to invest

Guiscard as duke, legitimizing his possession of Apulia, Calabria, and (anticipating future conquest) Sicily. In exchange, Guiscard vowed to remain loyal to the pope, pay an annual tribute, and make his troops available to defend the Church against the German emperor's pretensions in the Investiture Controversy. In that same year, Guiscard married a Lombard princess, Sichelgaita of Salerno, thus forging a powerful alliance. From then on, the convergence of interests would serve Guiscard's objective to legitimately gain power over the other Norman family chieftains so that he could achieve his true political aim. In 1060, he seized Taranto and Reggio in order to launch the assault on Malta and Sicily from these ports.

Accompanied by his brother Roger, one thousand horsemen, and one thousand foot soldiers, Guiscard began his invasion of Sicily in winter 1061 and took Messina. His victory at Cerami, two years later, paved the way for an attack on the island, which was poorly defended by the Muslims. The tactic used in Bari—a maritime blockade and ground attack—paid off handsomely. Proud of this resounding success, Guiscard took up residence in Salerno in 1077, increasing his possessions and leaving Roger in Sicily.

Determined to definitively eliminate Byzantine claims to southern Italy, Guiscard attacked the Eastern Roman Empire by crossing the Adriatic Sea in May 1081 with an army of sixteen thousand men, occupied the island of Corfu, and, thanks to his infantry, seized the town of Dyrrachium (also known as Durrës or Durazzo), a beautiful port on the Albanian coast. After defeating Emperor Alexios in battle and overrunning Macedonia, his army marched toward Thessalonike along the Via Egnatia. The troop's advance was interrupted when Pope Gregory VII requested Guiscard's help to defeat Emperor Henry IV's army. Guiscard entered Rome leading an army of thirty thousand men, for the most part Saracen auxiliaries, who pillaged the city and slaughtered its inhabitants.

In Greece, the Normans were defeated despite Guiscard's return, with four of his sons, in 1084. Having fallen ill, Guiscard died on the island of

Cephalonia on 15 July 1085. He was buried in Santa Trinità's basilica in Venosa. The sarcophagus containing his remains bears this inscription: "Here lies Guiscard, terror of the world."

Guiscard gained recognition through his personal skills, his companions' military might, and his keen knowledge of military science: he excelled at surprise raids, commanding an army, besieging large fortified cities, and disembarking troops transported by sea. The Hauteville family's success in the Mediterranean world, so hostile and foreign for northern Europeans, set the standard for a "warrior aristocracy" whose goal was to rapidly better itself in terms of wealth and social standing.

[See also Bari, Siege of; Civitate, Battle of; Dyrrachium, Naval Battle of (1081); Dyrrachium, Siege and Battle of (1081); Italy, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300); and Roger I.]

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Bernard Doumerc

Translated from the French by Carol Macomber

ROBERT OF BELLÈME

(1057–after 1130), third Earl of Shrewsbury and Norman magnate. The name Robert of Bellême was long a byword for feudal mayhem and treachery, but his reputation has changed in recent decades

as historians have highlighted his considerable military talents and put his major critic's diatribes into context. Orderic Vital was a remarkable chronicler, but his complaints against Bellême's rapacity and cruelty were driven by his efforts to defend his monastery's rights and estates via his chronicle. In the tangled politics of the Anglo-Norman realm, as well as in the no less turbulent dealings along the Norman frontiers, Bellême simply had the bad luck of annoying Orderic more than his own peers (who practiced similar policies of physical harassment and leveraging).

Bellême was born around 1057 to Roger de Montgomery, a magnate of lower Normandy who would also become Earl of Shrewsbury after the Norman Conquest. Even before 1066, Robert was politically active and would be knighted by William the Conqueror himself in 1073.

In 1088 he was among the rebels who tried to supplant William Rufus as king with Duke Robert of Normandy, ostensibly for the good of a unified realm. When that effort failed, Bellême's military activity focused on serving whichever master in Normandy could best further his interests. Thus, he operated for a time with the future Henry I, helped quell the Rouen revolt of 1090, and struck often at the also-rebellious barons and castellans of the Normandy/Maine frontier.

Even Orderic admitted Bellême's military genius, crediting him with inventing numerous siege engines that in 1092 cowed the previously insurmountable garrison and lord of Bréval. Such skill was likely an outgrowth from Bellême's other recognized talent of building impressive castles. He held thirty-four at one point and designed others, including Gisors. But Bellême was also a military pragmatist: during a conflict with Geoffroy of Mortagne, he shrewdly outwaited Geoffroy's depredations, safe within Domfront's walls. Even Orderic's charge of cowardice cannot hide the basic wisdom of Bellême's tactics. Once they had reconciled, William Rufus used him as his chief commander.

Even if Bellême was not as cruel as Orderic claimed, he had few scruples about violence. He reportedly abused and killed hostages, preyed upon

the Church in nearly every manner possible, maimed those he captured, and generally sought to establish his lordship by terrorizing his foes. His aggressiveness and ferocity led neighboring magnates usually to league together against him, a circumstance that cost him often enough on the battlefield, but even more at the negotiating table, where he often lost what he had gained in battle. In 1112 he was imprisoned for good by Henry I, dying sometime after 1130.

[See also William I of England.]

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Steven Isaac

ROBERT I (THE BRUCE)

(1274–1329), King of the Scots from 1306 to his death. Born in 1274, the oldest son of Robert de Bruce and Marjory, Countess of Carrick, Robert had four brothers, all executed (1306–1307) or killed (1318). Earl of Carrick from 1292, Robert seized the throne on 25 March 1306, provoking war with Edward I of England.

Robert's ignominious defeat at Methven on 19 June 1306 and his subsequent adventures as a hunted man—his hardships permanently impaired his health—were followed by a key success when his men, based at Inverurie and chasing some of the force of John Comyn, Earl of Buchan, decisively defeated Comyn's army at nearby Oldmeldrum on 23 May 1308 and then "burned all Buchan from end to end sparing none" (Barbour, *The Bruce*, book 9, lines 296–279). In August he took Aberdeen and, helped by James Douglas, destroyed the Macdougall lordship in Argyll. He also won over his nephew Thomas Randolph, later Earl of Moray. Randolph, Douglas, and Robert's brother Edward Bruce were the captains on whom the king most relied.

After the truce of 1309–1310, Robert raided Lothian and then northern England, granting “truces” to various localities for large sums—more than four thousand pounds in 1313. These funds made possible the sieges of Dundee and Perth in 1312–1313; after Perth he punished hostile inhabitants—a rare response.

The victory over Edward II at Bannockburn on 24 June 1314 was Robert’s supreme act of generalship: he showed personal courage in combat with Sir Henry de Bohun; strategic sense in considering and rejecting withdrawal to Lennox; tactical ability in choice of battle site, deployment, and use of his forces, including sidelining the ill-equipped; and robust use of psychology by addressing his captains in a speech that urged love of country and self-interest. He commanded one of three divisions, but no English source confirms that he committed it to the fight.

After Bannockburn, Robert participated in some raids but made a two-year truce in 1319. When Edward II invaded in 1322, Robert laid Lothian waste and withdrew to Fife to see the English starve and withdraw—he did not expect to repeat Bannockburn, though he followed the enemy into England and won a striking victory at Byland, almost capturing Edward. In 1323 the truce was renewed for thirteen years, an unacknowledged recognition by both sides that the war had reached stalemate, but the English revolution of 1326–1327 opened a new opportunity. Robert broke the truce and sent his captains to ravage Northumbria, where they ran rings around an English army. In March 1328 the bankrupt English government yielded his three terms: recognition of his kingship, recognition of Scotland’s free status, and recognition that only a church could hold land in both kingdoms. Robert died the following year, but his fame was preserved in a vernacular romance of some thirteen thousand lines, John Barbour’s *Bruce*, written in the 1370s and giving prominence also to Douglas, Moray, and Edward Bruce.

Men served for love of country or for booty in Robert’s armies, but there were problems: homicides, rape, and theft committed “in coming, staying, or going back.” A 1318 statute insisted that those

mustering must be allowed to buy provisions at the local price, though a “lord” must come provided with carts and provisions, or with sufficient money. In 1326 the king had clearly used his right to take bulk provisions (*grosse providencie*) on credit, probably to feed his armies. He lacked siege engines—save perhaps at Carlisle in 1315, when he had to withdraw ignominiously—though he took Perth after a siege in 1313. Surprise and betrayal were his best weapons against fortifications, as at Berwick, where he failed in 1312 and 1316, though his men succeeded in 1318. Cavalry came from magnates and lairds, but the lairds were not mounted on heavy chargers, a weakness acknowledged in the 1320s when Robert demanded knight service for new grants of land.

For infantry Robert could summon the levies of the countryside, men who were reasonably disciplined and armed with spears, and for whom there was an annual inspection of arms by sheriffdom, perhaps introduced by Robert. This ensured the adequacy of most freeholders, but in 1318 a higher standard was fixed for those with goods worth £10: now these men should have a padded jacket, basinet, coat of mail, iron helmet, and war gloves, and presumably a weapon; such a one might be given land for archer service. A poor man need have only a lance or a bow and sheaf of twenty-four arrows, and presumably also a jacket. Some could move nimbly on light mounts, but there could also be laggard troops on foot, ruffraff, *rangald*, struggling to keep up—the men sidelined at Loudoun and Bannockburn.

With such forces Robert could match English resources only by skill in choosing the ground, cunning in ambush or attack, and good captains, and here his skill and good fortune favored him.

[See also Bannockburn, Battle of; Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Carlisle, Siege of; Edward Bruce; Loudoun Hill, Battle of; and Methven, Battle of.]

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A. A. M. Duncan

ROBERT II CURTHOSE

Robert II Curthose ("Short Boots," c. 1054–1134) received the duchy of Normandy in September 1087 through the bequest of his father William the Conqueror. His younger brothers, William Rufus and Henry, received the Kingdom of England and five thousand pounds of silver, respectively, with the former reigning as William II until 1100. Robert's military activities were, by and large, a consequence of the fraternal inheritance; these can be identified as a series of ad hoc alliances and short-lived campaigns, punctuated by critical field actions.

Robert depended heavily on allies for his military campaigns. In 1088 he went to extraordinary lengths to aid Odo of Bayeux's insurrection against Rufus by exchanging the county of Contentin for Henry's silver. The money was spent on a fleet that never sailed, and the rebellion in Kent was pacified. Two years later, Robert reconciled with Rufus and together they besieged Henry at Mont-Saint-Michel, yet when Robert mercifully offered the starving Henry refreshment, Rufus angrily departed. In March 1094 Rufus and Henry warred together against their oldest brother in Normandy; Robert countered with an alliance with Philip I of France and captured Rufus's castle at Holm.

Robert Curthose was a participant in the First Crusade. In order to finance the expedition, he was forced to mortgage Normandy to Rufus for ten thousand marks of silver. Along with Bohemond of Taranto, Robert was instrumental in rallying

crusaders at Dorylaion in 1097, and he was also present for the capture of Jerusalem in July 1099. Upon returning west in September 1100, he easily regained his duchy, for Rufus had died the previous month. In the meantime, Henry had managed to claim the English throne (reigning as Henry I, 1100–1135).

Robert's reliance on military alliances persisted after the accession of his youngest brother. In order to counter Henry I's ambitions, Robert invaded England in July 1101 and allied with both Ranulf Flambard, Rufus's unpopular chancellor who had escaped his imprisonment in the Tower of London, as well as Robert of Bellême, Earl of Shrewsbury and heir to the Montgomery lands in southern Normandy. These efforts were in vain. On 28 September 1106 Henry won the battle of Tinchebrai when Curthose's numerically superior infantry buckled under a Breton cavalry charge. It was the end of Robert's military and political career: he was captured and imprisoned at Wareham, Devizes, and finally Bristol until his death in 1134. His son William Clito later replaced him as the severest threat to Henry I's hard-won acquisition of Normandy.

[See also *Crusades, subentry on Narrative* (1095–1183); *Dorylaion, Battle of*; *Jerusalem, Siege of* (1099); *Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion*; *Robert of Bellême*; *Rochester, Siege of* (1088); *Tinchebrai, Battle of*; and *William I of England*.]

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John D. Hosler

ROCHESTER, SIEGE OF (1088)

The attempt to capture Rochester in 1088 was the culmination of the first serious military threat against William II Rufus, son of William the Conqueror and king of England (1087–1100). Rufus's coronation in September 1087 prompted a rebellion on the part of several powerful magnates, including Odo, bishop of Bayeux, and Robert, Count of Mortaine, on behalf of Rufus's elder brother Robert Curthose, the Duke of Normandy. The siege of Rochester was a decisive victory that effectively ended the uprising.

In March 1088, the revolt began. Odo and the principal rebels fortified themselves in Rochester (Kent) on the Medway River, and from there they ravaged the local countryside. Curthose endeavored to transport his host from Normandy to England in support, but he was unable to finance the expedition. He therefore sold the county of Cotentin to his youngest brother Henry for 1.2 million silver pennies. Curthose never actually set sail, and in the meantime, Rufus made swift progress against his foes. Before arriving at Rochester, the king besieged Richard FitzGilbert's motte-and-bailey castle at Tonbridge in mid-May 1088, capturing it in only two days. This victory was followed by a successful six-week siege of Robert of Mortaine's castle at Pevensey. The two moves cut the link between Rochester and the sea—and thus with Normandy.

Odo was captured inside Pevensey. Rufus forced the bishop to agree to the surrender of Rochester and thereafter sent him north to compel the five-hundred-man garrison to stand down. But on his arrival, Odo was spirited inside the castle, forcing the king to besiege it after all. This he did by constructing two counter castles nearby and surrounding the town with an army of several thousand men. They had been raised through the so-called great fyrd, an assembly of freemen called to arms by Rufus. Facing starvation and a chance outbreak of plague, the rebels surrendered in early July. Rufus spared their lives but in a negotiated surrender confiscated their lands. Odo, Eustace of Boulogne, and Robert of Bellême were all exiled from England and their

lands confiscated. Lesser rebels soon came over to Rufus, and the rebellion fizzled out.

Years later, Rufus commissioned Gundulf, bishop of Rochester, to construct a new castle there. Costing sixty pounds, it featured a stone curtain wall and two rectangular towers, which have not survived. The present keep on the site was not begun until 1127.

[See also Castles, *subentry* on 500–1100; Robert II Curthose of Normandy; Robert of Bellême; and William I of England.]

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
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John D. Hosler

ROCHESTER, SIEGE OF (1215)

It is hard to overstate the visual and physical impact of Rochester Castle, with its stone curtain walls above the Medway River banks, towering above all, the great rectangular keep raised in the 1120s by William of Corbeil, archbishop of Canterbury. Rochester was a royal castle, although it usually stayed in the custody of the archbishops. This dual control became a major problem for King John in 1215 as his relations with Archbishop Stephen Langton deteriorated yet again, this time in conjunction with the baronial revolt.

The exact complicity of the archbishop or John's own castellan is impossible to determine, but the result was that rebel troops possessed the castle by the end of September in a move to protect their base in London. John quickly countered, his troops destroying the Rochester bridge within weeks so as to block reinforcements from London. By 11 October his forces had gotten into the city and begun a siege of



Rochester Castle. The castle's rectangular keep was built by William of Corbeil, archbishop of Canterbury, c. 1127. PHOTOGRAPH BY DAVID HILL

the castle itself. John himself arrived from Dover two days later. Inside, the garrison numbered between 95 and 140 knights, plus sergeants and bowmen.

Chroniclers were rightfully impressed by John's seven-week prosecution of the siege. He set up siege engines on Boley Hill, rising immediately south of the castle's outer curtain wall, and began a ceaseless barrage, his troops operating in shifts night and day. Less dramatic but more effective was the mine that created a breach in the curtain walls at the southeasterly corner. Simultaneously, a relief force from London was turned back with apparent ease. The defenders pulled back into the massive keep, which gave excellent cover from all the projectiles hurled against it. So John turned again to mining. By 25 November the mine was apparently ready, since John ordered his justiciar to provide forty pigs "of the sort least good for eating," their fat being applied to the timbers supporting the mine, which were then set alight. John's engineers no doubt rejoiced when the great keep's southeast corner tower came crashing down. The defenders still continued their resistance, taking advantage of the massive reinforcing wall that traverses the interior of the keep to hold one-half against the besiegers. As the lack of provisions took

its toll on the defenders, they expelled those who could no longer fight effectively. On 30 November they finally surrendered to the king's forces.

John's reputation as a capable leader was augmented by his textbook success against a determined garrison. Yet his propensity for cruelty made an appearance. The defenders expelled by their compatriots had their hands and feet amputated by the king's army. After the siege, John wanted to hang the entire garrison, but was dissuaded by one of his Poitevin vassals on the practical grounds that John's own forces, many of them hired overseas, would be scared to fight as well if such a fate awaited them in turn. In the end John contented himself with executing a crossbowman whose presence especially galled him, since he had formerly raised the man in his own *familia*.

[See also John, King of England.]

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Steven Isaac

ROGER I

(Count of Sicily, r. 1071–1101), Norman knight, nicknamed “Bosso” (boxwood) because of his robustness, son of Tancred, and younger brother of Robert Guiscard. Roger de Hauteville, Grand Count of Sicily, was born in 1031. He arrived in Italy in 1056 and served his elder brother, who was suspicious of his ambition and reserved Apulia for himself. Roger therefore set his eye on Calabria after 1057. He put down numerous revolts, crushed the Byzantine troops, and settled in Mileto in 1061, before the conquest of Palermo. As a reward for his successes, Robert Guiscard named him Count of Sicily in 1062 after the pontifical agreement that granted the papal banner to the Normans to conquer the island.

Negotiation with the Muslims was not out of the question, however. For example, the initial attack relied on an alliance with the emir Ibn al-Thumna, ruler of Syracuse, who wanted to eliminate rival *qayds* (chiefs). The construction of numerous well-situated forts—Mazara, Paterno, Troina (which became the capital of Roger’s realm), Castrogiovanni, San Marco d’Alunsio, and Palermo—allowed him to control a mountainous region occupied by Greeks and Muslims who were hostile toward the Norman presence. They represented the power of a military caste and housed modest garrisons of knights who practiced a mobile and efficient guerrilla warfare. These forts, which did not exist prior to the arrival of the Normans, served not to protect the populace but to collect booty and launch murderous raids; they became a symbol of oppression. Later, the number of Roger’s foot soldiers had to be increased in order to mount sieges and defend the fortresses. These foot soldiers clinched a military victory at Cerami with only 130 knights and also at Catania. After an initial defeat outside Palermo in 1064, the arrival of Robert Guiscard with his Pisan and Genoese allies assured the conquest of the city. Despite their small numbers—the sources mention 750 fighters, with the attack on Agrigento led by 250 knights—the troops led by Roger de Hauteville were victorious after a long and difficult war that took advantage of all the experience gained at Apulia and Calabria.

From then on, naval war assumed an essential place in their overall strategy.

After the capture of Messina in 1061, the taking of Palermo, wealthy and well fortified, on 10 January 1072 after a five-month siege demonstrated the capabilities of the Norman knights, who were able to launch a flotilla out of Reggio using the same tactics they had employed against Bari. Roger I could justly flaunt his triumph after the capitulation of Noto in 1085. The Normans had defeated the Byzantines and Muslim emirs, and their leader Robert, who would later become apostolic legate of Pope Urban II in 1098, had effectively secured his control over the island. The Grand Count died in Mileto in 1101, after consolidating his conquests from the African Muslims by seizing the islands of Malta and Pantelleria; this opened the way for his successor, Roger II, Duke of Apulia, Prince of Capua, who became king of Sicily by uniting all the conquered territories of southern Italy and Sicily.

The chroniclers describe Roger de Hauteville as a fierce warrior and a sensible politician. Geoffrey de Malaterra describes him as “eloquent in speech and cool in counsel . . . far-seeing in arranging all his actions, pleasant and merry with all his men; strong and brave, and furious in battle.” William of Apulia adds:

Inured to hard work, prudent and ingenious, ready to turn his hand to anything that needed doing, always seeking advancement, and rejoicing in honour and praise. He was just as ready to seek success by stratagem as by force if this was necessary, because a sharp mind can often achieve what violence cannot accomplish. He was distinguished by his eloquence and when consulted he gave a speedy and most pertinent reply.

[See also Robert Guiscard.]

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Bernard Doumerc

Translated from the French by

Johanna M. Baboukis

ROGER II

(r. 1095–1154), Count of Sicily (r. 1113–1130). Upon reaching the age of majority, Roger d'Altavilla inherited the title of Count of Sicily from his father Roger I, succeeding his brother Simon. He was skillfully guided by his mother, Adelaide of Monferrato, Roger I's third wife.

After the death of his cousin, Duke William of Apulia, Roger II quickly conquered and annexed the duchies of Apulia and Calabria (1127–1130). Such a territorial expansion alarmed many lords loyal to Pope Honorius II, although Roger was eventually able to defeat this anti-Norman alliance. The pope eventually granted him the title of duke in 1128. When the papal schism erupted in 1130, however, Roger allied himself with the antipope Anacletus II against Pope Innocent II, the successor to Honorius. Roger united the two dominions under one rule and was crowned King of Sicily by Anacletus.

Roger nevertheless remained isolated in his support of the antipope and faced a broad coalition that included the Emperor Lothair II of Süpplingenburg; Robert II, Prince of Capua; and important municipalities such as Pisa and Venice, all of whom supported the legitimate pope. During an exhausting conflict that lasted more than a decade, Roger repeatedly defeated the princes of Capua and Aversa, eliminated any possible ambitions of domination or claims of the German emperor in southern Italy, and even captured Pope Innocent II at the battle of San Germano (in 1139). The pope was released only after investing Roger with the principality of Capua and

Aversa (in 1139) and confirming him as both king and apostolic legate (a title Roger's father had earlier held). The city of Naples was also forced to capitulate to Roger's irrepressible ambition, although it was able to maintain its municipal autonomy.

Roger's policy of expansion was not limited to southern Italy: he had larger Mediterranean ambitions. He attempted to expand his possessions into Africa, occupying Gerba and Tripoli in 1135 and 1146, and tried to arrange a marriage between his son William and an Eastern princess. The Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Komnenos vigorously opposed this policy, however, and refused to act as an intermediary. Roger's response to this refusal was military expeditions against the coasts of the Peloponnesos and Epiros, which he looted and destroyed. He also launched a fleet against Corfu in 1147, resulting in his annexation of the island.

It was with Roger II that the Norman monarchy unified the south of Italy both militarily and politically. Roger was familiar with all the instruments of politics and propaganda of the Mediterranean world and used them in various ways, following Islamic and Byzantine models as well as Western ones. He created one of the more efficient monarchies of the medieval world. The kingdom was divided into districts, each headed by a justiciar for judicial affairs and a chamberlain in charge of tax collection. In 1150 he created the *Catalogue of Barons*, an inventory of the fiefs of the kingdom designed to detail Roger's feudal rights and to tighten his control. Moreover, while the majority of large urban centers retained administrative autonomy, important decisions had to pass through the king. Thus, the experiences of Norman towns were very different from those of contemporary northern Italy, that is to say, of the *comuni*.

He was an able strategist, whose successes were due as much to shrewdness and diplomacy as to military force: he conquered a large part of southern Italy without a single battle. In 1128, for instance, he successfully played for time against the papal army of Honorius II, wearing down his opponent almost as in a siege without ever launching an attack. But Roger was also known for his culture.

The Andalusian cartographer al-Idrisi also offers us a portrait of Roger, describing him as a man of great culture, great charm, and high ideals: "It would be impossible to describe all his knowledge of mathematics and politics or to mark the limit of his acquaintance with these sciences, which he has studied with assiduity and intelligence in each and every aspect. He has brought to them singular marvelous inventions and innovations, such as no other prince ever achieved."

[See also Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; and Roger I.]

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Federico Canaccini

ROGER OF LAURIA

See Ruggiero di Lauria.

ROMANCERO TRADITION

The body of poetry known as the Spanish *romancero* comprises untold numbers of brief, mostly narrative, octosyllabic verse poems. Typically, a romance has a pattern of end rhyme consisting of a single assonance that repeats itself throughout the poem on every other line. All *romances* share this pattern with Spain's heroic epics. In fact, as Menéndez Pidal has shown, many *romances* are fragments of older Spanish epics—*Poema de mio Cid* among them. There are also some with non-Spanish themes (Arthurian, Carolingian, etc.). Historical *romances* depict vivid epic scenes whose popularity endured while the epics themselves lost favor. Oral transmission of *romances* began in the thirteenth century; the first known transcription dates from

the fifteenth century. That is when medieval oral traditions, once reviled by the nobility, garnered the attention of Renaissance humanism. *Romances* and *villancicos* set to music seemed refreshingly new and entertaining to the upper classes. Courtly appreciation for the Spanish *romancero* came initially from Italy where Alfonso V of Aragon had fought to win the Neapolitan throne in 1442. Peninsular Spain was still fighting to regain Granada from the Moors, so it identified with *romances* that told of the early reconquest. The Castilian monarchs Enrique IV (r. 1454–1474), and Isabel I (r. 1474–1504) and Fernando II of Aragon (r. 1479–1516) commissioned new *romances* to publicize their fifteenth-century victories. Having reached the hands of court musicians after centuries among villagers, however, the *romances* were no longer simply epic fragments; they were experiencing a symbiosis of the heroic and lyric.

When Granada fell, poets started to romanticize the Moorish enemies of yesteryear in *romanceros moriscos* and *fronterizos*. An early example is the *Romance de Reduán* that depicts the ill-fated assault which Muhammad VII of Granada (r. 1417–1419, 1427–1429) ordered his *alcaide* (governor) Reduán to lead in 1407. The narrator catalogs the Moors' attire as they ride out, punctuating the list twelve times with "¡Cuánto . . . !" ("How many . . . !") followed by pale mares, raised spears, white leather shields, sleek green garments, sleeveless scarlet overcoats, feathers, *gentileza* (elegance), dark red cloaks, cream-colored boots, ornamental laces, gold spurs, and silver stirrups. Spears and shields are familiar to readers of the historical *Cid*, but these *romanceros* largely abandon epic tactics and politics in favor of color, drama, and arabesque luster.

The *romancero* is characterized by its ability to preserve traditions while adapting to changing times. The medieval *romancero* lives on among Sephardic Jews; Spaniards took *romances* to Latin America and the Canary Islands; and scholars have collected *romances* among Spanish speakers in Louisiana and the American Southwest.

[See also Epic Poetry.]

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Elena Baca Odio

ROMANCES

A genre of literature originating in France during the mid-twelfth century, the romance initially took the form of narrative poetry composed in the vernacular and was later also written in prose. Romance texts typically depict knightly protagonists who undertake heroic adventures or quests and who win the hand in marriage of a beautiful lady. These works may loosely be subdivided into Arthurian (that is, centered on the court of King Arthur and his knights) and non-Arthurian. There has been much critical discussion of the subject of love in romances, leading some to conclude that love forms the primary focus of most texts. However, depictions of war and combat outnumber love scenes in many, if not most, romance texts, and these works are therefore a good source of information regarding war and contemporary perceptions of it.

Many romance texts are set in an idealized world, where knights may have to fight against giants or enchanters, or where they may encounter invisible or superhuman foes. A key feature of the genre is that the knights themselves use weapons and armor recognizable to the audience, and use them in realistic ways. For example, texts may contain detailed descriptions of knights arming, meticulous explanations of how their equipment was cared for by squires, or detailed accounts of how particular weapons were used. These reality effects are further supported by a narrative logic, an internal narrative consistency, and a sense of psychological realism (in that characters react as the audience might expect).

There is a general consensus that a characteristic that distinguishes the romance from the epic is that the latter depicts scenes involving pitched battles, whereas the former privileges single combat. Romances do indeed contain many accounts of individual combats, but a more nuanced view is that romances depict both forms, but that the hero as individual remains the primary focus of attention at all times. His involvement in a battle is generally not presented as deriving from particular political or religious allegiances, but rather is dictated by his own personal agenda. Moreover, throughout scenes of combat in a romance, the emphasis is squarely on knights; other types of combatants, such as infantry and archers, are rarely mentioned.

Another characteristic of romances is that they feature frequent depictions of tournaments. Here again the primary focus is on the knight as individual, and jousts may be described in preference to the group melee. This emphasis on the individual knight highlights his behavior as well as his prowess. Romance heroes are noticeably either paragons of chivalry or undertaking quests for personal development that will make them so.

Chivalry is a concept often discussed in the context of romances, although it is important to distinguish between the word "chevalerie" as it appears in the texts (where it may have a number of meanings) and the modern interpretation of the word as applying to a particular set of behavioral rules. These rules are implicit in romance texts and govern the conduct of the knights of romance before, during, and after combat. Such rules may include warning one's opponent before attacking, the assailing of a lone knight individually rather than in a group, and sparing a defeated opponent who asks for mercy. This notion of chivalry applies in romances only to other knights and to some extent noble women, and then only when they themselves are behaving in an appropriate manner. The implication is that those who are not of a sufficiently high status or who do not conduct themselves worthily do not deserve favorable treatment.

This implies that romances served a didactic purpose, seeking to civilize the knightly class.

From reading romances, the modern audience can see both the interests and aspirations of the medieval audience. The implicit message in romance texts is that a knight could make a positive difference to his community if only he would act in the correct manner—like a knight in a romance text. Works often feature a protagonist in search of *mesure*, the balance of qualities to be found in the ideal knight, and such knights seek to demonstrate fearlessness and implacability in combat, as well as a gentler side when necessary. Those who are guilty of *demesure* are punished in some way, and the ideal knight held up as an exemplar exhibits prowess and courtesy in single combats, war, and tournaments.

[See also Chivalric Biographies; Chivalry; Epic Poetry; and Knighthood and Knights.]

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Catherine Hanley

ROMAN HERITAGE

[This entry contains two subentries, on the maximalist interpretation and the minimalist interpretation of Roman heritage.]

Maximalist Interpretation

In matters of warfare, as in other areas, many historians now see the period from the third century through the sixth as one of greater continuity than change, in contrast with the previously dominant view of a radical break in the fifth century with

the so-called "barbarian invasions." These scholars generally focus on the continuity of urban centers and prioritize continental examples over ones from Britain and northernmost Gaul (France and the Low Countries). Those emphasizing a sharp break with the Roman military stress barbarian invasions and the resulting violence (much more the case in Britain), overlooking the fact that throughout its history the Roman army changed primarily because of internal considerations, not threats of foreign invasion. Archaeological materials have become ever more important, revealing great regional variation.

Military tactics cannot be treated apart from logistical and command systems and, in turn, support and command have ultimately rested upon the civilian population and its government. Ammianus Marcellinus, writing around 390 CE, provides the last generally reliable account of the Roman army at war. He chose to end his narrative just before the accession of Theodosios I (r. 379–395), as was customary and prudent. Once historians leave behind the old soldier Ammianus, they are at pains to piece together fragmentary accounts. As a result only the most general tactics are discernible, even for the showdown between Aetius and Attila in 451.

Several features are clear, nonetheless: (1) warfare changed primarily because of internal Roman developments, specifically repeated bouts of civil war, rather than merely because of external threats; (2) once the central logistical system was abandoned, neither the interlocking network of Roman fortifications nor the army's ability to maintain large forces in the field long survived; (3) late Roman military armor and equipment reflected both continuity (because of the increased use of cavalry and small militia units) and experimentation (because of increased reliance upon client armies and hilltop refuges); and (4) defensive architecture set the stage for medieval practices.

Two fourth-century developments are especially noteworthy: (1) the creation of a defense-in-depth under emperors Diocletian (r. 284–305) and Constantine I (r. 307–337) that had the effect of separating civil and military command systems, thereby making it easier for a peculiarly military

culture to evolve; and (2) the cessation of the system of transferring tax revenues (*annonae*) from the core provinces to support the armies on the frontiers. The creation of a defense-in-depth is well documented. By reducing unit size and dispersing them, Diocletian sought to limit coordinated attempts at usurpation as well as provide a reserve force with expanded mobility. A growing number of historians regard the elimination of logistical support for the field armies as pivotal in changing the nature of warfare and much else in the western Roman Empire. They suggest that this halt most probably occurred during the civil wars toward the end of Theodosios's reign. What he intended as a suspension of the supply system became a cessation when he died within a few months of defeating the usurpers, having never reversed his decision. How these factors played out varied by region.

Britain was denuded of its mobile troop units when the usurper, Constantine III (r. 407–411) took them to Gaul, possibly at the request of Stilicho, the highest military commander in the West and guardian of one or both of Theodosios's orphaned sons. Elements of the frontier forces, typically fighting as militia, remained and were neither withdrawn nor deployed as a single force subsequently. Their fate is unknown.

Constantius I (r. 305–306) established irregular soldier-settlers, primarily Franks, along the lower Rhine, where they served under Roman officers. By 500 CE these immigrants had evolved into a new, highly composite civilization that foreshadowed the medieval synthesis. Gaul's central plateau was never heavily Romanized, whereas its urban centers along the Mediterranean coast continued much in the Roman tradition, including those of their military, even into the seventh century, regardless of the political regime.

The military in Visigothic Spain and Ostrogothic Italy also derived from the late Roman need for armed forces. Rather more is known about the Ostrogothic adaptations because of the prolonged war that Ostrogothic kings waged against the armies of the Eastern Roman Empire. Following the example of Theodoric (r. 474–526), their greatest king, Ostrogothic rulers deployed other barbarians as a defensive buffer in the Alpine areas, a strategy very

reminiscent of the late Roman frontier system, and they governed both Raetian provinces (essentially southern Germany and Switzerland today) as a part of the diocese of Italy until King Witigis (r. 536–540) recalled all forces to Italy to fight the eastern Roman armies under Belisarios. A case can be made that Italy had a more efficient military in the early sixth century under the Ostrogoths than at any time since Constantine I; so too for southern Gaul and Spain under Visigothic kings. Roman military forces had long been concentrated near mining operations in northern Spain, and this continued. Visigothic garrisons in cities to the south protected towns and traditional rural landowners from brigands into the sixth century and beyond.

The list of barbarians who built kingships upon Roman generalships is long and takes in almost every region of the Western Roman Empire. Thus did Childeric, father of Clovis (r. 481/482–511), first king of the Franks; so too, Theodoric the Great (454–526) and his father Thiudmir; and similarly, Alaric (ca. 391–410), leader of the Visigoths, did so whenever he could not secure a Roman command. The Byzantine historian Prokopios (ca. 500–550) noted that the Roman garrisons along the Rhine continued to serve as a militia force there under Clovis. Few of these general-kings had tax bases strong enough to support garrisons and siegecraft, so small group warfare continued to be typical. Roman influence on the practice of war is still apparent in much of western Europe well into the sixth century and in a few instances through even the seventh, but by then it is impossible to find a truly classic, professional Roman-style army elsewhere than in Byzantine Italy.

[See also Prokopios of Caesarea.]

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Thomas S. Burns

Minimalist Interpretation

The armies of the Middle Ages were very different from those of the Roman Empire. Although medieval writers described them using classical Latin terms, armies with training and organization comparable to those of the Romans were not seen again in Europe until the end of the Middle Ages.

The Barbarians. The disappearance of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century was not the result of any single cataclysmic military event but a complex and protracted process. Along the Rhine and Danube frontiers, partly under the influence of Rome, barbarians gathered in larger and more powerful political units, and the pressure they exerted interacted with acute tensions within the empire to create a long period of crisis that the empire did not survive. The Roman army had always recruited barbarians, many of whom served it well and enjoyed remarkable military and even political careers. But such troops were usually officered by Romans and therefore became integrated. Recruitment of soldiers within the empire was always difficult, and a series of military disasters in the late fourth century led to large-scale recruitment of barbarians, often in entire units, officered by their own warlords, who were, in effect, military entrepreneurs exploiting any situation for their own profit and that of their followers. Many of the barbarian units in the army were drawn from small-scale military settlements where land was held on condition of providing military service, particularly near frontiers: Sarmatians, for example, provided cavalry for Britain. Such units multiplied and by the early fifth century Vegetius commented on the collapsing discipline of the Roman army, many of whose

native troops wanted to throw away their armor in emulation of the barbarians.

In addition, very large alliances of barbarians forced themselves across the frontier and settled in the imperial provinces, which they had effectively conquered, nominally as allies (*foederati*). The biggest single group was the Visigoths, who settled in the Danube provinces. Once within the empire, their leaders acquired great ambitions and became an important factor in imperial politics. Alaric, the Visigothic leader, invaded Italy, but ultimately became exasperated by the Western emperor's refusal of his demands, and in 410 sacked Rome. The Visigoths settled in Aquitaine in 418, where they were established by the law of *hospitalitas*, which had been used for quartering Roman troops on civilians. In fact they acquired two-thirds of income from land and quickly became rulers of the province. The imperial court, based at Ravenna, was deeply concerned about defending Italy, and its withdrawal of troops from the frontiers enabled tribes to invade Gaul, among them the Vandals, who settled in Spain by 409. The Western empire, outside Italy, was largely subjected to barbarian groups. Their leaders needed imperial recognition and the imperial court deployed its wealth to play them off against each another, paying tribute to the great Hunnic federation of the steppe lands which under Attila (406?–453) seemed poised to take over the whole West. In 429 a contender for power at the imperial court invited the Vandals of Spain to invade North Africa. The loss of this immensely rich province weakened the whole system of imperial patronage and control of the army, which was increasingly barbarian. In these circumstances the commanders of the Western armies had great power, embittering the power struggles at the imperial court. After the murder of Valentinian III (419–455) the Western emperors counted for little, and in 476 Romulus Augustulus was replaced by the German, Odovacer, as king of Italy.

The Disappearance of the Roman Standing Army. The most important consequence of this protracted violence was the sharp decline in the material conditions of life in late Roman and early medieval

Europe. In such conditions the professional Roman standing army disappeared under the impact of war, invasion, internal conflicts, changes of priority and civil war, and above all, economic decline. The barbarians did not come to destroy, but the protracted process by which they gradually overran the West was highly destructive, as shown by the *Life of Saint Severin* (c.410–482), a holy man who lived in Roman Noricum (roughly modern Bavaria and Austria) in the mid-fifth century. On behalf of the local population Severinus negotiated with the imperial authorities and various barbarian groups, but city after city was abandoned as Roman military organization splintered, to the extent that his biographer, Eugippius, writing c. 511, had to explain: “Throughout the time that the Roman empire existed, the soldiery of many towns were maintained at public expense for the defence of the frontier. When this practice fell into abeyance, both these troops and the frontier disappeared.”

What passed for the Roman army by 476 was largely barbarian, and the essential precondition for a regular army, economic well-being, was fast becoming a memory. This was made more severe because piecemeal conquest created a patchwork of successor-states under warlords whose authority was uncertain.

All this meant that the inheritance of the Roman army to the Middle Ages was very limited. Without great wealth to tax, a standing force with its own factories and logistics on the Roman pattern was impossible. Initially, all free barbarians, but not Romans, were soldiers, led by their top warlords. Some Roman units, essentially those based on the military settlements, were assimilated into the barbarian ranks, as the Byzantine writer Prokopios noted. One such group was the *Taifali*, of Gothic origins, settled around modern Tiffauges on the Loire. Gradually the distinction between newcomers and natives vanished, so that the obligation to military service came to cover all free men. At the same time most farmers were less effective soldiers than the rulers and their elite followers who could devote themselves to war. These barbarian leaders copied Roman armor, as the helmet of the famous Sutton

Hoo treasure shows, and armed themselves with the mail and scale armor of Roman soldiers. But only the elite could afford such equipment. Prokopios also noted that the Franks of northern Gaul had few horsemen. In fact we know that the elite often did fight on horseback: Prokopios was simply contrasting them with the Roman army whose traditions had passed to Byzantium. Thus there emerged the characteristic medieval army, made up of the retinues of warlords, each centered on a small, well-equipped elite, which was often mounted, backed up by an ill-armed mass. These armies are known to us largely through the writings of a clerical elite educated in Latin who often used classical terms derived from ancient writings, such as “legions,” to describe them. Thus early medieval armies lived in the shadow of Rome, though their substance was very different.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900) and Franks, Merovingian, *subentry on* Narrative (482–751).]

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John France

ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES

There were two Romanian principalities in the Middle Ages: Walachia and Moldavia. Walachia covered the region between the Lower Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, and the Black Sea. Moldavia was north-east of Walachia, between the river Dniester and the eastern Carpathians. As the last Christian states to be founded in eastern Europe, their history is

properly documented only from the fifteenth century onward. There is a complete edition of charters relevant to the history of medieval Walachia and Moldavia (*Documenta Romaniae Historica*, Berza, et al., 1971– and Oțetea, et al., 1966–). The narrative sources have their roots at the court of Ștefan cel Mare (1457–1504), but the medieval texts survived only in later manuscripts. P. P. Panaitescu published the complete edition of fifteenth–sixteenth century chronicles, using the previous editions of Ion Bogdan (1959). The last comprehensive work on the military history of the Romanian principalities in the Middle Ages was published in the 1980s (Olteanu, et al., 1984–1988; vols. 2 and 3 are especially important). Beside this, only specialized monographs dedicated to some important Romanian rulers contain detailed references to the military history of the principalities. The latest comprehensive history of the Romanians (*Istoria românilor*) was published beginning in 2001.

Because of the lack of written sources, few details are known on how Romanians first occupied the extra-Carpathian region and how the two principalities emerged. The Romanians, called usually Vlachs (Vlachs) in the Middle Ages, populated a large area in the Balkans. They played an important role in setting up the second Bulgarian Empire, after the revolt against the Byzantines in 1185. Contemporary written sources mention Vlachs north of the Danube for the first time in the twelfth century, living alongside Slavs and Cumans. In the thirteenth century the region from the Carpathians to the Black Sea was a Hungarian sphere of interest, where the Hungarians even founded a catholic bishopric (*episcopatus Cumaniae*), which was destroyed during the Great Mongol invasion in 1241–1242. In the second half of the thirteenth century, between the newly founded Golden Horde, the Hungarian kingdom, and Bulgaria, are documented for the first time some smaller Romanian realms (led by voivodes and *kenezii*) subject to the Hungarian kings. One of the leaders of these voivodeships, probably Tihomir or his son Basarab, began the unification process that led finally to a strengthened early state. Basarab even took up an active foreign policy on

his own account on the side of the Bulgarians, first against the Byzantines and later against Serbia. This was one reason that the Hungarian king Charles I (Charles of Anjou) began a military campaign against him in order to replace Basarab with one of his own men. In 1330 the Romanian voivode won a great victory over Charles's army, and this date can be regarded as marking the beginning of an independent Walachia.

Moldavia was in the same situation as Walachia—it too had to win independence from Hungary. In the mid-fourteenth century Louis I of Hungary began two campaigns against the Tartars in order to put an end to their influence in the region. The king founded a marquisate to defend the eastern border of Hungary. In 1359 the marquisate was taken by Bogdan, who founded an independent early state, later to be called Moldavia.

After obtaining relative independence, the voivodes (rulers) of both Walachia and Moldavia began to extend their influence over a larger territory. The most difficult task was taking possession of the Genoese towns in the coastal region of the Black Sea, founded in the thirteenth century. This process lasted until about 1400. The establishment of an autonomous church organization further strengthened these principalities. The metropolis of Walachia was founded in 1359 and that of Moldavia in 1401, after a long conflict with the patriarch of Constantinople.

Mircea the Elder (Mircea cel Bătrân; r. 1386–1418) was the first Walachian voivode to establish good relations with Poland and (more importantly and fruitfully) with the Hungarian king, Sigismund of Luxemburg, thus making Walachia an important regional power. In 1396 Mircea took part in the crusade that culminated in the battle of Nicopolis. After that defeat the position of Mircea in Walachia was shaken, and only Hungarian aid helped him to regain power. The period that followed was the culmination of the medieval history of Walachia. Mircea even managed to intervene in the Ottoman civil war, supporting Musa, Bayezid's elder son.

The most important event in the external policy of the Romanian principalities was the advance of

the Ottomans. Because of its geographical position Walachia was much more exposed than Moldavia, and the first encounter was recorded in 1369. In 1393, after the fall of the czarate of Trnovo (Veliko Tŕrnovo), the border of the Ottoman Empire reached Walachia. Mircea the Elder made serious efforts to keep the invaders out and during these conflicts even annexed Dobrudja to Walachia. As a response, Bayezid I in 1394 started a great campaign to remove him—the first attack led by a sultan against Walachia. Although Mircea obtained a great victory at Rovine (May 1395), his army of about ten thousand could not stand up to the impressive Ottoman army, which numbered about forty thousand soldiers. Mircea was replaced by Vlad I the Usurper. This marked a new era in the history of Walachia, in which the rulers were appointed or aided by the sultan or by the Hungarian king. Mircea soon regained the throne and, although he later strengthened his position significantly, he finally agreed to pay tribute to the Ottomans (1415) to avoid further conflict. In the fifteenth century Walachia did not pay a set tribute to the Ottomans: the tribute depended on the political context, although when it was resumed, the sultan gradually increased the amount of money demanded.

Moldavia was first attacked by the Ottomans in 1420. While not as exposed as Walachia, Moldavia was subject to regular attack by its Tartar neighbors, allied with the Ottomans, from the mid-fifteenth century. Ottoman pressure increased later, especially when they began to conquer the northern coastal region of the Black Sea. Moldavia paid tribute to the Ottomans from 1456, at first with interruptions, as had been the case in Walachia.

In the mid-fifteenth century, because of the forceful anti-Ottoman policy of János Hunyadi, the strength of the anti-Ottoman party of the boyars in Walachia and Moldavia grew significantly. This is the reason that, after Hunyadi's death, the new rulers of the Romanian principalities—Vlad the Impaler in Walachia, and Ștefan cel Mare in Moldavia—tried to resist Ottoman political influence.

In the second half of the fifteenth century the Romanian principalities had no chance of

maintaining a long-lasting resistance to the Ottomans, even with Hungarian or Polish aid. Although unlike Bulgaria and Serbia they had never been conquered, their dependence on the Sublime Porte (the sultan's court) gradually grew: the amount of the tribute regularly increased, they lost the coastal region of the Black Sea and all the castles along the border, and the sultan intervened in the election of the voivode. For the Ottomans the limited additional benefits of outright occupation were less than the costs would have been, so the Romanian principalities enjoyed great autonomy during the sixteenth century.

[See also Boyars; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; Hunyadi, Mátyás; Kenezii; Louis I of Hungary; Nicopolis, Battle of; Sigismund of Luxemburg; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Ștefan cel Mare; Vlachs; and Vlad Țepeș.]

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Radu Lupescu

ROMANOS I LEKAPENOS

(c. 870–948), Byzantine emperor (r. 920–944). The son of an Armenian immigrant family, Romanos

Lekapenos rose through merit in the Byzantine navy, eventually becoming admiral of the fleet with control of the sea-lanes and supplies to Constantinople. He was, in 917, instructed to ferry the Pechenegs, nomads occupying the Black Sea steppes, across the Danube to attack Symeon of Bulgaria. However, liaison with the Byzantine agent charged with conducting them to the river broke down, and the Pechenegs withdrew northward. Contemporary accusations of sabotage cannot be ruled out, since Romanos was generally competent. The upshot was disaster at the battle of Anchialos in 917, discrediting the regency-government, and Romanos positioned himself as state savior. Posing as loyal protector of the adolescent Constantine VII, to whom he married his daughter, Romanos was crowned coemperor on 17 December 920. Shortly after he astutely appointed John Kourkouas commander-in-chief, assigning him to campaign against the eastern Muslims. To distract Symeon of Bulgaria, now on the warpath, Romanos forged alliances with numerous surrounding peoples, while letting Bulgarian forces occupy much of Thrace. Lasting peace came only after Symeon's death in 927, when Romanos married his granddaughter to Symeon's son and heir, Peter.

Now he gave Kourkouas his head (allowed him to follow his own inclinations and direction) and much-trumpeted incursions against Muslim-ruled territories followed, in conjunction with intensive diplomatic overtures toward Christian Armenian princelings: two prime military targets, Melitene and Theodosiupolis (present-day Erzurum), lay in Armenian-speaking areas. Melitene was duly annexed in 934. While devising strategy with Kourkouas and taking credit for victories, Romanos stayed in Constantinople, mindful of legitimist sentiment favoring the coemperor Constantine and the risk of sudden "barbarian" incursions. The Hungarians raided western provinces in 934 and 943, and a Rus' fleet swooped on the Bosporos in 941. Partly to reassure Constantinople's anxious citizens and partly to showcase military successes in the east, Romanos caused Kourkouas to acquire the *mandylion*, the cloth bearing Christ's features, from Edessa; the wonderworking relic was brought

to Constantinople, where it acted as a talisman. The ailing Romanos was, however, on bad terms with his sons, who dethroned him on 20 December 944; he died in exile on 15 June 948.

[See also Anchialos, Battle of (917); Constantinople, *subentry* on Rus' Attacks (860, 907, and 941); and Kourkouas, John.]

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Jonathan Shepard

ROMANOS IV DIOGENES

(r. 1068–1071, d. 1072), Byzantine emperor. The Diogenes family was a well-connected aristocratic family originally from Cappadocia. Romanos's father Constantine had been a leading general for Basil II. Romanos was appointed to defend the Danube frontier for Constantine X Doukas (r. 1059–1067), with the office of *doux* of Serdica. In the 1060s he formed an alliance with the Patzinaks as a prelude to rebellion against Constantine. After Constantine's death, his wife Eudokia Makrembolitissa, who ruled as regent for her son Michael VII Doukas, exiled Romanos on the charge of treason. She came to believe, however, that it was necessary to have a strong general as emperor, so she recalled Romanos, married him, and elevated him to the throne as Michael's co-emperor on 1 January 1068. This decision did not have the support of the Doukas family.

Romanos's efforts were concentrated on repelling the Seljuks from eastern Anatolia. He led two expeditions to the east, in 1068 and 1069. During his campaign in eastern Anatolia, the Turks sacked the western Anatolian cities of Ikonion and Chonai. Romanos was also unable to oppose the continued

losses in southern Italy to the Normans, who conquered Bari in 1071.

Romanos is best remembered for the defeat at the battle of Manzikert, where the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan captured him. The loss at Manzikert was at least partly due to the treasonous behavior of Andronikos Doukas, whose family was pushed aside when Eudokia brought Romanos to the throne. Although Alp Arslan released Romanos on reasonable terms, he was treated as a rebel by the Doukas family. He was captured by Byzantine forces loyal to the Doukai and blinded on 29 June 1072. He retired to a monastery and died soon thereafter.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204); Manzikert, Battle of; and Seljuks.]

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Leonora Neville

RONCESVALLES, BATTLE OF

The battle of Roncesvalles in 788 was the unhappy conclusion of the great Spanish expedition undertaken by Charlemagne in that year. The war represented the declared will of Charlemagne to enlarge his empire, to gain economic profit, and so to commit the Frankish warrior nobility to himself.

Contemporary Arabic historiography mentions an offer of submission sent to Charlemagne by Sulayman al-Arabi, the governor of Barcelona and Girona, in exchange for military aid against the Umayyad ruler 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Mu'awiya in al-Andalus, the Muslim-dominated part of Spain. Charlemagne decided to accept the offer and sent two Frankish armies across the Pyrenees in the

north and in the south. The northern army under the personal command of Charlemagne subdued Pamplona. He then marched up the Ebro Valley to Zaragoza and met before the Roman walls of that city the southern army coming from Gerona and Barcelona.

Charlemagne, however, failed to conquer Zaragoza, which was successfully defended by the Muslims. On his retreat, the walls of Pamplona were torn down. But then, crossing the Pyrenees, Charlemagne's rear guard was heavily attacked by the Basques and perhaps also by some Muslim war bands, which had perhaps allied themselves with the Basques. In his biography of Charlemagne, Einhard mentions the names of three leading military commanders who were killed by the enemy: the *Truchsess* (*regiae mensae praepositus*, official in charge of the royal table) Eggihard; the *comes palatii* (count of the palace) Anselm; and the margrave of Brittany, Roland. The latter name was immortalized by the *Chanson de Roland* (Song of Roland), which in the following centuries became a basic text for medieval chivalry throughout Europe. Perhaps already in the time of Louis the Pious, the son and heir of Charlemagne, there existed a genre of song that praised the names and deeds of slain Frankish heroes. This defeat marks a clear turning point in the life of Charlemagne, who had never before suffered a severe defeat—called a "humiliation" by Roger Collins.

It is difficult to determine exactly where the disastrous battle took place. Our most detailed source, the *Annales regni Francorum*, refers only to the high peaks of the Pyrenees as the location. Two places have been suggested: Roncesvalles and the vicinity of the Spanish monastery of Siresa in the Hecho Valley. The *Annales* explain the defeat as a result of the unfavorable conditions faced by the Frankish warriors. The combat is described as a typically asymmetrical one: the Franks, despite their superiority in armament and bravery, were in an unfavorable situation because of the difficulty of the terrain and the unorthodox tactics of their enemies. A detailed reconstruction of the battle is impossible because the sources are insufficient; most of

the contemporary Frankish sources do not even mention the defeat.

[See also *Charlemagne and Einhard*.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

ROSEBEKE, BATTLE OF

See Westrozebeke, Battle of.

ROSES, WARS OF THE


The Wars of the Roses were contested between the Lancastrians (red rose) and Yorkists (white rose) for the Crown of England. They consisted of three wars and thirteen campaigns. The first war began as a result of Henry VI's incompetent rule, compounded by defeat in the Hundred Years' War with France and unrest in England. Hostilities broke out with the battle of St. Albans in May 1455, with further engagements at Blore Heath (1459), Northampton (1460), Wakefield (1460), Mortimer's Cross (1461), and St. Albans again (1461), culminating in the decisive encounter at Towton (1461), the year that the duke of York became Edward IV. There followed some more limited action until 1464 in Northumbria, as the Yorkists took control of castles there, with battles at Hedgeley Moor and Hexham in 1464.

The second war (1469–1471) in the Wars of the Roses was the result of an initially successful military coup by Richard Neville, Duke of Warwick ("the Kingmaker"), in alliance with Edward IV's brother, George, Duke of Clarence. Against a complex and

vacillating political background, in which Edward was captured, fled into exile, and returned to regain the throne from Henry VI, battles were fought at Edgecote (1469), Losecote (1470), and Barnet and Tewkesbury (1471). There followed a period of peace, until Edward's death in 1483 led to the third war, when his brother usurped the crown, becoming Richard III. At the battle of Bosworth in 1485, Henry Tudor's victory effectively ended the wars, although some historians judge that this came only with the battle of Stoke in 1487, when Henry VII defeated the impostor Lambert Simnel.

Over the three decades that made up the Wars of the Roses, it is estimated that only fifteen months were actually spent in military campaigning. This combined with relatively restrained ravaging to limit the damage inflicted on the country. One reason for this restraint was the battle-seeking strategy of the commanders, a notable feature of the wars—leaders did not wish to antagonize the local population by imposing huge demands for logistical supplies. One historian of the wars has likened a campaigning army and its baggage train as the equivalent of one of the country's major cities being on the move. The wish to force a quick decision by battle usually meant that neither side took the time to gather its full strength in the field. Eschewing the more common practice in medieval warfare of battle avoidance, it was therefore rare for battle to be declined or, like Edgecote, to occur by accident. The battles always had a clear victor; again unusually, the battles of the Wars normally secured strategic objectives by dint of success in the field.

An important and specific feature of the Wars of the Roses is their relative lack of sieges. Battle-seeking was the result not only of logistical issues but also of practicalities: decades of war abroad and peace at home had meant many fortifications had fallen into desuetude. Across the English Channel, sieges and ravaging remained the central strategies of warfare, the outcome of sieges and not battles being the major determining factor of a campaign's success. In the Wars, armies were therefore mustered for battle and only infrequently for besieging or garrisoning, the campaigns consequently



Battle of Northampton, 10 July 1460. King Henry VI (1421–1471, *kneeling*) is captured by the Yorkists. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/ THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

appearing mobile and fast-moving. There were significant exceptions. The Northumberland campaign of 1461–1464 was centered around castles; here, border security had ensured the maintenance of fortifications. In 1471, London was unsuccessfully besieged and assaulted by Thomas Neville, the Bastard of Fauconberg, and in 1474, a Yorkist blockade defeated a Lancastrian seizure of St. Michael's Mount in Cornwall.

The numbers involved in the battles are difficult to determine. A large army of the Wars of the Roses might comprise ten thousand men, with a ratio of archers to men-at-arms of approximately seven to one. Edward IV's major expeditionary to France in 1475 had 10,173 archers and 1,278 men-at-arms. The number of archers in English armies was higher than on the continent and included mounted ones; English bows were noted for their greater thickness and length. Knights and men-at-arms were equally accustomed to fighting on foot as on horseback, so

much so that the former was known on the continent as "the English method." The infantry comprised mainly billmen (users of staffed weapons) and some pikemen. Valuable as archers were when massed in large formations, the cavalry and infantry contingents relied on each other working together in combat to be effective; the defeat at Edgecote was blamed on the lack of archers.

Casualties are even harder to ascertain. Battles were often made bloodier by the decisive nature of the victories; defeated armies rarely withdrew in order, and routs, such as at Towton, made cutting down fleeing enemy troops, a task performed by cavalry known as "prickers," all the easier. Towton has earned the reputation of being the bloodiest battle ever fought on British soil; the lowest contemporary figure for those killed there is nine thousand, reflecting the fact that, in terms of the number of combatants, it was also probably the largest encounter of the Wars of the Roses. The chronicler Polydore

Vergil observed of the soldiers that "so great was the slaughter that the dead carcasses hindered them as they fought."

Fatalities were disproportionately borne by the nobility and the political and military leaders; there was little chivalry exhibited in the Wars. This was the result of a deliberate policy of removing political opponents. One source reports that after his victorious battles, Edward IV mounted his horse and ordered his men to spare the commoners and instead kill the lords. At Tewkesbury, Prince Edward of Lancaster, the contender for the throne, sought quarter in the battle but was intentionally struck down with other leading Lancastrians. Survivors, including the Duke of Somerset, escaped to the nearby abbey, where they sought sanctuary. Edward IV, at first magnanimous in victory, granted this, only to break his word; the Lancastrians were dragged outside and decapitated, the normal form of dispatch for enemy commanders.

In battle, armies were customarily placed into three or four divisions across the field: left and right wings, center, and reserve or flanking detachments. However, advancing with three divisions in columns also occurred. Defensive positions, even when entrenched and provided with artillery, seemed to have come off worse, as shown by the battles of St. Albans, Blore Heath, Northampton, Towton, and Barnet. Battles would normally open with a barrage by artillery and archery, the latter being particularly effective at breaking up defensive formations as happened to the Lancastrians at Towton and Tewkesbury. There then followed a bludgeoning *mêlée* and sometimes a flanking movement before a clear outcome was achieved. Battles did not end equivocally.

The opening battle of the Wars of the Roses was fought at St. Albans on 22 May 1455. Both armies had undertaken a night march to reach St. Albans, the royalists under Henry VI raising his banner in the town square. The forces of Richard, Duke of York, set up position to the east of the town. They were much better prepared for combat; they had veterans, archers, and artillery, as well as two to three thousand more men. The Lancastrians, in contrast,

relied in vain for urgently requested reinforcements that arrived a day too late, adumbrating the Wars' propensity for quick battles in which all available forces were not arrayed in the field. Credit must be given to Richard for so actively pursuing the royalists and thereby gaining this crucial advantage. The Lancastrians, with Lord Clifford and the Duke of Somerset as their generals, set up their men around the town's gates on the east side, with the town's ditch between them and the Yorkists. Although St. Albans was unwallled, the houses of the town provided a significant barrier, as did the blockades across the roads into the town. York and his generals Warwick and Salisbury, drawn up in three divisions, attacked the gates at about 10:00 A.M. The narrowness of the lanes and the strength of the Lancastrians' defenses led to heavy casualties for the Yorkists; the contemporary source *Fastolf Relation* tells how Clifford "kept strongly the barriers." After about an hour, Warwick abandoned the frontal assaults and instead led his men on a flanking attack through the back gardens, fighting their way into the houses. This they did successfully, bursting on the streets and through to the market place. The Lancastrians manning the gates feared an assault from the rear and took flight; the remaining defenders resisted for about thirty minutes but eventually broke under the attacks and a deadly archery barrage. Henry VI was wounded in the neck by an arrow; Somerset, expecting no quarter, took four men down before being laid low by an axe and hacked to pieces; Clifford and the Earl of Northumberland were also killed in the combat. The number of dead is estimated at fewer than one hundred, predominantly on the Lancastrian side. Henry remained king, but York ruled England for a year as its protector.

The battle of Northampton on 10 July 1460 is notable for the capture of the hapless Henry VI and for the roles played by weather and treachery. Henry VI's Lancastrians, although outnumbered by the Yorkists at perhaps five thousand strong, were well entrenched in a fortified camp just outside the town with artillery and a ditch filled by the river Nene. Archers were deployed between the contingents of Lord Grey, on the right flank, and the Duke

of Buckingham on the left. At about 2:00 P.M., in heavy rain, the earls of March and Warwick, plus Lord Fauconberg led their three divisions, probably in column, to the camp's right flank, coming under heavy archery attack. The rain had rendered the artillery inoperable. In what seems to have been pre-arranged treachery, Grey ordered his men to allow the Yorkists into the camp, one source declaring that they even helped them over the ramparts. The weight of superior numbers was immediately felt, and within thirty minutes, the Yorkists had won the day. Buckingham, the Earl of Shrewsbury, and lords Egremont and Beaumont died attempting to defend the king; perhaps three hundred other royalists also died, mainly when trying to escape across the river. "So few men slain in so great a fight," as the contemporary poet Whethamstede observed.

As already noted, the battle of Towton of 29 March 1461, the largest campaign of the Wars of the Roses, is considered to be the deadliest battle to have been fought in Britain. Edward IV had declared himself king on 4 March, but it was this decisive engagement that actually secured the crown for him. Sources for Towton are sketchy, both for numbers and reliable combat details. Fighting actually broke out on the previous day as the two sides contested the crossing of the River Aire. The Yorkists took the Lancastrian defensive position but with significant losses: Lord Fitzwalter was killed, and the Duke of Warwick was hit in the leg by an arrow. The following morning, during heavy snowfall, the larger Lancastrian force, led by the Duke of Somerset and Earl of Northumberland, arrayed itself in three divisions facing Warwick, Edward, and Lord Fauconberg. It was normal practice for battles to begin with an archery barrage. Here the Yorkists had a distinct advantage: a following wind ensured that their arrows carried onto the Lancastrian ranks, while the Lancastrian arrows fell short of theirs. Losing men to no advantage, Somerset's troops quickly advanced to engage with the Yorkists. This surge nearly broke the Yorkists, putting Edward's cavalry to flight, and would likely have won the day if Northumberland had similarly followed through swiftly on the other flank. However, his delay allowed Edward to regroup

his men and bring reinforcements into the long, bloody slogging match of the *mêlée*. This swung the battle and the Lancastrians fled in panic, leading to a rout. As they attempted to cross the river Cock, they were easy targets for pricklers and archers; the slain were said to have dammed the river—the Bridge of Bodies. Forty-two Lancastrian knights were taken prisoner and executed.

Returning from exile, Edward led a force of between seven to ten thousand men, including mercenaries from the European continent, to defeat the Lancastrians again at the battle of Barnet on 14 April 1471. The Duke of Warwick, now fighting on the other side, fielded an army of comparable or larger size. An overnight artillery barrage overshot Edward's camp, pitched close by; the smoke produced possibly contributed to the heavy fog on the morning of 14 April, which prevented the commanders from appreciating the disposition of enemy forces. Both armies' right wings overlapped and thereby overwhelmed their opponents' left wings. The confusion of battle is exemplified by what followed. Nearly three hours into the engagement, the Earl of Oxford, having destroyed Edward's left, began pulling his eight hundred men back to reform and attack Edward in the center. Warwick's men were unaware that Oxford's troops were returning and, believing them to be Edward's troops (whose sun badge was similar to Oxford's), loosed an arrow shower on them. A cry of "Treason!" went up, and Oxford's men deserted the field; Edward surged forward, and the Lancastrians collapsed. Losses were heavy on both sides, with more than one thousand fatalities. Warwick, caught fleeing, was killed.

Less than three weeks later, on 4 May, Edward saw off the Lancastrian threat to his reign at the battle of Tewkesbury. On the same day as Barnet, Henry VI's wife, Queen Margaret, and son, Prince Edward, had landed at Weymouth with the intent of reaching Lancastrian strongholds in Wales. Edward force-marched west to stop them with some five to six thousand men, two thousand of whom were experienced archers; the size of this force was similar to that of the Lancastrians. Both sides deployed their troops in the customary three divisions across

the field. Edward's center was flanked on the left by his brother Richard, Duke of York, and on the right by Lord Hastings (some accounts put Gloucester in the center). Prince Edward's center had Somerset to the right and the Earl of Devon to the left. Having positioned two hundred cavalry in woods to his left, Edward advanced on the strong Lancastrian defensive position on a hill near the abbey of Tewkesbury; woods, dykes, and enclosures made the approach a tricky one. Once again Yorkist archery, combined with more artillery, laid down a superior barrage. This may have caused Somerset to leave his position and, unseen by the enemy, lead his men through the terrain's natural cover to the Yorkists' left flank; this maneuver may also have been a preconceived plan to coincide with a forward surge from the Lancastrian center, which never materialized. Here Somerset's troops had the advantage of a downhill charge on Gloucester's division, which wheeled around to meet the challenge. Somerset's departure from the defensive line had eased the situation on the Yorkist front, allowing Edward to support his brother. As they pushed Somerset back, Edward's men-at-arms burst from the woods and attacked Somerset's rear. Somerset's troops ran, many being cut down in Bloody Meadow. Edward then crushed Prince Edward in the center. The prince was killed while fleeing, thus ending the direct Lancastrian line. Somerset and other leading Lancastrian prisoners were executed.

The Wars of the Roses were effectively concluded by the battle of Bosworth on 22 August 1485. Contemporary sources, near or otherwise, are scant. As at Northampton, political defection played a vital role. Henry Tudor's forces of some five thousand men, including continental mercenaries, took on Richard III's Yorkist army, which was perhaps up to twice that strength, situated defensively on a hill. Richard's vanguard, under the Duke of Norfolk, was seemingly formidable, comprising cavalry and infantry with archers in front. The Earl of Northumberland led the reserve. The forces of Lord Stanley and his brother Sir William, thousands strong, were also on the periphery of the field, both sides claiming them as allies; the Stanleys were waiting to throw in their

lot with the winning side. Henry's much weaker vanguard advanced under the Earl of Oxford, hoping to be reinforced by the Stanleys. Richard, catching sight of Henry's banners, determined to attack him directly. In so doing he no doubt hoped to kill Henry, thereby winning the battle, or by putting enough telling pressure on him to bring the Stanleys in on the king's side. Leading his men around the main battle, he charged on Henry's forces and nearly succeeded in his objective; that he came close is shown by Henry's standard bearer being killed in the combat. At this crucial juncture, Sir William Stanley threw his men in against Richard. The king's men deserted him, and Northumberland did not commit his troops to combat. Richard went down fighting, surrounded by enemy troops. About one thousand men were also killed, all but one hundred of them on the Yorkist side. The victor was crowned Henry VII on the battlefield, and the Tudor dynasty was established on the throne of England for more than a century.

[See also Britain, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1500); Edward IV of England; and Richard III of England.]

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Sean McGlynn

ROTA

In Poland from the early fifteenth century a *rota* (Latin: *comitiva*, *rota*; German: *Rothae*) was a unit of mercenary troops placed under the leadership of the captain (*magister rotae*, *rothmagister*) who had recruited the soldiers. In order to recruit troops, a captain needed a special document from the king. The recruited soldiers had to undergo a special inspection, called a review or parade, conducted by a royal official competent in military matters. Those soldiers whose training and equipment met official standards were accepted for service. During the inspection a special roll was made to record the names of the soldiers and their equipment. These registers became the basis for the soldiers' pay and any compensation for future losses of horses and equipment. The number of soldiers in units varied. Until the 1470s a *rota* could range from a dozen men to four hundred. At the end of the fifteenth century the size of companies was standardized at about two hundred soldiers. Mercenaries were accepted for three months' service, with the possibility of extension for another three months.

The captain was responsible for the equipment, discipline, and training of the unit. He led the company to the battlefield. Each company comprised up to a dozen smaller units called *poczet*, each with a *towarzysz* (Latin: *socius*)—the equivalent of a non-commissioned officer—at its head. By the end of the fifteenth century the infantry companies came to be divided into ten-man decuries, commanded by decurions (Polish: *dziesiętnik*). Buglers and pennon bearers, present in most of the infantry companies, served to convey orders to the soldiers in battle. Soldiers had to equip themselves. Although mercenaries provided their own equipment, it was nevertheless more uniform than that of the levied

troops. Pavise bearers carried huge shields (as tall as a meter or more) to protect against missiles. Missile men were mainly equipped with crossbows. Fewer than 1 percent of the troops carried firearms (typically a hand culverin or a harquebus [hackbut]). By the end of the fifteenth century, however, matchlock harquebuses had largely replaced crossbows. In the 1490s a new category of soldier, the lancers, appeared. They were equipped with plate armor and a lance (*sulica*) about 3 meters (nearly 10 feet) long. For armor, missile troops often employed helmets and arm protection.

From the early sixteenth century heavily armored riders bearing lances (Latin: *hastae*) played a major role in the Polish mercenary cavalry. The cavalry *rotas* were dominated by crossbowman in partial plate armor. During the 1490s the first missile men with firearms appeared in paid cavalry units. In 1498 a first *rota* of *Racs* (Polish: *Racowie*, from Hungarian *Rac* = Serb) is recorded. *Racs* used only spear, saber, and shield. Hussars also began to appear in Polish mercenary units. Their equipment was: spear, saber, shield, helmet, and mail armor (*lorica*). Both *Racs* and hussars came to Poland from Hungary. Hussars in Poland started to use plate armor, pistols, and characteristic feathered "wings"—the origin of the famous seventeenth-century Polish "winged horsemen."

Pay varied with status. Most cavalrymen received ten to twelve Hungarian florins per quarter, whereas missile troops received only five florins. The captain's pay rate is unknown, but may have been as much as thirty Hungarian florins per quarter. Soldiers were reimbursed for weapons lost in battle in accordance with predetermined rates. Pay was in cash, or occasionally in woolen cloth. As the Polish kingdom came to rely more and more on mercenary troops for its *Obrona Potoczna* (permanent defense force), the post of *hetman* (Latin *campiductor*, or master of the field) was created. This senior royal official was charged with the management of all mercenary troops.

[See also Cavalry; Mercenaries; Hussars; *Obrona Potoczna*; and Slavic Lands, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

ROUEN, SIEGE OF (1204)

The "siege" of Rouen, the most important Norman city along the Seine, was the capstone of the campaign of King Philip II of France to seize the duchy of Normandy from the English crown. Rouen remained safe until Château Gaillard fell in early March 1204. As Philip closed in, he liberally granted favorable terms and trading rights to cities when they surrendered, but punished those who did not. The people of Rouen realized they might lose their own trading networks and rights if they continued to hold out against Philip in favor of King John of England. John seemed little disposed to help the city even as Philip occupied the west bank opposite it. Philip's men captured the main bridge over the Seine after a short siege, and it appeared it would be only a short time before Rouen was fully invested. On 1 June the city leadership negotiated a thirty-day grace period after which, if they did not receive assistance from John, they would surrender. As part of the arrangement Philip granted generous terms to the local nobles, knights, and citizens, essentially offering them deals they could not refuse. Though the people of Rouen sent messages to John, he had written them off, telling them to do what they thought best. The people of Rouen knew what was best for them, and opened their gates to Philip even before the thirty days expired, on 24 June 1204. The fall of Rouen sealed Normandy's fate; it now indisputably belonged to the French crown by both feudal title and military conquest.

[See also Château-Gaillard, Siege of; John, King of England; and Philip II of France.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

ROUEN, SIEGE OF (1418–1419)

The siege of Rouen was the major military event of the conquest of Normandy by Henry V. Landing at the mouth of the river Touques on 1 August 1417, the English took Lower Normandy easily. In April 1418 siege was laid to the last remaining strongholds, Domfront and Cherbourg. Domfront surrendered in mid-July, and although Cherbourg held out until early September, Henry considered his position secure enough to allow him to lay siege to Rouen, the capital of the duchy, and, through its position as the first bridging point on the river Seine, the key to Upper Normandy and the Paris basin. Henry arrived with his army on the eastern outskirts on 29 July. Twenty-four weeks later the city surrendered by composition, and Henry entered in triumph on 20 January 1419. This was the longest siege of his conquest. Furthermore, Rouen was the largest place in France successfully besieged by the English during the whole of the Hundred Years' War, holding at least twenty thousand civilians and soldiers (by the end of the fifteenth century, the population was nearer forty thousand). Chroniclers number the garrison at four thousand men but the actual figure of paid troops is uncertain. Henry's army numbered around seven thousand, of which two-thirds were archers. It included men who had served throughout


the conquest to that date as well as three thousand reinforcements sent from England in May and June 1418 with the siege of Rouen in mind. Once the Duke of Gloucester received the surrender of Cherbourg, his troops also joined Henry.

The king established various siege camps at key points controlling access to the city by land and river, and interlinked by trenches dug by the English soldiers. He also installed his troops at the abbey of Saint Katherine on high ground to the east of the city. He was careful to prevent food from reaching the defenders, while ensuring adequate supplies for his own men. To this end, he only began the siege once Pont-de-L'Arche, the next bridging point upstream toward Paris, where the Eure joined the Seine, had been secured by his army on 20 July. He placed chains across the Seine at Rouen to prevent boats from bringing food into the city, and also assigned a group of Irish soldiers to guerrilla-like activities to the northeast, to police neighboring villages and ensure that supplies were taken for the benefit of the besiegers. He also came to an agreement with Caudebec downstream that its fate would depend on the outcome of the siege of Rouen and

that in the meantime it must desist from hostile actions against the English. This made it possible to bring food for the besieging army upstream from English-held Harfleur.

Henry anticipated that the siege would not be easy. He preferred to starve the city into submission rather than to bombard it, being keen to keep its defenses intact so that it might serve as his secure capital in due course. The city had such extensive walls and towers, as well as a castle, that large quantities of artillery would have been needed to effect any meaningful damage. Furthermore, the French had burned buildings in the suburbs (in particular, houses that abutted the walls), in order to make English access more difficult. The military resources of the town, under the command of Guy Boutellier, sire de la Roche Guyon, were substantial both in terms of men and armaments. Artillery fire from the walls caused damage to the English siege camps, which were also harassed by sorties from the city, often conducted on a large and coordinated scale.

The importance of the siege means that it is well covered in chronicles. In addition, we have a unique narrative poem of thirteen hundred lines written by



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an English observer, John Page, who tells us that “at that sege with the kyng I lay.” (There was an archer of that name in Sir Philip Leche’s retinue in the 1417 army of invasion.) Internal references date the poem to 1419–1421. Taken together, these sources provide fascinating insight into the conduct of a medieval siege as well as the plight and response of inhabitants to a lengthy blockade. For instance, Page tells us how Henry prepared his men for a possible battle with the French in mid-December, commanding them to sleep in their armor and arraying them with their backs toward the city. Charles VI, at this point under Burgundian control, had indeed taken the oriflamme from Saint Denis on 17 November, and his large army had moved first to Pontoise and then Beauvais. But shortly before Christmas, the French decided that they were not strong enough to chance a battle. By 2 January it was made clear to the Rouennais that no help would be forthcoming: the Duke of Burgundy sent a secret order that they should treat the English as best they could. The townspeople, desperately short of food, had tried to put pressure on the French government by expelling women, children, priests, and the poor and elderly in mid-December. Their numbers vary from eight thousand in Monstrelet to twenty thousand in Waurin and Le Fèvre. Page is more restrained, referring to “many a hundred,” but gives a graphic description of their plight trapped and starving in no-man’s-land between the city and the English lines, since Henry would not let them pass through. For the English king, this was useful propaganda. Those driven out had been disowned by their own people “and cursed their own nation.” At Christmas, Henry had food brought to them in the ditches. They, according to Page, responded with a hymn of praise for Henry “who has more compassion than has our own nation.” The treaty of surrender, negotiated by the town rulers with the king, required them to readmit the expelled and to feed them for the six days until the city was handed over. Save for the levy of a large ransom (later cancelled) and the token execution of one man, the surrender was a deliberate model of mercy and good lordship on Henry’s part. Once Rouen was his, the towns of Upper Normandy and

the Seine valley surrendered without offering resistance, and the French decided to approach Henry for a peace settlement.

[See also Henry V of England.]

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Anne Curry

ROUEN, SIEGE OF (1449)

Following the sack of Fougères and the breaking of the Anglo-French truce in April 1449, the king of France, Charles VII, began a campaign to recapture English-held Normandy. Charles declared war on 31 July and by the end of September the towns of Lisieux and Coutances and numerous small fortresses had fallen. At the beginning of October, Charles met with his captains, led by Jean, Count of Dunois, at Pont de l’Arche. Messengers were sent to the English at Rouen, the Norman capital, asking them to surrender, but the garrison refused to receive them. In atrocious weather conditions, the French, led by Dunois, began the siege on 13 October. After three days of fighting, Dunois returned to Pont de l’Arche and obtained information that certain of the city’s civilian inhabitants intended to allow the French entry into the city. On the 16th the French made a direct assault on the city’s walls, only to be driven back by the defenders, led by John, Lord Talbot.

The next day, however, a delegation of citizens and the archbishop arrived at Pont de l'Arche and again expressed their willingness to surrender the city provided they were granted safe conduct by the French. When this was granted, the citizens began to arm themselves against the English defenders. Faced with this, the English commander and lieutenant-general of Normandy, Edmund Beaufort, Duke of Somerset, had little choice but to abandon the city and retreat to the castle. On 19 October Dunois called on Somerset to surrender before Charles VII entered the city. The duke agreed and came to terms with the French king to vacate all the towns of the Seine Valley and pay a ransom of fifty thousand ecus. Although the English continued to hold the coastal towns of Normandy, the fall of Rouen marked an important victory that had important consequences for Somerset's reputation and the stability of the Lancastrian regime at home.

[See also Charles VII of France.]

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David Grummitt

ROUVRAY, BATTLE OF

In February 1429, Sir John Fastolf led a convoy of four to five hundred supply wagons south from the English-held territories in France. His destination was Orléans. The supplies carried by the convoy, including numerous barrels of salt herring (Lent was not far off), were for the English forces that had been besieging this key bridging point over the Loire River since October of the previous year. Fastolf had some seventeen hundred fighting men under his command, mostly archers, plus around one thousand noncombatants.

A Franco-Scottish force commanded by the Duke of Bourbon, the Count of Clermont, Dunois, and Sir John Stewart of Darnley set out to intercept the convoy. Their forces amounted to some three to

four thousand men, a mix of men-at-arms and archers. Fastolf received warning of the threat in time to make his own dispositions. Near the village of Rouvray he stopped the convoy and arranged its carts into a defensive formation consisting of a large enclosure with two openings, each of which was covered by archers. On what was deemed to be the better-protected side were placed the non-combatants and the horses. It is unclear whether Fastolf's defensive structure was consciously based on accounts of the *Wagenburg* formation adopted by the Bohemian Hussites or not; it is probably more likely that he was drawing on previous English practice in using baggage wagons to shore up defensive positions during campaigns.

The Franco-Scottish forces arrived on the scene after Fastolf had got his defenses in order. There then followed a confused and probably acrimonious debate over how to tackle the enemy. Contemporary accounts suggest that the Scots wanted to attack on foot while at least some of the French wanted to charge the wagons on horseback—presumably hoping to force entry through one of the openings. The result was a confused and ill-coordinated series of assaults on both horse and foot. All the assaults were repelled by English archery, with especially heavy fighting around one of the openings. Eventually the Franco-Scottish army withdrew, leaving some seven to eight hundred dead including Darnley and his brother William Stewart. The Scots appear to have borne the bulk of the casualties, which may lend credence to the allegations subsequently articulated in Orléans (where both Dunois and Darnley were popular) that the French units commanded by Clermont failed to engage the English at all and left the Scots and Dunois's men to their fate. Fastolf's forces by contrast had suffered minimal losses. The convoy re-formed and ultimately completed its journey to Orléans.

The defeat at Rouvray (mockingly referred to as the "battle of the Herrings") appears to have had a severe effect on morale at the court of King Charles VII of France, though it is possible that this may have been subsequently overstated for dramatic effect. It may nevertheless have made Charles

and his advisors more receptive to the apparently bizarre claims of a peasant girl from Lorraine—Joan of Arc (Jeanne “La Pucelle”)—that she had been entrusted by God with the mission of defeating the English.

[See also Dunois, Jean, Count of and Orléans, Siege of.]

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Brian G. H. Ditcham

RUDOLF I

(1218–1291), crowned 1273. To evaluate the military dimension of Rudolf of Habsburg's reign, there are essentially two groups of sources available: one consists of numerous anecdotes told about this king, the other contains accounts of actual military achievements. Both are problematic. The anecdotes were not written down until after the king's death, and the extent to which they reflect historical reality is questionable. Considering the successes of Rudolf's army on the battlefield, the actual impact of the king on this success is rather difficult to understand. Some of the anecdotes about Rudolf concern his skills as a warrior. In the *Chronicon Colmariense*, which was compiled by a Dominican monk and deals with the period from 1218 to 1304, the section covering the year 1273 describes him as “experienced in war”: “He was victorious more through wisdom than through strength, and above all was blessed with good fortune.” This picture seems to be confirmed by other episodes involving Rudolf; the chronicler Matthias von Neuenburg, who basically viewed Rudolf in a positive light, mentions a saying of his: “Anyone who is involved in three disputes

should settle two of them.” Other accounts, by contrast, depict Rudolf as warlike and aggressive: “I know what the king is like; he'll attack us if he has to crawl here on his hands and knees.” Thus do Rudolf's opponents characterize him—at least according to Matthias von Neuenburg. Another story seems, at first, to be a testimonial to Rudolf's qualities as the ideal leader. When it was difficult to provision his troops, he is said to have pulled a beet out of the ground and eaten it, and thus raised the troops' morale. This anecdote, however, feeds the stereotype of the “poor king” that had grown up around Rudolf. In the end, all of these stories can must be regarded primarily as building blocks of the image of the king that these authors wanted to draw; even if they do not completely contradict reality, these accounts do very little to describe Rudolf's skills as a commander.

Rudolf's greatest military success was his victory over Přemysl Otakar II of Bohemia in the battle of Dürnkrut in 1278. Rudolf's army proved to be strategically and tactically superior to that of his opponents—or, to put it more accurately, Otakar proved to be inferior to the Habsburg king. Rudolf understood how to make efficient use of his enemy's mistakes and his own resources. His entrance in person into the battle was significant; the fact that his men saw him rejoin the fight after falling from his horse was regarded as a decisive factor. One can only speculate, however, concerning his actual leadership qualities in battle. There is a certain connection between the Habsburg king's shrewdness, as reported in the anecdotes, and his tactical trick of the reserve unit that entered the fray only when its attack on Otakar's flank could win the battle for Rudolf. In any event, Rudolf was a successful field commander whose kingship was based essentially on his military victories, especially his triumph against Otakar of Bohemia.

[See also Dürnkrut, Battle of and Přemysl Otakar II.]

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Martin Clauss

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

RUGGIERO DI LAURIA

(c. 1245–1305), Italian admiral in the service of Aragon and Sicily. Ruggiero was born in southern Italy at Scala in Calabria to parents closely connected with the ruling house of Hohenstaufen. His father fell with Manfred, King of Sicily, at the battle of Benevento in 1266 when the Hohenstaufen forces were defeated by those of Charles I of Anjou. Ruggiero and his mother went into exile with Constance, Manfred's daughter who married Peter, the heir to the throne of Aragon, in 1268. From this point on, Ruggiero's career was marked by his loyalty to the royal house of Barcelona and above all to Peter himself. Early in Peter's reign, from 1278, Lauria proved himself an effective governor of Valencia and was also involved in trading voyages to North Africa, where the Aragonese had extensive interests. His reputation, however, was made as admiral and commander of galley fleets, winning a remarkable series of battles between 1283 and 1300. No other admiral in the medieval period had so long and successful a career. Lauria has been compared with leaders such as the Black Prince or Lord Nelson and credited with complete mastery of the difficult science of controlling a galley fleet.

To contemporary chroniclers, Lauria was not only lucky in war, but a man of outstanding vigor. His chance came with the outbreak of the War of the Sicilian Vespers in 1282. In early 1283 he was made admiral of the kingdoms of Catalonia, Valencia, and Sicily even though at this time he seems to have had little experience in war at sea. Other aspects of the office, which included control of all arsenals and the administration of maritime law, would have been less unfamiliar to him as an experienced royal servant.

Lauria's early battles at sea were all fought against the galley fleets of Charles of Anjou, largely consisting of vessels from Marseille manned by Provençals. His own forces included both Sicilian and Catalan ships in which the galleymen were Sicilian, while the fighting men, both crossbowmen and the lightly armed *almogaveres*, came from Catalonia. Details of events of the battles of Malta (1283), the Gulf of Naples, (1284), and Las Hormigas (1285) are much more plentiful than for many other naval engagements of this period. Not all the chronicle accounts agree and Catalan writers such as Ramón Muntaner wished to glorify Lauria's deeds and those of his master Pedro III. Even so, it does appear that Lauria was able to consistently control his galley captains and prevent an action from becoming a confused *melée* of individual combats between opposing galleys. His usual approach was to rely at first on the skills of his crossbowmen to decimate the enemy's galleymen. The *almogaveres* then boarded and captured the vessels. At the Gulf of Naples, he is also credited with luring the Angevin forces to sea by a feigned retreat, while at Las Hormigas he was confident enough to attack the enemy at night.

After the deaths of both Charles I of Anjou and Pedro III of Aragon in 1285, Lauria continued in the service of the Crown of Aragon. The balance of forces and the political situation in the Mediterranean region as a whole, however, had become increasingly complex, so although it is arguable that Lauria's main concern was the interests of Aragon, he was also presented with opportunities to act more like a pirate for his own enrichment than a royal admiral.

A resounding victory over the combined Angevin fleets from both Provence and Calabria, known as the battle of the Counts, in the Bay of Naples in June 1287 seemed to demonstrate once and for all the superiority of Aragonese naval tactics and command, but the political situation was no longer so clear-cut. The rule of Sicily had become separated from that of Aragon-Catalonia at the death of Peter. Not only the Angevins but also the Genoese, Venetians, and various rulers of fiefs in the Balkans and the Byzantine Empire in the East had competing interests in the area. Lauria used his control of the fleet to

raid extensively on the coasts of southern Italy. In 1292 he also set out for the Peloponnesos (where he laid waste to Corfu and sacked Monemvasia), and the Aegean where he attacked many islands including Lemnos and Mykonos and eventually seized the entire mastic crop of Chios, a vital element in Genoese trade in the region. This activity may have served to further the aims of James II, who had reunited the crowns of Sicily and Aragon-Catalonia in 1291, but it also showed Lauria acting both diplomatically and militarily on his own behalf.

Lauria's dual loyalties to his own interests and to the house of Barcelona became even more obvious in the final stages of his career. James II's relations with his brother Frederick, who had become the regent of Sicily when James became king of Aragon, worsened after 1291. By 1295 James had concluded a truce with Charles II of Anjou and made his peace with the papacy. Lauria, with some initial reluctance, also became reconciled with the pope and the Angevins, being rewarded handsomely with the islands of Djerba and Kerkema as papal fiefs. In 1299, as admiral of Catalonia, Valencia, and Sicily, he led the Aragonese fleet against Frederick's Sicilian galleys. Frederick was no match for the tactical skills of his former commander, who won another victory off Cape Orlando not far from Messina. Frederick, however, had more success against his brother on land and in June 1300 had collected a fleet to challenge Lauria, now sheltering his galleys in the Angevin base at Naples. The Sicilian fleet led by the Genoese Conrad d'Oria seemed at first to be in a strong position, but once he had received reinforcements, Lauria left port and was eventually victorious in a hard-fought and bloody engagement off Ponza.

The war itself finally ended more or less in a stalemate in August 1302 with the Treaty of Caltabellotta. Lauria, however, remained a towering figure in both Sicily and Aragon. While still a vassal of Frederick II, he returned to Aragon to continue to serve James II, mainly in North Africa. He died in January 1305 and was buried at his own request at the feet of Pedro III of Aragon in the monastery of Santa Croce. There is no doubt of his skill as a commander of galleys in action; his record speaks for itself. However, some

room exists for disagreement over the root causes of his success. Were his vessels superior in design to those of the Angevins? The evidence for this is scanty and is irrelevant to his final victories against Sicilian ships. Did he have better fighting men? Certainly, the reputation of the Catalan crossbowmen and *almogaveres* was formidable. Did he use particular tactics or exercise greater control over his fleets than his opponents? Here, the questionable nature of much of the chronicle evidence is a factor. The evidence of the efficiency and relative sophistication of the administration of the Aragonese fleet is more solid. Lauria stood at the head of an organization that was able to provide well-armed and manned vessels in sufficient numbers. He also had, for the most part, the whole-hearted support of the Aragonese crown. If his chief motivation was loyalty to Aragon, the Crown of Aragon also provided him with an arena in which his talents as a naval commander could show to the best advantage.

[See also *Naval Combat and Tactics*.]

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Susan Rose

RUSSIA

See *Slavic Lands*.

S

SAGRAJAS, BATTLE OF

See Zallaqah, Battle of.

SAINT ALBANS, BATTLE OF

See Roses, Wars of the.

SAINT-AUBIN-DU-CORMIER, BATTLE OF

This battle was one of the principal episodes of the "guerre folle" ("mad war"), the revolt of the princes of France against the royal government dominated by Pierre of Bourbon and Anne of France, Lord and Lady of Beaujeu, brother-in-law and elder sister of the young king Charles VIII. During this war, the royal armies attacked François II, Duke of Brittany, one of the architects of the revolt.

After an initial expedition in 1487, in the course of which the French occupied a number of fortresses in Brittany (including Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier), a second expedition became necessary to put an end to Breton resistance. The royal army, fifteen thousand strong, including ten thousand soldiers of the *compagnies d'ordonnance* and five thousand Swiss mercenaries and equipped with a large amount of artillery, was placed under the command of Louis de La Trémoille. It set out on campaign in mid-April 1488. In rapid order the French took Châteaubriant

(23 April) and Ancenis (19 May), then, after a brief truce, attacked Fougères, which fell on 19 July. During this time, the Breton army, under the orders of Jean de Rieux, marshal of Brittany, Louis, Duke of Orléans, and Jean de Chalon, Prince of Orange, assembled at Rennes on 23 July, then headed to Andouillé, where it arrived on the twenty-sixth. This was a composite force of about 11,600 fighters, including 4,600 foreign auxiliaries.

When they learned that Fougères had fallen, the Bretons decided to lay siege to Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier, held by the French, about twelve miles southwest of Fougères. They set out on 27 July. Their army was divided into three corps. In front was a vanguard under the orders of Marshal de Rieux, numbering four hundred Breton "lances of the ordonnance" (twenty-four hundred mounted fighters), seventeen hundred other Breton combatants, and three hundred English archers commanded by Lord Scales. The main battalion, under the orders of the Prince of Orange and the Duke of Orléans, was composed of thirty-five hundred Castilian and Gascon infantry brought to Brittany by Alain d'Albret, eight hundred German lancers, and one thousand Breton archers. The rear guard, led by the Lord of Châteaubriant, had two thousand mounted men-at-arms and *coustilliers* (light cavalry). The next day, 28 July, this army halted a mile and a half northwest of Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier and took up combat positions

to await the arrival of the French; the battle line was arranged to face south, on elevated terrain. The vanguard, occupying the left flank, was next to a forest; the main battalion was in the center; the rear guard, the only mounted unit, was placed on the right flank. Finally, the artillery was placed in front of the line. When the French entered upon the battlefield from the south, the Bretons were solidly in place.

The French army was also divided in three: the vanguard, on the right flank, under the orders of Adrien de L'Hospital; the main battalion, commanded by Louis de La Trémoille, assisted by the Italian captain Giacomo Galeota (who had previously served Charles the Bold); and the rear guard, under the orders of the Lord of Baudricourt. As on the Breton side, the artillery was placed at the front, protected by a hastily dug trench.

The action began at 2:00 P.M. with an exchange of cannon fire, causing losses on both sides. The Breton vanguard of Marshal de Rieux then advanced to the fore and met a violent counterattack from the French right flank. To support Rieux, the Prince of Orange moved the main battalion forward, probably supporting it from the left, but this movement caused a break in the formation. Galeota, taking advantage of the opportunity, led a cavalry attack to create a breach in the enemy's center. He was killed in the action, but the push succeeded, and his mounted men-at-arms were followed by the warriors of the French main body. The Breton line, attacked front and rear, finally broke up. The battle had lasted four hours, following which the victors gave chase to the defeated fighters. The Breton army suffered heavy losses, with five to six thousand dead. The Prince of Orange and the Duke of Orléans were among the prisoners.

After this decisive battle, the duke of Brittany, François II, was obliged to accept the terms of the Treaty of Verger, concluded on 20 August 1488. He was required to place his diplomatic activities under the control of the king of France, and ceded to him Saint-Malo, Dinan, Fougères, and Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier. The political autonomy of the duchy of Brittany was severely compromised as a result.

[See also *Compagnies d'Ordonnance*.]

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Bertrand Schnerb

*Translated from the French by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

SAINTES, BATTLE OF

This skirmish occurred as part of the Anglo-French contest for the control of Poitou and Gascony. Henry III of England, hoping to regain land lost by his father King John, but also to halt further French incursion into remaining English territory, joined with rebels under the Count of La Marche against Louis IX of France. Henry arrived in Poitou on 13 May 1242 with a small expeditionary force of under two hundred knights. Delays caused by diplomacy and calls for reinforcements cost Henry dearly, as it allowed Louis to take the initiative. Unable to stem the successful French march south at Taillebourg two days earlier, Henry retreated to Saintes, his army probably being harassed en route by the French advance guard.

Troop numbers are impossible to ascertain, but the armies were relatively large, both being led by kings in the field: at Taillebourg, not long before, Matthew Paris puts Henry's army at an inflated strength of sixteen hundred knights, twenty thousand infantry, and seven hundred crossbowmen; Joinville, for the French, disingenuously claims that the English outnumbered them 20 to 1. Both sides were reinforced for Saintes; it is unlikely that all the troops would have been able to engage in combat. The encounter was possibly sparked when a

French foraging party was attacked by the Count of La Marche's men. The main forces then engaged outside the town of Saintes "in the narrow roads between the vineyards," according to Paris, when the English made a full-scale sortie. Prisoners were exchanged after the battle: at least twenty knights and a large amount of infantry on the English side for eight named French knights and others. Both sides claimed victory, Henry writing to Frederick II that the French "retreated to their tents in confusion." However, the English king continued his retreat, abandoning Saintes to Louis and ultimately his continental ambitions.

[See also Louis IX of France.]

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Sean McGlynn

SAINTS, MILITARY

Military saints were Christian warriors who were canonized after their deaths. Typically, they were martyred for their Christian faith under the pagan Roman Empire. Although they were canonized for their martyrdom rather than their heroic deeds for Christ on the battlefield, in medieval Europe their cults centered on their military careers. Military saints demonstrated that warriors could give valuable service to God, and that God would help them in their work.

Saint Maurice, for example, was the commander of the Theban Legion, whose members, according to Christian tradition, had been martyred for their Christian faith in Gaul in the late third or early fourth century. Because he was from Thebes in Egypt, Maurice was usually depicted in European art as a black African. Saint George, whose cult was based at Lydda in Palestine, was canonized for the appalling tortures he suffered at the hands of a Roman governor before being killed for his Christian faith.

These saints were known in Western Europe before the eleventh century, but there were also Byzantine military saints such as Saints Demetrius and Mercurius who came to the attention of Western European warriors only with the crusades. The warriors of the West adopted their cults because they seemed to endorse these warriors' own brand of spiritually justified warfare.

Western medieval accounts of the crusades depicted military saints coming to the crusaders' aid in military crises. So, for example, an anonymous eyewitness recorded that during the first crusade in the battle against Kerbogha outside Antioch on 28 June 1098, an army mounted on white horses, under a white banner, came to help the crusaders, led by Saints George, Mercurius, and Demetrius. The chronicle attributed to Ernoul, possibly written in the early thirteenth century, recorded that at the battle of Montgisard in November 1177, God and Saint George, "who was in the battle that day," helped the Christians to defeat Saladin's forces. Such accounts offered contemporaries an explanation for victories against great odds.

The military religious orders of the Temple, the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem, and the Teutonic Order venerated Saint George, while the Teutonic Order venerated Saint Maurice. Saint George was adopted as a patron also by other Christian warriors. Jean Froissart depicted the warriors of England and Guyenne as calling on Saint George during their battles against the French, and Ramón Muntaner described the Aragonese and the Catalan Company calling on Saint George for military aid in their engagements against the Muslims or other Christians.

Yet warriors did not become saints as a result of their military activities. Those few members of the military religious orders who achieved canonization, such as the Hospitaller Saint Hugh of Genoa, won this distinction through traditional good works of charity and piety, not through their actions on the battlefield. Even though a warrior's military career could have value in God's sight, medieval Christians did not believe that it alone was sufficient for sainthood.

[See also *Saints' Lives*.]

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Helen Nicholson

SAINT-SAUVEUR-LE-VICOMTE, SIEGE OF

Located in the middle of the Cotentin peninsula of Normandy, the French town of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte came under English control in 1356 when its lord, Geoffrey de Harcourt, recognized Edward III of England as his king. Saint-Sauveur then became an English base for raiding the surrounding countryside. A French attempt to take back the town, led by Olivier de Clisson, failed in 1369, so a longer-range plan to rid the peninsula of the English presence began in 1372. With Jean de Vienne as their leader, and having fortified a number of surrounding strongholds by 1374, the French initially tried to blockade the English garrison at Saint-Sauveur into submission, but the strongholds themselves came under attack. By January of the next year, the French king, Charles V the Wise, issued a document committing two thousand additional men-at-arms to the operation and calling for the destruction of Saint-Sauveur.

The direct siege commenced in February 1375. Of particular interest is the great faith the French put in gunpowder artillery to retake the town. This was not the first time that cannons were used for siege operations, but a series of municipal documents and eyewitness accounts gives extraordinary details of their manufacture, use, and effect at Saint-Sauveur. Cannon builders, some of whom had clearly established reputations of expertise in their field, and their assistants were secured, as were the myriad supplies needed to build, transport, and service their artillery pieces. Thirty-two guns of various sizes and firing different projectiles were ultimately brought to Saint-Sauveur, including four large iron cannons that launched stone balls, five smaller lead-firing iron guns, and twenty-four smaller brass weapons

that also used lead shot. Of the large iron guns, two were brought in from Paris, a distance of 180 miles (290 kilometers), as the crow flies; a third that fired 100-pound stone shot was built 27 miles (43 kilometers) away at Saint-Lô, while the fourth large gun, constructed at Caen, was test-fired, transported over 55 miles (90 kilometers), and put into action as soon as it arrived at Saint-Sauveur in mid-May.

Against the besiegers, the English garrison, led by Thomas Catterton, replied with mechanical artillery using stones from toppled buildings as ammunition. A battlement of Saint-Sauveur collapsed at one point and Catterton himself had a near-death experience involving a cannonball, yet the English held. Seeing that his guns could not break the defenders, Vienne contemplated a direct assault, but deemed it too costly and unlikely to succeed. By mid-May the deadlock convinced both sides that a negotiated settlement was worth pursuing. Catterton agreed that if relief did not arrive by 3 July 1375, he would evacuate Saint-Sauveur, but only after receiving a payment of fifty-five thousand gold francs.

A final push to conquer the town before the looming deadline saw the French build and import even more guns to Saint-Sauveur, but only the four stone-firing iron cannons ever saw action. With no relief having arrived by 3 July, the English dutifully collected their ransom, gathered their belongings, and headed west to the nearby port of Carteret for transport home. After five months of siege, the French had finally wrested control of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte, but in the end their cash had to do what their guns could not.

[See also Artillery; Fortifications; France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); Gunpowder; Hundred Years' War, *subentry on* Costs; Jean de Vienne; Metallurgy; and Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology.]

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Peter J. Burkholder

SAINTS' LIVES

Christianity formally regarded all killing, even in war, as a sin for which a heavy penance had to be imposed. Thus because the crusading indulgence regarded killing in the cause of liberating Jerusalem as meritorious, it was often believed that the First Crusade (1095–1099) represented a revolution in Christian attitudes toward violence. But the *Lives* of the saints—short biographies written in the Middle Ages—reveal that in practice, throughout the Early Middle Ages, churchmen accepted that violence had a positive value. This is set out in the life of Bruno I of Cologne (d. 965):

If anyone who is ignorant of the divine dispensation objects to a bishop ruling the people and facing dangers of war and argues that he is responsible only for their souls, the answer is obvious: it is only by doing these things that the guardian and teacher of the faithful brings to them the rare gift of peace and saves them from the darkness in which there is no light.

Saint Augustine had endorsed the “barbed hooks of the executioner” out of the same conviction, that the social order rests upon violence, and that violence has, therefore, a real value. But the social order was threatened by external attack as well as by internal strife. Saint Aidan (d. 651) blessed a Welsh army that defeated Saxon invaders. In the early tenth century, Gerannus, bishop of Auxerre, fully armored, crushed a Viking raid.

Approval of violence extended beyond self-defense. The church was impressed by Charlemagne's conquests, which had extended Christianity, and although forcible conversion was formally regarded as wrong, the life of Saint Lebuin, an Anglo-Saxon missionary to Germany, reveals a quite different attitude, for faced with stubborn resistance to conversion he proclaimed: “There is ready a king in a neighboring country who will invade your land, despoil and lay waste, will tire you out with his campaigns, scatter you in exile, dispossess or kill you.”

Saint Bobo was truly a warrior-saint, a Provençal nobleman who spent his life fighting Saracen invasions. The value of saints' *Lives* is that, with some

exceptions, they were not written by great men and profound thinkers, but by humbler and often anonymous clergy. They make no attempt to reconcile their stories with the theological ideas of the church. For this reason they are valuable in revealing to us something of the day-to-day attitudes of medieval churchmen before the Crusades.

[See also *Bishops and Saints, Military*.]

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John France

SALADIN

(r. 1171–1193), founder of the Ayyubid dynasty (named after his father Ayyub) in Egypt, Syria, northern Iraq, and southeastern Anatolia, famed for his victory against the crusaders (Franks) at the battle of Hattin in northern Palestine in 1187, the subsequent conquest of Jerusalem, and the significant reduction of the territory under crusader control. Saladin is the way that the French-speaking crusaders pronounced his honorific title “Salah al-Din”; his private name was Yusuf, and after his rise to power he took the royal title al-Malik al-Nasir (“the defending [or helping] king”).

Saladin was born into a Kurdish military family in Tikrit in today's Iraq in 1138, but soon moved with his father and his uncle Shirkuh to Syria, where they took up employment in the service of Zengi, the Turkish ruler of Aleppo and Mosul. They continued working for Zengi's son, Nur al-Din Mahmud, gaining high rank, respect, and influence. Young Saladin received the education expected of a scion of the

military-political elite, including religious training, although there is little indication that at this stage he had strong inclinations in this direction. In the 1160s, Nur al-Din dispatched Shirkuh three times at the head of an expeditionary force to Egypt, and he was accompanied by his nephew. Nur al-Din had responded to calls from elements in the Shia Fatimid court in Egypt at odds with those who had invited in the Franks from Syria. Shirkuh's force went to Egypt in 1164, 1167, and 1169, each time succeeding in thwarting the plans of the Franks and their Egyptian allies. Saladin distinguished himself in these campaigns, especially in Alexandria in 1167, where he led resistance to the Frankish attack on the city. In 1169, the Sunni Shirkuh was nominated as *wazir* (chief minister) of the Fatimid state, a position that carried both administrative and military responsibility, but he died after just a few weeks. Saladin was picked to fill his uncle's place as commander of the Syrian expeditionary force and also as *wazir*, and thereupon he worked to end Fatimid rule, which he was able to achieve with the death of the Fatimid caliph in 1171. Residual Fatimid resistance was cruelly put down, and Saladin worked to consolidate his rule, ignoring Nur al-Din's calls to return to Syria. A confrontation with Nur al-Din was averted probably only by the latter's death in 1174.

During the next dozen or so years, Saladin devoted himself to two main causes: gaining control over the far-flung territories ruled by the Zengids (Nur al-Din's sons and other relatives) and others in Syria and beyond the Euphrates, and fighting the Franks. Modern scholars, at least in the West, are at odds regarding Saladin's motives and long-term plans. An older view, best represented by Hamilton A. R. Gibb and still current among some scholars, particularly in the Arab world, saw Saladin as motivated from the beginning primarily with a vision of jihad (holy war) to expel the Franks from Jerusalem and Syria as a whole. His desire to conquer Muslim territory was therefore to prepare the way for this noble cause, giving him a territorial and economic base to achieve it. Andrew S. Ehrenkruetz (1972), however, saw Saladin as mainly motivated by a desire for increasing the power of himself and his

family (mostly at the expense of Muslim rulers), and the use of *jihadi* rhetoric largely as a cynical ploy to cover his true intentions. A middle view was subsequently adopted by historians including Malcolm Cameron Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson (1982): without denying Saladin's aspirations for greater authority and territorial control, they also see a real commitment on his part to the ideals of jihad. In other words: Saladin was a complex person, surely motivated partly by religious ideals, but also by the needs of Realpolitik and the concrete wish for increased power, territorial and otherwise. In practical terms, this meant that most of the time in the period up to about 1185 he was campaigning against other Muslim rulers and not the Franks. In any event, the expanding state of Saladin meant more revenues and vassals, and this in turn translated into a larger military force with which to deal eventually with the Franks. Yet, until the mid-1180s, Saladin did not enjoy much success against these latter enemies: His forces were bested at the battle of Mont Gisard near Ramlah in November 1171 and could achieve nothing better than a stalemate at 'Ayn Jalut in 1184. He did, however, defeat King Baldwin at Marj 'Uyun in June 1179 and capture the incomplete fort at Jacob's Ford the following August. Had Saladin died from the grave illness he suffered in 1185, he would likely not have received more than brief notices in the history books.

Saladin, however, recovered, and began the process that led the great victory at Hattin in the summer of 1187. In the late spring of that year, his troops began to gather east of the Jordan. The Franks reacted by massing at Sephoris in the Galilee. After a feint to Tiberius, Saladin succeeded in drawing out the Franks, encircling them, and then inflicting upon them a total defeat, ending at the Horns of Hattin on 4 July 1187. Almost the entire Frankish army was annihilated or captured, including King Guy. Over the next few months, most of the Frankish possessions in Palestine and Transjordan were taken, the *pièce de résistance* being Jerusalem, captured on 2 October, thereby realizing a long-standing goal of the anti-Crusading jihad. However, Saladin could not savor his victory for long. Already in 1189, local

Franks who had reorganized at Tyre put Acre under siege, taking it in July 1191 just before the arrival of the Third Crusade under Richard I of England. Saladin was unable to stop this army's advance south along the coast, and when he attempted a full-fledged battle at Arsuf, he was soundly beaten. When it became clear that Saladin was unable to defeat the Franks, while Richard was incapable of taking and holding Jerusalem, a truce was negotiated between them recognizing Frankish control of the coastal region, from Ashkelon to the north (September 1192). The crusader entity in the Levant had been weakened and reduced, but not eliminated, and would exist in some form until 1291.

While there is no doubting Saladin's personal courage and his willingness to endure long campaigns in difficult conditions, his overall military record is checkered. His early years as an independent ruler were mainly devoted to conquering territory from other Muslims, a mission that he achieved in a slow but systematic way. His record vis-à-vis the Franks in the Levant in this period was far from impressive, and often his commanding style can be described as uninspired and uninspiring. On the other hand, his victory at Hattin—where he led an army drawn from Egypt to southwest Turkey of today—was brilliantly conceived and executed, with minimal losses to his own troops. Yet much of the effects of this success were subsequently lost in the Third Crusade, where he was unable to gain the initiative or achieve any important victories. In spite of all these setbacks, Saladin's fame was guaranteed by Hattin and the subsequent conquest of Jerusalem. He died in 1193, leaving behind him a federated state stretching from Egypt to the Lake Van region in modern Turkey. His descendants and family members ruled in Egypt until 1250, and in Syria and beyond the Euphrates until 1260.

[See also Hattin, Battle of.]

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Reuven Amitai

SALADO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Salado took place near the city of Tarifa, Spain. Alfonso XI (r. 1312–1350) of Castile made hasty preparations and marched south after he received news that the Marinids under Abu al-Hasan 'Ali (r. 1331–1351), aided by Yusuf I of Granada (r. 1333–1354), had laid siege to Tarifa. Alfonso enlisted the help of his father-in-law, Afonso IV of Portugal (r. 1325–1357), as well Genoese and Aragonese naval support. For the Castilian monarch, losing this city would deprive him of his only port on the strategically important Strait of Gibraltar; for the Marinids, Tarifa would serve as another base from which to control maritime traffic in the Strait and conduct raids into Andalusia; and for Granada, a victory over the Christians could diminish the Castilian pressure on the kingdom's borders.

Upon their arrival, the Christians offered battle which Abu al-Hasan accepted. The Castilian strategy consisted of trapping the numerically superior Muslim army in a relatively tight space, and of making them fight on two fronts. To this end, Alfonso sent an advance party that broke through enemy

lines and entered Tarifa. In addition to raising the garrison's spirit, this allowed them to properly prepare for the battle.

On the next day, the two forces faced off with the Salado River between them. Afonso IV's army, augmented with Castilian soldiers, fought against Yusuf's forces, while Alfonso XI's host, assembled into three tight contingents, faced off against Abu al-Hasan. Another Christian force marched out of Tarifa and took up a position behind Marinid lines. As the battle between the Portuguese and the Granadans raged, the first problem faced by the Castilians was the obstacle posed by the Salado. The first hand-to-hand combat took place as the Christians took possession of a nearby small Roman bridge and used it to cross over in an orderly fashion. Yet instead of challenging the Marinid army, most of the Castilian knights broke through their lines and set upon Abu al-Hasan's encampments, with Tarifa's garrison quickly following suit. In the ensuing chaos, the encampments' defenders were scattered, leaving them at the mercy of the Castilians. Alfonso reassembled his forces and launched a cavalry charge into the enemy's formations. Despite being under attack from two fronts and having their encampments ravaged, the Marinid forces resisted the onslaught and even appeared on the verge of launching a counter-attack when their formations broke and they started to flee. The reasons for this are somewhat unclear, though the constant pressure and the news that the Portuguese had defeated the Granadans may have demoralized them. Another intriguing possibility, presented by Abu Hummu ibn Musa II (1347–1387) in his chronicle, was that, as Abu al-Hasan directed his immediate army to counter the attack behind him, his other troops misinterpreted the movement of his standard as a retreat. Thinking all was lost, they ran from the battlefield.

With this victory, Alfonso halted any further serious incursions into the Iberian Peninsula from Morocco, cemented Castile's position as the ascendant power in the Strait of Gibraltar, and set the stage for his future campaigns.

[See also Alfonso XI of Castile; Algeciras, Sieges of; and Iberia, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Nicolás Agrait

SALTES, NAVAL BATTLE OF

When Fernando I ascended to the throne of Portugal in 1367, there was instability in Castile resulting from a dispute between Pedro I and Enrique, Count of Trastámara. He thought he could take advantage of this to enlarge Portugal's territory; consequently, Portugal was at war with Castile between 1369–1371 and 1372–1373, but did not succeed. By 1380 Fernando I decided to request support from his ally England and an army led by Edmund, Earl of Cambridge (brother of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster and pretender to the Castilian throne) was promised.

Juan I of Castile learned of this and ordered the Masters of Santiago and Alcántara to attack southern Portugal. Fernando I and Juan I made ready their powerful armadas and the Portuguese decided to go off in search of their rival to try to prevent a blockade of Lisbon. When their fleet left the river Tagus on 11 July 1381 under the command of Admiral Count João Afonso Telo (brother of the queen), it consisted of twenty-one galleys (the contemporary Castilian chronicler, López de Ayala, says twenty-three) and four large vessels (*naus*). The Castilian fleet, stationed in Seville, had only seventeen galleys operational. Admiral Sánchez de Tovar set sail, probably intending to block the estuary of the river Tagus in order to prevent the English troops from landing at Lisbon.

On 17 July the two fleets came in sight of one another off the east Algarve coast. Seeing the disproportionate forces arrayed against him, the Castilian admiral changed direction and headed for Huelva, perhaps trying to shift the battle to the river, where the heavy Portuguese *naus* would have difficulty maneuvering. The Portuguese gave chase enthusiastically, but, in their haste, their fleet got dispersed. Near Saltes the experienced admiral Sánchez de

Tovar ordered his ships to do an about-turn and lined them up to await the Portuguese attack. João Afonso Telo, rather naively, did not bother to regroup, nor did he allow his exhausted rowers any rest. Instead, those galleys that carried the biggest supplies of water were ordered to advance and make contact with the enemy. When they clashed, the twelve Portuguese galleys that led the attack were overwhelmed by the seventeen Castilian galleys, which took them one by one. The eight following behind had no time to provide support. Exhausted and poorly provisioned, they too were easily overcome. Far off, the last Portuguese galley turned tail and fled to Lisbon together with the four heavy *naus*.

The Portuguese defeat was dismal. Twenty galleys were captured, and (Lopes reports) six thousand Portuguese were taken as prisoners to Seville. There were huge material losses, and the battle also had consequences for the rest of the war, leaving the Tagus estuary vulnerable to attack from the Castilian fleet.

On 19 July the army of Edmund of Cambridge arrived at Lisbon. But they scarcely had a chance to get involved, for the war ended suddenly in August 1382, with a truce between Portugal and Castile.

[See also Enrique II and Pedro I of Castile.]

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João Gouveia Monteiro

SALVATIERRA, SIEGE OF

Salvatierra Castle lies some sixty-five miles (one hundred and five kilometers) southeast of Toledo on a

vital route running between Toledo and the Muradal (Despeñaperros) Pass to upper Andalusia passing through La Mancha. The Order of Calatrava, one of the principal Iberian military orders, established a major headquarters there at the beginning of the thirteenth century, from which it could raid nearby Muslim castles and towns while observing any movement of Almohad military forces heading north. When King Alfonso VIII of Castile (r. 1158–1214) broke a ten-year truce by intensifying raiding and settlement in La Mancha, the Almohad caliph, Muhammad al-Nasir (1199–1213), retaliated by bringing a large expeditionary force out of Andalusia in late June of 1211, intent upon retaking all lost territories and possibly attacking Toledo itself. He first chose to focus on Salvatierra as a troublesome outpost whose raiders and noisy church bells constituted a serious problem for Muslim defense and sensibilities.

The Calatravans kept the castle well supplied and fully garrisoned, but Muhammad was determined to take it. Bent on outlasting the Calatravans, he seized all nearby hills and fortresses to gain optimum firing position for his war machines. The garrison sought assistance from the Castilian king, but Alfonso, unaware of the caliph's plans, had committed his forces widely that summer, and could gather only a small force of urban militias, insufficient to effect relief of the besieged fortress. In September, he authorized the surrender of Salvatierra after ten weeks of siege. The caliph allowed the knights and clergy to depart with what they could carry. It was unquestionably a Pyrrhic victory, in that it distracted the Almohads from any further attempt to move on Toledo. Moreover, it sparked a major effort to retake Salvatierra the following year, a campaign that resulted in a Muslim disaster at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa.

[See also Alfonso VIII of Castile; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of; and Orders, Military, *subentry on* Iberian Orders.]

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James F. Powers

SANCHO III GARCÉS

Garcés (1000–1035), a ruler renowned as much for diplomacy as for military prowess. The end of the first Christian millennium was a dark period for the small Christian states of Iberia. Though weakened by dynastic discord in the last decades of the tenth century, the Caliphate of Córdoba produced one of its greatest military leaders, al-Mansur, who had ravaged Christian territories from Santiago de Compostella to Barcelona. In the midst of this destruction, the front-line, Christian state of León suffered through a minority that allowed western Spanish affairs to pass into the orbit of Navarre, a state with little previous reconquest experience except for the unsuccessful campaigns of Sancho II Garcés (Abarca) (970–994).

With the accession of Sancho Abarca's grandson, Sancho III Garcés, Navarre remained a set of isolated principalities along the Pyrenees. Eschewing war as a means to increase his territory, Sancho turned to diplomacy and marriage to extend his control over much of the Pyrenean borderland. The only truly military activity he engaged in during his reign was the conquest (1015–1018) of the mountainous counties of Sobrarbe and Ribagorza, both of which had been badly mauled by Muslim raids. This move allowed him to garner eastern influence with the vassalage of Ramón Berenguer I of Barcelona (1018–1035).

Sancho's greatest acquisitions of the period did not occur as the result of military success, but from an extremely successful marriage negotiation that tied his daughter, Sancha, to the king of León, Alfonso V (999–1028). When Alfonso died on an expedition against the Muslim fortress of Viseu, he left his kingdom to his young son Vermudo III (1028–1037), who remained under the control of his mother and Navarrese grandfather. From his position as the

power behind the Leonese throne, Sancho quickly extended his influence over the county of Castile, which was also suffering through the minority of its ruler, García Sánchez (1017–1029). When the count acted against Sancho's advice and arranged a marriage with the Leonese princess Urraca, his fate was sealed. When traveling east to León in 1029 accompanied by a Navarrese retinue, García was brutally murdered. Though no proof of Sancho's involvement ever came to light, he clearly profited from the deed by being named the county's regent. He followed the same road to indirect power on the other side of the Pyrenees in the region of Gascony, which he kept under his feudal dominance until his death.

Influenced by French feudal ideas, Sancho III, named "the Great" by posterity, viewed as one entity the reigns he acquired by conquest and marriage. He quickly assumed the Leonese imperial title and claimed for himself the remarkably ambitious epithet "emperor of all Spain." His arrogance and avarice made him a great many enemies, one of whom assassinated him on 18 October 1035. His dream of a unified Iberian, Christian state died with him and the Navarrese *imperium* was divided into the realms of Navarre, Castile, Sobrarbe and Ribagorza, and Aragon. Despite Sancho's ultimate failure, his reign provided a model of statehood for both western and eastern Spain. Despite his great accomplishments as the builder of a complex dynastic empire, Sancho is probably the only medieval monarch to be termed "the great" without a martial justification for the sobriquet.

[See also Al-Andalus; Iberia, *subentry on* Historiography (500–1100); Ramón Berenguer I; and Reconquest, Concept of.]

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Donald J. Kagay

SANDWICH, BATTLE OF

This naval engagement, fought off the coast of Sandwich in the English Channel on 24 August 1217, marked the end of the French invasion of England begun in May 1216. For a year, Prince Louis of France (later Louis VIII) had ruled one-third of England from London, his French forces augmented by widespread support from the English baronage. The death of King John in October 1216 and the succession to the throne of the nine-year-old Henry III, with the aged William Marshal as his formidable regent and commander in the field, transformed the political and hence military climate. In May 1217 the French suffered a major reversal at the battle of Lincoln; to continue their campaign, they now depended on reinforcements being sent by Louis's wife, Blanche of Castile. At the battle of Sandwich the French fleet bringing these strong reinforcements was intercepted by the English navy.

William Marshal and Henry watched from the shore as the English fleet sailed out under the command of Hubert de Burgh to meet the French, led by the notorious Eustace the Monk, an experienced naval mercenary. The French wished to avoid an encounter, as they were laden with vital supplies, troops, and even a trebuchet. There is little agreement on numbers, with sources divergently claiming that the English had twenty-two or eighty ships

and the French forty, seventy, or, extravagantly, at least three hundred ships. Accepted estimates give the French convoy sixty transports and ten escorts fitted with fortifications, and the English sixteen large and twenty smaller vessels, some with iron-reinforced bows for ramming. The English successfully cut across the French to get behind them. The French may have temporarily considered this a nervous evasive action. Upon reaching the French rear, the English were now upwind of them. Taking advantage of this situation, when they came to close quarters with the enemy, they hurled quicklime pots at the French, many of whose vessels were lower in the water, blinding the crews. A barrage by English archers and crossbowmen under the direction of Philip d'Albini also inflicted many casualties. The English kept the initiative by fiercely boarding the French ships, taking only a few valuable knights as prisoners for ransom and slaying the rest. Many French sailors threw themselves into the sea rather than face the English boarding parties. Eustace, the most prominent victim, was found hiding in the bilges of his large flagship and was dragged on deck and beheaded. Although some of the larger French ships in the van escaped, the spoils of victory were impressive. Most important, the English victory meant that Louis had to sue for peace. He signed the Treaty of Lambeth in May and left England. The traditional English naval defensive



Battle of Sandwich. The death of Eustace the Monk (*right*) at the battle of Sandwich on 24 August 1217. Illustration from Matthew Paris's *Chronica maiora II*, MS 16, fol. 56r, thirteenth century. THE MASTER AND FELLOWS OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

strategy of preventing foreign troops from landing on English soil had proved effective. The contemporary English chronicler Roger of Wendover offers an insightful judgment on why the French were defeated: they “were not well skilled in naval warfare. . . . The English sailors were used to fighting at sea.”

[See also Louis VIII of France and Marshal, William.]

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Sean McGlynn

SANTA HERMANDAD

Unions of nobles and townsmen in medieval Castile and the Crown of Aragon, the *hermandades* (brotherhoods) were organized both to keep the peace and to put political pressure on the monarchy. The earliest brotherhoods that sprang up in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were associated with the protection of urban districts or the transport of goods. Many of these organizations were temporary and were drawn from guild members. By the end of the fourteenth century a number of these bodies, such as the Hermandad de la Marina de Castilla and the Hermandad Vieja de Toledo, had become permanent aspects of Castilian commerce. Political brotherhoods of the same period had a much wider appeal across the Iberian Peninsula. In 1226 a young Jaime I of Aragon (r. 1214–1276) allowed three of his Aragonese cities to form a “brotherhood, association, and union” to deal with the widespread lawlessness that he could not eradicate. Surely the most important medieval brotherhoods were the political bodies of nobles and townsmen formed throughout the thirteenth century to increase their

influence over sovereigns whose authority was being expanded by Roman law. Linking themselves with written aims and through the exchange of hostages and castles, these organizations, especially in the Crown of Aragon, imposed a new institutional direction for royal government by making the parliament a permanent institution.

During the unstable period after the death of the Enrique IV of Castile (r. 1454–1474), the Santa Hermandad (Holy Brotherhood) emerged as a military unit with police functions. With the allegiance of Enrique's realms split between his daughter Juana (“La Beltraneja”) and his half sister Isabella, and a war looming with Portugal, which supported Juana, Isabella (Isabella I of Castile, r. 1474–1504) and her husband, Fernando II of Aragon (r. 1479–1516; Fernando V of Castile, r. 1474–1504), moved in 1476 to organize individual municipal brotherhoods across Castile into a general military force of approximately forty thousand troops that served the queen and was paid for by her. By the next year this impromptu army had begun to attain an increasingly complex organization composed of “general delegates” (*deputados generales*) from towns across Castile, León, Andalusia, and Galicia who formed a national assembly for the Santa Hermandad. Though beginning only with towns loyal to Isabella, the Santa Hermandad swiftly spread to the Crown of Aragon while evolving from a set of loosely connected militias to an important part of the royal army during the Granada War (1481–1492).

Until 1498 the Santa Hermandad remained an important part of the new royal administration put in place by Fernando and Isabella. The Supreme Council, consisting of a president, military commander, attorney general, advocate general, and constable, oversaw all legal, fiscal, and military aspects of the organization. Growing more and more hated by Spain's rural population because of its heavy taxation and rigorous interpretation of the law, the Santa Hermandad was subsumed by the Council of Castile in 1598 but maintained its police functions by arresting and imprisoning all types of troublemakers and criminals. The shadow of the Santa Hermandad stretched down to 1835 when

such local police units were replaced by individual municipal forces.

[See also Granada, Siege of; Iberia, subentry on Narrative (1300–1500); and Jaime I of Aragon.]

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Donald J. Kagay

SANT'EGIDIO, BATTLE OF

Following the collapse of Neapolitan rule in central Italy after the death in 1414 of Ladislas, King of Naples, the condottiere Braccio da Montone, exploiting the military weakness of the papacy under Martin V, attempted to obtain control of his native Perugia. In May 1416, Montone began conquering Perugia's territory, and the city appealed to Carlo Malatesta, Lord of Rimini, agreeing to invest him with the city's lordship as "Defender of the Perugini for the Holy Church."

By the beginning of July, Montone had started in earnest to besiege Perugia, while Malatesta gathered his army in Assisi. Montone's efforts to stop his enemy's advance produced no result, and he carefully prepared for the upcoming battle. Pitching his camp on a hill overlooking the river Tiber, near the village of Sant'Egidio, about six miles (ten kilometers) from the beleaguered city, he dressed some of his light cavalrymen as men-at-arms to give the impression of a well-defended encampment. Montone then sent a strong contingent toward Ponte San Giovanni, two miles (three kilometers) to the rear, to stop a

possible sortie from Perugia, and he deployed the rest of his army to block the road from Assisi, resting his left flank on the Tiber. Dividing the heavy cavalry into squadrons of about 150 men, he intermingled them with foot soldiers tasked to kill enemy horses. Expecting a long and grueling match, he ordered the camp followers to prepare barrels of water and other refreshments for the fighters. Montone had some 2,500 cavalrymen and 1,000 foot soldiers at Sant'Egidio against the enemy's 3,500 cavalrymen and 1,600 foot soldiers.

Unaware that Montone had eight hundred concealed cavalrymen in reserve, Malatesta believed he had superiority of numbers. He therefore divided his army into three parts, deploying them in a semicircular array intended to envelop the enemy. Attempting to lure Montone into the trap, Malatesta sent forward the first division under Angelo della Pergola; it easily repulsed Montone's vanguard. Montone, however, refused to be tricked, and by constantly rotating his squadrons he maintained a continuous pressure on Pergola's forces, at the same time allowing his own men to refresh themselves behind the lines. As the first division retreated, Malatesta threw the second and then the third into the fray. At last, beholding Malatesta soldiers starting to falter after seven hours of battle under scorching heat and choking dust, Montone launched his reserve against the crumbling enemy line. Pergola managed to escape with about four hundred cavalrymen, Malatesta and his remaining forces being captured to a man. Montone lost 180 men-at-arms, compared to Malatesta's three hundred.

Following the battle, Perugia surrendered to Montone. Malatesta eventually obtained his freedom by paying a ransom of eighty thousand ducats.

[See also Braccio da Montone and the Bracceschi; Condottieri; Italy, subentry on Narrative (1300–1493); and Malatesta, Sigismondo Pandolfo, and the Malatesta Clan.]

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Niccolò Capponi

SANTIAGO

The apostle St. James the Greater, identified in the New Testament as the brother of St. John. In life, a peaceful fisherman, during the ninth century he came to be seen as a medieval warrior saint, Santiago Matamoros or “killer of Moors”—a change dictated by the crusading needs of the Spanish reconquest. Said to have first appeared at the possibly apocryphal battle of Clavijo (c. 822 or 844), leading outnumbered Christian forces in the slaughter of their Muslim foes, Santiago would fill a similar role many times, not only during the Middle Ages, but in the conquest of America. He became patron saint of Spain and his name echoed for centuries in the Spanish war cry: “Santiago y España” (“for Saint James and Spain”).

To emphasize a connection with Jesus, he was frequently conflated in the medieval mind with his fellow apostle, Saint James the Lesser, the Lord's brother. Santiago is prototypical of a not uncommon medieval phenomenon—the miraculous “rediscovery” of a saint's remains. According to legend, after his death in Palestine, he was transported across the Mediterranean to northwestern Spain where his tomb was discovered by a peasant digging in a field marked by a fixed star in the heavens; hence the name of the city founded on the site, Santiago de Compostela (literally, “the field of the star”). Compostela soon became a major Christian pilgrimage site and the road to Compostela became one of the most traveled of the medieval period. Early in the seventeenth century, King Felipe III (r. 1598–1621) stirred up heated controversy by elevating the newly-canonized St. Teresa of Avila to co-patron of Spain.

[See also Clavijo, Battle of and Reconquest, Concept of.]

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

SAPIENZA, BATTLE OF

See Porto Longo, Naval Battle of.

SARMIN, BATTLE OF

Often referred to as the battle of Tell (or Tall) Danith, the battle of Sarmin was fought in western Syria between Roger of Salerno's Antiochene army and the Seljuk army under the atabeg of Mosul, Bursuq ibn Bursuq, on 14 September 1115. The battle resulted from complicated maneuvers in the summer of 1115 when Bursuq, on orders from the Seljuk sultan Muhammad, crossed the Euphrates with a force estimated by chroniclers at forty thousand men but in fact much smaller. Bursuq's objectives were twofold: first, to persuade or force the Muslim coalition centered on Aleppo and Damascus to accept Seljuk suzerainty, and second, to weaken the principality of Antioch.

As the Seljuk army crossed the Euphrates and advanced toward the Orontes River, Roger of Salerno reached an accord with Najm al-Din Ilghazi of Mardin and Toghtekin of Damascus. The force camped at Apamea in June, where they were joined by Baldwin, King of Jerusalem, and Pons of Tripoli, bringing the army to nearly seven thousand men. As both sides tried to provoke a general engagement, Bursuq captured Hama and besieged the Antiochene fort of Kafartab. At the end of August, after a prolonged stalemate, Bursuq feigned withdrawal. Thinking the danger past, the Frankish and Muslim commanders disbanded their troops and returned to their respective cities.

Bursuq then reversed course and stormed Kafartab on 5 September, while the government of Aleppo signaled its readiness to submit to the sultan's orders. Not anticipating a Frankish response, Bursuq sent a sizable detachment to occupy Aleppo as his army advanced north through wooded, uneven country east of the Orontes, preparing to besiege the town of Zardana, between Aleppo and Antioch.

In Antioch, Roger of Salerno gathered his household troops and headed south along the Orontes, to the Chastel Rouge (modern-day Rugia), where he was joined by the rest of his army—perhaps three thousand—on 12 September. Both sides were unaware of the other's exact location, and Roger spent 13 September scouting for Bursuq's columns, which were around Ma'arrat. On the morning of 14 September, as the Franks were preparing to march east, one of Roger's scouts reported that the Seljuk army was very close, was nearing the town of Sarmin (probably in the plain roughly four miles west of modern-day Idlib, Syria), and was beginning to set up camp. The Antiochene forces advanced across the intervening ridge in columns, Roger ordering them not to plunder, but rather to make the destruction of the enemy their first priority. As they crested the ridge the Seljuk forces initially mistook the Frankish heavy cavalry for a border patrol or raiding party, but they were quickly disillusioned as the Franks charged into the Seljuk camp.

It speaks to Bursuq's leadership that he was able to rally his army around the Tell Danith, near Sarmin, where his standard was established. The Franks, however, demonstrated equal leadership and tactical flexibility, catching the re-forming Seljuk cavalry and archers in a pincer movement; Baldwin, Count of Edessa, advanced directly from the left, while Guy Le Chevreuil, a prominent vassal from the Tarsus, attacked from the side, probably Baldwin's left. Roger's division apparently advanced from the right, followed in echelon by Robert Fitz-Fulk's detachment. Fulk repulsed an attempted breakout by Seljuk heavy cavalry, although the Franks' turcopole levies suffered heavy casualties. The second Frankish wave then arrived and joined battle in the center, as the melee became general. The Seljuk

forces broke, Bursuq and the remnants fleeing east. Casualties cannot be computed, but Antioch's losses, though heavy in some divisions, were far less than the Seljuks'.

The battle of Sarmin saved the principality of Antioch and ended the Seljuk sultanate's attempts to reconquer Syria. Roger of Salerno gained enormous prestige and in the following months pushed steadily closer to Aleppo. Both Aleppo and Damascus became increasingly nervous of Antiochene power and, without Seljuk pressure from the east, fell away from the Frankish sphere of influence. Four years after Sarmin, Muslim forces, led by Roger's former ally Ilghazi, annihilated the Antiochene army at the Ager Sanguinis (Field of Blood).

[See also Ager Sanguinis, Battle of; Crusades, *subentry* on Narrative (1095–1183); and Seljuks.]

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Daniel P. Franke

SAUCOURT, BATTLE OF

On 3 August 881, Louis III of France defeated Viking raiders in a rare set battle. The Vikings who fought at Saucourt-en-Vimeu were part of the "Great Army" that had been raiding the Lower Rhine from 879 to 881. The term "Great Army" first appeared in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* to describe the Viking fleet that arrived in 865 and overwintered for many years. It implies a dramatic increase in the size of Viking war bands, but the Frankish sources document that the size of Viking fleets had been increasing ever since 840.

The *Annals of St. Vaast* is the principal narrative source for the battle. The Vikings had crossed the River Somme and approached the area of Beauvais. Louis mobilized an army and crossed the River Oise. With good intelligence, Louis was able to determine the position of the Viking forces. He had dispatched scouts, who reported that the Vikings were returning from a raid encumbered with booty, and positioned his forces at a site along the route. The *Annals* report few tactical details. After Louis's initial victory, the Vikings retreated into a royal villa. Thinking the battle won, the Franks ignored the Vikings ensconced in the royal villa and began to celebrate. The Vikings then caught the Franks unaware with a surprise counterattack. The Viking breakout from the villa resulted in the death of about one hundred Franks, but Louis rallied his forces and won a final victory.

Most contemporary sources regarded the battle as a decisive victory. The *Annals of Fulda* reported that Louis and his army killed nine thousand Viking horsemen. In Regino of Prüm's account, some eight thousand Vikings were put to the sword. The *Ludwigslied*, an Old High German poem that intermingles Christian and Germanic elements, also celebrated Saucourt, without giving tactical details. The poem reiterates a recurrent theme of other sources on the Viking raids that God sent the Vikings to punish the Franks for their misdeeds. The Germanic feature of the poem emphasizes the praise of warrior virtues. In contrast, Hincmar of Reims downplayed the victory, writing that Louis fled the scene even though no Vikings were in pursuit. Hincmar's perception of the battle as a defeat has to be set in the context of his political agenda, because the archbishop had been passed over for a high position at the king's court.

Although Louis III won the battle, he was unable to follow up Saucourt with another victory, because he died of an equestrian accident the next year, in 882. An isolated victory, Saucourt did little to alleviate the Viking raids. The Vikings merely shifted the focus of their operations to Lotharingia.

[See also Vikings.]

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C. M. Gillmor

SAULE, BATTLE AT RIVER

The Brothers of the Sword in Livonia faced a financial crisis in 1236. It could not easily recruit outside of north Germany, it had few resources outside of Livonia for hiring mercenaries, and crusaders preferred the overland journey to Prussia to boarding ships for Livonia. Furthermore, the Brothers were in no position to ask the native peoples to pay greater taxes and tithes—the memory of the revolt of 1223 was still fresh. There were two possible solutions to the problem. The first, incorporation into a large and wealthier military order, was rejected by the Teutonic Knights in 1235. The second was to expand, then use the taxes and military services of the conquered peoples to defend the order and its lands against its many rivals for hegemony in Livonia.

When two thousand crusaders led by the north German counts of Haseldorp and Dannenberg arrived, intending to strike a blow against the pagan foe, the Swordbrothers' experienced and competent master, Volquin, led them south to Samogitia. He brought 100 knights, 1,200 infantry, 1,500 native

militiamen, and 200 Russians from Pskov. The attack was initially a success—the army plundered and burned, rounding up cattle and horses. But the retreat turned into a disaster when the crusaders reached the Saule River. Seeing Samogitians holding the opposite bank, Volquin recommended forcing a crossing on foot at once, but the “pilgrims” refused to abandon their horses. By the next morning, when everyone had agreed on a cavalry attack, the Samogitians had been reinforced by Lithuanians from the highlands. When the crusader charge failed to break the pagan lines, the Livonian militiamen, sensing defeat, fled the battlefield, leaving the crusaders to be surrounded and annihilated. Only fifty or sixty Swordbrothers remained to hold the castles in Livonia and Estonia until 1237, when the Teutonic Knights sent reinforcements from Prussia.

[See also Orders, Military, *subentry* on Northern Orders and Baltics, *subentry* on Narrative (500–1300).]

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William Urban

SCAFATI, BATTLE OF

See Nocera, Battle of.

SCANDINAVIA

[This entry contains three subentries, on Scandinavian sources, an overview of Scandinavian military history, and on Scandinavian historiography.]

Sources

The oldest sources for Scandinavian history and warfare are rune stones preserved in large numbers

from the tenth and eleventh centuries, but also pre-dating this period, such as the large rune stone from Rök in Sweden. This example, from around 800, with the longest of all inscriptions on a stone, celebrates the military and other achievements of a dead chieftain as well as those of characters from history and heroic legend. The many eleventh-century rune stones from Sweden also offer a glimpse of military history, as several serve as either gravestones or cenotaphs for people expressly having taken part—or fallen—in campaigns to England or expeditions to the East (such as several stones referring to Yngvarr and his expedition of 1042 to Serkland—which may be located somewhere in the Near East, possibly Arabia). Rune stones also afford an insight into the organizational side of Viking Age warfare and trade, as not only members of fallen warriors' or seafarers' families (with a high frequency of female heirs) but also members of the ship's company could be responsible for erecting stones. The terminology used by the latter allows us to assume something like proto-guilds at least for late Viking Age ships' crews.

Skaldic poetry, mainly in the form of a highly formalized praise-poetry practiced virtually exclusively by Icelandic Skalds at Scandinavian courts all over the North and Britain (as well as, we must assume, the Viking kingdom of Dublin in Ireland), has its source value through the supposed proximity of its texts and authors to historical events, although many of the stanzas preserved in Icelandic sagas and ascribed to Viking Age persons may well have been composed by the saga authors themselves and thus date only from the thirteenth century. Close source criticism is essential for establishing whether a particular poem has any historical source value whatsoever. Those that can be assumed to be genuine, however, like the one composed shortly after the death of King Olaf Haraldsson, are among our most valuable sources for pre-literate Scandinavia.

The political and military history of medieval Scandinavia is well covered by several historical works, both in Latin and in the vernacular Old Norse (the language common to Norway and Iceland from

the ninth to the fourteenth centuries). Most of these texts were written in Iceland in the twelfth and particularly thirteenth centuries. Even a history of the Danish kings (the *Skjöldunga saga*) was composed in Iceland in the thirteenth century, as was a history of the rulers of the Orkney Islands (the *Orkneyinga saga*).

In addition to the fictitious narratives and the historical works, brief annalistic notes as well as numerous private, clerical, and royal documents have been preserved and edited. They were repeatedly used again in informal historiography, such as in the sagas about Haakon IV Haakonsson of Norway (1204–1263) and that about his son Magnus VI Haakonsson (1238–1280), both commissioned by the latter and written by Sturla Thórdarson, nephew of Icelandic historiographer Snorri Sturluson.

One of the most explicit sources on warfare is the Old Norwegian King's Mirror (*Konungsskuggsjá*), a possibly unfinished encyclopedic text composed in the 1360s in the tradition of the (pseudo-) Aristotelian *Economics*. Of the three books (on the trader, the royal following [*hirð*], and the king), the second book, in five sections, deals with the equipment of the mounted warrior, the battle formation called boar's snout, ships and fights at sea, the mounted fight, and finally engines and equipment for and against sieges. Although this information has been used in the past to give an impression of thirteenth-century Norwegian warfare (Falk), it could be shown to be drawn from the late Roman author Vegetius (c. 400) in his *Epitoma rei militari*, albeit not directly but most likely via the full quotations given in the *Speculum Doctrinale* (Part 2) by Vincent of Beauvais (Paris, c. 1250), with a few additions from other sources.

The numerous narrative works relating to the history of Scandinavia fall into several genres, which normally lack any source value beyond a general impression of early medieval Scandinavia and anecdotal evidence of a historical character. The exception are those sagas dealing with the contemporary history of Iceland in the thirteenth century, where the genres of the Sturlunga sögur ("Sagas about

the Sturlungs") describe the bloody civil war in Iceland during the so-called Age of the Sturlungs, the most powerful family of Western Iceland during that period. The second genre of relatively high source value is that of the Biskupa Sögur ("Bishops' Sagas"), which not only cover important (and sometimes sanctified) bishops of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in both their political as well as religious aspects, but also some bishops of the thirteenth century and their struggles with local chieftains. The most outstanding of these are the sagas about Guðmundr Arason (1161–1237), bishop of Hólar, who despite widespread veneration never achieved official sanctity, and through his uncompromising religious fervor managed to alienate himself from many Icelandic chieftains, who frequently used military force against him.

Danish history is well covered by the Latin *Gesta Danorum* of Saxo Grammaticus (c. 1150–after 1216), whose sixteen books span the period from mythical beginnings to the year 1202; however, the first nine books cover the mythical and heroic past up to the rule of King Harald Bluetooth in the mid-tenth century and have source value only for the mythology of Scandinavia, hardly for its history. Apart from oral sources and older poems that he rendered into Latin, Saxo could already use several of the vernacular historiographies compiled at the time in Norway and Iceland for his Danish history, particularly the *Skjöldunga saga* ("Saga of the Danish House of the Skjöldungs"); the author of the *Knytlinga saga* ("Saga of the Descendants of Cnut") in turn used Saxo's work soon after.

Swedish history is less well covered, but Sweden—like Denmark—in the later Middle Ages developed a genre not used in western Scandinavia, namely rhymed chronicles, of which the *Erikskrönikan* (c. 1325) is the outstanding example. The genre was still active in the fifteenth century, particularly in Denmark, where several such works were composed, of which *Rimkroniken* is the foremost.

During the later Middle Ages, all Scandinavian countries developed specific forms of rhymed folk songs or rhymed folk narratives, of which the Faroese dance-songs as well as many of the prolific

Icelandic Rímur preserve narrative medieval material otherwise lost.

As sources for medieval Scandinavian warfare we may also count the various excavations, whether of the tenth-century military camps of the Trelleborg-type, the defense systems established in southern Jutland and around Haithabu called the Danewirk, or the town excavations in Visby on Gotland.

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Rudolf Simek

Narrative

Scandinavian military history may be divided into four somewhat overlapping periods, depending on the scope and objectives of warfare, how it was organized, and how it is attested in the sources.

1. Migration-Age Scandinavia (fifth through eighth century) was dominated by small and highly militarized territorial polities. Archaeological evidence and occasional allusions in

contemporary sources indicate the rise of larger proto-kingdoms with advanced military infrastructure inspired by late Antique practices.

2. Viking-Age Scandinavia and the early Christian period (late eighth through early twelfth century) were dominated by massive expansion abroad. This process was closely related to the rise of the medieval Scandinavian kingdoms: first Denmark, then Norway, and finally Sweden. The tenth and eleventh centuries, in particular, were defined by fierce competition for supremacy over all Scandinavia (and England) and by the emergence of the first supraregional ("national") systems of military and naval organization.
3. High-medieval Scandinavia (twelfth through early fourteenth century) saw extensive civil wars in Norway and Sweden, internal consolidation (law, administration, military structures) of all three kingdoms, and the integration of various territories outside Scandinavia proper, ranging from negotiations to crusades.
4. Late-medieval Scandinavia (late fourteenth through early sixteenth century) was the age of dynastic unions. Military activity within Scandinavia centered on the ambitions of the Hanseatic League, noble factions, and royal candidates for one or more of the kingdoms, often in a bewildering array of combinations.

1. Migration Age Scandinavia (Fifth through Eighth Century). When the Roman Empire began to disintegrate in the west after 400, thousands of Scandinavians that had found employment in Roman armies in a centuries-old practice used their acquired skills, equipment, and prestige in local struggles for power, resulting in the pervasive militarization of Scandinavian society for centuries to come. Although we know almost nothing of the individuals involved and their motives, the nature of this warfare can be reconstructed as quite advanced and similar to late- and post-Roman practice. It was carried out across Scandinavia, consuming large amounts of resources and requiring

complex organization. Large battles involved up to a few thousand well-equipped infantry and possibly Byzantine-style cavalry. Naval warfare was pervasive: boat burials, boathouses, and harbor barriers abound all along the Scandinavian coastlines. In addition, the early Scandinavians built fortifications in great numbers, some of which show clear signs of violent destruction and conflagration. Occasionally, these energies spilled over to the continent. Gregory of Tours is the first to name a Danish king, Chlochilaich, who raided the coast of Gaul with a fleet in the early sixth century, albeit unsuccessfully. Some scholars have connected him with the legendary Hygelac in *Beowulf*. Although a Danish people is well attested, it would be difficult to identify geographically a kingdom based on this ethnic grouping before the Viking Age. Sixth- to ninth-century observers speak of different Danish "tribes" that were perhaps distinct kingdoms. Chlochilaich/Hygelac must have been a ruler of some standing but had no known successor.

Boathouses and the power centers with which they were associated indicate several small polities along the Norwegian coast, and the Swedish Vendel finds indicate that a powerful, militarized, and seafaring community emerged in eastern Sweden in the late sixth and seventh centuries. Military equipment excavated there, especially cataphract cavalry, shows a strong affinity with Byzantine and Sassanian models, likely stemming from direct exposure to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern military practices. Though it is difficult to prove that the Vendel chieftains introduced Byzantine/Sassanian heavy-cavalry tactics to Scandinavia, Prokopios is clear that Herul mercenaries, settled on the middle Danube by the Byzantines, maintained close contacts with their homeland in Scandza. This seems to have entailed a system of recruitment through which Scandinavians retained direct input from the Mediterranean world, and if some of the Heruls indeed came from southeastern Sweden, the knowledge they brought home would have given the Vendel chieftains a competitive edge vis-à-vis other local rulers.

Frankish influences were also strong but indirect, via Frisia and Saxony, both of which gradually became integrated in Frankish institutions and culture during this period. This is especially evident in military practice and organization, where the Saxons during the eighth century became virtually indistinguishable from the Franks. The first evidence of this influence on Scandinavia derives from the early eighth century. In 710 Saint Willibrord was allowed by the fiercely (and stereotypically) barbaric king Ongendus/Angantyr to preach in Denmark. Although Willibrord was unsuccessful in his mission, Ongendus or one of his successors must have been sufficiently impressed by the emerging Frankish power under Charles Martel to embark on the ambitious fortifications of the Danevirke in 737. Shortly before, in 726, a canal was dug through the island of Samsø, north of the main Danish archipelago, providing access to a natural harbor from which a large fleet could be deployed rapidly in all directions. This coastal defense could cover all the main approaches from the north through the straits between Jutland, Fyn, and Zealand, suggesting a potential naval threat from that direction. Frankish pressure and Saxon influences became even more pervasive as a result of Charlemagne's expansion, as his most intransigent foes in Saxony—Widukind with his followers—sought refuge with King Sigifred of Denmark in 777.

2. Viking-Age Scandinavia and the Early Christian Kingdoms (Late Eighth through Early Twelfth Century). Shortly thereafter, some local chieftains in Denmark and Norway organized raids against the British Isles and the Frankish Empire. Their resources and skills derive directly from practices of the previous period, but their energies were directed outward, with the consolidation of the Danish kingdom, which appears to have gained control of modern Denmark, western Sweden, and southeastern Norway around 800. The formidable Godfred, by now intimately familiar with the Carolingians' strengths and weaknesses, was able to challenge Charlemagne himself and engage in alliances and warfare with Saxons and Slavs independently of him, while reinforcing the Danevirke.

His ninth-century successors fought several civil wars, during which disgruntled nobles and pretenders found refuge with the Franks or alternative employment as Vikings before rejoining the fray. This appears to have given Norwegian petty rulers more freedom of movement, and by the late ninth century one of them, Harald Finehair, created the first Norwegian kingdom centered on the western and southern coasts. A simultaneous movement took place in northern Norway, where the Earls of Hålogaland extended their rule to Lade (Hlaðir) near present-day Trondheim. These processes forced ever more petty rulers to seek their fortunes abroad, leading to the age of great armies and colonization. All these wars were dominated by naval warfare and the ability to organize large fleets, whose infrastructure—boathouses, harbors, and fortifications—has been clearly identified in the archaeological record along with stunning finds of longships from the ninth century onward.

Internal developments around 900 and during the following generation are again poorly attested, but saga texts and contemporary European sources indicate that the internal power struggles in Scandinavia never abated, with frequent battles on land and sea as well as dynastic and regional shifts in power. In Norway, the two major powers, the rulers of the western fjord country (Vestlandet) and the earls of Hlaðir, controlled most of the coastline. The former, apparently successors of Harald Finehair, had close ties to England, bringing Christianity and perhaps also Anglo-Saxon forms of military administration, whereas the latter had close ties to Denmark. Southern Norway and central Sweden were still dominated by petty kings. By the late tenth century the Danish Jelling dynasty under Harald Bluetooth dominated. He converted the Danes to Christianity and reestablished Danish suzerainty over southern Scandinavia, reinforced by a massive military infrastructure consisting of large, regularly laid out fortifications in Denmark and Skåne (southern Sweden). He also expanded the *Danevirke* and secured Danish independence from the Ottonians, who made occasional military and frequent ecclesiastical thrusts to the north. This reorganization,

and similar developments in the other kingdoms, prepared the groundwork for the massive Danish and Norwegian fleets of the following century.

With the assistance of Norwegian earls and petty rulers, the Danes embarked on an ambitious conquest of England under the formidable Sven Forkbeard (r. 991?–1014), which demonstrated that combined Scandinavian military power was more than a match for the Anglo-Saxon kingdom, one of the best organized in Western Europe at the time. Although their exact motives are unclear, it seems that Aethelred the Unready was able to detach some of the Norwegian chieftains from Danish service through bribes and diplomatic support. They subsequently exploited a combination of Danegeld, personal prestige, local connections, and absence of many rulers in England to set up their own regimes in Norway. Olaf Trygvason was a petty ruler from southeastern Norway who accompanied the Danes to England, fighting at the battle of Maldon in 991. In 995 he defected and managed in a few years to establish a grip on most of Norway south of Nidaros/Trondheim (which he founded in 997, just a short distance from Hlaðir) before attempting to gain Slav allies in the Baltic, where he fell at Svold in 1000 against a coalition of the kings of Denmark and Sweden, along with the Earl of Hlaðir. More successful was Olaf Haraldsson, another petty ruler with family connections in southeastern Norway. He seems to have abandoned Sven's successor, Cnut the Great (r. 1017–1035) in England, come to Norway in 1015, and defeated his opponents at Nesjar the next year; by the early 1020s he was fully engaged in establishing a church organization with the help of English clerics. By 1025–1026 he had found an ally in the Swedish king Anund Jacob, with whom he attempted to break Danish power in Skåne and Denmark proper. However, he relied heavily on support from local Norwegian rulers, and Cnut was able to stop the Norwegian-Swedish alliance at Helgeå in 1026 before bribing most of Olaf's supporters into abandoning him. Olaf was subsequently driven from the country in 1028 and to Russia, but when a power vacuum appeared on the death of the Earl of Hlaðir and Cnut's absence in England, he made



Scandinavian Battle. Two men fighting. Detail from the side of a sledge discovered at the Oseberg burial site, ninth century. VIKING SHIP MUSEUM, OSLO, NORWAY/GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL.

another attempt, supported by the Swedes and a few Norwegian petty rulers, but died in a battle against a coalition of Norwegian magnates and freemen at Stiklestad in 1030.

Cnut was now at the height of his power, ruling directly over Denmark, England, and Norway, where he installed his son as viceroy. This clearly irked the Norwegian magnates, who preferred loose suzerainty over tight royal administration, and when Cnut died in 1035, Olaf's son Magnus was brought from Russia and recognized as King of Norway. His position was reinforced by the canonization of his father, and after the death of Harthaknut (Hardecanute, r. 1035–1042), Magnus with the full support of his nobles even won recognition as King of Denmark (r. 1042–1047), which he successfully defended against a Slav invasion in 1043.

Olaf's half-brother, Harald Sigurdsson (known as Hardrada, "Hard Ruler"), had fled to Russia after Stiklestad in 1030, where he embarked on a successful mercenary career, first under the rulers of Kiev,

and then for nearly a decade as a Varangian commander in the Byzantine field army and imperial guards. He returned to Norway in 1045–1046 laden with riches and experience, forcing his nephew to recognize him as co-ruler. When Magnus died in 1047, Harald ruthlessly suppressed the Norwegian magnates, who had previously controlled vast economic and military resources in the form of large fleets and private retinues numbering in the hundreds. Instead, he established agents loyal to him, with only small retinues, to enforce a tight administrative and military system. This was the origin of the national *leidangr* (Old Norse; in Norwegian *leidang*, Danish *leding*, Swedish *ledning*) or naval levy, which was possibly inspired by the Byzantine *thema* (theme) system in its extremely effective and centralized control of resources.

Although the Danes recognized Sven Estridsen as their ruler, Harald attempted systematically to pound Denmark into submission through annual raids—a strategy recommended in Byzantine



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military manuals—until he abandoned the attempt in 1064. For this purpose Harald had mostly used his personal following (*hird*), which appears to have been very large, but he eventually raised forces from the whole country by imposing heavy military obligations on every single community through the *leidang*. This he mobilized to press his tenuous claim on the English throne in 1066, supported by Tostig, brother of the current king Harold Godwinson. Harald's

death at Stamford Bridge in 1066 has obscured his achievements. He raised one of the largest Viking fleets in history (at least three hundred large ships, manned by at least eleven thousand men) from a country of fewer than 200,000 inhabitants. His dynasty prospered until the beginning of the Norwegian civil wars in 1130, and his military organization survived through the thirteenth century and provided a model for the national military levies of

Denmark and Sweden. In the meantime, his successors were able to maintain their independence as well as mobilize large fleets. His grandson Magnus III Olafsson ("Barelegs," r. 1093–1103) led several expeditions against the Orkneys, the Hebrides, the Isle of Man, Wales, and Ireland, where he fell. His son Sigurd Jorsalfar ("Jerusalem-farer," r. 1103–1130) led a naval crusade in 1108–1110, which blockaded Sidon; Sigurd cooperated well with Frankish forces thousands of miles from home, before leaving most of his fleet in the Byzantine service at Constantinople.

Denmark also stabilized; after the death of Sven Estridsen (r. 1047–1076), four of his sons ruled in succession. Although one of them, Cnut IV (d. 1086), considered invading England in 1085 and even assembled a fleet for that purpose, German pressure and suspicion of a local plot prevented it from sailing. Sweden saw the emergence of two royal houses, one centered in Svealand in the east, another in Götaland in the central lake country. We know little of this region before the twelfth century, though politics and warfare were dominated by great magnates allied with the rather weak kings, who raided, conquered, and colonized territories in the eastern Baltic. All three countries were, by the early twelfth century, thoroughly Christian, with bishoprics and monasteries as new centers of power. Use of written administration had become the norm, and although legal practice and organization may appear archaic (or "Germanic"), most legal codification was actually done by scholars trained in the emerging European cathedral schools and universities. Most aspects of twelfth-century Scandinavian society thus reflected contemporary Catholic Europe, though the Scandinavian thalassocracy was a peculiar feature inherited from the Migration and Viking ages and reinforced by the establishment of national levies under royal control.

3. High Medieval Scandinavia (Twelfth through Early Fourteenth Century). Danish consolidation gathered momentum under the Valdemarian dynasty (1157–1241), which made Denmark a significant power again by the early thirteenth century, as it gained supremacy over all the German coastal principalities east of the Elbe and established a colony

in Estonia by vigorous crusading. Danish power in the region was broken only by their crushing defeat at German hands at Bornhöved in 1227. This became abundantly clear in the infighting and succession of weak kings for a century after the death of Valdemar II Sejr in 1241.

In Norway developments were reversed; after a long period of civil wars from 1130, which ebbed in the early thirteenth century, the dynasty of King Sverre (r. 1177–1202, whose successors ruled until 1319) oversaw the age of the Norwegian Empire (Norgesveldet), when Norway gained control of the Atlantic islands, Iceland (1263, ending endemic infighting among local aristocrats) and Greenland, by peaceful means. Sverre himself is credited with introducing new military tactics and strategy in Norway during the climactic stages of the civil wars, including heavy cavalry, castle-building, and artillery. The latter innovation probably dates to the early twelfth century in Norway, however, whereas cavalry and castles became far more important in the Swedish and Danish lowlands because of the more suitable terrain and greater resources. As on the continent, clerics played a significant role in the power struggles of the twelfth century as a result of their vast resources and European and papal connections. After internal struggles subsided, the clergy ensured effective administration. Using the military infrastructure established by Harald Hardrada and administrative capabilities introduced in the twelfth century, the thirteenth-century kings of Norway had secure defenses and could send naval expeditions across most of the northern Atlantic to maintain their hegemony. A brief but costly war with Scotland in 1263, where the inconclusive skirmish at Largs combined with a storm prevented the main Norwegian fleet from landing effectively, resulted in the cession of the Isle of Man and the Hebrides to Scotland.

Sweden was finally unified after 1250 under the Folkung dynasty. During the first half of the fourteenth century Sweden embarked on campaigns against Novgorod and sought to exploit Danish weakness by integrating Skåne, with the approval of local magnates. Despite royal consolidation,

such magnates could remain highly independent and even pursue their own foreign policy. Such intra-Scandinavian aristocratic squabbles followed from increasing intermarriage across borders and reached their height during the decades around 1300, when Danish aristocrats fled to Norway from Denmark after murdering King Eric Klipping (1286). This sparked a long war between Norway and Denmark, which was further complicated when one of the most powerful aristocrats in Sweden, Duke Eric, carved out a semi-independent fiefdom centered on western Sweden that also included Danish and Norwegian provinces.

4. Late Medieval Scandinavia (Late Fourteenth through Early Sixteenth Century). Such interrelationships were, of course, also a royal phenomenon, and dynastic unions subsequently became the norm: first Norway with Sweden (1319) and then Norway with Denmark (1380), before the Union of Kalmar of all three was established in 1397. Hanseatic wealth and naval power rendered the old Scandinavian naval levies obsolete, because the shipbuilding capacities of comparatively poor, rural communities could no longer match those of the Hanseatic cities, which could construct much larger cogs. The *leidang* was therefore gradually commuted to a tax, though the defensive provisions remained on the law books and could be revived when circumstances warranted. Warfare was frequent but small-scale due to poor royal finances and the domination of stone fortifications before the age of gunpowder artillery. The costs of such fortifications and their garrisons were high, whereas offensive warfare relied on expensive mercenaries. Although Sweden struggled to withdraw from the union after the mid-fifteenth century, finally succeeding in 1523, Norway eventually lost its independence completely to Denmark in 1536. This has been attributed to the fact that the Black Death devastated Norway particularly hard, and in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Norwegian nobles and urban communities were unable to resist Hansa encroachment and make their voices heard under Danish and Swedish supremacy. In fact, during the period of dynastic unions, nominally Norwegian kings were more

often found in the wealthier kingdoms of Sweden or Denmark embroiled in aristocratic squabbles or pursuing ambitious foreign policy objectives, which were frequently overlapping concerns because of aristocratic intermarriage and integration in Northern Europe at the time.

Surprisingly, warfare was vigorous in the decades following the plague. Sweden (with reluctant support from Norway) finally annexed Skåne from Denmark in 1355–1356 with local approval. This prompted Valdemar Atterdag (r. 1340–1375) to organize the Danish reconquest of Skåne (1360). He followed up with an attack on Gotland in 1361, where complex and conflicting loyalties meant that the rural levies fought without the support of the burghers and foreign residents of the main city of Visby and were massacred by Valdemar's professional troops just outside the city walls. A subsequent war was fought between Denmark and the Hanseatic League (1368–1370) for control of the trade routes through the Danish straits. Although the Danes lost and had to make extensive concessions, including Hanseatic control of many castles along the straits, the accords also meant Hanseatic support for Denmark against Sweden.

The combination of intertwined successions and the formidable leadership of Queen Margarethe of Norway, daughter of Valdemar and widow of Håkon VI Magnusson (d. 1380, one of the last medieval kings to reside in Norway), led to the establishment of the Union of Kalmar in 1397. The union was fairly stable and peaceful until 1448, with the notable exception of Danish-led wars against Holstein and other north German principalities. Most subsequent internal struggles were over the succession to the throne or over the question whether Sweden (and to a lesser extent Norway) would remain in the union. For instance, the battle of Brunkeberg (1471) was fought between two Swedish factions—principally, landowning nobles who supported the Union and dissenting townspeople and farmers—over Sweden's independence. The victory of Sten Sture's faction was a step toward complete Swedish autonomy but only one of many battles fought over the issue and among shifting factions between 1448 and 1523, when Gustaf

Vasa drove out the Danes and founded the dynasty that would transform Sweden into a great power in the early modern era. At the very end of the Middle Ages, cannons and fortifications adapted for the use of gunpowder artillery were introduced, although this development only gathered momentum in the sixteenth century. The last of the "medieval" potentates, Olaf Engelbrektsson, last archbishop of Nidaros (Trondheim), built a stone fortification designed for defensive cannons in Trondheim Fjord and sought to resist the Reformation promoted by King Christian III of Denmark, but he was forced to flee shortly after Norway was annexed as a Danish province in 1536.

[See also Brunkeberg, Battle of; Cnut; Godfred; Harald Hardrada; Magnus I Olafsson; Olaf II Haraldsson; Sven Forkbeard; *Themata* (Themes); and Vikings.]

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Leif Inge Ree Petersen

Historiography

For all the wars, fighting and extensive militarization in Scandinavian society during the Middle Ages, military history has remained ancillary to other approaches that focus on politics, ideology, economy, administration, or society. Often, one must turn to general studies and the standard national multivolume histories, such as those of Andersen, Helle, Lunden, and Hedeager, for sidelights on military developments. Specialized studies devoted to military history per se have been the province of military officers (e.g., Hedegaard) and popularization

(e.g., Sundberg and Ersland), although the distinction is not in Scandinavian historiography; many of those authors are accomplished scholars. Most recent publications on military history have appeared in series managed by military institutions and museums, and some of the best academic research on military matters today is based on archaeology.

Recent collective publications from the Danish National Museum, particularly those edited by Jørgensen, have demonstrated that Scandinavian warfare in the period 500–1066 was dominated by advanced infrastructures at an early age, including large-scale defensive works and clusters of boat-houses located near economic and political centers. From this, it is possible to reconstruct a network of local and regional power centers in constant competition or loose consensus under a more powerful figure, typical of Viking expeditions of the late ninth to early eleventh centuries. Military organization was under the control of regional magnates or petty kings; royal administrative control evolved only well into the statebuilding process of the High Middle Ages.

Scandinavian military power was based on exceptional naval skills. Crumlin-Pedersen and many others (see contributors in Jørgensen) have studied the development of shipbuilding. Jesch examines the skaldic and runic evidence for ships and fleets, and Anglophone historians, notably Sawyer, Howard, DeVries, Clarke, Lawson, and Coupland, have studied their deployment and effect beyond Scandinavia. This offensive capacity was matched by the building of vast defensive works. The most famous is the Danevirke, which protected the earliest Danish kingdom from Saxons, Slavs, and Franks in the eighth century. Throughout Scandinavia, according to the studies edited by Storgaard and Jørgensen, there is evidence of harbor defenses. The practice of building *bygdeborg* (village forts) in stone was widespread, and many of them show traces of warfare and destruction from the Roman Iron Age until the Viking period. Jørgensen and Henning have edited publications dealing with the large, regularly laid-out forts that appear in southern Scandinavia in the

late tenth century, presumably as bases for major expeditions or centers of control established by the Jelling dynasty. Thus, early Scandinavian communities had a great capacity for organizing labor and logistics, even before the introduction of Christianity and written administration.

The origins of these features are difficult to discern. Archaeologists such as Axboe, Jørgensen, and Hedeager have demonstrated that Roman influence in Scandinavia was pervasive, and there is strong evidence that Scandinavians served in Roman armies until the fall of the West. This occurred far later in the East Roman Empire, yet this aspect has received little attention before the age of the Varangians, studied by Blöndal (and Benediktz) and Davidson. The military implications of Roman and Byzantine contacts have not yet been fully explored. Although much has been written on Viking activities in general, there is very little on Scandinavian military interaction with the Frankish realm, especially during the Merovingian and early Carolingian periods, partly because of the rudimentary state of Frankish military historiography until recently. This is therefore an important avenue of research in the future, where the work of scholars ranging in view from Halsall to Bachrach and from recent archaeological collaboration (e.g., Henning) to continental seafaring (e.g., Haywood) should be taken into consideration.

The *leidangr* (Old Norse; in Norwegian *leidang*, Danish *leding*, Swedish *leding*) was a national military levy associated with the rise of royal power (1066–1350), but it developed into a tax system by the late Middle Ages. The extensive legal material from the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, along with far later administrative documents, has borne most of the evidential weight on the *leidang*. This has slanted studies toward fiscal administration and constitutional developments, an approach exemplified by Dybdahl. Classical studies for Sweden include Hafström and for Norway, Bull and Harbitz. The definite study of Denmark is now Lund's comprehensive treatment. The studies of Musset and Kuhn are more general. According to older research, this apparently ancient military/tax system prevailed

well into the thirteenth century, when European feudal influences began to take over, especially in the more populous and economically better-suited lowlands of Denmark and southern Sweden. This is demonstrably a false dichotomy derived from pitting "Germanic" against "feudal" paradigms within a national framework but still prevails in much writing. However, with the move away from the nationalist perspective, B. Sawyer, Fagerland, and others have begun to unravel the complexities of inter-Scandinavian aristocratic politics and warfare well before the period of the Kalmar Union. Lund argues that the Danish *leding*, once believed to be an ancient feature predating the Danish state, was a development of the 1170s. He has also pointed the way to further research by emphasizing European parallels and sources of inspiration for earlier regional systems, from the English and their *fyrð*, as well as from the Franks.

The Danes probably drew on a better-developed Norwegian system. P. Sawyer suggested Anglo-Saxon origins for this, but no one followed up his initiative, and research on Norwegian and Swedish military organization of the High Middle Ages has proceeded rather fitfully, if at all. Harald Hardrada (r. 1046/7?–1066) was the first ruler to control and impose his own men on the territory that became Norway. Harald probably drew on a variety of sources (Byzantine, Frankish, Anglo-Saxon) to establish a royally controlled system that has traces in later legislation and provided a model for the rest of Scandinavia. The best work for this is still Andersen, on whom DeVries draws heavily.

Generally, scholars of this period only touch upon military history, despite using sources that have great potential for research on military matters. Bagge and Imsen have studied the function, composition, and social status of the *hird* (royal bodyguards), which developed from a military following to an aristocratic administrative apparatus. Bagge has written the definitive study on the thirteenth-century Norwegian didactic treatise, *The King's Mirror*, although without addressing military affairs, for which articles in the work edited by Schnall and Simek provide a basic analysis.

Research on warfare after the Black Death has been incidental to political histories and other topics, such as the collective survey *Den Nordiske adel*. Yet the period is better documented because of surviving administrative records and imposing stone fortifications in increasing numbers, especially in Denmark and Sweden, studied by Olsen, Mogren and Wienberg, and Lovén. These required small, professional garrisons, most of whom were equipped by great magnates or a rudimentary royal administration. It was with such resources, mercenaries, and occasional peasant levies that most of the later medieval wars were fought, as studies by Opsahl and Poulsen explain. The old Scandinavian *leidang* survived on the law books for purposes of taxation and was occasionally revived in times of emergency (as late as 1563 in Norway), but contemporary European patterns prevailed, such as the introduction of gunpowder artillery, as in Hedberg.

[See also Franks, Carolingian; Franks, Merovingian; and Vikings.]

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Leif Inge Ree Petersen

SCHEUT, BATTLE OF

When he died in 1355 the Duke of Brabant had no male heir. After his death his eldest daughter, Johanna, was chosen to succeed him. Louis of Male, Count of Flanders, who had married Margaret of Brabant, another daughter of the late duke, demanded a division of the duchy. He also complained that he had not yet received the dowry promised to his wife. Johanna could not accept these demands, and this soon escalated into full war.

After the first Flemish invasion was launched on 15 June 1356, a quick truce was concluded.

However, the peace was short-lived, and a second invasion began on 9 August 1356. The Flemish advanced directly against Brussels, the capital of Brabant. On 12 August, they arrived in sight of the town and took position near Anderlecht, while the Brabançons assembled on the plain of Scheut.

On 17 August war cries were raised on both sides, and the cavalry of Brabant charged the enemy. Then the militias of Brabant attacked the Flemish, though without order or formation. The result was a terrible melee in which both sides fought courageously. The Brabançons seemed to have had victory within their grasp; however, inexplicably, they panicked and fled.

The contemporary historian Jean le Bel blames the militias of Brussels and Leuven for having panicked and, in their confused flight, disorganized the rest of the army. According to others, the cause was the deplorable conduct of the lord of Asse, the hereditary standard-bearer of Brabant. In fear, he had thrown the precious standard to the ground and, seeing this, the Brabançons believed the battle was lost and abandoned the field.

The Brabançons retreated toward Brussels. The knights were largely able to escape from death or capture. This was primarily due to their being on horseback while the Flemish army was composed principally of infantry. However, an unpleasant surprise was waiting for the refugees. The Bruxellois, wishing to prevent the Flemish from entering the city on the tails of the fleeing troops, kept the gates of the capital closed. The fugitives therefore headed farther south. The next day (18 August) the magistracy of Brussels decided to surrender. The count of Flanders was recognized as the legitimate lord of the town.

[See also Brabançons and Jean le Bel.]

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Sergio Boffa

SCHOOLS AND MASTERS OF ARMS

From about the twelfth century, professional instructors of fencing, or "masters of defense," existed across western Europe. With each generation these fighting men, both noble and commoner, discovered and invented fighting techniques that became a discipline. Experts of these combatives became professional self-defense teachers and heads of fencing schools. They systematized and taught their methods, stressing that effective fighting involved understanding and applying key physical and mental components inherent to all hand-to-hand combat.

German guilds such as the Marxbrüder and Freyfechter in Frankfurt, the Luxbrüder in Hamburg, and the Federfechter in Nuremberg, as well as other organized fencers, existed as early as 1397. These groups enjoyed many imperial privileges into the seventeenth century. Urban militias, too, trained in established schools in England and Northern Italy from at least the late fifteenth century. Many such guilds were concerned not just with training knights for battlefield survival or preparing them for judicial combats, but were also set up to provide working men with martial skills. Like most other professions and crafts, in some towns they formed as trade associations or guilds, a status that gave them more economic self-determination and political influence. The guilds also addressed professional matters such as hiring of instructors, regulating of fees, rivalry among members, and undue competition between different schools. Most schools held public displays of fighting to test their students before awarding them a rank. Such events created good publicity for the guild and allowed students to display their martial skills.

Whether as military trade, commercial craft, or private learning, practitioners of the art of defense exercised these skills as an open-ended and evolving craft. Teachings were based on unarmored combat skills. Training in the schools, whether in an established facility or on an outdoor field, typically began with grappling and soon proceeded to the quickest weapon, the common dagger. It then moved on to

the simple staff, the basis of all spears and polearms. Fighting with the sword and buckler, the fighting man learned not only the use of shields, but also the fluid and effective coordination of two weapons. This was of enormous benefit with a sword and dagger, or indeed even any single weapon with an empty second hand. Once the fighting man learned the longer double-handed sword, whether of the wider or narrower variety of blade, he could then handle any similar weapon just as easily using nearly identical moves. If he also learned the poleax, this would teach him about all manner of axes and clubbing weapons.

No training could fully prepare a man for all the dangers of the battlefield. But learning fighting skills, like the acquisition of good weapons and armor, increased a man's chances of survival. The man in combat could easily be incapacitated by a single well-placed stab, cut, or impact blow, and the cumulative effect of even lesser injuries could debilitate a fighter enough to render him useless if not mortally wounded. The art of defense as taught in schools of arms by masters of defense was meant to aid a combatant do such to others while preventing such from being done to himself.

[See also Knighthood and Knights; Manuals, Military; and Training.]

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John Clements

SCHOSSHALDE, BATTLE ON THE

In the midst of the thirteenth-century territorial disputes and conflicts over lordly rights among the

great dynasties of its region (Kyburg, Habsburg, Savoy), the sovereign city of Bern prospered and grew continually stronger. Alliances were concluded with various rulers in order to strengthen Bern's own position. The election of Rudolf of Habsburg as king in 1273 aggravated the situation, but he confirmed the city's "Handfeste" (freedom) in 1274, and the Bernese supported the king militarily in the Burgundian campaigns of the early 1280s. When Rudolf levied a general tax in 1285, Bern, heavily in debt at the time, refused to pay it. The city sought support in its refusal by joining a coalition of Burgundian rulers under Count Amadeus V of Savoy that was hostile to the king.

In May 1288 Rudolf proceeded to besiege Bern, a heavily protected city, with a strong army, but he lifted the siege in June. In August, the king again camped before the walls of the city. He tried to take the city by storm in mid-September but did not succeed, whereupon he once again withdrew his troops from Bern. His son and namesake, Rudolf II of Habsburg, Duke of Swabia, assumed command for the continuation of the war. In early May 1289, Rudolf II secretly assembled a mounted force of three hundred to four hundred men in Aargau. He laid an ambush in the woods on the Schosshalde hillside near Bern and led a sham attack on the city's lower gate. The Bernese impulsively launched a thoroughly disorganized counterattack and, in pursuing the enemy, ran into the ambush. The Swabian cavalry overran and routed the Bernese. About one hundred men fell, and about 150 were taken prisoner. Rudolf lost his relative, Count Ludwig of Homberg. In the aftermath, Bern received rough treatment, including plundering. Duke Rudolf wanted to tear down the city's walls, but his father prevented it.

A peace treaty was concluded on 14 May 1289 in the Aargau city of Baden. Bern paid the taxes it owed and endowed an altar for the fallen Count Ludwig of Homberg, as well as read anniversary masses for his soul. Contemporary sources are silent on the course of the battle on the Schosshalde, but the Bern chronicler Konrad Justinger (d. 1438) reports the event in detail more than a century later.

[See also Switzerland, *subentry on Narrative*.]

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Oliver Landolt

Translated from the German by

Johanna M. Baboukis

SCOLARI, FILIPPO

See Pipo of Ozora.

SCOUTS AND SCOUTING

Medieval commanders were well aware of the need to prepare the way for military operations by reconnaissance, and for intelligence on the movements of their enemies. For this they employed scouts, who are sometimes called spies, for the two functions were intimately related. Vegetius, in his *De Re Militari*, advised the use of scouts and local guides when in unfamiliar territory. The Byzantine emperor Maurice (r. 582–602) recommended the use of scouts in his *Strategikon*, and Rabanus Maurus stressed how vital they were in his *De Procinctu Romanae Miliciae*.

These literary exhortations clearly reflected military practice.

In 782, at the suggestion of Theoderic, Charlemagne's commander, the Frankish army sent out scouts who located rebellious Saxons on the Süntel mountain: it was not due to lack of reconnaissance that some of the Frankish leaders charged impatiently on the enemy camp and were defeated. Harold of England knew that Duke William of Normandy intended to attack England and sent spies to Normandy, who were discovered. Duke William invaded and established his camp at Hastings in October 1066. His men set about plundering the countryside to feed the army. This dispersal of forces was highly dangerous, but William sent out a screen of scouts to watch the approaches from the north and they duly reported the sudden arrival of the Anglo-Saxon army of Harold, who had marched at great speed towards his enemy. Almost certainly he had hoped to surprise William just as he had surprised a Viking army at Stamford Bridge on 25 September. William's scouts are pictured in the Bayeux Tapestry, the famous embroidery that narrates in pictures the circumstances of the Norman Conquest of 1066.

In August 1099 the army of the First Crusade, having captured Jerusalem, became aware of an Egyptian army gathering at Ascalon to attack them. They marched out, sending ahead scouts who tortured



Scout. William of Normandy (c. 1028–1087) asks Vital (*right*) whether he has seen King Harold II's army. Detail from the Bayeux Tapestry, c. 1066–1086. MUSÉE DE LA TAPISSERIE, BAYEUX, FRANCE/WITH SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE CITY OF BAYEUX GIRAUDON/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

herdsmen attending the enemy's supply animals for information. In the twelfth century the Western settlers in the Latin Kingdom recruited *Turcoples*, light cavalry who were often used as scouts and spies. In 1174 the king of Scotland, encamped outside Alnwick castle, was captured after careful reconnaissance by English forces revealed the opportunity for a surprise attack. Richard I of England (r. 1189–1199) on the Third Crusade employed Muslim spies to gather intelligence about Saladin's armies. In 1265 Simon de Montfort the Younger was trapped outside Kenilworth castle by the royalists thanks to the services of a female transvestite called Margoth. In 1302, before the battle of Courtrai, the French commander paid an informant for a plan of the Flemish dispositions, though it hardly profited him because he perished in the terrible French defeat. Philippe de Mézières, writing in the 1360s, believed that his project for a crusade would be facilitated by recruiting Eastern Christians to spy on the Muslims.

Scouting and spying may seem somewhat contrary to the dictates of "chivalry," but medieval men appreciated the value of these wiles and commanders knew full well the need for intelligence in the planning and execution of operations of war.

[See also Ascalon, Battle of; Britain, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300); Charlemagne; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Crusades, *subentry* on Narrative (1095–1183); Hastings, Battle of; Maurice; Montfort, Simon (V) de; Richard I of England and Anjou; Spies and Intelligence; Strategy; Vegetius; and William I of England.]

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John France

SCROPE-GROSVENOR CONTROVERSY

The armorial dispute known as the Scrope-Grosvenor controversy took place in the Court of Chivalry between 1386 and 1390, when a verdict was finally given in favor of Sir Richard Scrope of Bolton, Yorkshire. On the 1385 campaign of Richard II to Scotland, Scrope bore the coat of arms azure, a bend or, and while serving in the army he saw Robert Grosvenor of Cheshire bearing the same arms. Over the following five years the rival claimants called on some four hundred witnesses (one of Scrope's was none other than Geoffrey Chaucer) to testify to their right to bear the said arms. These deponents' testimonies provide a wealth of information on the military activities of English soldiers, especially during the first and second stages of the Hundred Years' War.

Scrope v. Grosvenor is one of three extant Court of Chivalry cases dating from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the others being *Lovell v. Morley*, which was contemporaneous with *Scrope v. Grosvenor*, and *Grey v. Hastings*, which dates from 1408 to 1410. Of the three, *Scrope v. Grosvenor* is the most famous. This is partly because it is the only Court of Chivalry dispute to have been fully published, but is also due to the fascinating accounts given by the deponents. Scrope and Grosvenor each claimed that the contested arms had always been in the possession of their respective families. Each sought to prove that his side had the more ancient claim to the said arms, and both called on witnesses to support these assertions. The majority of the deponents did this by stating that they or their ancestors had served on campaign alongside members of the Scrope or Grosvenor families (depending on which side they were supporting) and there saw them bearing the contested arms.

Many deponents recounted that they had served on a variety of expeditions and in several theaters of war, and although most of the accounts are highly selective and a few are occasionally inaccurate, there is no reason to doubt their veracity in general. The testimonies provide firm evidence of the English aristocracy's commitment to soldiering during the

fourteenth century and of the variety of their martial experience. Most deponents focused primarily on service given during the Hundred Years' War, and their vignettes yield many details about their own and other soldiers' careers that cannot be found elsewhere. The depositions also reveal a great deal about chivalric culture. A number of witnesses, for example, claimed that they had seen the contested arms displayed in stained glass. Some of the most interesting details concern crusading activity. Sir Richard Waldegrave, for instance, told of how he had seen Sir William Scrope bearing the contested arms in Satalia during a meeting between the King of Cyprus and Takka Lord of Satalia. Testimonies such as this explain the controversy's enduring appeal and value to military historians.

[See also Heralds and Heraldry.]

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David Simpkin

SEA POWER

In the mid-nineteenth century, Alfred Thayer Mahan put forward the idea that the successful exercise of sea power necessitated the existence of a battle fleet able to destroy any enemy in a decisive encounter. His views were derived largely from the activities of British fleets in the eighteenth century. Julian Corbett later pointed out the limitations of sea power, especially the need for cooperation between land and

sea forces. Neither analysis is entirely appropriate for medieval times. Navies and battle fleets in the modern sense did not exist, nor were ships and seamen able to maintain a blockade for lengthy periods in the manner of later fleets. Intelligence regarding the whereabouts of enemy ships was often lacking so that the rare sea battles came about more by chance than design. Rulers' aims were also frequently unclear and imprecise, while communication difficulties made combined operations difficult.

Nevertheless, in particular circumstances, medieval rulers could use their maritime resources to enhance their power. This is most clearly seen in the Mediterranean, in the war of the Sicilian Vespers, and also in the series of wars fought largely at sea between Genoa and Venice from 1253 to circa 1400. The victories of the galley fleet commanded by the outstanding admiral Roger of Loria (Lauria)—e.g., the battles of Malta in 1283 and Las Hormigas in 1285—helped Pedro III of Aragon to defeat both Angevin forces in Naples and the king of France in Rousillon. The bitter rivalry between Genoa and Venice was largely fought out at sea. The configuration of the Mediterranean coastline and seasonal changes in the prevailing winds created favored courses followed by the ships of both cities. Thus opportunities arose not only for piracy but also for set-piece battles, such as those near Ragusa (Dubrovnik) in 1298 and off Porto Longo near Modon in 1353. The War of Chioggia in 1378–1381 nearly ended in disaster for Venice largely because the Genoese were able to blockade the city with the help of Hungarian allies, after capturing a Venetian fleet off Pola. Both cities suffered when an Ottoman fleet began to operate in the Aegean after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The Turks had the advantage of ready access to land bases in the Balkans and the possibility of coordination with their land forces. Venetian influence in the region was greatly diminished after the loss to the Turks of Modon and Coron, their bases in the Peloponnesos, following the battle of Zonchio in 1499.

In northern waters, in the early medieval period, the Vikings were notable seamen and navigators, but their raids often involved relatively small groups of men and ships acting to secure private interests.

The power eventually exerted by rulers such as Cnut (r. 1016–1035) depended on the success of their land forces. Long ships were essential as transport for armies, but the rare so-called sea battles were amphibious actions in estuaries or inlets with the ships often run aground. From the later thirteenth century, both French and English rulers began to take a greater interest in the possible use of ships in warfare. The campaigns of Edward I in Wales and Scotland relied on the logistical support of fleets of “arrested” (conscripted) merchant ships. His armies would have been starved of victuals and arms without this help. In the same way, the main use made of ships by Edward III was to get his forces across the Channel. His victory over the French at Sluis in 1340 brought him renown but had little strategic importance. French amphibious raids on English south-coast towns were in many cases a more effective use of maritime power.

In the early fifteenth century Henry V not only assembled a royal fleet of over thirty ships but also built vessels, including his enormous *Gracedieu*, whose main purpose was warfare. His death and changes in the political situation brought these developments to a premature end. Only the Earl of Warwick in the 1460s, from his base at Calais during the Wars of the Roses, showed some understanding of how ships might be used to advance his claim to power.

Perhaps because the galleys of the war fleets in the Mediterranean were more maneuverable and more suited to boarding actions than the round ships most common in northern waters, the maritime powers of the south understood the potential of sea power better than those in the north. Here rulers normally used ships to transport and supply their land armies; sea battles were not desired or looked for.

[See also Chioggia, Battle of; Genoese-Venetian Wars; Naval Combat and Tactics; and Ships and Sailing.]

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Susan Rose

SECKENHEIM, BATTLE OF

Elector Palatine Frederick I's victory in the battle of Pfeddersheim (4 July 1460) was followed by a short break in the “Süddeutscher Fürstenkrieg” (South German Princes' War)—at least in the Rhineland. But the conflict soon continued, with similar alliances, in the “Mainzer Stiftsfehde” (a feud about the archdiocese of Mainz), when Pope Pius II dismissed Diether of Isenburg, archbishop of Mainz, in the autumn of 1461. After the disaster at Pfeddersheim, Diether was now allied with Frederick I the Victorious, who was renowned for his military ability. To secure his confederate's help in defending his archbishopric, Diether made immense territorial concessions to the elector Palatine. Early in 1462 both men were excommunicated by the pope, and Emperor Frederick III declared an imperial war against them. Shortly afterward Count Ulrich of Württemberg, Count Palatine Louis of Veldenz, Margrave Charles of Baden, and his brother Bishop George of Metz established an anti-Palatine coalition. Their support was for the papal nominee and new archbishop of Mainz Adolf of Nassau.

By the end of June 1462 these allied princes invaded the Palatinate with about six thousand to eight thousand men, inflicting heavy devastation on the land. Assuming the feared elector was absent, they intended to capture his residence, Heidelberg. But Frederick was there—it is possible that he had spread the rumors of his absence himself, in order to tempt his enemies. He quickly collected his forces, including eight hundred men-at-arms and two thousand infantry, with numerous Swiss mercenaries

amongst them. Additionally, some three hundred of Diether's men-at-arms and many local peasants followed the electoral army.

Not far from Seckenheim (today a part of Mannheim), Frederick cornered enemy troops—possibly a strong marauding detachment—that had left the fortified camp some twelve miles off. When the allied forces realized they were trapped, the confluence of the Rhine and Neckar rivers behind them thwarting a retreat, they prepared to do battle and to escape southward. To help their soldiers recognize one another in this age before uniforms, they chose oat straws as a badge.

Frederick arrayed his men in echelon battle formation with his vanguard and the main body of men-at-arms in the center, flanked two ranks deep by the light-armored mounted crossbowmen. The infantry remained hidden in a nearby forest. As their badge the Palatines stuck hazel leaves to their helmets.

The battle commenced with smaller skirmishes and an exchange of shots, followed by a ferocious charge by the heavy cavalry. Fighting in the thick of the fray, Elector Frederick and his men had only just prevented the enemy's breakthrough when the advancing Palatine infantry finally and completely enclosed the allied forces. Still, a group of approximately three hundred horsemen escaped the enclosure and found and massacred the waiting grooms of the Palatine men-at-arms.

Nevertheless, the battle turned out to be Frederick's decisive victory over his enemies. While he lost only ten or twelve knights, his adversaries counted more than forty killed. Crucial, however, was the large number of prisoners (124 noblemen and 203 squires), among whom were the most important princes of the alliance—Count Ulrich of Württemberg, Margrave Charles of Baden, and Bishop George of Metz. These were led in triumph to Heidelberg, where they were ransomed for considerable funds, as well as territorial and political concessions to Frederick I, in 1463.

[See also Frederick III of Habsburg and Pfedder-shseyim, Battle of.]

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Uwe Tresp

SEINE, NAVAL BATTLE OF THE

The capture of Harfleur was the main tangible English gain from the Agincourt campaign in 1415. The port provided an entry point for future English campaigns in the Seine valley toward Paris, and a French attempt to recapture the town was undertaken in the spring of 1416. This involved a land siege and a naval blockade in which the French fleet, operating out of the new harbor of Honfleur, was reinforced by a Genoese force of six hundred crossbowmen aboard eight galleys and eight carracks. The Franco-Genoese force raided the English coasts as the English fleet was pieced together.

This fleet finally assembled off Beachy Head on 14 August under the command of John of Lancaster, Duke of Bedford, and sailed for the Seine estuary on a favorable wind. It was estimated at between seventy and more than one hundred ships strong, including four carracks; the Franco-Genoese force was larger (about 159 vessels) and had eight carracks. The English appear to have had more troops embarked (some seven thousand).

The Franco-Genoese fleet appears to have been taken by surprise, and crews had to be hastily reembarked. Battle was given on 15 August. The English, still favored by the wind, assaulted the Franco-Genoese line. Initially the attackers took heavy casualties as their decks were showered with missiles from the high bow and stern castles of the carracks until they could grapple with opposing ships. The battle was fierce and protracted, lasting some seven hours with heavy losses on both sides (some twenty English vessels were sunk and Bedford

himself wounded). The turning point came with the capture or destruction of four of the Genoese carracks, after which the Franco-Genoese fleet disintegrated. Bedford and the wounded, together with the captured ships and part of the fleet, returned to Southampton while the rest, under Sir Walter Hungerford, pushed on to Harfleur. The siege was lifted.

[See also Harfleur, Siege of.]

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Brian G. H. Ditcham

SELJUKS

The Byzantine Princess Anna Komnene maintained that the Turks were more civilized than the Franks or Western Europeans. Such a statement surprises those who think of the eleventh- and twelfth-century Turks as ferocious nomadic tribesmen recently erupted from Central Asia and at the time still only superficially converted to Islam. But Anna was probably referring to the Seljuk and other Turkish elites who then ruled most of the cultural heartlands of the Middle Eastern world.

The Turks and their rulers were nevertheless sometimes motivated by ideas that stemmed from an earlier view of the world. Unlike the Arabs and the Persians, they brought with them from pre-Islamic Inner Asia a folk myth in which Turks were destined to dominate the world. This world view, inherited by or shared with the Mongols, probably dated back far beyond recorded history, but it first appeared in written form in the earliest surviving version of the *Oghuz Epic*, in thirteenth-century Uighur script. Many of the symbols and emblems in this ancient Central Asian Turkish epic can often be traced back


to Indian iconographic influence via the Buddhism adopted by many Turks before their conversion to Islam. Thereafter they continued to have an impact upon Turkish Islamic culture for many centuries, especially in military and secular fields, though also upon Turkish forms of Sufi Islamic mysticism.

The Great Seljuks. The Seljuks invaded the Middle East and in 1055 established their sultanate at Baghdad, from where they controlled the Abbasid caliphate. During the early decades of their rule, the backbone of the Seljuk army consisted of free Turkish tribesmen, who served out of loyalty to their leaders and in hope of booty or land. Yet even as early as 1091, the influential Iranian chief minister Nizam al-Mulk wrote his *Siyasat Nama* on the art of government for the Great Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah I. How much influence this had at the time is debatable, but it later became a famous text on the subject and contributed to a revival of aspects of Iranian government under Turkish Seljuk rule.

Concerning military matters, Nizam al-Mulk emphasized the need to have a reliable and well-equipped elite guard regiment that was also splendid, to impress foreign ambassadors. He recommended that a standing army of professional infantry be recruited from a variety of ethnic or cultural groups to promote competition and reduce the threat of military coups. His advice was followed to some extent by later Seljuk and post-Seljuk rulers, who similarly continued the tradition of recruiting largely Turkish mamluks of slave origin.

From Seljuks to Atabegs. Within a few years of the Seljuk conquest of the Jazira and Syria, the region again fragmented, though during the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries many of its provinces were ruled by Seljuk *maliks*, or lords, as deputies of the great Seljuk sultan in Iran and Iraq. They had authority to appoint and dismiss commanders and government officials and also to take personal command of the local army. However, their role was gradually taken over by *atabegs*, a title that became virtually synonymous with that of *isfahsalah*, or army commander.

The ruler's elite guard regiment continued to form the kernel of the armies of this fragmented period.



Seljuks. Battle between the Byzantines and Seljuks. Illustration from the *Skylitzes Chronicle*, fol. 234v, eleventh century. WERNER FORMAN/ART RESOURCE, NY

Consisting largely of highly trained and well paid *ghulams* recruited from slaves, it was responsible for protecting the ruler, supervising his siege machines, and guarding state military arsenals. Freeborn troops consisted of mercenaries from outside the state and locals who served in return for pensions or regular payment. Virtually all these professional soldiers were cavalymen, foot soldiers normally being mustered as needed, along with tribal auxiliaries.

Seljuks of Rum. Little is known about the army of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum in the twelfth century, though it probably attempted to mirror that of the Great Seljuk Sultanate of Iran and Iraq. The first half of the thirteenth century saw significant changes in recruitment. The resulting two separate armies consisted of Turcoman nomads, slave-recruited *ghulams* and freedmen, regional mercenaries, mercenaries of western European or Crusader origin, and various allied contingents. That part known as the Ancient Army was essentially the same as the army that had served the Seljuks of Rum in the

twelfth century. The New Army generally consisted of mercenaries—or at least properly paid soldiers—from a remarkable variety of sources. With perhaps a few exceptions among the ex-Byzantine and ex-Armenian aristocracies, the Seljuks of Rum did not normally recruit local unconverted Christians into their army before the Mongol conquest and occupation, for the simple reason that their most likely foes would be fellow Greeks or Armenians.

Tactics. It is clear that the Turks' horse-archery tactics gave them an advantage over the largely Arab armies of Syria during the second half of the eleventh century. When the First Crusade arrived only a few years later, the only major technological difference between the invading Christians and the defending Muslims was the latter's composite bows. These the Turks used primarily on horseback and the Arabs largely on foot.

With what the Christians described as its "astounding" range and high shooting rate, the composite bow, in the hands of fully trained soldiers, was a potentially battle-winning weapon. Nevertheless, its

powers of penetration have been exaggerated. It normally shot lighter arrows than the west European self bow, and weight is required to pierce armor.

Some historians have pointed to the arrival of the Seljuk Turks, along with a supposed decline in the Middle Eastern tactical tradition of close cooperation between horse and foot, as resulting in the rise of light cavalry and corresponding decline in heavily armored cavalry in the Islamic Middle East. Yet a subsequent revival in the use of horse-armor perhaps indicates, on the contrary, that archery both on horseback and on foot formed the major threat to cavalry during this period.

Most sources agree that the horsemanship of the professional Islamic soldier was better than that of the Bedouin soldier. Whether there really was a revival of cavalry skills during the Great Seljuk Sultanate remains a matter of debate. In any case, it has been claimed that training involved horsemanship, archery, swordplay, and polo at least once a week.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (900–1204); Crusades, *subentry on* Narrative (1180–1245); Horsemanship; and Mamluks.]

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David Nicolle

SEMPACH, BATTLE OF

The aggressive territorial policy of the confederated city of Lucerne, resulting in its acquisition of outlying towns, challenged the governmental and territorial interests of the Austrian dukes in the region of modern-day Switzerland. At the end of 1385, the territories of the Swiss Confederation opened hostilities against the Habsburg city of Rapperswil and other localities that supported Austria. Although the Habsburg dukes of Austria were largely able to come to terms with the South German cities, which up to this point had been equally hostile to Austria, they could not do the same with the confederated regions. Consequently, Austrian duke Leopold III assembled an army consisting of nobles from the Swabian, Tyrolean, Alsatian, and Swiss areas, and military contingents were raised from the nearby Austrian towns in Aargau, Thurgau, Klettgau, Schwarzwald, Breisgau, and Sundgau. This Austrian army set off in the direction of Sursee and Sempach by way of Brugg and Zofingen. Countering this Austrian attack was an army consisting of contingents from Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden.

The two armies met near the village of Sempach on 9 July 1386, an unusually hot day, according to contemporary sources. Very little information on the course of the battle is available; the sources leave much to be desired. Even the strengths of the two armies are not precisely known. Recent research suggests an Austrian force of about twenty-one hundred to twenty-eight hundred mounted soldiers, besides infantry and baggage. The confederated side had, at most, three thousand infantry. It is generally assumed that the armies were numerically of about the same size. The meager sources do reveal that the Austrian army launched a fierce attack on the confederated troops from the top of a hill. The latter suffered heavy losses at first, but later the tide of the battle turned, and the Austrian duke Leopold III was killed.

About a thousand men fell on the Austrian side, including seven hundred knights, whereas the confederated army lost about two hundred.

The heavy losses among the Austrian nobility led to political instability in the Habsburg-ruled areas. Over the course of time, confederation historiography embellished the battle of Sempach with various myths and sagas. One such tale, unattested in the contemporary sources, involves a heroic deed by one Winkelried, who is said to have thrown himself heroically into the lances of the Austrian knights; his self-sacrificing death allowed his fellow fighters to break through the enemy lines. Over time, this event became a fixed element of descriptions of the battle of Sempach.

Despite its thorough demystification by modern historical work, the battle of Sempach continues to be an important event in the collective Swiss memory. It is commemorated annually with a memorial celebration, occasionally exploited by the political right and right-wing extremists. Habsburg historiography also found propagandistic uses for Duke Leopold III's death in battle, especially in the fifteenth century, in order to support claims of Habsburg sovereignty in the confederated lands; in this view, the duke was killed "by his own, on his own [territory]" (*dux Lupoldus per suos et in suo interfectus*).

[See also Switzerland, *subentry* on Narrative.]

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Oliver Landolt

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

SERVICIUM DEBITUM

Also referred to as *servitium debitum* ("service owed"), *servicium debitum* is the term for military

or knight service owed to a lord. Despite its feudal associations, such military service was evident in Anglo-Saxon England and was adapted after the Norman Conquest. In return for lands held by the king, tenants-in-chief provided him with a quota—either agreed or imposed by the monarch—of knights based on an official assessment of their lands, based on the knight's fee, or fief. Miles of Gloucester was expected (on vellum at least) to field 97.5 knights according to the 1166 *servicium debitum* of his lands held in England and Wales (a mounted sergeant counted for half a knight). Annual military service was for a limited period; this caused problems of troop retention on lengthy campaigns. William I commanded *servicia* of some five thousand to six thousand knights, set at forty days per year in peace time, and two months' service during times of war. The *servicium* could take the form of a number of duties, including castle-guard—an obligation for a knight to undertake garrison service. In William I's reign, 170 knights' fees were absorbed by Dover Castle. Sergeants, archers, and crossbowmen also owed forms of tenurial service.

The limitations of service meant that over time, *servicium debitum* was often commuted and military taxes became common, the money paid often being assessed by the *servicium*. Scutage (*scutagium*), or shield money, developed from a fine being paid for failing to attend Carolingian army musters into a regular hypothecated tax by the end of the twelfth century, paid in lieu of personal service. Although the link between scutage and the *servicium debitum* is debated, the importance of such developments lay in the alternative methods of troop provision. The money collected in this way was used to employ mercenaries and marked the decline of a strictly feudal organization for war. These developments were reflected across Europe, with different regions evolving with differing traditions and variations. In France in 1272, Philip III taxed those who did not serve with him on campaign according to their status and not their property or wealth.

The *servicium debitum* had some flexibility and could be adapted to longer terms of service: when the full quota was not required, knights who did

not serve could support those who did. Thus for Henry II's invasion of Wales in 1157 every two knights equipped a third, a measure emulated by both King Richard and King John. John, however, became acutely aware of one of its shortcomings in providing expeditionary troops in the early thirteenth century: the growing reluctance of knights to serve abroad, with the obligation becoming interpreted as being a domestic one.

Nevertheless, the *servicium debitum* remained useful in England until about 1300. In 1218 a royal army mustered to besiege Newark: 470 knights were expected from 115 named tenants. Not only knights were summoned: John of Monmouth had to provide sixty miners for the siege. By the time of Edward I's Welsh wars of 1276–1277, 375 of 7,000 knights served, the rest paying scutage. *Servicium debitum* did not hinder advances in army recruitment in an increasingly monetized age from the early twelfth century in the form of royal household troops and indentures; bastard feudalism was not an innovation of the later medieval period. As early as 1101, Henry I of England was paying £500 annually for the service of a thousand Flemish knights.

[See also Feudalism, Bastard; Muster and Review; and Obligation, Military.]

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Sean McGlynn

SETENIL, SIEGES OF

The town of Setenil, in the province of Cadiz, was one of the fortifications erected along the eastern border between the kingdoms of Castile and Granada. Its topographical position atop a sierra

situated between two valleys, its fortress (composed of walls with crenellated battlements and a moat surrounding the town), a castle at the highest peak, and a sizeable garrison all combined to protect the fortification against assault.

In 1407 the *infante* (prince) Fernando de Antequera initiated an expedition against several castle fortifications bordering the Kingdom of Granada, near the city of Ronda. The Castilian troops were successful in some of their attacks, including the conquest of Zahara, but failed miserably at the walls of Setenil. Between 5 and 25 October, they beleaguered the defense, using bombards (large gunpowder artillery), but the bombardment was not effective in weakening the stronghold. Some bombards broke and others ran out of stone projectiles. New pieces of artillery were brought in and stones were procured in neighboring quarries, but the artillery was unable to break down the walls, which had been reinforced by the defenders of the city.

The *infante* decided to attempt a massive assault by scaling the walls with the help of a wooden tower, covered with hides to render it fire-resistant, and maneuvered by five hundred men. However, on 23 October the attack failed when one of the wooden tower's wheels broke before reaching the targeted walls, and the troops refused the attempt to scale the high walls without the support of the tower. Meanwhile, the Muslims of Setenil were successful in their attacks against the besiegers, while other towns thwarted foraging detachments, resulting in the breaking of the Castilian army's morale by exacerbating supply problems and unleashing a wave of dissent. Two days later, on 25 October, the siege was lifted.

The fortress of Setenil remained in the hands of the Muslims until September 1484, when Fernando II the Catholic (r. 1479–1516), now in the final phase of war against the Kingdom of Granada, decided to attack the capital city. Contrary to the outcome of 1407, the siege of the city was a success as a result of the massive and effective use of artillery. On 6 September 1484 a seven-hundred- to two-thousand-man vanguard of cavalry troops sent by the marquis of Cadiz, Rodrigo Ponce de Leon,

blocked off the entrance and exits to the town while awaiting the arrival of the artillery troops, headed by the king, which arrived on 10 September. Three days later the heavy bombards arrived, and the attack was launched against the stone walls of the town. The lighter artillery of *cerbatanas* (small culverins), *pasavolantes* (small, fast-action cannon), and *ribadoquines* fired projectiles over the wall, causing massive casualties and destruction of the homes within. On 18 September, the Muslims began to negotiate their surrender agreement, which included their safe passage out of the city with their possessions in exchange for the release of their Christian captives.

Undoubtedly the difference between one siege of the city and another is a result of technical improvements in the tactics of the Castilian forces.

[See also Catholic Monarchs, The; Fernando de Antequera; Iberia, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1500); and Zahara, Sieges of.]

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Francisco García Fitz

Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

SEVILLE, SIEGE OF

After the disintegration of the Almohad caliphate in the early thirteenth century, al-Andalus was divided

into small ministates (*taifas*), including Seville. Located at the confluence of the Guadalquivir and Tagarete rivers, Seville controlled the lower Guadalquivir valley. The Guadalquivir afforded good communications with the Atlantic and Africa. Seville's sizable fortifications were completed in 1222 with the construction of the Torre del Oro, an *albarrana* tower that defended a crossing of the Guadalquivir. A thick iron chain protected the city from naval assaults while reinforcing the bridge that joined the city to the castle of Triana on the opposite side of the river.

In the spring of 1245, Fernando III of Castile (r. 1217–1252) decided to attack Seville—which with its lengthy wall was by that time one of Spain's largest cities. That summer he launched various raids from Córdoba in order to weaken Seville economically and psychologically. He also arranged for a Castilian fleet to sail from Cantabrian ports to join the enterprise the following May.

After yearlong preparations, the siege lasted from June 1247 to 23 November 1248 when the city capitulated. Between March and June 1247, Fernando III descended from Córdoba, taking control of the countryside to the north and east of the city. In June the Castilian ships—five galleys and eight round ships—defeated a Muslim fleet from Ceuta, Tangiers, and Seville at the mouth of the Guadalquivir. (The city had sought the support of other Muslim powers.) This allowed the first Christian camps to be established to the south of the city. At the beginning of the siege there were three such fortified Christian positions; by its end there were eight.

This campaign had the support of the papacy, which raised it to the status of a crusade. By the siege's final phase the Christian forces numbered twelve to fifteen thousand men: around one thousand soldiers, two hundred knights from the royal retinue, another two hundred from the international and Iberian military orders, another two thousand from noble hosts, an uncertain number from the municipal militias of Castile and Leon, and the entourage of the archbishops of Toledo and Santiago, as well as volunteers and mercenaries from Portugal and Aragon, including the *infantes* of Aragon and the

Count of Urgell. Fernando III's ally Muhammad I of Granada (r. 1232–1273) also contributed three to five hundred horsemen. In total there were three to four thousand horsemen and eight to ten thousand infantrymen. Fernando III established a successful deployment system that limited the service of the municipal militias and most of the noble hosts to a period of one to three months.

The size of the Muslim garrison, under the command of General Saqqaf, is not known. Relief forces from Ceuta, Tangiers, and Niebla were defeated in land skirmishes and naval battles before they were able to make contact with the garrison.

The second phase of the siege lasted from July to December 1247. Because the Christian forces were not strong enough either to conclude the siege or to launch an assault, they decided to strengthen their position. As 1248 began, new forces arrived, and the Castilian king was able to launch more aggressive offensives. Before this action took place, however, the people of Seville, desperate to break the naval blockade, unleashed a number of attacks on the Christian fleet. In one of these they used rafts loaded with naphtha and other flammable materials. Their attack was a failure, but it forced the besiegers to put large wooden poles in the river in order to prevent further surprise attacks.

During the siege's third phase, which lasted from January to July 1248, the city was completely encircled. The Castilian fleet was able to break the chain in the Guadalquivir, thus cutting Seville's communication with its western castle, Triana. But an unsuccessful frontal assault on that castle demonstrated the dangers of such an approach, and the king decided to starve out the city. At the same time the Castilian siege engines proved useless because of the city's own artillery fire. Once the fleet had managed to isolate the city completely, and when no signs of relief came from Ceuta, Tunis, or the Almohad Empire, as early as August 1248 the besieged began to negotiate their surrender. Finally on 23 November, Fernando III victoriously entered Seville. He allowed Seville's residents to leave with as many belongings as they could carry. This proved the high point of Fernando III's military career and

marked the beginning of the end of the *Reconquista* of the thirteenth century.

[See also Fernando III and Iberia, subentry on Narrative (1100–1300).]

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José Manuel Rodríguez García

SFORZA, MUZIO

See Attendoli, Muzio.

SHIELDS

The shield was used throughout the medieval period, primarily as an additional defense carried in the left hand, leaving the right free to wield a weapon such as a sword or spear. However, although shields were primarily used defensively, they could also be used as a weapon, for example, thrust into the face of an opponent or used, especially edgewise, to strike an enemy or knock aside his weapon. Sometimes, particularly in the Roman and early medieval period, a group of soldiers would stand with their shields edge to edge to form a so-called shield wall, allowing the soldiers to move in a coordinated attack. In the later medieval period shields developed an additional function as a form of identification as they became used to display the personal heraldic arms of the bearer. Few examples of early shields survive from before the later medieval period and much evidence for them comes from fragments excavated from archaeological contexts, manuscript illustrations, medieval sculpture and other pictorial evidence as well as from contemporary records and literature.

Shields were used extensively by the Romans and were, in the later imperial period, usually

rectangular in form and curved across their width to fit the body. A mid-third-century example excavated at Dura Europos, in modern Syria, measured forty by thirty-three inches (102 by 83 centimeters), five-eighths to seven-eighths of an inch (15 to 20 millimeters) thick and was covered in leather. The center was covered by a large metal domed boss, to protect the hand holding the shield, and the rim was protected by an applied border of wrought iron or bronze. Although most shields at this time were rectangular, oval shields were also used. An example, also from Dura Europos, measures approximately forty-four by thirty-seven inches (112 by 95 centimeters) and is constructed of twelve to fifteen poplar planks three-tenths to half an inch (8 to 12 millimeters) thick joined together edge to edge. A horizontal bar, riveted only on each side, reinforced the inside of the shield and also provided a wooden grip that was anchored on the front by a large domed boss, measuring seven by nine inches (185 by 220 millimeters). It is unknown what fabric was attached to the surface of this shield, although it was probably leather or canvas.

Most Carolingian soldiers, even those of the lowest rank, carried a convex, circular shield for protection. These were usually quite large, up to about thirty-two inches (80 centimeters) in diameter, and made from wood covered in leather. An iron boss reinforcing the center of the shield protected the hand holding the shield while an additional strap allowed it to be slung over the shoulder when not in use and for ease of carriage. Early Anglo-Saxon shields were flat and circular of small to medium size, approximately twelve to twenty-four inches (25 to 66 centimeters) in diameter although larger examples, up to thirty-six inches (92 centimeters) are known. Made of between three and nine wooden planks joined edge to edge and covered either on the front or on both the front and back with leather, Anglo-Saxon shields usually had a circular iron boss that covered a central hole across which a bar was secured that served as a handle. There is some evidence from contemporary texts that shields could be brightly painted or decorated with pictures of dragons or other beasts.



Kite-shaped Shields. Fragment of a gilded copper reliquary titled *The Temple Pyx*, c. 1140. BURRELL COLLECTION, GLASGOW, SCOTLAND/© CULTURE AND SPORT GLASGOW (MUSEUMS)/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

The example from the Sutton Hoo ship burial, from c. 625, was probably made of lime wood covered both inside and out with leather and was approximately thirty-eight inches (96.5 centimeters) in diameter. It had a highly decorated boss made from iron and gilt bronze, its rim was protected with a bronze strip, and it was decorated with applied gilt bronze plaques.

The Bayeux Tapestry shows two types of shield in use by the later eleventh century. The first, and more common type, was used primarily by the cavalry but also carried by the infantry, was "kite-" or teardrop-shaped with a distinctive rounded top and long tapering form. Most appear to have a simple boss on the front and some are decorated. On the inside were two vertical straps, called "enarmes" probably made of leather; the left arm was inserted through the first and the shield held by the second. These were held in place by four fastenings, the heads

of which were usually decorative. A strap, called a "guige" was used to hang the shield over the left side of the body when not in use. Less common, and used exclusively by infantry, was a deeply convex circular shield with a central boss. Some examples appear to have been reinforced with radial strips of iron or leather and most seem to have a decorative outer rim again possibly of iron.

The kite-shaped shield remained in use until the middle of the thirteenth century, although it was shortened, the top flattened and the overall shape became more triangular. During the second half of the thirteenth century it was reduced in size while the sides became slightly convex and this smaller triangular shield is today often called the "heater shield" because of its similarity in shape to the bottom of a flatiron. Made from thin wood, often with an applied layer of canvas covered with leather, the shield was used to display the bearer's coat of arms. Few examples survive but that of Edward the Black Prince, who died in 1376, still hangs in Canterbury Cathedral. Made from poplar, it measures nearly twenty-nine inches (73 centimeters) in length and some twenty-three inches (59 centimeters) wide and is covered with canvas and gesso overlaid with parchment and leather, and the front is decorated with the prince's arms. An earlier example, dated to the early thirteenth century, survives in Sitten Museum in Switzerland and still retains a pad for the arm, the enarmes and guige. It is painted blue and decorated with a gold-painted eagle of leather and gesso. From the end of the fourteenth century the right-hand top corner was often cut away to form a notch (*bouche*) that served as a support for the couched lance.

Shields continued to be used through the fourteenth century, but by the early decades of the fifteenth century were becoming less used by the cavalry and knights. However, the infantry continued to use a small round shield, called a buckler. This was usually very small, on the order of twelve inches (30 centimeters) in diameter, with a central spike and often reinforced with concentric rings of iron. A special form of shield, the "adarga," of heart-shaped form developed in Spain in the thirteenth century and continued in use into the 1700s. A number of

other irregular and characteristic forms of shield were also used especially in eastern Europe and Germany. The so-called "Hungarian" shield was rectangular at the bottom but the upper part extended to form an elongated point with a vertical left-hand edge.

However, though less used on the battlefield, shields continued in use for some types of joust. In particular, a small rectangular shield was frequently hung from a cord to protect the left side of the body.

From the later thirteenth century a type of shield called the *pavise* was developed that went on to be extensively used throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, most notably by crossbowmen, archers, and handgunners. *Pavises* were large, roughly rectangular shields of varying sizes. The largest measured about five feet (1.8 meters) high by two to three feet (60 to 90 centimeters) wide. Weighing more than twenty pounds (8.5 kilograms), these were propped up by a wooden or metal brace



Pavise. Late fifteenth century. Musée National du Moyen Âge, Paris. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

that, when not in use, was stored in a groove made in the face of the shield. Shorter *pavises*, measuring twenty-four to thirty inches (60 to 75 centimeters) high by twelve to eighteen inches (30 to 45 centimeters) wide and weighing less than ten pounds (4 kilograms), could be held in the hands of assistants, called *pavesarii*. When set on the ground, often in long rows, archers could either shoot from behind them or use them as protection between shots. Surviving examples are frequently painted with heraldic or symbolic devices, especially of Germanic or Swiss towns, though they seem to have been used throughout Europe.

As the name suggests, the earliest *pavises*—thought to have originated sometime in the early to mid-thirteenth century—were associated with the northern Italian town of Pavia. However, the first solid evidence for their use in warfare are Florentine regulations issued shortly before the battle of Montaperti in 1260 that demanded the service of all of the town's soldiers, including archers, crossbowmen, and their *pavesarii*. The latter were required to carry their *pavises* near to the crossbowmen and to be ready to use these shields to protect them. When the army was not involved in fighting, the *pavises* were to be carried in the baggage, but the *pavesarii* were also to remain close to it so that they could be retrieved quickly if needed. However, they do not appear elsewhere in Europe until the fourteenth century. During this century and the next one, *pavises* became very popular throughout Europe, as shown by frequent references to them in written documents, illustrations in artistic sources, and extant examples. Yet by the early sixteenth century they had largely disappeared.

Finally, although shields disappeared from the battlefield during the course of the fifteenth century, they retained a ceremonial function. Usually highly decorated to reflect the status of their patron, circular steel shields were carried by various guards across Europe.

[See also Armor, Body; Bayeux Tapestry; Montaperti, Battle of; Tournaments and Jousts; and Weapons, Hand-to-Hand.]

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Robert Douglas Smith

SHIPS, BYZANTINE

From the sixth-century Marzamemi wreck found off North Africa, from a fourth-century wreck at Yassi Ada, and from the seventh-century wreck (remarkably retrieved and preserved) at the same site, we have good ideas of early Byzantine merchant vessels. No such remains have been found, however, for military vessels. Our sketchy knowledge of them is provided only by textual references and some crude graphic representations. Moreover, for a civilization that lasted some eleven centuries, changes clearly occurred in both commercial and military design, with inevitable influence of foreign types in the late period.

For the early Byzantine (late Roman) and middle Byzantine periods, naval manuals and historical and administrative texts contain a confusing and overlapping range of terminology. The two basic types of warships identified are the *dromonion* or *dromon*, and the *chelandion*. However distinctive they may have been originally, they gradually merged into one type of ship, which was built in various sizes. Another vessel type, called *ousiakon* or *pamphylos*, was a heavily manned warship (a "ship of the line") or troop transport. Still another type was the light *galea*. The *dromon* was the basic Byzantine warship. Designed for speed, as its name ("racer") implies, it reduced the old Roman trireme, with its three banks of rowers, to single-bank construction, with enhanced sail power (probably partly of lateen type) carried on up to three masts. The average length was between 120 and 160 feet. Most *dromons* had a *xylocastron*, a wooden tower at the bow from which missiles were launched. In larger ships, another

platform amidships held mechanisms for projecting the dread "secret weapon" of the middle Byzantine period, the combustible "Greek fire" (*pyr thalassion*). According to size, ships might be equipped for ramming and grappling tactics. All carried signal flags for coordinated operations.

[See also Byzantine Empire; Greek Fire; Naval Combat and Tactics; Sea Power; and Ships and Sailing.]

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John W. Barker


SHIPS AND SAILING

From late antiquity until the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries one of the most obvious features of ship design and ship handling, in the areas covered by this encyclopedia, was that a different tradition existed in northern waters and the Atlantic coasts of western Europe from that in the Mediterranean. Ship types in the Mediterranean, especially the larger examples and those most likely to be involved in war at sea, were derived from the galleys of the Greeks and the Romans. In northern waters, there was no such clear ancestry. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries these competing traditions eventually drew closer together, leading to the development of the full-rigged galleons of the sixteenth century and the concurrent great expansion of ocean navigation by Europeans. During this period, any vessel might find itself pressed into use in a sea battle: only at the very end of our period is there evidence of the emergence of warships as a separate class with no

expectation that they would be used for commercial purposes.

Northern Ships. Although it is very likely that, during the period of Roman domination, most ships used along the coasts of the Channel, whether trading ships or those transporting troops and officials from other parts of the empire, were very similar to the ships found in *Mare Nostrum* (our sea, the Mediterranean) these vessels had little influence on the design of those used by the Northmen or Vikings. These sea raiders, coming originally from Scandinavia, expanded their sphere of influence as Roman power faded, eventually establishing themselves in many parts of the British Isles and northern France. The evidence for the design of their ships and the way in which they were crewed and handled is strong; complete vessels have been excavated at burial sites (e.g., the Nydam ship c. 400, the Oseberg ship c. 800, and the Gokstad ship c. 850), or underwater (e.g., the Skuldelev ships c. 1000). There is other material and iconographical evidence (e.g., the ships shown in the Bayeux Tapestry c. 1080), and there are mentions in poetry and saga literature.

These vessels were long in relation to their beam (maximum breadth), with a relatively low freeboard; both stem and stern posts were curved, rising above the level of the main part of the boat and sometimes decorated with carved dragon or snake heads. There was a single mast stepped amidships, which supported a single square hempen sail suspended from a sailyard, centrally attached to the mast. The ships could also be easily rowed, something that would have been common in battle or when maneuvering near the shore or in harbor. They were steered by a single side rudder near the stern, usually on the starboard (right-hand) side. These vessels were eminently seaworthy and well capable of voyages across the Atlantic to Iceland, Greenland, and Newfoundland (the Vinland of the sagas). The size of the crew would be reduced in vessels on trading voyages but could be as many as sixty or seventy on raiding expeditions, while voyages to Iceland or elsewhere with new settlers could entail carrying farm animals, women, children, and large quantities of supplies. The ships were clinker built; that is



Viking Ship. The Gokstad longship, ninth century. VIKING SHIP MUSEUM, OSLO, NORWAY/
THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

to say, the keel and stern and stem posts were first positioned, and the shell of the boat was then built up with the addition of the planking working from the keel upward. These planks overlapped each other with some form of caulking material, often moss or animal hair, laid along the overlap to reduce leakage. The planks were fastened to each other by long nails driven from the outside, with the protruding end inside the hull hammered over a small metal washer or rove. The curvature of the hull planking, especially at the bow and the stern, seems to have been established by experience or simple rules of thumb. There is no evidence of mathematical calculations or the drawing of plans. Frames (ribs) and bracing beams were finally inserted into the hull to give it increased lateral strength. When the ship was ready for launching, the hull was painted and treated with pitch or pine resin to provide a protective waterproof coating.

Cogships. These basic techniques were also used in the building of cogships. By the fourteenth century this was the dominant ship type for all kinds of middle- to long-distance voyages, whether military or commercial, in northern waters. They had a much larger ratio of beam to length than the Viking longships, giving them a profile much like a walnut shell.

The cog also had a much greater freeboard than a long ship. (The Bremen cog measured 20.5 feet [6.25 meters] from keel to gunwale [the topmost side-plank] while the Gokstad longship measured only 6.2 feet [1.9 meters]). This allowed for a much increased cargo-carrying capacity and greater stability but also made it impossible to row a cog. The design allowed a sternpost rudder to be adopted gradually in place of the side rudder, while upper works (castles) were also incorporated into the hull during the fourteenth century to provide better accommodation for elite passengers and ships' masters, and raised fighting platforms if a vessel was involved in warfare. A top castle was also fitted to the masthead, from which missiles could be thrown.


Cogs are shown in many medieval illuminated manuscripts and on the seals of seaport towns and have also been excavated; the best-known example is probably the cog found at Bremen in 1962, 78.7 feet (24 meters) long and 26.2 feet (8 meters) in the beam, built about 1380. This vessel was wrecked, perhaps in a flood in the river Weser, while under construction. Its first four strakes (planks of the bottom and sides) were laid edge to edge, giving the vessel a flat bottom, useful in harbors left dry at low tide and in shallow anchorages. The remainder of

the hull was clinker built. Cogs were true sailing vessels, although their single square sail could only be trimmed to allow them to sail before the wind or on a broad reach (at an angle of c. 70° to the wind). Vessels with both oars and sails, much on the pattern of Viking ships, continued to be built but were used mostly in inshore waters. There were also ships called balingers which seem to have combined oars and sails for the sake of speed, sometimes as passenger craft and sometimes as pirate ships. Both cogs and oared balingers varied considerably in hull size; this was measured in "tuns," that is the number of wine casks (or their equivalent) with which it was estimated a ship could be loaded. Cogs varied between 30 and 400 tuns, although most were around 70–120 tuns. Balingers were seldom larger than 120 tuns, with the smallest around 20 tuns.

Ships in the Mediterranean. In Greek and Roman times, ships were constructed on the shell-first principle with planking flush laid, that is, without the overlap characteristic of clinker building. The planks were joined to one another with mortise-and-tenon joints, a system that required a high degree of woodworking skill. Some time during the seventh century this system was gradually

abandoned in favor of the frame-first system with carvel (flush-laid) planking. The excavated wreck known as the Yassi Ada ship exemplifies this transition. Another underwater excavation, that of the Serçe Liman vessel, found off the Aegean coast of Turkey, dating from circa 1025, revealed a ship that had the keel, the stem and stern posts, two full frames, and the floor timbers in place when planking began. Caulking material was forced into the seams between the planks, which were nailed to the frames. This method of construction was the standard one used throughout the region.

Galleys. Many vessels were of the galley type, long in proportion to the beam with large crews of oarsmen. These were the ships associated with the trading cities of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, used for trade in high-value goods and capable of sustaining a regular service on well-known trade routes. They were equally effective as warships. In a favorable wind they sailed well, with two or three masts carrying large lateen sails (triangular sails attached to a yard along their long side). The oars were arranged differently from those of galleys in classical times, when the rowers sat at different levels. The usual system, from at least circa 1290, was that there were



Cogship and Galleys. A group of crusaders prepare to depart. Illustration from MS Fr 4276, fol. 6. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

three oarsmen on each rowing bench operating oars of different lengths. The galley men were not slaves or convicts at this time but free and well-paid volunteers who fought as marines or crossbowmen if the vessel were attacked. These galleys did not have rams, but they did have beaks at the bow above the water level, which could be used during the boarding of an opponent. They also had two side rudders (near the stern) until around the mid-fourteenth century and usually a pavilion at the stern for the master and other officers. Cargo space was limited in the shallow hulls, although passengers (often pilgrims to the Holy Land) were sometimes accommodated in the noisome space beneath the deck. Venetian galleys were usually around 125 feet (38 meters) long on the deck.

The frame-first method of construction demanded that the shipwright be able to calculate in advance the form of the frames needed, at different points of the ship's hull, to achieve the desired profile. Perhaps because of this requirement or because shipbuilders in this region were increasingly literate and relied less than northern shipwrights on rules of thumb and experience to design hulls, Venetian shipbuilding manuals survive from the early fifteenth century, some illustrated with technical drawings. Accounts from earlier periods also survive, such as those relating to galleys built in Barcelona for the Crown of Aragon and in Marseille for the House of Anjou.

Round or Sailing Ships. Round or sailing ships developed in the Mediterranean at the same time as the galleys. The carvel system of building the hull was used with twin side rudders. The ships were rigged with lateen sails on one or two masts according to the size of the vessel, which tended to increase markedly after the First Crusade, with the growing demand for pilgrim and military transports. These vessels were also used for trade in bulky cargoes, such as salt or alum, ill suited to the galleys with their limited cargo capacity. In the fifteenth century, these ships varied in size from around 120 to 600 tons. Local coasting traders and fishing boats abounded, often showing features designed to cope with local conditions, such as the need to beach a vessel rather than coming alongside a quay.

Changes in Hulls and Rigging in the Later Middle Ages. According to the Florentine chronicler Giovanni Villani, a cog from northern waters (probably from the Basque country around Bayonne), was seen in the Mediterranean for the first time in 1304. Italian and Spanish shipwrights were intrigued by its sternpost rudder and could see its advantages for use in the large round ships being built in this area at this time. This linking of a fundamental change in the design of southern sailing vessels and gradually of galleys too, to a particular voyage, is probably an oversimplification, but there is no doubt that by the end of the fourteenth century the side rudder was seldom seen on the larger Mediterranean ships. Similarly Genoa began to use large sailing ships known as carracks on trading voyages to northern waters. These were much larger than most cogs (c. 500 to 600 tons), and often had two masts with lateen sails.

Northern shipwrights were slow to adopt the carvel method of hull construction that had allowed these vessels to be built. It was probably not until at least the last quarter of the fifteenth century that carvel hull construction began to dominate in English and Flemish shipyards. Changes in rig, however, were adopted more quickly and show a mingling of the two formerly separate traditions. At first two, then three masts became common. The aftermost (mizzen) mast often carried a small lateen sail, while the mainmast carried a large square one. The foremast might be rigged in either style, although a smaller square sail was most common until the sixteenth century. A topmast and top-sail could then be added above the main sail, until the full-rigged ship of the later sixteenth century became the norm.

The fusion of northern and southern styles of building resulted in a great improvement in the "seakindness" and sailing qualities of the ships. Controlling side rudders on some of the large ships built in the late thirteenth century must have presented great difficulties to the crew. Lateen-rigged ships could sail closer to the wind than those with one square sail, but tacking such a sail required a large crew and took some time since the sail had to be furled, the

yard raised to the vertical, and both sail and yard "walked" around the mast to the other side of the ship. The yard then had to be repositioned and the sail unfurled. The yard of a square sail was merely braced on the other side of the ship to accommodate the shift in the direction of the wind relative to the ship's direction of sailing. Similarly, if it was necessary to reduce sail in bad weather, a square sail could be reefed (shortened) by tying up reefing points or by removing a section (the so-called bonnet) from the foot of the sail. Both methods are clearly visible in many contemporary drawings. A lateen sail had to be lowered and a smaller one lashed to the yard in its place. On the other hand, carvel building allowed for much greater flexibility in hull design and made it feasible to build larger vessels. Clinker building for anything other than small boats had run into a technical dead end in the early fifteenth century when Henry V of England's *Grace Dieu* (fourteen hundred tons capacity) was built with cumbersome and costly "three skin" clinker planking. This required very large quantities of high-quality timber and could not be adapted for more precise and seaworthy hull forms that could be achieved in the frame-first technique.

A further driver of change in ship design also began to make its influence felt in the closing decades of the fifteenth century. Cannon had been used on ships for some time, usually firing over the rail amidships, or from the fore- or aftercastles. Placing guns on more than one deck firing through gunports meant both that the hull must accommodate these openings (more or less impossible in a clinker-built ship) and that the ship must be sufficiently maneuverable in battle to be able to bring its guns to bear on the enemy. This was possible for a full-rigged sailing ship in the sixteenth century provided there was adequate wind. The large war galleys of Mediterranean powers like Venice could be maneuvered by their oarsmen in most wind conditions. These vessels, however, could only carry a small number of large guns stationed on the prow firing over the bows. The presence of the oarsmen and the need to allow room for the recoil of the cannon precluded placing guns in any

other position. To most mariners and naval commanders, by the sixteenth century commercial and military advantage lay with fully rigged sailing vessels of the most up-to-date hull design. Local variations in design continued for the workaday boats of fisherman and coastal traders, but warships and others capable of long-distance voyages showed similar characteristics throughout European waters.

[See also *Naval Combat and Tactics* and *Navigational Technology*.]

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Susan Rose

SHREWSBURY, BATTLE OF

The battle of Shrewsbury (21 July 1403) was rooted in the revolution of 1399 that deposed Richard II. Sir Henry Percy's army mustered in the late king's name, and although Percy, known as "Hotspur," was accused of an attempted regicide in his own interest, that revolution remains key to patterns of participation. Thomas Walsingham's narrative of the battle, written through a classical prism, influenced later readings, including Shakespeare's *Henry IV*. Yet this was a hurried campaign, with troops hastily assembled, and a battle bitterly fought between small but unequal forces.

After Humbleton Hill the military focus had shifted to the Welsh march, where several forces were engaged in combating Owain Glyn Dŵr. The largest was at Shrewsbury, under the nominal leadership of the young Henry, Prince of Wales, but Hotspur, justice of Chester since 1399, also disposed of forces and garrisons in the northwest. The rebellion was planned in collusion with his father, Henry, Earl of Northumberland, but Hotspur returned to Chester on 9 July with only a small company from the family's northern estates. Henry IV had news of the conspiracy at Leicester on 12 July en route north with his household. The decision to immediately confront Hotspur, without waiting to raise a substantial royal army, was a tactical gamble credited to the advice of George Dunbar, the Scottish Earl of March.

Walsingham's allusive narrative focuses on Burton-upon-Trent, casting the borough, as it were, as "Burton-on-Rubicon," although most of the preparations were undertaken in Lichfield. Royal agents drew in retainers, estate officials, and tenants from Lancastrian estates in the Midlands. Hotspur's men rode the same routes; one was arrested at Twywell in Northamptonshire. The prince's army at Shrewsbury fragmented in conflicting loyalties, Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, and many others joining the earl's nephew, Hotspur.

The king's gamble was successful and, although Hotspur was able to choose the field, a short ridge above open fields planted with peas to the north of the town, the royal army was larger and better

organized, with a substantially greater number of knights. This reading is confirmed by the fact that, despite Percy's bloody defeat, it was the king's army that sustained the greatest number of named casualties. These were two incipient armies, perhaps fewer than ten thousand men, many without experience, stiffened by seasoned soldiery, but probably beyond control after the first contact. Not surprisingly, the battle itself lasted a mere two hours. An initial archery duel induced panic on both sides. The king's left flank broke and fled, but his forces rallied under Prince Henry, later seriously wounded in the face, and counterattacked their pursuers, a lesson that reached martial manuals such as *Le Jouvencel*. At this point Hotspur, together with the captured Archibald IV, Earl Douglas, sought to snatch a dramatic victory, abandoning the ridge in an attempt to kill the king. Edmund, Earl of Stafford, was killed in his defense and Douglas lost a testicle. Hotspur's death signaled the final collapse, and his army broke up in flight northwards. The two thousand dead were collected inside a specially dug enclosure, which later became the site of a memorial college.

[See also Henry V of England and Glyn Dŵr, Owain.]

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Philip Morgan

SICILIAN VESPERS, THE

"The Sicilian Vespers" is the name given to the revolt that occurred in Palermo, Sicily, on 30 March 1282 against Charles of Anjou, who had ruled Naples and Sicily since 1266, and his army. This uprising, which quickly expanded to include all of Sicily, was the

beginning of the struggle between the Angevins and the Aragonese for the possession of Sicily. The conclusion of this struggle marked the separation of the island of Sicily from the Kingdom of Sicily and the birth of a new political order in southern Italy.

Origin of the Revolt. The origin of the revolt can be found in the conflict between the Hohenstaufen on one side and the pope and Charles on the other. After his victories at Benevento (1266) and Tagliacozzo (1268) against Manfred and Conradin, Charles remained the undisputed ruler of the Kingdom of Sicily, which included much of southern Italy.

Left largely free by the pope, Charles took advantage of this autonomy and used his authority decisively, setting every papal caution aside. He condemned Conradin and many of his officials to death in a show trial in 1268, and he created a detailed survey plan to expropriate the estates and property of many Ghibellines, passing them to those loyal to him. He similarly replaced bishops and abbots, thus swiftly creating a new ruling class entirely faithful to him.

Charles had a series of objectives, including expansion in Epirus and Achaia and into lands controlled by Byzantium. These objectives gave birth to a massive economic need that drove an increase in taxation. Fiscal oppression was felt particularly in Sicily, in part because the capital had been transferred to Naples, and Sicily was no longer the focus of Charles's attention. Charles had visited the island only once, in 1270–1271, as he was leaving on crusade. Thinking back to the years of Manfred's unpopular government there were those who wrote: "Then you [Manfred] seemed a greedy wolf, now you appear as meek as a lamb."

In the spring of 1282 the Sicilian shipyards were in ferment because of Charles's approaching departure on a crusade against Byzantium and to the Holy Land. His agents scoured the island confiscating grain and livestock in preparation for his departure, causing a great deal of resentment. But the spark that exploded on 30 March lit a fire so fierce that Charles's intended plans were never able to be implemented.

Reading different accounts of the events, one can reconstruct what likely happened in Palermo in front of the Church of the Holy Spirit on 30 March 1282. The people had gathered there to celebrate the Monday after Easter. At one point an Angevin garrison joined in. Some sources report that a French sergeant, Droetto (or Drouet), began to look for hidden weapons, and with this excuse fondled a young bride's breasts. Others report that as the Angevins joined in, drunk, they began making comments about the young bride. All the sources agree that the bride's husband killed the brazen sergeant with a knife.

At this point, when other members of the garrison attempted to avenge their fellow, they were assaulted by the crowd gathered for the feast, who cried, "Death to the French!" All members of the garrison were slain, first with stones, then with swords. As the slaughter took place the bells were sounding vespers.

Nor was the revolt limited to this episode. General dissatisfaction was smoldering, and there were a number of flashpoints in the weeks that followed. Historians are uncertain whether the revolt was a spontaneous one caused by discontent or was a planned rebellion supported by the Aragonese and sponsored by the Byzantines. This latter possibility is supported by the words of the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, who in recalling the uprising that prevented an Angevin expedition against him, wrote in his autobiography: "If I should dare to claim that I was God's instrument to bring freedom to the Sicilians, then I should only be stating the truth."

Most probably all these factors came together to promote the revolt. In any case the people of Palermo immediately rose up against their occupiers, and the streets saw many massacres. The rebels sought out the French in taverns and in homes, and they spared no one, not even women or children. Even Sicilian women who had married the French shared their husbands' fate. Friars from convents that were suspected of having Angevin refugees were seized and forced to say a word in the Sicilian dialect (*ciciri*) unpronounceable by the French. Those who were

unable to pronounce the word properly were killed on the spot.

Only a very few, including the justiciar Jean de Saint-Rémy (who had been wounded in the face during a skirmish), managed to take refuge in the castle of Vicari. During this one night alone, the rebels who had seized the city killed approximately two to three thousand of the French in Palermo. The Angevin flag was replaced with the imperial eagle, which the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II had given to Palermo.

At this point the rioters met with representatives of the guilds and decided to form a municipal government. They chose a captain, Roger Mastrangelo, and other representatives such as Henry Baverio, Nicholas of Ortoleva, and Nicholas of Ebdemonia.

The next day the newly born commune, headed by its representatives, organized an expedition to the castle of Vicari, where the justiciar had taken refuge along with others who had escaped the slaughter. The Angevin garrison was too small to resist, and thus the justiciar offered to surrender on the condition that they be allowed to sail for Provence. During the negotiations, however, he was shot with an arrow, and this began an assault in which all the occupants of the castle perished.

In the following days, news came to Palermo of similar uprisings throughout the island. On 3 April the captain of Corleone—the first town to rebel after Palermo—proposed to coordinate forces by sending troops to Trapani, Caltanissetta, and Messina. At the sight of the rebels, all the French either fled or were killed. Only the vice justiciar of western Sicily, William Porcelet, who had a reputation for honesty, was spared: he was escorted with his family to Palermo, where he embarked for Provence.

After fifteen days only Messina remained under Angevin rule. The powerful garrison led by Erbert d'Orléans and the fleet in the bay were not vulnerable to attack. Moreover the principal family of the city supported Charles. An opportunity opened up at the end of April, however, when Erbert, who no longer trusted Messina, wanted to send a French contingent to Taormina. This lack of trust provoked a reaction from the people of Messina, who burned

the fleet and elected Bartolomeo Maniscalco as their captain.

Papal Involvement. At the height of the revolt the representatives of the new municipalities decided to send an embassy to Pope Martin IV. They wanted to place Sicily under papal jurisdiction, hoping that Sicilian towns could enjoy the same political autonomy that the city of Perugia had—that is, as a free municipality under direct papal sovereignty.

Giovanni Villani reports that when the Sicilian deputy greeted the pope with a triple *Agnus Dei*—"Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world, have mercy on us"—the pope replied caustically by quoting Scripture three times: "'Hail, King of the Jews!' And then they slapped him." The pope offered no other reply.

The pope's alliance with Charles, as well as reports of dangerous Sicilian alliances with both the Aragonese and Byzantium, meant that the pope could not accept the proposal, although some of the arguments of the rebels were certainly understandable. Charles's fiscal policy had been far harsher than that of the Hohenstaufen. Moreover, with Sicily downgraded to a mere province, Sicilian outrage was understandable, especially because the regular meetings held to monitor the conduct of the justiciars no longer took place—as the very same pope was to lament in 1285.

Martin IV's refusal to grant the municipal autonomy of Sicilian towns had the effect of pushing the rebels to contact Pedro III of Aragon, who, having married Manfred's daughter, claimed Sicily in the name of the Hohenstaufen family. The causes of the rivalry that opposed Charles to Pedro were multiple. Provence had been under Aragonese domination for some time before the Angevins inherited the county, and the merchants of Barcelona who aspired to trafficking in North Africa did not appreciate Charles's sovereignty over Tunis. A few weeks after the vespers, Pedro sailed from the port of Barcelona with a large fleet whose declared aim was to undertake a crusade against the king of Tunis. In fact the fleet quickly turned toward Palermo, where the Sicilian parliament welcomed the proposals of the ambassadors to invite Pedro to assume the crown of Sicily.

Thus Pedro, after entering the port of Trapani in August, was greeted triumphantly in Palermo in September.

The war between the Aragonese and the Angevins continued for some twenty years, even after the deaths in 1285 of both Pedro and Charles, and included important engagements such as the battle of Naples (5 June 1284), during which Charles's son the future Charles II of Naples was captured by Ruggiero di Lauria. The conflict ended in 1302 with the Peace of Caltabellotta, by which the Kingdom of Sicily was divided: the island of Sicily, now called the Kingdom of Trinacria, was ruled by Pedro's son Frederick of Aragon, and the part of the kingdom in southern Italy, now called the Kingdom of Naples or, still, the Kingdom of Sicily, was ruled by Charles II.

[See also Charles of Anjou and Italy, subentry on Narrative (1000–1300).]

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Federico Canaccini

SIEGE WARFARE

[This entry contains two subentries, on Byzantine siege warfare and on the tactics and technology of siege warfare.]

Byzantine

Sieges were a dominant reality of Byzantine warfare. Constantinople itself was subjected to numerous sieges, including those by the Avars (626), Arabs

(717–718), crusaders (1204), and Ottomans (1453). Notable offensive Byzantine sieges included those of Candax on Crete (961), Tarsos (965), and Antioch (968) in the tenth century. Sieges are described by historians, occasionally drawing on earlier texts, and in military manuals—both those inherited from classical antiquity and those written by the Byzantines. Until the development of the cannon, classical methods of siege warfare remained relevant, although they did add new devices and techniques. In offensive operations the Byzantine manuals particularly emphasize the value, where possible, of using starvation, ruses, and offers of light terms for surrender to reduce danger and loss of life. When this is not possible the manuals recommend a typical sequence including securing the siege camp and sources of supplies, careful reconnaissance of the topography, constant harassment using the army in relays, and use of ladders, battering rams, siege shelters for tunneling, stone-throwing machines and incendiaries, and siege towers. Among the specifically Byzantine weapons is a hand-held device for projecting Greek fire, said by the emperor Leo VI to have been invented during his reign (886–912), and a light siege shed woven from willow branches called the *laisa*. Notably the general Nikephoros Ouranos in his *Taktika* (c. 1000) says that while his contemporaries have tried various devices recommended by the ancients, the most effective is tunneling. This typically involved use of wooden props in the area under a wall or wall tower that were eventually ignited to cause a collapse. The primary stone-thrower was the rope-pulled trebuchet, used to drive the defenders from the battlements, and the more powerful counterweight trebuchet, introduced in the twelfth century.

Methods of siege defense are articulated in detail in the tenth-century treatise *De obsidione toleranda*. There the defending general is told to employ various measures: secure supplies in warehouses and control their distribution; evacuate noncombatants; organize the workforce, particularly the arms manufacturers; store needed raw materials; fill the cisterns; restore any deteriorated portions of the walls and secure any tunnels; widen moats and

place sharp stakes in them; spread caltrops; hang bells on the walls to serve as an early warning system; announce harsh penalties for deserters; organize and train the soldiers; stock the battlements with various items (stones, beams, sharp stakes, incendiaries, human excrement) to counter enemy siege shelters and rams; remove anything outside that might be helpful to the enemy; poison external water supplies; make careful use of sorties and make careful provision for readmission of those carrying them out.

Examples of narrative siege descriptions by Byzantine authors include Prokopios on the Gothic siege of Rome (537/38), in which the Goths used four siege towers; Agathias on Narses' siege of Cumae (552/53), with a description of a sapping operation; the *Miracles of St. Demetrius* on the Avaro-Slav siege of Thessalonike (possibly 586 or 597) describing what are presumably trebuchets, as well as rams and siege sheds; John Kameniates on the Arab siege of Thessalonike (904), with siege towers on ships; and Anna Komnene on the Norman siege of Dyrrachium (1107–1108) with a ram-tortoise, sapping operation, and siege tower.

[See also Castles; Fortifications, *subentries* on Overview and Byzantine Fortifications and Building Techniques; Greek Fire; Hand-to-Hand Combat; and Weapons.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

Tactics and Technology

For all the impressive innovations in defensive design and attack weaponry, siege warfare changed remarkably little over the Middle Ages. Whether castles were constructed as wooden motte and bailey, concentric stone, or late medieval pentagonal forts with bastions, and while weapons deployed ranged from simple projectile-launching machines through the counterweight trebuchet to the advent of gunpowder artillery, the basic methods and principles of attack and defense remained constant.

Strongholds and Strategy. The central importance of sieges in medieval warfare cannot be overstressed; this importance can only be understood by placing sieges in their military context. Wars were fought for the control of land and land was controlled by fortresses; thus, military campaigns were centered on the taking and holding of strongholds, whether those were isolated frontier forts or walled towns with a castle within. The physical and symbolic domination of the landscape by castles and walled towns was reinforced by the role of garrisons, and not least by their mounted contingents, for it was cavalry that gave a castle its operational range to protect, enforce, attack, ravage, and forage up to a calculated daily radius of ten miles. Forces in the field could therefore remain vulnerable and exposed if strongholds were not taken. Vast amounts of resources were expended on sieges, in both defensive and offensive preparations: Richard I spent more on Château-Gaillard near the conflict zone on the French border in Normandy than on all his castles together in relatively peaceful England; in besieging Kenilworth in 1266, Henry III utterly exhausted the revenues of ten counties and thereby suffered the second worst financial year of his fifty-five-year reign. The importance of sieges can also be gauged by the time spent on many of them: Château-Gaillard (1203–1204) lasted six months, Milan (1161–1162) ten months, and Montreuil-Bellay (1149–1151) some three years.

Battles could prove decisive, as Hastings (1066), Bouvines (1214), and Bosworth (1485) show; but for all their drama, their successes were more likely to

be short-lived: England won all the major battles of the first century of the Hundred Years' War—Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), Najera (1367), and Agincourt (1415)—but ultimately lost the conflict by the mid-fifteenth century because French forces besieged and took English strongholds in sustained and methodical offensives. Sieges were far more common than battles, the latter themselves frequently arising from siege situations as relief forces marched to the stronghold to break the investiture, as happened at the battles of Lincoln (1217) and Castillon (1453), the latter tellingly an engagement that effectively marked the end of the Hundred Years' War. Medieval commanders who actually sought battles might undertake sieges with the sole intent of provoking a full-scale field engagement; such was the thinking behind Edward III's sieges at Tournai (1340) and Calais (1346–1347).

The image of siege warfare naturally tends to be one of static, localized action, but in reality the medieval commander's focus on sieges often led to highly mobilized warfare in the form of troop movements and forced marches. Army movements on campaign were typically dictated by the location of castles, pressed by the need to besiege or relieve them, to increase the size of field armies from the castle's garrison or to reinforce the garrison's numbers, to take refuge, or to collect weapons and supplies. The greatest impact of sieges on rapid troop movements came from two pressures: relief columns marching to the siege, often prompting the besiegers to take flight hastily; and diversionary tactics, usually in the form of aggressively ravaging territory belonging to the besiegers' commanders with the intention of drawing them away from the stronghold to defend their own lands. Both factors were common features during the 1216–1217 war in England, for example. Unsurprisingly, contemporary chroniclers of medieval wars habitually recorded campaigns chiefly as a succession of sieges.

Initial Actions. The dominance of sieges in warfare beginning in ancient times saw the development of established and even formalized procedures and conventions in medieval siege situations. However, if a stronghold was unprepared it might be

subjected to a sudden attack, obviating the need for a siege: in 1221, Fotheringay Castle's skeleton garrison was overwhelmed by an opportunistic escalade. A full, lengthy siege usually underwent various stages. When an enemy force came before the walls of a stronghold, the first recourse was usually to negotiations in the hope that this would save time, lives, and money. A garrison that came to early terms would be allowed to leave the castle unharmed, often being permitted to take their personal arms and equipment with them. A truce might be arranged stipulating that should a relief force fail to come to the aid of the castle within a determined time, the garrison would hand over possession without resistance. At Bedford Castle in 1215, the garrison surrendered when a seven-day truce expired with no sign of aid forthcoming; at Wark in 1173, a forty-day truce gave sufficient time for a relief force to appear on the scene. To counter the threat of precipitous capitulation, garrison commanders were threatened with execution for treason against their lord if they delivered up a stronghold too readily. In 1453 the Duke of Norfolk wrote: "It has been seen in many realms and lordships that for the loss of towns or castles without siege, the captains that have lost them have been dead and beheaded."

A siege would formally open with a shot from a siege engine or cannon. Storming and escalade—scaling the walls with ladders—were commonly the first tactics employed by a besieging general in the hope of bringing about a rapid conclusion. If those tactics were successful, the initially heavy casualties normally incurred by the attacker could be offset against the prospect of a lengthy siege with its concomitant dangers of disease, famine, logistical problems, desertions, and relief armies. Crusaders took Béziers in 1209 within hours of setting up camp, forcing their way through the city's gates; Robert Bruce took Perth in 1312 under the cover of night. Subterfuge was also pursued: in 1098 Antioch fell to the crusaders through treachery.

Bombardment and Mining. The next stage was ushered in by an artillery barrage and assault from siege machines: mangonels, trebuchets, balistae, siege towers, battering rams, and, by the



Siege of Jerusalem, 1099. A group of crusaders storm and escalate Jerusalem's walls. Woodcut in *Historia itineris contra Turcos* by Robert of Rheims, c. 1486. PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

mid-fourteenth century, cannon. These were deployed mainly to cause breaches in the walls or even a collapse, but some were also used as antipersonnel weapons. Siege towers were large wooden towers moved on wheels up to a stronghold's wall. This usually necessitated filling in a section of the surrounding ditch first, a hazardous task that might be rewarded with bonus payment, as on the Third Crusade (when even bodies are recorded as being used as fill). The lower levels of the tower afforded protection for miners operating at the base of the wall, while from the top archers could shoot down onto the battlements and a bridge could be lowered, allowing troops to cross onto the wall. This was

the deciding factor in the fall of Jerusalem in 1099. Understandably, given the dangers, tower duty was not popular: in addition to a concentrated defensive counterbarrage of arrows and missiles, the towers were often unstable and had an unnerving propensity to collapse or topple. To lessen the threat of fire, the structure would be covered in hides, sometimes soaked in vinegar. Siege towers, nevertheless, were highly effective weapons and thus were often the target of sorties by garrisons. At the siege of Bedford in 1224 siege towers looked down into the castle and were able to lay down a highly effective barrage, forcing the defenders into cover. Henry V's French campaign of 1415 transported them in sections in his train, ready for quick assembly. Such was the importance of siege towers that during the Third Crusade, for example, that ships from a relief fleet were dismantled to provide wood for them.

Synonymous vocabulary for siege weapons makes an accurate record of their development difficult, especially before the late medieval period. Contemporary chroniclers employed the term *ballista* for various projectile machines. A ballista is generally taken to be a large catapult, like a crossbow, that shoots huge bolts, with force created by a winch. A mangonel was also a form of ballista. This hurled stones on a relatively low trajectory from a wooden arm shaped like a spoon; operating on the torsion principle, it released a rock when the beam shot up and struck a padded crossbeam.

The largest petrary (stone thrower) of all was the trebuchet, the heavy artillery of the pre-gunpowder era. This consisted of a huge beam pivoted on an axle: at one end was a heavy counterweight and at the other a sling to hold a projectile flung on a high trajectory. Before the counterweight trebuchet appeared in numbers by the end of the twelfth century, the force was provided by traction from a group of men (or women) pulling down explosively on ropes attached to the beam. They were highly efficient machines. The most powerful trebuchets could launch rocks weighing over a ton; in practice, they would hurl anything over the walls at the defenders, including dead animals to spread disease and severed heads of prisoners to demoralize the enemy.


Sobriquets were given to these machines, such as "Warwolf" and "Bad Neighbor." The trebuchet still attracts much modern research, not least because it is regarded as a rare medieval innovation in siege warfare.

Cannon slowly replaced the trebuchet after their arrival on the scene in the early fourteenth century, the earliest depictions being from 1326–1327. Originally a device consisting of a vase-shaped chamber, it soon evolved into the familiar cylindrical shape. These early cannons were deployed on the battlefield, but rather ineffectively; their predominant use was in sieges. Built on the sometimes hazardous principle that bigger is better, by the mid-fifteenth century cannon such as "Dulle Griete" from Ghent weighed thirty-six hundred pounds. Cannon worked best in batteries, which could be afforded by only the wealthiest leaders. Initially many strongholds could not hold against them: French sieges against the English in 1449–1450 notched some sixty victories in succession, largely due to their extensive use of cannon. In 1442 Dax held out against the French for only three weeks. However, such rapid outcomes must be treated with caution because there may also have been political reasons for many swift capitulations. Trebuchets could also bring a siege quickly to a conclusion: in the 1235 conquest of Ibiza ten stones were sufficient to force one stronghold to surrender. Trebuchets were still used effectively in action as late as the sieges of Burgos in 1475–1476.

Such weapons were not the exclusive preserve of the attacker. Castles were increasingly designed to accommodate machines of their own: in the late thirteenth century Roger Bigod hired a military engineer to advise him on the placing of catapults on four of his towers at Chepstow Castle. In 1266 at Kenilworth stones hurled from both sides are said to have collided in midair. At the siege of Crema in 1159, Frederick Barbarossa tied hostages to his siege tower as a human shield against the town's mangonels; the garrison continued with its barrage. Fortifications themselves became thicker and lower to counter artillery fire, with increased scarping to deflect shot: castles were either modified

with artillery bastions as at Kalmar in Sweden and Kyrenia in Cyprus; evolved through a transitional stage as at Sarzanello and Sassocorvaro in Italy; or were newly built as gun platforms or artillery fortresses, as at Pendennis, St. Mawes, and Deal in England, and Salses in France.

Perhaps the most effective way to take a castle was by mining. Sappers dug under a tower or wall, usually directing their efforts against the foundations of a tower. Wooden timbers supported the roof of the tunnel; when sufficient material had been excavated, these supports were burned away and the tower or section of a wall would collapse, opening a breach that could be stormed or, just as likely,



Besieging a Tower. A "cat" or "sow" (mobile reinforced roof) protects the attackers as they besiege a tower. Illustration from the *Chronicle of France or Chronicle of Saint Denis*, MS Roy 16 G VI, fol. 74, fourteenth century. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

leading to an immediate surrender. King John used the fat from forty pigs to help ignite the timbers under Rochester Castle in 1215, successfully bringing down a tower. Sapping might begin at the very foot of a wall, in which case cover was provided by either "cats" and "sows" (mobile mantlets or reinforced roofs) or by a long, protected gallery (as at Château Gaillard in 1203–1204), or it might begin as far out as half a mile, as recorded at Constantinople in 1453. Mines involved sophisticated, major engineering operations undertaken by specialists. They were not always a preferred option because of the time required to execute them, but at Limoges in 1370 a mine was started at the onset of the siege and brought down a section of the defenses in just a week, leading to a successful storm.

In an attempt to detect mines, garrisons would place bowls of water on the battlements: ripples caused by disturbances indicated activity underground. Countermining was employed as another defensive measure, successfully so at Tortona in 1155; countermines also occasionally led to subterranean combats when one mine broke into the other, as reported at Limoges in 1370. Mines were greatly feared by defenders: in 1359 the captain of Cormicy surrendered immediately on being shown the mine excavated under one of his towers.

Blockade and Sack. If all the above measures failed, then a besieger's hope lay in blockade, if he could afford the risks of the time this involved. Blockade was important at any stage, as it prevented a beleaguered garrison from receiving reinforcements and supplies or food; such a major undertaking was not easily achieved, as the crusaders found at Acre (1189–1191). Starvation was a fearful weapon. At Château-Gaillard in 1203–1204 and Rouen in 1418–1419, hundreds of noncombatants were expelled by the garrisons to preserve food stocks; the besiegers refused to let them through their lines, thereby applying psychological and moral pressure on the besieged who were meant to be their defenders. As a result, hundreds died. Cannibalism in such situations is recorded by medieval chroniclers. In 1241 Faenza submitted to Frederick II after an eight-month blockade. As William the Breton wrote in the

early thirteenth-century: "Famine alone vanquishes the invincible and by itself can take cities."

Garrison commanders often attempted to break a siege or blockade by going on the offensive in the form of a sortie (or sally). These were surprise attacks by the garrison on the besieger's camp and represented another important role for the mounted contingent of a garrison. Besiegers needed cavalry not only to counter the threat of a relief army but also to meet the danger of such mounted sorties. In 1213 Simon de Montfort led a spectacularly successful sortie at Muret. However, sorties were risky enterprises that could go just as spectacularly awry: at Taillebourg in 1179, Richard I's troops chased those making the sortie back through the town's gates. Sorties were not always an act of desperation: at Béziers in 1209 the town's garrison decided to take advantage with a sortie as the besiegers set up camp; the result was the same as at Taillebourg.

The consequences for a garrison and inhabitants of a town taken by force were often infamously severe: sack, rape, and massacre were accepted as the price of defeat and permissible under the laws of war according to the rights of the victor. However, the biblical justification for slaughter (Deuteronomy 20:16) rather strains the exegesis, as it stipulates wholesale massacre only for rebellious towns owned by the lord; such massacres were far more likely to occur in foreign territory, such as the one carried out at the fall of Jerusalem in 1099. Gauging the extent of such massacres is difficult to determine, but clearly there was widespread killing at the culmination of many sieges, as at Caen (1417) and Montmorillon (1372). Massacres of garrisons were less likely to take place in the heat of a storm but rather in a more organized manner: when Rougement fell in 1420, its garrison of sixty was drowned in the river Yonne; in 1224 the defeated garrison at Bedford was hung from specially erected gallows. At Limoges in 1370 many noncombatants were slain out of hand, although many of the garrison were granted their lives.

Inhabitants of a defeated town commonly faced expulsion, their homes and property being appropriated by the victor, who often colonized the conquered town with his own people. The evicted

were immediately impoverished: the citizens of Carcassonne expelled in 1209 were cast out with only the clothes that they were wearing; the town itself was saved from destruction because it was wanted as an economic and strategic center for subsequent military operations. One chronicler recalls the refugees from Henry V's success at Harfleur in 1415: "It was a pitiful sight to see the misery of these people as they left their town and belongings behind." The lure of plunder was a vital element in troop recruitment and retention: in 1358 the army of Charles the Dauphin dramatically increased in size when he offered troops the spoils of Paris. At Fronsac in 1451 the English negotiated a surrender so as to avoid a sack; discontented French troops, upset at the loss of booty that this entailed, fabricated an incident that justified their taking and sacking the town. The prospect of women provided another incentive, rape commonly being reported, as at Winchelsea (1380) and Bruges (1382); in 1217 at Lincoln many women drowned trying to escape rape by the troops sacking the city.

The severity of sack was not emphasized only as a punishment but as part of an armory of terror deliberately deployed to cower other potential strongholds of resistance into submission. After the massacre at Béziers in 1209, Carcassonne did not have the heart to resist for long and risk the same consequences. At Moléon in 1381, the Duke of Bourbon offered one chance of surrender to the garrison; if they failed to take it they would all be hung as an example to others who considered resistance. The citizens of Rouen capitulated to Philip Augustus in 1204, not least because they knew that his threats of dire consequences for holding out were not empty ones. When Duke William of Normandy took a fort near Alençon in 1049, the garrison had their feet and hands amputated; the town duly capitulated, as did another fort at Domfront. The excesses witnessed at medieval sieges reflect the importance of taking strongholds: hostages and prisoners were executed barbarously before the eyes of the enemy at Berwick in 1333; ball was played with severed heads at Crema in 1159; at Auberoche in 1344 a messenger from the English garrison was catapulted back over the walls

by the French while still alive. No wonder, then, that negotiation was not only the first recourse at a siege, but the way in which the majority were resolved.

[See also Acre, Siege of; Agincourt, Battle of; Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Bedford, Siege of; Berwick, Sieges of; Bouvines, Battle of; Bruges, Siege of; Caen, Siege of; Calais, Siege of (1346–1347); Carcassonne, Siege of; Castillon, Siege and Battle of; Château-Gaillard, Siege of; Constantinople, *subentry on* Siege of (1453); Crécy, Battle of; Crema, Siege of; Crusader Castles; Faenza, Siege of; Fortifications; Harfleur, Siege of; Hastings, Battle of; Jerusalem, Siege of (1099); Limoges, Siege of; Lincoln, Battle of; Milan, Sieges of; Montreuil-Bellay, Siege of; Muret, Battle of; Nájera, Battle of; Poitiers, Battle of; Rouen, Siege of (1204); Rouen, Siege of (1418–1419); Taillebourg, Battle of; Tournai, Siege of; and Wark, Sieges of.]

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Sean McGlynn

SIGISMUND OF LUXEMBURG

(1368–1437); crowned King of Hungary, 1387; of the Romans, 1410; of Bohemia, 1420; emperor, 1433).

Sigismund has been treated negatively by historians until the late twentieth century, blamed for his severe defeats at the hands of the Ottomans and the Hussites and portrayed as an untalented and

inadequate military leader. He did actually earn some battlefield successes against the Ottoman Turks, holding "the shield of Christendom." However, Sigismund was generally inclined, throughout his long reign, to seek political means to avoid the high cost in blood of facing the Ottoman main army in a pitched battle.

From the early 1390s the southern border regions of Hungary were subject to Ottoman invasions. Key Danube strongholds (including Golubac and Orşova in present-day Serbia and Romania) fell. Sigismund led expeditions against the Ottomans almost annually. When Sultan Bayezid I (1389–1402) started a scheme of systematic conquest, Sigismund realized that only with Western participation could the Ottoman advance be stopped. Although he assembled a substantial crusading host, the Nicopolis campaign (1396) ended in catastrophe due to tactical faults, poor discipline, and lack of unified command. Thereafter Sigismund adopted a defensive policy and created semi-vassal buffer states around Hungary, which were required to raise armies or put their fortifications under Hungarian control but were protected by Hungarian interventions from the assaults of Ottoman-vassal warlords (e.g., in Bosnia, Walachia).

The diet held in Temesvár (Timișoara, Romania) in 1397 effected a complete change in military institutions. Sigismund reorganized the general levy, suspended the "ancient" noble privilege not to wage war in an offensive campaign outside the frontiers, and introduced a new quota system of recruitment in accordance with tenant holdings, the *militia portalis*. "All the gentlemen must rise with us in soldierly fashion," he declared, with their *familiares* (household retainers) well-equipped, when- and wherever the king required. Half of all ecclesiastical revenues were seized for the defense of the frontiers.

Sigismund pushed the frontier further southward, started a fortification-building program, and laid the foundations of fortified border regions (*confinia*), handing over castles, administrative offices, and state revenues to one regional commander, Pipo of Ozora (Filippo Scolari). He raised sufficient financial resources to support the program by leaving

ecclesiastical offices vacant (to tap the revenues of their properties) and mortgaging royal possessions.

Sigismund elaborated a defense scheme in 1432/33 in Siena, partly enacted in the 1435 decree, which stipulated that certain prelates and *ispáns* (sheriffs of counties) be designated to protect definite frontier zones and repel attacks with all the nobles, their *banderia*, and a fixed number of *portalis* archers raised in the county "as long as it may seem necessary."

Sigismund suffered catastrophic defeats in his Bohemian crusades of the 1420s; all imperial crusading hosts sent against the Hussites were crushed, being incapable of doing anything against their superior military technology and tactics. (The Hussites blamed Sigismund for the betrayal of Jan Hus, burned at the stake by the Council of Constance, which Sigismund had convened.) Yet from the early 1430s he won smaller victories and advanced a political solution by making an agreement with the moderate branch of the Hussites.

Sigismund was not a man of war, but an *imperator pacificus*, even though he is the only ruler in fifteenth-century Europe who was constantly on campaign. He spent the years 1426–1428 in the field, near the age of sixty. He managed a two-front struggle from the 1420s along the southern border with the Ottomans and facing Hussite inroads in the north. His bulwarks, garrisoned with regular standing forces, defended Hungary until the 1520s. However, Sigismund should be noted primarily for his diplomatic talent, military legislation, defense organization, and financial management rather than for his chivalric deeds on the battlefield.

[See also Baybars I; Hungary; *Militia Portalis*; Nicopolis, Battle of; and Pipo of Ozora.]

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Attila Bárány

SIGNALS

The signals used in medieval warfare were a relatively unsophisticated combination of visual and audible signs. With no standing armies (with the exception of the military orders) and short campaign seasons, it was impractical for troops to learn complex systems. Yet signals were vital to the conduct of armies at both the strategic and tactical levels.

At the strategic level, signals were primarily to warn of invasion. Used throughout the medieval period, the best recorded system is perhaps that instituted on the south coast of England in 1336, when the government prepared beacons on hill-tops, to be lit if a French raiding force was sighted. Also, churches within twenty miles of the coast were ordered to ring only one bell at services but all of them in the event of a landing. In Spain and Portugal in the thirteenth century, there was a similar system, called the *apellido* (call). This system used both audible signals (such as trumpets, drums, and bells) and visual signals (bonfires) to rally urban militias against raids or invasion.

At the tactical level, signals were generally given audibly with trumpets and visually with banners and were used at all stages of a battle. The sounding of trumpets was used to marshal troops. Jean Froissart (c. 1337–c. 1405) records a number of occasions on which trumpets were blown to signal the men to prepare for battle. At the first call they were

to saddle and prepare their mounts, at the second to arm themselves, and at the third to mount their horses and muster beneath their banners.

The unfurling of banners signaled to the enemy that one was preparing to fight. From the fourteenth century on, it appears that the unfurling of the Oriflamme, the sacred banner of Saint Denis carried by French armies when their king took the field, also signaled that no quarter would be given to the enemy. According to the commentators Enguerrand de Monstrelet (c. 1400–1453) and Jean de Waurin (d. c. 1474), Sir Thomas Erpingham, commanding the English bowmen, opened the battle by throwing his baton into the air and shouting “Now strike,” but it is more usual to read of an engagement being presaged by advancing banners and blaring trumpets.

Banners were used to signal maneuvers during the course of battle. Because the lord and his banner formed the heart of a force, his movement across the field drew the rest of his force after him. At the battle of Mansura during the 1250 crusade of Louis IX, the French king signaled a movement of his entire army to the right by having the royal banner and the Oriflamme moved in that direction. After their victory at Westrozebeke in 1382, the French commanders sounded trumpets to recall their troops to return from the pursuit. Since trumpets were sounded to order both advance and retreat, there must have been distinctive calls for these orders, but those details have been lost.

[See also Banners; Discipline; Fortified Churches; Hundred Years' War, *subentry* on Naval Raids on England; Tactics, Battle; Training; and War Cries.]

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Robert W. Jones

SILISTRA, BATTLE OF

See Dristra, Battle of.

SIT', BATTLE AT THE RIVER

The Sit' is a small river that flows 150 miles to the northeast of Vladimir, along the Novgorodian and Suzdalian frontier, before joining the upper Volga. When the Mongols of the Golden Horde attacked Ryazan in late 1327, Yurii II Vsevolodovich, grand prince of Vladimir-Suzdal (r. 1212–1216, 1218–1238), sent a force under his son Vsevolod to aid the ruler of the town. This detachment was defeated at Kolomna and Ryazan was sacked, and the Mongols next advanced against Vladimir.

Iurii decided to leave his capital, along with his brothers and three of his sons, to recruit troops outside the city. He left behind two of his sons who were charged with the defense of Vladimir. After his departure, which was around 15 January, Iurii would have needed twenty to twenty-two days to reach the river Sit'; he could not have moved very quickly, as he recruited warriors on his way.

Iurii selected a campsite at the Sit' about eighteen miles to the west of the Volga, where that river and the Mologa provided natural defenses. There he waited for aid from Novgorod, and for the Tatar attack. While in the camp, he learned of the fall of the city of Vladimir in mid-February, as well as of the destruction of the other cities of the principality. He should therefore have been ready for an attack by the Mongols, yet the latter, or at least a part of their army, attacked the Russian camp unexpectedly. While Batu Khan with the main Mongol army advanced toward Novgorod, the troops of Burundai, whom he had left behind, attacked the camp at the Sit' on Thursday, 4 March, after Iurii had been there for almost a month. The prince's unpreparedness is hard to explain, but his army retreated and was scattered, having had no chance to win the fight. Archaeological excavations at the battlefield support this. Iurii was killed; one of his sons, Vasilko, was captured, tortured, and executed. The subsequent events are hard to reconstruct.

Iurii's brother, Iaroslav, either did not participate in the battle or escaped. He was the one who continued to rule after reaching an agreement with the Tatars. The histories only relate the deaths of Iurii and Vasilko.

Many chronicles mention the defeat on the Sit'. The *Chronicle of Novgorod* notes that there were many rumors surrounding the circumstances of Iurii's death, but offers no details.

[See also Golden Horde; Kalka, Battle at River; Mongols and Slavic Lands, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300).]

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Marta Font

SKANDERBEG

See Kastrioti, George.

SKOUTATOI

The *skoutatoi* (also *skoutaratoi* or *hoplites*) were the heavy infantry of the Byzantine armed forces, named for their shield (*skouton* or *skoutarion*). The *Strategikon* attributed to the emperor Maurice (c. 600) describes them as trained to fight with shield and "staff" (*bergia*), and to throw the javelin. Their equipment included shields which were to be the same color as that of their unit, spears (*kontaria*), helmets (*kassidia*), slings, darts, cuirass (*zaba*)—at

least for the front two ranks—and greaves for the first and last ranks. In his *Taktika* (c. 905) Leo VI, who indicates that the ancients called them “hoplites,” gives a similar inventory and adds double-edged axes. Nikephoros Phokas in his *Praecepta militaria* (c. 965) uses only the term “hoplites,” whereas Nikephoros Ouranos in his *Taktika* (c. 1000) calls them *skoutaratoi*. Both describe recruitment (under age forty, of large stature, particularly from Armenia) and organization in kinship groups (*kontoubernia*), presumably for unit cohesion, and specify the least expensive armor: knee-length padded tunics (*kabadia*) of cotton or coarse silk, boots, felt caps, as well as swords, axes, slings, shields, and *kontaria* of twelve to fourteen feet, although the issue of length is controversial.

The tenth-century manuals describe the function of the heavy infantry as providing a defensive shield for the cavalry. In a square formation and aided by slingers and archers, the heavy infantry allowed the cavalry to exit and, if defeated, reenter the formation through intervals in the ranks, and would follow up a successful cavalry engagement.

[See also Manuals, Military; Maurice; and Nikephoros II Phokas.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

SLAVERY

The enslavement of captives, especially the abduction of the women and youths of a territory, constitutes a powerful statement of military supremacy. In many preindustrial warrior-centered cultures the acquisition of slaves was synonymous with power and the shaming of vanquished opponents. In this respect, the societies of medieval Europe were no exception. Slave-raiding and slaveholding were

consistently equated with martial prowess, masculinity, virility, and ethnocentrism. Prior to the introduction of chivalric codes, warriors taken in battle were often maimed, or executed within sight of the field of conflict. Such a fate was deemed more honorable than slavery, which carried stigmatizing associations of submission and servility. Moreover, the sources suggest that the real target for ravaging armies was the enslavement of noncombatants from an opponent's territory.

Despite the illusion of a unified Christendom, for much of the period Europe was a politically unstable region ravaged by the war bands of rival territories. Ecclesiastical prohibitions against the enslavement of Christians were largely ignored, and the ethnicity or religious affiliation of captives appears to have been of little concern to the marauding warriors. In actuality, the medieval church had few problems with the institution of slavery, which it regarded as a necessary foundation of social order. Yet, during the late-tenth and early-eleventh centuries, ideals promoted by the increasingly influential ecclesiastical reform movement began to infiltrate into the warrior elites of Europe. The reformers sought to limit violence within Christendom and modify warrior behavior through the introduction of the Peace of God movement and associated chivalric codes of behavior. The nominal adoption of the reformers' codes signaled a revision in the values of the warrior elite, dramatically affecting perceptions of war as a slave hunt. In particular, attitudes toward the enslavement of women were significantly modified, and this traditionally boast-worthy, power-affirming practice became regarded as sinful and reprehensible. The adoption of revised warrior norms thereby reduced the prestige associated with slave-raiding and eventually tempered the treatment of noncombatants. From the twelfth century onward, then, slave-raiding within Christendom came to be regarded as a backward and uncivilized mode of warfare.

Yet, as the reform papacy's crusading enterprises channeled Christian warriors to the eastern fringes of Europe, to fight the (not dissimilar) slaveholding and -raiding warrior elite of the Islamic world,

traditional European practices of slave-raiding resurfaced, endured, and intensified. Indeed, the religious differences of the opposing armies appear to have invalidated the modified codes adopted within Christendom. Once again, noncombatants were the most likely victims of these ravages, and women and children were deliberately targeted by both sides in order to provoke, dishonor, and denigrate the enemy. The Crusades therefore ensured the continuing prevalence of slave-raiding activities into the High Middle Ages.

[See also Mamluks.]

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David Wyatt

SLAVIC LANDS

[This entry contains nine subentries, on Slavic sources from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1500; an overview of Slavic military history from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1500; and on Slavic historiography from 500–1000, 1000–1300, and 1300–1500.]

Sources (500–1000)

In his work *De bello Gothico* (3.14), the sixth-century Byzantine historian Prokopios of Caesarea wrote that the Slavs usually fought walking toward the enemy and carrying a shield and a spear. They did not wear a coat of mail. The emperor Maurice (r. 582–602) titled one of the chapters of his *Strategikon* (11.5) "How to Fight with the Sclavins, the Ants, and Other Similar Tribes." They did not appear in open spaces. Descriptions of the anti-Avar revolt of the Slavs under the leadership of Samo, along with subsequent events of Samo's reign (c. 623–659), appear in the chronicle of Fredegar (Fredegarius).

Bavarian-Moravian wars of 846 to 869 are described in the *Annales Fuldenses*.

Arabic sources are extremely important. Ibn Khurradadhbih (820/26–912/33) writes that the merchants from Ruthenia brought many swords as well as valuable leather. Ibn Rustah described the armament of the Slavs, which he said consisted predominantly of spears and shields. The king of the Slavs is said to have had strong and valuable coats of mail. The Süleyman swords made of good iron were also mentioned. Ahmad ibn Fadlan writes about the Ruthenian swords in 922. He also mentions knives and battleaxes.

For the history of Moravia, the life of Saint Methodius, written after his death in 885, is of great importance. Many interesting facts about the Slavs and the conflicts among tribes are found in al-Masudi's work, written in the mid-tenth century. The detailed description of Ibrahim ibn Ya'qub, a Jewish merchant from about 965, also should be mentioned. Although his work did not survive, we know its content from the works of the later Arab authors al-Bakri and al-Qazwini. According to the source, shields, saddles, and bridles were manufactured in Prague. Among the Obodrites of King Nacon's country, the warriors had full armament consisting of plate armor, helmets, and swords. Mieszko I, Prince of Poland (r. c. 963–992), had a group of warriors supported financially from taxes. The group consisted of three thousand cuirassiers divided into detachments. The prince provided them with clothes, horses, weapons, and everything they needed. The Slavic way of building strongholds was also described.

There is much information on the first army of the Piasts in the chronicle of a German monk, Widukind of Corvey (d. after 973). Concerning the relations between Germany and its neighbors, especially Poland, Bohemia, and Ruthenia (between 975 and 1018), the most informative source seems to be the chronicle of Thietmar, bishop of Merseburg. Cosmas of Prague depicted the fights within Bohemia and with its neighbors from the ninth to the twelfth century. At the beginning of the twelfth century the *Cronicae et gesta ducum sive*

principum Polonorum, whose anonymous author is traditionally called "Gallus Anonymus," was written. A valuable source of historical knowledge is the twelfth-century chronicle from Kiev known as the *Povest' vremennykh let* (Primary chronicle). One of its versions is called the *Chronicle of Nestor*. The history of the western Slavs (Pomeranians, Obodrites, Wielets, and so forth) until the second part of the twelfth century can be found in the chronicle of Helmold of Bosau about the Polabian Slavs.

[See also Arabs; Baltics, *subentry on Sources* (500–1300); Germany, *subentry on Sources* (911–1024) and Prokopios of Caesarea.]

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Jan Szymczak

Sources (1000–1300)

The most important source dealing with the territories populated by Slavs in this period is the work of Constantine VII Porphyrogenetos (r. 913–959), emperor of Byzantium. He wrote it after the Slavs had settled down and the organization of the Christian states had begun. The work informs us about the Slavs in the Balkans, around Kiev, and in the Carpathian Basin as well as their neighbors. The emperor's aim was to demonstrate the success of his wars. Therefore he focuses on military technology. The troops of the Rus', for example, reached Byzantium by sailing down the Dnieper and close to the Black Sea shores. They could easily be defeated while they were preoccupied with embarking and disembarking. In the eastern Balkans the Bulgarian Slavs threatened the Byzantine borders. The western Balkans, ranging from the Adriatic coast of Croatia and Dalmatia to the Bulgarian territory were of

interest to Byzantine historiographers, for example, Symeon Logothetes, Leon Diakonos, and Ioannes (John) Skylitzes. The Frankish Empire was attacked in the north by western Slavic tribes, the Bohemians around Prague, the Polans around Poznań, and the Dalmantes and Obodrites to the north of these. These events are related by Adam of Bremen and Thietmar of Merseburg.

In the second millennium the first sources with information about earlier or contemporary fights were written at the turn of the eleventh and the twelfth century. These sources are mainly chronicles, partly hagiography. When literacy among the Slavs evolved, a significant division appeared. The Slavia Latina belonging to the Roman Church wrote in Latin, the Slavia Orthodoxa in Slavonic. There are exceptions, for example, the Slavic variety of the legend of the Bohemian saints Václav (Wenceslas) and Ludmilla or the Glagolite codices among the Croatians. Across the Slavic regions, the historiography that emerged at the turn of the eleventh to the twelfth century bears the common feature of viewing events, whether former or contemporary, from the perspective of the ruling dynasty.

The first figure of Bohemian historiography is known by name: Cosmas, a canon of the Prague Cathedral Chapter. His *Chronica Bohemorum* tells us mainly about the conflicts between the Přemysl dynasty and its neighbors, the western Slavs. His chronicle was continued by unknown authors; we know of two compilations in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Since Bohemia was a part of the Holy Roman Empire, the Bohemian events are closely linked to the history of the empire. This is why annals and chronicles written in German monasteries contain rich information about early Bohemian history.

The name of the historiographer of the Piasts is unknown; he was not a local priest but arrived from distant parts. He is referred to as Anonymus Gallus as he is supposed to have come from France. Vincent Kadłubek, canon and later bishop of Kraków (1208–1218), was another writer a century after Anonymus Gallus. His work is not traditional, follows ancient examples, and has dialogues. In Polish

historiography the annals written in the Chapters and the mendicant monasteries became popular in the thirteenth century. At the courts of the independent principalities (first in Silesia in the late thirteenth century), events were recorded as well in the form of annals.

In the early twelfth century the eastern Slavs had the Nestor Chronicle, also known by its first words as the *Povest' vremennych let* (= PVL, i.e., Tales of bygone years). Nestor is one of the possible authors but we also know Sylvester, who was abbot of the Vyduhich Monastery. In this monastery the Kiev Chronicle was written in the late twelfth century as a continuation of the PVL. This, completed by the Halych–Volhynian Chronicle of the late thirteenth century gives the Hypathios codex. This is a chronicle of the southern Rus', whereas the events of the northern parts were recorded in the Lavrentios Codex and a number of Novgorodian codices. As for hagiography, the legend of Boris and Gleb, canonized first among the princes (1072), relates conflicts they were involved with. Combats are also recorded in Alexander Nevksy's *vita* in the late thirteenth century.

On the Balkans the only Latin chronicle was written by Thomas, archdeacon of Spalato (present-day Split, Croatia). He wrote about the ancient and medieval past of the diocese going back to the antique period (when it was known as Salona). Spalato was a part of medieval Dalmatia, separated from neighboring lands, but Thomas had information on territories outside the town, too, especially of the western Balkans, which was a part of the Hungarian kingdom. The literacy of the Slavs of the Eastern Balkans was rooted in Orthodox Christianity. Their independence from the Byzantine Empire was emphasized and reflected in the lives of the early saints: Saint Symeon, Saint Sava, and Stefan Prvovenčani. Military campaigns are covered by twelfth-century Byzantine chroniclers (Niketas and Kinnamos); in the thirteenth century we have information from the Hungarian narrative sources (Anonymus, Kézai, and from the fourteenth-century chronicle-composition of earlier events).

[See also Alexander Nevsky; Byzantine Empire, subentry on Sources (900–1204); Hungary, subentry on Sources (1000–1300); John Skylitzes, Chronicle of; and Thietmar of Merseburg.]

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Márta Font

Sources (1300–1500)

Most sources on the Byzantine-Bulgarian wars are of Byzantine origin, including *De Michaelē et Andronico Palaeologis, libri tredecim* (Of Michael and Andronikos Palaiologos, thirteen books, also known as *Contemporary Times*) by George Pachymeres (1234–c. 1310), covering the years 1260–1308. The author is well informed about the national affairs happening in the second part of thirteenth century, and his work is the basic source describing the conflicts between Bulgaria and Byzantium at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Nikephoros Gregoras (c. 1295–1359/1360) wrote a thirty-seven-book *Byzantina Historia* (known as *Roman History*). It gives an account of the period from 1204 to 1359 and is a significant supplement to the historical work by John Kantakouzenos (1292–1383). Kantakouzenos's *History*, in four books, deals with the years 1320–1356 (although there are some events from 1364). Undoubtedly, it is the best source of knowledge about Byzantine-Bulgarian armed conflicts in the fourteenth century. As a grand leader, Kantakouzenos fought with the Bulgarians near Rusokastron in 1331. He played a significant role in battles of 1341 and 1342, and was a Byzantine emperor from 1347 to 1354. An expert on military matters, he describes the battles as well as siege methods. Another meaningful source of information is the panegyric *On Armed Activities of the Famous Leader*, written at the beginning of the fourteenth century and devoted to the achievements of the popular Byzantine leader Michael Doukas Glabas Tarchaneiotes (c. 1235–after 1304). It was written by Manuel Philes (1275–1345), a court poet of the emperors Andronicus II Palaeologus (r. 1282–1328) and Andronicus III Palaeologus (r. 1328–1341). The panegyric contains an authentic list of fortresses placed within the area of Stara Planina. Some of these fortresses were rebuilt between 1297 and 1303. The panegyric is, therefore,

an excellent, although not easily interpretable, source facilitating the process of scholarly reconstruction of the fortification system created by the Bulgarians in the eastern and central parts of the mountains.

Some Bulgarian sources provide information on the conflicts with Turkish invaders. One of them is the so-called *Bulgarian Anonymous Chronicle* from the beginning of the fifteenth century. Another is the *Pochvalno slovo za Evtimij* (known as *Eulogy of Euthymius, Patriarch of Trnovo*) (1375–1394), written by Euthymius's student Gregory Tsamblak between 1414 and 1418. Although hagiographic, it contains much information on the Ottoman siege of the Bulgarian capital in 1393. The only document discussing the expedition of Ali Paşa Çandarlı Zâde to Bulgaria between 1388 and 1389 is *Kitâb-i cihân-nüma* (known as *The Mirror of the World* or *A History of the Ottoman Court*,) written by the chronicler Neşrî between 1487 and 1493. The fragment concerning Ali's expedition was probably obtained from the so-called *Oxford Anonymous*.

Czech Chronicles. As for the Czech chronicles, the first is the so-called *Dalimilova kronika*, which was written by a knight and relates Czech history until 1314. Between 1305 and 1339, in the Cistercian monastery of Zbraslav, the *Chronicon aulae regiae* was written. It covers sixty years until 1338 and is the most relevant and informative source depicting this period of Czech history. The Hussites' wars were described by numerous chroniclers, but Vavřinec of Brezove (1370–1437) is regarded as the most reliable author. His main works are *Husitská kronika* (The Hussite chronicle) and *Píseň o vítězství u Domažlic* (The song on victory near Domažlice). Aeneas Sylvius (later Pope Pius II, r. 1458–1464) was the author of *Historia Bohemica*. He arrived in Bohemia in 1451 as a diplomat and described the Hussites' wars and the tactics of using war wagons. Another important source is *Historia Wratislaviensis* by Peter Eschenloer, giving an account of the wars in Silesia in the 1470s.

Poland. We have at our disposal comparatively few sources concerning wars and military services in fourteenth-century Poland. The existing chronicles are preserved fragments of the *Kronika Katedralna*

Krakowska (Krakow Cathedral chronicle), covering the years 1202–1377 (formerly considered a part of John of Czarneków's chronicle; see below). Much attention is devoted to the kings of Poland: Władysław I Łokietek (the Elbow-High, r. 1320–1333) and Casimir III (the Great, r. 1333–1370). This is a valuable source describing the Polish–Lithuanian wars in Ruthenia between 1340 and 1366. Another source is *Joannes de Czarneków Chronicon Polonorum* (The chronicle of John of Czarneków), which covers the years 1370–1380. The author gives much information about political events and domestic conflicts in greater Poland. In the Cistercian monastery in Oliwa near Gdańsk, *Chronica Oliviensis* (The chronicle of Oliwa) was written after 1350. The author, Abbot Stanisław, not only gives an account of the events in Pomerania but also describes Polish–Teutonic relations.

The *Annals of Traska* covers the period up to 1340. It includes information about the Teutonic Knights' invasion of Poland in 1331 and ends with a description of the occupation of L'viv during the Polish expedition to Ruthenia, in which its author, Traska, took part.

The short *Cronica conflictus Wladislai Regis Poloniae cum cruciferis anno Christi 1410* is one of the most significant sources describing the battle of Grunwald. The anonymous author was probably one of the ecclesiastics who was in the close circle of the king of Poland, Władysław II Jagiełło. The document gives a detailed account of the encounter on the Grunwald battlefield. *Banderia Prutenorum* is a unique work with fifty-one Teutonic banners captured by the Poles after the battle of Grunwald.

The *Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, written by the Polish canon Jan Długosz between 1454 and 1480, is the most important historiographic works on medieval Poland. Books 9–12 describe the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Długosz employed Polish and foreign written sources along with oral information provided, for instance, by participants in the war with the Teutonic Order in 1409–1411: a Father John and Zbigniew Oleśnicki, the cardinal and bishop of Krakow (r. 1423–1455). Długosz himself participated in negotiations with Czech

mercenaries in the Teutonic army, which resulted in the purchase of Malbork from them in 1457. He also took an active part in Władysław Jagiełło's military expedition to Prague in 1471. Długosz's chronicle is an important source of knowledge not only for Poland but also for Bohemia, Hungary, Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Germany. The chronicles written by Bernard Wapowski, Maciej of Miechów, and Martin Kromer in the sixteenth century contain a lot of information about Poland at the end of the fifteenth century.

Organizational matters were regulated by royal decrees. The oldest one goes back to Casimir the Great's times; later decrees were issued by Władysław II Jagiełło and Casimir Jagiełłończyk (Casimir IV). The documents on military issues have been published in numerous volumes, among them the *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae* and *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*.

Ruthenia. As far as the Ruthenian sources are concerned, *Povest' o Pskovskom kniazie Dovmonte* (The story about Prince Dowmont of Pskov) devotes much space to wars. The reports of wars with the Tartars and of the battle of Kulikovo can be traced in *Zadonshchina* (The lands behind the Don River) and *Skazania o Mamaevom poboishche* (The tales of the victory over Mamai). Wars against Lithuania and the Tatars at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century are described in chronicles from Sophia and Novgorod (*Sophijskaia I letopis; Novogordskaia letopis*). The Perm, Moscow, and Sophia (*Sophijskaia II letopis*) chronicles are the main sources for accounts of the struggles in Ruthenia in the second half of the fifteenth century.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on Sources* (1204–1453).]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

Narrative (500–1000)

In the early Middle Ages the Slavs occupied huge areas of central and eastern Europe. The first area of their expansion was the lands stretching in the east to the middle Dnieper. The Black Sea steppes and the lands north of the Danube were occupied by the Huns, which prevented the Slavs from moving to the south. Expansion in this direction was resumed, however, and the Danube crossed, after Attila's empire collapsed.

Slavic Expansion in the Balkans. The Slavic invasions mostly affected the Balkan provinces of

the Byzantine Empire. In 568 the settlement of the Avars in the area of Pannonia involved the imposition of control over the Slavs; the Avars were used by Byzantium to keep the Slavs from invading. Soon, however, the Slavs and the Avars began to cooperate against the empire. First, at the beginning of the seventh century, they colonized a major part of the Balkan Peninsula. Between 622 and 625 the rule of the Avars was rejected by Samo, a Frankish merchant who established a short-lived state that he ruled until 659. Samo's empire comprised Moravia, the Czech valley stretching from the Spree River in the north to the Sala (IJssel) River in the west and the Oder River in the east. After Samo's death this state collapsed and was limited to Moravia. In 679 the proto-Bulgarians began to attack the Antes, who had settled in the Balkans. This led to the creation of the Bulgarian empire, located along the lower Danube. The acceptance of Christianity in 864 (or 865) by the khan Boris Mikhail I (r. 852–889) completed the Slavization of the Bulgarians.

Two tribal groups, the Serbs and the Croats, were being formed in the north. The biggest opponent of the Serbs was the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian czar Symeon the Great conquered the Serbs in 924. After his death in 927 the Serbian prince Časlav Klonimirović Vlastimirović (r. 927–960) rebuilt the Serbian state. Časlav fought against Hungarians in 960. He was hurt in battle, captured, and thrown into the Sava River to drown.

Two larger associations were formed in the Croats' territory in the seventh and eighth centuries. First was the Littoral (or Dalmatian) Croatia in the south, and the second was the duchy of Pannonia (Pannonian Croatia) in the north. In the 925 the Croatian lands were united by Tomislav, Duke of Dalmatian Croatia (r. 910–928). Tomislav defeated invasions of the Hungarians in battles over the Drava River. As an ally of Byzantium, he fought against Bulgaria in 924–925. Tomislav was crowned king of Croatia in 925.

Slavic Strongholds. The settlement of new areas and the necessity to defend Slavic lands facilitated the process of linking particular territorial communities in more organized units, that is, in tribes.

These were led by leader-princes and their retinues. The tribes built strongholds to protect their people from various invasions. Probably in the middle of the ninth century, a famous work, the *Descriptio civitatum et regionum ad septentrionalem plagam Danubii* (Description of the cities and regions on the northern bank of the Danube), commonly known as the “Bavarian Geographer,” was written in the convent of Saint Emmeram of Regensburg. The Bavarian Geographer provides information about the number of strongholds belonging to particular tribes. The number of strongholds is an indication of the military and political strength of each tribe.

About 830, Mojmir, one of the tribal leaders of Moravia, rebuilt his state under the suzerainty of Frankish kings. In 855, Rastislav, Mojmir’s successor over what is called Great Moravia, became independent of Germany. Rastislav asked the Byzantine emperor Michael III to send missionaries to Moravia in 863. Constantine (Cyril) and Methodios, who were sent there, brought not only the Holy Bible but also other liturgical books translated into Slavonic. The Christianization of the Moravians by the Byzantines was strongly opposed by the Bavarian clergy, who impeded the Byzantine mission. After the deaths of Cyril (869) and Methodios (885), their followers had to leave Moravia, and the church was taken over by the Latin rite.

The end of German rule in Moravia was caused by a dynastic crisis that helped Svatopluk to take power. Independence was gained in 874. Moravia under Svatopluk’s reign—from 871 to 894—stretched probably over the Silesian land of the Vistulans, reaching the Bug River in the northeast. The Moravian expansion faced Bulgarian influence at the Cis River in the southeast. The Magyars (Hungarians) put an end to the empire of Great Moravia between 902 and 906. Taking advantage of the weakness of Hungary after the Magyars’ defeat in the battle on the Lechfeld in 955, the Czech tribes occupied Moravia, Slovakia, Silesia, and the country of the Vistulans, creating a strong country around the Carpathian Mountains and the Sudeten. The civil war in 995 between the Czech Přemyslids and the Slavniks was won finally by the Přemyslid family.

Another political and trading center was Kievan Rus’ under the authority of the Rurik family, which from the time of Prince Igor (r. 941–945) gained much territory up to the Bug and San rivers. Prince Sviatoslav of Kiev defeated the Bulgarians in 968 and became influential in the Balkans. In 981 his son Vladimir the Great occupied the Cherven strongholds and the region of Przemyśl to control the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea trade, through the Balkans and the Carpathian Mountains in the north, with the people on the Baltic Sea coast. In 988/9 he was baptized in Byzantium.

Poles and Polabians. The *limes Sorabicus* (Sorbian boundary), created by Charlemagne in 805, defined the limits of Slavic settlements. The border ran along the Danube from around Lorch to Regensburg, where it turned to the north, past Nuremberg, Bamberg, and Erfurt to the Elbe near Magdeburg. The sources confirm the existence of a Serbian-Lusitanian duchy along the Sala River in the ninth century. Two groups of Slavic people existed in the east, the Poles and the Polabians. The Pomeranians were located between them. The Polabian Slavs created two political groups: the Community of Obodrites in the northwest and the Liutizians, also called the Veleti, in the east. The people of Polans, probably the Goplans, Vistulans, Lendians, and Silesian tribes, lived to the east of the river Oder, in the basins of the Warta, Vistula, and Bug rivers.

The final union of the Polish tribes was accomplished by Mieszko I from the Polans family, the Piasts. In 965 he married the Czech princess Dobrava, and he was baptized in 966. The Czech-Polish alliance appeared to be unstable. Mieszko, with the help of the Germans, defeated the Czechs, who were supported by Lutics. In 990 he added to his country the territories of the Vistulans: the Kraków region and Silesia.

Between the tenth and eleventh centuries the Slavic states of Bohemia, Poland, and Kievan Rus’ existed in central Europe, and Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia existed in the south of Europe. The Polabian Slavs were not organized to the same degree.

[See also Baltics, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1300); Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900); East Central Europe, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1000); Franks, Carolingian, *subentry on* Narrative (751–899); and Lechfeld, Battle on the.]

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Jan Szymczak

Narrative (1000–1300)

Around the year 1000 Slavic peoples lived in many parts of Europe, mostly in smaller groups. In the west they lived from the Elbe across the Bohemian basin and the eastern Alps to the Adriatic. They populated the territory between the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea; in the Carpathian basin they lived where the mountains and the plains met, as well as in Transdanubia. In the Balkans they were present along the Adriatic coast and eastward to Thessaloniki, in the east from the Carpathians to Novgorod along the Dnieper River. Despite the great distances, language differentiation did not surpass the level of dialect; after all, the writings of the missionaries Cyril and Methodius were accessible in all Slavic regions.

After the fall of the Moravian empire the Přemysl dynasty organized its rule in the first third of the

tenth century in the territory of the western Slavs. In the last third the same was done by the Piasts, with Gniezno and Poznań as the centers. From the point of view of the neighboring Holy Roman Empire both were parts of Sclavinia. Down to the mid-twelfth century no linguistic differences existed between Bohemian and Polish. The expansion of the empire facilitated the organization of both dynastic centers: the Bohemian tribes fell prey to the imperial expansion. The first center of the land of the Piasts was Poznań-Gniezno, which was forged together by fights against the German princes. By the turn of the millennium, the Piast center was transferred to Kraków and was only a tributary of the empire.

Some of the western Slavic tribes (Obodrits, Dalamants, Sorbs, Kashubs, the Slavs of the Alps or Pannonia) did not form political entities. The territory they populated became a part either of the aforementioned Slavic states or of the Hungarian kingdom or the Bavarian principality where these groups assimilated. The Slovenians known today did not have an independent state in the Middle Ages. The Carantans of the ninth century (Alpine Slavs) formed the population of Carinthia under the Babenbergs and of Styria and southern Tyrol. The Slavs of Macedonia were not an independent group among the Slavs, and must search for their ancestors among either the Serbs or the Bulgarians. Similarly, the Slovaks were not an identifiable group among the undifferentiated Slavic peoples that lived in parts of the Hungarian kingdom.

The Slavonic people lived in a large area and had contacts with the different neighboring peoples, which had an influence also on their kind of fighting. Eastern Slavs and Bulgarians fought with the Turkish tribes in the steppe zone. Eastern Slavs and Polish tribes near the Baltic Sea had contact with Vikings; thus, for instance, the Viking sword was widely used. The small groups (clans) of Slavonic tribes lived around a castle. The military power of the clans was not generally enough to dominate in conflicts with each other; this is why they quite often needed auxiliary troops from among their neighbors. About the Slavs many written sources

inform us, among them the ninth-century Bavarian Geographer, the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (905–959), and annals from monasteries in the Holy Roman Empire.

The southern Slavs formed separate ethnic groups within the framework of the Byzantine Empire. In the eastern Balkans the Bulgarian Turks appeared in the seventh century; their mixing with local Slavs led to the formation of a Slavic-speaking Bulgarian ethnicity. The continuation of their nomadic legacy and confrontations with the Byzantine Empire were characteristic of the first Bulgarian state. Symeon (r. 893–927) converted to Christianity and adopted the title of tsar (emperor). He conquered large parts of the Balkans, including areas where Serbs lived. The Bulgarian state on the borders of Byzantium and the steppe was under continuous attack. This led to its breakup in the early eleventh century. In 1018 Emperor Basil II the Bulgar Slayer (r. 976–1025) conquered the first Bulgarian state. In the north-western areas of the Balkans the tribes that later formed Croatia owed their independence to the Frankish-Byzantine struggles. In the late ninth century Trpimir appeared as the ruler of the seacoast. Tomislav (r. 910–928) became king in 925. The territory along the Adriatic shores was described by the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (r. 944–959) in the mid-tenth century; he said that Croatia extended from the Istrian peninsula to the Neretva River between the sea and the Kapela (Gvozd) mountains. Around the first millennium these two political organizations deserved the name “Christian states”; the other smaller centers of Serbia (Rascia) and Bosnia started to take shape slowly.

Among the eastern Slavs the beginnings of statehood meant organization of control over the Novgorod-Kiev river route in the late tenth century. In eastern Europe the leading stratum of Slavs first had to pay taxes to the Khazars, then merged with Viking (Varangian) groups. Thereby a political elite was formed that organized the Kievan Rus'. This state embraced the eastern Slavic peoples without differentiation. An actual differentiation can be found only in the fourteenth century, and led to the Ukrainian and Belorussian ethnicities.

The Slavs lived in a clan system that formed alliances of neighbors in a circle of about 4 square miles (10 square kilometers). The larger units (*zhupa*) occupied areas of 8 to 12 square miles (20 to 30 square kilometers), the tribes 39 to 386 square miles (100 to 1,000 square kilometers). The emerging larger entities were named after where they lived. These entities were formed from the many small groups in answer to outside dangers. In the center of a region there was generally a castle. The diameters of the castles did not exceed 100 feet (30 meters), and they were built of wood and earth. Advantageous terrain was exploited, where rivers joined or mountains formed a shield. Among the western Slavs these small fortresses were widespread before the formation of states on the Frankish pattern. The castles excavated in the eastern parts of present-day eastern Germany were round, and the population could use them as a place of asylum. Houses were built in the neighborhood of the fortress (as at Oldenburg, or Starigrad). Among the eastern Slavs the appearance of the Varangians and the Khazar taxing system contributed to the foundation of the centers. We know of castles similar to those of the western Slavs from this era. After the formation of states new fortresses were erected, also serving as the centers of tax collection. Archaeologists can prove the existence of old fortresses close to the new ones. In some cases it is reflected in the names, such as Novgorod (New Castle). The Slavs first known by their regions (Moravians, living along the Morva; Drevljane, living in the forest; Poljans, living on plains) came to be known later as belonging to a certain castle, a center (Kievans, Smolenskis, Novgorodians), and to a neighborhood. This is a further clue to organization according to regions. In the Balkans communities were formed on *zhupanes* based on relationships. A certain area had a fortress where the population could retreat at times of danger. In Croatia, for example, we know of twelve *zhupanes*. In the organization of the different areas populated by Slavs, geographical facts constituted the important differences. In the Slavic territories that observed the Latin rite (*Slavia Latina*), castles were denoted as *civitas* or *castrum*. In the Orthodox

world (*Slavia Orthodoxa*) where Slavic was dominant, the expressions *grad* and *gorod* became general. Next to Latin literacy there was a spoken Slavic formula: the Polish *gród*, the Bohemian *hrad*, the Croatian *grad*. Castles constructed of timber served as living places of the would-be elite, whereas their surroundings were inhabited by groups of various legal statuses (warriors, handcraftsmen, tradesmen, servants). Early castles (*castrum*, Slavonic *detinec* or *kremľ*) were not only places of administration, but were also used for defense.

In terms of the military forces it is necessary to distinguish two groups, one constituting the warriors of the escorts of the elite, the other the common armed freemen. The differentiation of society was based on the ability to participate in military affairs, that is, on ownership of horses and enough income to obtain weapons. Only a part of the elite became noblemen; the others lost the ability to fight and became a dependent part of society. The escorts were ethnically mixed everywhere. One of their constituents came from the neighboring ethnic groups. The Patzinaks, Cumans, Volga Bulgarians, and other nomadic peoples were represented in all the principalities of the Kievan Rus'. In the case of the southern Slavs, the Bulgarian Turks were not escorts but the dominant element in the population. The Varangians played a role in the early center of Great Poland (Gniezno-Poznań) as well as in the Kievan Rus'. Newcomers from Scandinavia first settled around Novgorod (as at Staraya Ladoga) in the ninth century and turned south, but additional new settlers came continuously up to the mid-twelfth century. Slavic newcomers arrived in the Novgorod region from the south. For the sake of border defense against the Cumans the so-called black hats were settled, organized from many small nomadic groups to the south of Kiev.

The military escorts of the Slavic princes, although we lack data about them, cannot have been very strong. This made it important to gather warriors from among neighbors at times of decisive battles. This need (when, for example, the Piasts fought against the Holy Roman Emperor) contributed to the strengthening of the smaller Slavic centers, and

actually of state development. The troops of the Přemyslids were insufficient against the imperial army. Their independence was only enough to gain the title of princes within the empire. The military force of the Přemysl princes was important as part of the imperial troops against the Piasts (1039) and the Hungarians (1030, 1051–1052) as well as during the emperor's Italian campaign (1158). The chroniclers (Cosmas and his continuators) mentioned only the presence of Bohemian princes or Bohemian troops. In the struggles of the Piast princes against each other, none was able to win a decisive victory, and this, along with the system of inheritance and property, contributed to a splintering process.

This held true of the eastern Slavic areas, too, with the difference that the extent of dissolution and regional variations was greater. The Rurikid princes used neighboring troops in their fights against each other. Among other things, they made use of the Piast princes' military aid. The Cumans played an important role in the south, the Volga Bulgarians in the northeast, and the army of Hungary in the west.

Of the southern Slavs, the Croats came under Hungarian rule in the late eleventh century. Actually, it was a personal union. In 1091 King Ladislaus (László) I of Hungary (r. 1077–1095) conquered Slavonia (the territory between the Drave and Save rivers plus some areas beyond the Save), and later he brought the Croats under his rule. Koloman (r. 1095–1116) defeated the Croatian king Peter in the 1090s and had himself crowned king of Croatia.

The anti-Byzantine struggles of the Bulgarians and Serbs started in the mid-eleventh century. The Serbs revolted against Byzantium in the late 1140s with an allusion to their relationship with the kings of Hungary. Still, the internal crisis of Byzantium and its collapse during the fourth crusade (1204) were needed for the Serbian victory. Their actual independence began under Stephen Nemanja (r. c. 1167–1196). Serbia began a forceful expansion during the thirteenth century in the Balkans. The seacoast, southern Bosnia, and northern Macedonia came under Serbian rule, just as Bulgaria would in the fourteenth century. The Bulgarians got free of Byzantium during the internal struggles for its throne in the 1180s.

In 1185–1186 the new, second Bulgaria was founded by Ivan Asen I (r. 1185–1196) who was supported by Bulgarian-Cuman-Walachian troops. The country not only gained independence, its ruler Ivan Asen II (r. 1218–1241) conquered Thrace and Macedonia. In the thirteenth century the Hungarian kingdom continued its expansion in the Balkans. Not even the Tartar invasion of 1241 inaugurated a change, as only the retreating Tartar army crossed Walachia, and it did not go any farther south. The Hungarian expansion touched Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, partly through influencing the monarchs, partly by organizing a buffer zone (*banate*).

In the thirteenth century the Tartar onslaught from the east reached many Slavic countries. First they attacked the Cumans, the neighbors of Kievan Rus', which had split into regions. The battle at the river Kalka (1223) took place outside the borders of the Rus' so there were many casualties, but not among the Tartars. The Tartars looted the principalities of Rjazan' and Vladimir-Suzdal in the winter of 1237–1238, and came to the frontiers of Novgorod. In 1239 they destroyed Chernigov. In the course of the great western campaign starting in the autumn of 1240 they conquered Kiev (6 December), then attacked Halych. At the passes in the Carpathians the Tartar army split in two. One part circumvented the Carpathians from the north and sacked Little Poland, where they did not encounter any resistance. In Silesia Prince Henry tried to stop them at Legnica (9 April 1241) but was badly defeated. The Tartars moved on to the Carpathian basin. The other part of their troops entered the basin through the passes. After the campaign of 1240–1242 they retreated to their former territory, ruling even the steppe close to the Black Sea. Kiev and Chernigov came under direct Tartar occupation. In Vladimir-Suzdal Tartar tax collectors appeared and the prince of the Rus' became a vassal. In the late thirteenth century Tartar punitive campaigns were common. Novgorod did not witness Tartar rule. The Prince of Halych-Volhynia tried to gain independence from the Tartars; combining his forces with those of Andrey Jaroslavich and Daniil of Halych, he fought them in 1252. After their defeat Andrey escaped to Sweden and Daniil had



Alexander Nevsky (c. 1220–1263). Duke of Novgorod. Fresco, seventeenth century. BILDARCHIV PREUSSISCHER KULTURBESITZ/ART RESOURCE, NY

to demolish the fortresses along the southern frontiers of Halych. In 1254–1255 the prince tried to resist again, but without success, so for the campaign of 1258–1259 against the Lithuanians he had to give troops to the Tartars. The Tartar attacks continued in the second half of the thirteenth century; they led campaigns against Little Poland both in 1258 and in 1285.

In the northern regions of the territories of the eastern Slavs, Alexander Nevsky defeated the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights. Thereafter Novgorod was free of any attacks. In the course of the campaigns against the Lithuanian tribes of the Baltic area, Alexander started to expand on the former territory of the Rus' in the direction of Polock, Smolensk, and Volhynia. The western regions of the eastern Slavic

area came under solid Lithuanian rule. The latter started to expand at the cost of the western Slavs as well in the late thirteenth century. Of the Piast princes those of Mazovia had to face Lithuanian attack; a further danger was the pagan Prussians of the Baltic region. Konrad of Mazovia (r. 1202–1247) invited the Teutonic Order especially against the Prussians. The order established its own state on the Baltic Sea.

The military history of medieval Slavic states was characterized not only by external dangers but also by fights against one another. In the eleventh century the Polish ruler Bolesław I Chrobry (“the Brave”) (r. 992–1025) conquered Prague, and the Bohemian ruler Břetislav (r. 1034–1055) looted Gniezno in 1039. But the former also sacked Kiev. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries witnessed many stations in the course of the formation of partial principalities. These wars had the chief aim of conquering the dynastic center (for instance, Cracow or Kiev), but there were also significant fights for other territories. The greater regional centers in Piast territory were Little Poland, Great Poland, Silesia, Mazovia, Kujavia, and Pomerania. In eastern Slavic areas the three great centers of the thirteenth century were Novgorod, Vladimir-Suzdal, and Halych-Volhynia. Smolensk, Chernigov, and Perejaslaw were of lesser importance. Other territories broke away from these. The Bohemian power struggles were the least significant ones, as there was one partial principality only, the former Moravian region, even if it often had three smaller units (Brno, Olomouc, and Znojmo). At the beginning of the thirteenth century Bohemia became a hereditary kingship, which strengthened its position in the Holy Roman Empire. King Přemysl Otakar II (r. 1253–1278) fought to acquire new territories for the empire.

The southern Slavic territories came under the rule of Byzantium and the Hungarian kingdom in the eleventh century. They remained in this state of double dependence even after their official independence in the late twelfth century. There was rivalry between regional units here, too, but the regions were much less solidly structured than was the case with the western and the eastern Slavs.

[See also Alexander Nevsky; Banate; Bolesław I Chobry; Castles, *subentries on* 500–1100 and 1150–1350; Cumans; Kalka, Battle at River; Khazars; Legnica, Battle of; and Sit’, Battle at the River.]

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Márta Font

Narrative (1300–1500)

The Slavs inhabited central and eastern Europe, which was a very restless area in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Slavic countries fought many times with each other, and Bohemia was the location of religious wars. But the greatest threat was conflicts with neighbors: Germany and the Order

of Teutonic Knights to the west and the north, Byzantium and Ottoman Turks to the south, and Tatars (the Golden Horde) to the east.

The Balkans. In 1300 the new Bulgarian czar Theodore Svetoslav (r. 1300–1322) undertook the task of regaining the mountains of the eastern Stara Planina range and the Thracian harbors on the Black Sea. One of the most important battles of the early fourteenth century—one that strengthened the position of Serbia as a new Balkan power—was the battle of Velbužd (1330) between the Bulgarians and the Serbs. Each army consisted of about fifteen thousand soldiers. The Bulgarian czar Michael Šišman (r. 1323–1330) was killed in the battle, and ultimately the Serbian detachments placed their protégé on the Bulgarian throne. Another important battle for the Bulgarians took place on 18 July 1332 near the fortress of Rusokastro, where around three thousand Byzantines were defeated by more numerous Bulgarian-Tatar forces.

In October 1366, Amadeus VI of Savoy, helping the Byzantines, went with twenty galleys to attack the Thracian ports controlled by the Bulgarians. As a result of the treaty signed on 21 December 1366, the Byzantines got the ports to the south of the Stara Planina range. In 1363 the last battle between Bulgaria and Byzantium had taken place after the expedition of the Byzantine emperor John V Palaiologos (r. 1341–1391), who sailed to Anchialos. Having conquered it, he besieged Mesembria. At that time the Bulgarian emperor hired the Turkish detachments prowling Thrace and attacked the Byzantines, breaking the siege.

In the second part of the fourteenth century, Bulgaria faced Ottoman attacks, Serbian expansion in Macedonia, and Hungarian offensives in the northwest of the country, resulting in sieges of Belgrade and Vidin. From 1373, Bulgaria with Trnovo as its capital became a vassal state of the Ottomans. Beginning with the fourteenth century a few independent political units emerged, the most important of which were the principalities of Vidin and Dobrudja. In the years leading up to 1388, the Turks conquered large areas of Bulgaria to the south of the Stara Planina. Then at the beginning of 1388

the Turks conquered the northern and northeastern parts of Bulgaria. In 1395 they occupied Trnovo, bringing about the collapse of the country. The Vidin principality collapsed after the 1396 battle of Nicopolis. Thereafter Bulgaria was fully occupied and controlled by the Ottomans.

Bohemia. At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Czechs were in conflict with many of their neighbors. Bohemia was attacked in 1304 by the German king Albert I, but after an unsuccessful siege of Kutná Hora the German army retreated. After the extinction of the Přemysl dynasty the Bohemian throne was taken over by John of Luxemburg (r. 1306–1346). He raided Kraków in 1327. The Bohemian army marched through Silesia and made the princes of Silesia pay homage to the Bohemian king. In 1345 a new Polish-Czech war broke out. First the battles took place in Silesia, then near Kraków. A siege of the capital of Poland was unsuccessful and ended with a treaty signed in 1348 in Namysłów (Namslau). According to the treaty, the Polish king renounced any claims to Silesia, and the Bohemian king renounced any claims to the Polish throne. Thus the Czechs consolidated their authority in Silesia.

In 1419 the Hussite revolution broke out with its center at Tábor. On 25 March 1420 near Sudomeř, the Hussites, with four hundred infantry and twelve wagons, defeated the substantially more numerous Czech knights led by Peter of Šternberk (Sternberg). After the death in 1419 of the German king Wenceslas, who had ruled Bohemia as Wenceslas IV since 1378, Sigismund of Luxemburg took over the leadership in the war. The crusade that he organized in the summer of 1420 allowed him briefly to occupy Prague. Sigismund was crowned king of Bohemia at that time, but ultimately his mainly German forces were pushed out of Bohemia. The Hussites were successful in Sigismund's second crusade as well, winning near Višehrad on 1 November 1420. At that time Jan Žižka, the commander in chief (*hetman*) of Tábor, organized a stable army. Sigismund was dethroned in 1421, causing a third crusade that started in the summer of that year. The crusader forces fled, however, at the approach of Žižka's armies. Later in the year,

leading the Hungarian army (Sigismund was also the king of Hungary), Sigismund attacked Bohemia from the east, but the expedition ended unsuccessfully in January 1422 with defeats near Kutná Hora and Nemecký Brod (modern Havlíčkův Brod).

The Hussites, searching abroad for support, made an alliance with Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Sigismund Korybutowicz, a nephew of the Polish king Władysław II Jagiełło, was sent to Bohemia with a few thousand volunteers. The divisions within the Hussite movement intensified the conflict in Bohemia. The knighthood, supported by Prague townsmen, fought against the more radical field army led by Žižka near Hofice in 1423 and at Skalice and Malešov in 1424. Žižka's army, known as the Taborites, won each of these battles decisively. Later in 1424 the reunited Hussites decided to attack Moravia, but Jan Žižka died before the attack began. The expedition did not bring the expected results, and after battles with Moravian, Hungarian, and Austrian armies, the Hussites retreated.

Žižka's successor, Prokop the Bald (also known as Prokop the Great), managed to unite the Hussite movement, which was able to defeat a German crusader army at the battle of Ústí nad Labem (Aussig) on 16 June 1426. For the battle the Hussites deployed twenty-four thousand people and five hundred war wagons, whereas the German army consisted of about seventy thousand people and three thousand war wagons. In 1427 the Germans once again attacked Bohemia, but they fled when the Hussite armies approached. The Germans stopped near the Bohemian town of Tachov on the border with their empire. They intended to fight a battle, but again they retreated on seeing the Hussite army.

The unification of the Hussite movement and the increased strength of their field armies facilitated the Hussites' going on the offensive. Their aggressive operations lasted from 1428 to 1437 and are known today as the "great expeditions" (*spanilé jízdy*, literally "graceful rides"). The first of these expeditions reached as far as the region of Bratislava, the second Silesia. At the end of 1429 and beginning of 1430 the Hussite armies attacked Saxony and Bavaria, occupying more than forty towns. The Hussites' expansion

provoked the pope and Sigismund of Luxemburg to organize another crusade, this one led by Frederick Hohenzollern and a papal legate, Giuliano Cesarini. When on 14 August 1431, Prokop the Bald's army met the crusader army near Domažlice, the crusaders fled, abandoning their camp. The Hussites chased the fugitives, destroying their detachments. In 1432 the field armies reached Berlin. The next year the Orphans (or Orebites), together with Polish knights, attacked the Teutonic Order's state. The expedition reached the Baltic Sea but did not succeed.

Despite numerous successes, the Hussite movement started to decline at the beginning of the 1430s. Its weakening was partially caused by its division into a radical branch, the Taborites and the Orphans, and a branch more moderate in its attitude toward the church, the Calixtines or Utraquists. This internal division was the ultimate reason for the movement's failure. On 30 May 1434 a battle took place near Lipany between the Taborites and the Orphans on one side (ten thousand infantry and seven hundred horsemen) and, on the other side, the Calixtines, the armies of the Old Town of Prague, and mercenary soldiers (twelve to thirteen thousand infantry and two hundred horsemen). The radicals were defeated, and about ten thousand people were killed, among them Prokop the Bald. In the following years most of the Hussites accepted the return of Sigismund of Luxemburg to the Bohemian throne. His last opponents, under Jan Roháč z Dubě, were defeated at the castle of Sion (or Zion) and were hanged in Prague on 9 September 1437. The date is accepted as the end of the Hussite movement in Bohemia.

The emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg died in December 1437, and after his death the conflicts concerning the successor to the Bohemian throne began. The candidates were Albert of Habsburg and Casimir Jagiełło, the brother of Władysław III of Poland. Casimir was supported by five thousand armed soldiers sent to Bohemia from Poland and twelve thousand Czech supporters. Albert's army was bigger in number and forced Casimir's supporters to retreat. The pro-Jagiellonian side was defeated on 22 September 1438 near Železnice, and in February 1439 the conflict ended with an armistice.

After Albert's death in October 1439, an interregnum lasted in Bohemia until 1457. Numerous internal conflicts occurred at that time, and they intensified between 1448 and 1452. After the short reign of Ladislav Postumus (r. 1453–1457) the throne was taken over by George of Poděbrady (r. 1458–1471). He defeated his opponents in Moravia, forced Archduke Albert of Habsburg to resign his aspirations to the Czech throne, and also conducted wars against Wrocław. Between 1468 and 1471, George fought with Mátyás Hunyadi of Hungary. George died in March 1471, and in May the Czech nobles elected Władysław Jagiełło (r. 1471–1516), son of Casimir IV of Poland, as king. To protect him from attacks by his rivals to the throne, the Poles guaranteed him an escort for the time of the journey: it consisted of seven thousand armed soldiers, including fifty-three hundred mercenaries—twenty-eight hundred horsemen and twenty-five hundred infantry. No incidents occurred during the journey to Prague, and on 22 August 1471, Władysław was crowned.

Poland. In the fourteenth and especially the fifteenth century, the most difficult neighbor of Poland was the state of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. After thirteen years of war and the so-called Second Peace of Toruń (Thorn) in 1466, the Order lost a considerable part of its territory, and the Teutonic Knights ceased being a threat to Poland. But in the second half the fifteenth century, Poland more and more often had to defend against attacks from Tatars and Turks in the southeastern part of the Polish kingdom. From this time to the seventeenth century the fights against eastern enemies were the Polish army's most important challenge.

Northern and Western Borders. Between 1304 and 1314 the prince of Kraków Władysław I Łokietek (the Elbow-High) united the Polish lands, and in 1320 he was crowned king of Poland. At that time Polish relations with the Teutonic Order were bad. In 1308 the Teutonic Knights deceitfully occupied Gdańsk and later Gdańsk Pomerania. In 1331 the Teutonic army attacked Poland, reaching as far as Kalisz. During their retreat, on 27 September, Władysław attacked the part of the Teutonic army that was guarding a supply column near the village of Płowce and won.

Then other Teutonic forces started to arrive on the battlefield and forced the Poles to retreat. But because of the heavy losses they had suffered, the Teutonic Knights broke off their siege of Brześć Kujawski, near Płowce, and went home.

The Treaty of Kalisz, signed in 1343, settled peaceful relations between Poland and the Teutonic Order. The treaty was effective until 1409 when the so-called grand war broke out. Initially the battles took place in frontier areas, but in the summer of 1410 the Polish-Lithuanian army under the command of Władysław II Jagiełło (r. 1386–1434) made its way to Malbork (Marienburg), the seat of the Teutonic Order. The Teutonic army opposed them on 15 July 1410 near Grunwald. After its victory there, Jagiełło's army arrived at Malbork. The subsequent siege, which lasted from 22 July to 19 September, ended unsuccessfully. The Poles and Lithuanians won another battlefield victory on 10 October near Koronowo (Krone) in Pomerania. The Teutonic army had about thirty-five hundred horsemen, against the Polish army's two thousand horsemen and several hundred infantry. Another Polish victory came on 5 November near Tuchola (Tuchel). The treaty signed on 1 February 1410 in Toruń restored the status quo ante and imposed a war indemnity on the Teutonic Knights.

In 1414 another Polish-Teutonic war broke out. In July the Polish-Lithuanian army, consisting of about forty thousand soldiers and led by Władysław II Jagiełło, invaded the lands belonging to the Teutonic Order. The Polish army stayed active in western Prussia, reaching the north of Paslek (Preussisch Holland). The Teutonic army avoided an encounter in the open field, concentrating on the defense of towns and castles. The Jagiellonian army did not manage to occupy any important town, but it plundered the villages of the countryside—later causing the war to be called "a hunger war." The war ended in October 1414.

In July 1422, Jagiełło conducted yet another expedition against the Teutonic Order. Its sole result was the plundering of the lands of Chelm and Pomerania. The expedition ended in September with the treaty of Melno Lake, by which Poland regained a small area at Kuyavia.

In 1431 the Teutonic army invaded Kuyavia and the northeastern part of Greater Poland. The Order helped the Lithuanian prince Swidrygiello (or Śvitrigaila; r. 1400–1452), who had organized an anti-Polish rebellion in Lithuania. The Teutonic Order entered Poland, where on 13 September 1431 near Dąbki village (near Nakło, or Nakel) on the river Noteć a detachment of seven hundred horsemen and five hundred infantry from Kurlandia, led by Marshal Werner von Nesselrode, was destroyed by the Poles.

In 1433, Poland recruited detachments of Czech Hussite Orphans under the command of Jan Čapek of Sány to help fight the Teutonic Knights. The Hussite force comprised five to seven thousand light infantry, nine hundred horsemen, and a hundred and twenty war wagons. Reinforced by the mass levy of Greater Poland, the army entered New March (Neumark) at the beginning of June 1433 and plundered it. By the end of June the armies left New March and marched to Pomerania, where they were joined by a levy army from Lesser Poland. The Polish-Czech army reached the Gulf of Gdańsk and then returned to Poland. The Treaty of Brześć Kujawski, signed on 31 December 1435, ended the war.

In February 1454 a rebellion against the Teutonic Order, encouraged by the Prussian Confederation, broke out in Prussia. The rebels occupied most of the towns and turned for help to the Polish king, Casimir IV Jagiełło (r. 1447–1492). The king announced on 6 March 1454 the incorporation of Prussia into Poland and declared war on the Order, beginning what is generally known as the Thirteen Years' War. The Teutonic army, deprived of its subjects' support, fought with the help of mercenary troops. The conflict began with the siege of Chojnice by the Polish army and the rebels. On 18 September the Teutonic army won a battle near Chojnice. In 1457 the Poles bought Malbork, Tczew (Dirschau), and Iława (Deutsch Eylau) for 190,000 Hungarian florins. Poland was able to purchase the lands from the Czech mercenary troops because the Teutonic Order had fallen into arrears with their soldiers' pay.

From 1461, Poland depended exclusively on mercenary troops commanded by Peter Dunin, who on

17 September 1462 won the battle of Świecino. The Polish army comprised one thousand horsemen, including 112 heavy-armed lancers, and about one thousand infantry. The Teutonic army, commanded by Fritz Raweneck, consisted of one thousand horsemen and seventeen hundred infantry, including thirteen hundred armed peasants. The key moment of the battle was when the Teutonic army pushed back the Polish units. But the Order's troops found themselves under the heavy fire of Polish crossbowmen and surrendered with heavy losses: one thousand were killed, including three hundred horsemen, among them Raweneck. On the Polish side one hundred men were killed and one hundred and fifty were injured, including Peter Dunin.

The success at Świecino encouraged Peter Dunin to besiege Gniew (Mewe) on the Vistula River in July 1463. The grand master of the Teutonic Knights, Ludwig von Erlichshausen, tried to relieve the town, and on 9 September he sailed from Królewiec (Königsberg) to Gniew with a fleet of forty-four ships and fifteen hundred soldiers. On 15 September the fleet was attacked by thirty vessels from Gdańsk and Elbląg (Elbing). Most of the Teutonic ships were sunk, and five hundred soldiers were taken prisoner. Gniew surrendered on 1 January 1464. The most significant event of the war was the capitulation of Chojnice on 28 September 1466. The Thirteen Years' War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Toruń on 19 October 1466. Poland gained Pomerania, the Chelm lands, Warmia (Ermland), and the Zulawy (Werder). The Teutonic Order lost its independence and accepted the Polish king's superiority.

In 1478 the War of the Priests (Pfaffenkrieg) broke out between Poland and Nicolaus of Tüngen, bishop of Warmia, supported by the Teutonic army. The Polish army, consisting of mercenary troops and skillfully led by Peter White, won numerous battles in Pomerania and Warmia, forcing the Order to retreat. The conflict ended with the treaty signed in Piotrków Trybunalski in 1479.

In 1474 an expedition to Silesia—dependent at that time on Hungary—set off. The Polish army consisted of forty thousand people, including twenty thousand from the mass levy, thirty-three hundred

mercenaries (including fifteen hundred infantry), and the Tatars' detachment and Lithuanian reinforcements. Under the control of Casimir IV Jagiello, the army set off on 26 September and crossed the Oder in the south of Opole. The Czech army of fourteen thousand men joined the Polish army on its way, and both armies reached Wrocław on 28 October. The armies decided not to attack the well-fortified town, which had twelve to fifteen thousand armed soldiers—including six thousand Hungarians brought by Mátyás Hunyadi—inside. Hunger and cold forced the Jagiellonians to make a treaty with Mátyás and retreat from Silesia without having made any gains.

Eastern Border. Between 1210 and 1376 the Lithuanians invaded Polish territory fifty-three times, devastating Mazovia, Kuyavia, eastern greater Poland, and eastern lesser Poland. These were mostly short plundering attacks. After the Union of Krewo (1385) the attacks stopped.

Poland joined the conquest of the Ruthenian lands in 1340–1366. From 1416 to 1494 the Tatars attacked this part of Poland fifty times. If the Moldavian and Turkish invasions are counted, the areas were attacked every year or two. A permanent defense was organized to protect them. In 1485 three thousand mercenary troops were sent to Moldavia at the request of its prince, Ștefan cel Mare (r. 1457–1504). They were supposed to help the Moldavians recapture from the Turks the Black Sea ports of Kiliya and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy (both now in Ukraine). Despite the victory on 16 November at Katlabuga Lake, the ports were not won back.

In 1497 the Polish king John I Albert (or Jan I Olbracht; r. 1492–1501) led an expedition to Moldavia to overthrow Ștefan cel Mare. The Polish army comprised eighty thousand people and thirty thousand war wagons. The army left Lviv in June and on 19 September opened the siege of Suceava, the capital of Moldavia. The city repulsed the attack, and in October the Poles began their retreat, during which the Moldavians defeated them on 26 October at the battle of Cosmin Forest. The Polish expedition was a complete failure.

The Ruthenian Lands. During the reign of Gediminas (r. 1316–1341), the ruler of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Ruthenian lands became the object of Lithuania's expansionist ambitions. The conquests were continued by Olgerd (or Algirdas; r. 1345–1377), who occupied the Kiev region, Volhynia, and Podolia. In 1340, 1349–1352, and 1353–1366 the Polish king Casimir III, "the Great," conducted wars in Halych Ruthenia and Volhynia. When he entered Ruthenia, the Lithuanians endeavored to stop him. As a result Poland conquered and occupied both Ruthenias. Chelm and Belz stayed with Lithuania as Polish fiefs.

The part of Ruthenia that was joined to Poland was attacked many times and ravaged by Tatar and Moldavian invasions. Moscow was attacked three times between 1368 and 1372, but it was never conquered. In 1380 the Tatars tried to strengthen their position in Ruthenia by organizing an expedition to Moscow. The Ruthenian army opposed them on 8 September at Kulikovo Pole (Field) and defeated the army of Mamai Khan. Moscow surrendered in 1382 after a three-week siege conducted by the Tatars led by Tokhtamysh Khan.

By the end of the fourteenth and in the first part of the fifteenth century the conquests of Ruthenia were continued by the Lithuanians, who occupied Smolensk and attacked Pskov. The Lithuanian conquests were not stopped even by the repulse on the Vorskla River inflicted by the Golden Horde on 12 August 1399. In 1425 the Lithuanian ruler Vytautas became the guardian of the young Prince Vasily II of Moscow, his grandson, and at the same time he enlarged his influence on the Muscovy duchy. In the 1420s the Lithuanians forced Pskov and Novgorod to pay tribute. During the reign of Ivan III (r. 1462–1505), Muscovy began its expansion into Ruthenia, depriving Lithuania of many territories. In the 1470s Muscovy conquered Pskov and Novgorod, which had been dependent on Lithuania. It also demanded the return of Ruthenian lands. This resulted in a war in 1498–1503, the key battle of which was fought near Vedrosha on 14 July 1500. The Lithuanian army, consisting of five to seven thousand people and led by Constantine Ostrogski, was defeated by the

Muscovy army of around thirty thousand. The successful battle encouraged Moscow to continue its sixteenth-century expansion to the west.

[See also Baltics; Chojnice, Battle of; Cosmin Forest, Battle of; East Central Europe, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Golden Horde; Grunwald, Battle of; Hungary; Hunyadi, Mátyás; John of Luxembourg; Kulikovo, Battle of; Marienburg, Siege of; Mesembria, Siege of; Nakło, Battle of; *Obrona Potoczna*; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern Orders; Płowce, Battle near; Prokop the Bald; Sigismund of Luxemburg; Štefan cel Mare; Velbužd, Battle of; Vidin, Siege of; and Žižka, Jan.]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

Historiography (500–1000)

The relative lack of sources about Slavic lands in the period before 1000 may be somewhat compensated for by approaching the subject through works on the Slavs' neighbors. Views on the role of nomadic peoples in early medieval eastern Europe can be found in the collection *The Other Europe in the Middle Ages: Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans*, edited by Florin Curta with the assistance of Roman Kovalev. A similar work, entitled *Wczesnośredniowieczni*

sąsiedzi Słowian (The neighbors of the Slavs in the early Middle Ages), was published by Maria Miskiewiczowa. The relationship between the Slavs and Byzantium was described in a 1999 volume by Petăr Angelov, *Bálgarija i bálgarite v predstavite na vizantijskite (VII–XIV vek)*. The first four chapters of Florin Curta's study *Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 500–1250* are devoted to the period 500–1000. Gerard Labuda's *Pierwsze państwo słowiańskie: Państwo Samona* (The first Slavic state: Samo's state) is a study devoted to the empire of Samo (r. c. 623–659)—the first known ruler of a Slavic state, formed by the Wends, who had previously been Avar subjects.

On the history of Great Moravia, the most influential scholar has been Lubomír Havlík, whose works include *Velká Morava a středoevropští Slované* (Great Moravia and Central European Slavs), *Kronika o Velké Moravě* (Chronicle of Great Moravia), and *Svatopluk Veliký, král Moravanů a Slovanů* (Svatopluk the Great, King of Moravians and Slavs). Since the latter part of the twentieth century, however, the location and extent of Great Moravia, as well as the interpretation of the name, have been questioned. The historian Imre Boba (1919–1996) was convinced that the heartland of this early Slavic polity was near ancient Sirmium in modern north-western Serbia. Another valuable volume regarding Boba's work is *Kijevtől Kalocsáig: Emlékkönyv Boba Imre tiszteletére* (From Kiev to Kalocsa: Festschrift in honor of Imre Boba), edited by István Petrovics. Later the historians Péter Püspöki Nagy and Senga Toru argued that two Moravian polities existed at the same time: one in the territory of modern Moravia, the other in the south. Martin Eggers also supports the "two Moravias" theory—see his *Das "Grossmährische Reich": Realität oder Fiktion?* (The "Great Moravian Empire": Reality or fiction?)—but he believes that both realms must have been situated far to the southeast of modern Moravia. Charles R. Bowlus has pointed out that the Carolingian marcher organization was oriented toward the southeast, which supports Moravia's southern location.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries in central and eastern Europe, the Slavic states of Bohemia,

Ruthenia, and Poland emerged. They are described in *Historia Słowian południowych i zachodnich* (History of southern and western Slavs), by Jerzy Skowronek, Mieczysław Tanty, and Tadeusz Wasilewski, and in Jerzy Strzelczyk's *Odkrywanie Europy* (Discovering Europe). Dušan Třeštík analyzes early medieval Bohemia in his *Počátky Přemyslovců: Vstup čechů do Dějin (530–935)* (The dawn of the Přemyslids: The entrance of the Bohemians into history, 530–935). The origin of Poland is discussed by Henryk Lowmianski in a six-volume study, *Początki Polski: Z dziejów Słowian w i tysiącleciu n.e.* (The beginnings of Poland: On the history of the Slavs in the first century), as well as in Gerard Labuda's two-volume *Studia nad początkami państwa polskiego* (Studies on the origins of Poland as a state). More recent works on northern and western Slavic lands are Kazimierz Wachowski and Gerard Labuda's *Słowiańszczyzna zachodnia* (Western Slavs), Marek Dulinicz's *Kształtowanie się Słowiańszczyzny Północno-Zachodniej: Studium archeologiczne* (The shaping of northern and western Slavic Lands: An archaeological study), and Sebastian Brather's *Archaeologie der westlichen Slawen: Siedlung, Wirtschaft, und Gesellschaft im früh- und hochmittelalterlichen Ostmitteleuropa* (Archaeology of the Western Slavs: Settlers, economy, and society in the early and late Middle Ages in east Europe).

Two other titles can be singled out for their usefulness regarding this period: Jan Šolta has described the history of the Serbians and Lusatians in *Abriss der Sorbischen Geschichte* (Outline of history of the Serbs), and Urszula Lewicka-Rajewska's *Arabskie opisanie Słowian: Źródła do dziejów średniowiecznej kultury* (Arabic description of the Slavs: On the history of medieval culture) discusses, for instance, horse breeding in ancient Slavic societies, while another chapter deals with armament.

[See also Baltics, *subentry on Historiography (500–1300)* and Hungary, *subentry on Historiography (500–1000)*.]

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Jan Szymczak

Historiography (1000–1300)

For decades the research of the history of Slavic peoples in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries has had many directions. One is the publication of sources: new editions, new commentaries, and the rethinking of some aspects. This is inevitable in the case of narrative sources such as historiography and hagiography. One can call the modern editions of the histories of the countries traditional. Regarding the Slavic countries, the political changes of the early 1990s led to a renaissance of the great summaries of the turn of the twentieth century through reprinted editions. During Communist times, neglect of certain sources and the arbitrary selection of others led to academic misinterpretations, resulting in distortions of the history of the Middle Ages, including of its military history. See B. D. Grekov's "world of fantasy" about medieval times and B. A. Rybakov's book on the Kievan Rus'. The reprinting of older scholarship has led to the revival of a certain former way of thinking but has had an undoubtedly positive effect on source criticism.

In contrast to the single-nation studies that were most common earlier, research since the 1990s has tended to take a regional view or make cross-regional comparisons—particularly in conference volumes or exhibition catalogs resulting from team projects. In Slavic countries, publications have increased in number. In addition to historical work done in Slavic countries as well as in the English-speaking world, important results have been produced at research centers that belong to

neither of the two—for example, the Baltic states, Finland, and Hungary. The same holds true of source criticism.

Because many Slavic countries (Bohemia, Poland, the Kievan Rus') started to evolve around the year 1000, the year 2000 was important, with many studies celebrating the millennium. In the Slavic states of the Balkans, the process of state building began earlier, yet where the spheres of interest of Rome and Constantinople clashed, stability was not achieved for a long time. From the point of view of military history, the fights against the neighboring great empires and for the leadership within a new state deserve more attention. The new states had to defend their independence against the neighboring Christian empires. Also, they had to fight against the nomadic peoples of the East, such as the Patzinaks (Pechenegs), Cumans, and Tartars. The changes in the inner power structures and the lack of stability led to many internal conflicts followed by military events and dynastic alliances. Of the nomadic attacks, the Tartar devastation of the thirteenth century was the gravest.

Research continues to pay special attention to conversions to Christianity and to the various specific Slavic regions. The actual borders of eastern, western, and southern Slavic regions still remain to be defined, as does the genesis of different ethnicities. The genesis of different ethnicities is not necessarily a part of military history, but it requires the evaluation of sources written to describe foreign enemies, who were defined as an "other."

[See also *Baltics, subentry on Historiography (500–1300)* and *Hungary, subentry on Historiography (1000–1300)*.]

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Márta Font

Historiography (1300–1500)

Military operations of the Bulgarians are discussed in Dimităr Angelov and Boris Čolpanov's work, as well as in the volume edited by Dimităr Zafirov and Emil Aleksnadrov. Army administration was described

by Ivan Biljarski. Information concerning the armament of the Bulgarian army can be found in Stojan Vitljanov's work and in the collection edited by Valeri Jotov, Veselin Nikolov, and Vladimir Slavcev. A valuable summary of archaeological research on town fortifications and administrative centers was provided by Petăr Balabanov, Stefan Bojadžiev, and Nikolaj Tuleškov. A. N. Kirpichnikov and Mikhail Gorelik have presented the military history of Russia in many studies.

The Polish-Teutonic wars of 1308–1521 have been described by Marian Biskup. Karol Olejnik conducted research on military conflicts that took place on the western border of the Kingdom of Poland. Krzysztof Baczkowski studied the military efforts of the Poles to mount the Hungarian throne in 1471 and 1490–1492 and on the Polish-Hungarian war in Silesia in 1471. The wars fought by Poland with the Tatars, the Moldavians, the Turks, and the Hungarians in Jagiellonian times have been discussed by Marek Plewczyn'ski. The results of research on armament in medieval Poland have been gathered in the books edited by Andrzej Nadolski (covering 1350–1450) and Andrzej Nowakowski (covering 1450–1500). The beginning and development of firearms in Poland are discussed in detail in Jan Szymczak's work. Tadeusz Grabarczyk discussed Polish mercenary infantry: its organization and composition and its participation in wars. Defense fortifications are described in numerous works devoted to particular regions of Poland. Worthy of mention are the work by Janusz Bogdanowski and the lexicon of castles by Leszek Kajzer, Stanisław Kołodziejski, and Jan Salm. For an overview description—in English—of the medieval Polish army, see the book by Witold Sarnecki and David Nicolle.

Wojciech Iwańczak discussed knightly ideals and warcraft in fourteenth-century Bohemia. The Hussites have been described by František Šmahel and František M. Bartoš; in English the best approach to the Hussite wars is through Frederick Heymann's biography of Jan Žižka. The foreign policy of the Czechs in the years 1440–1471 was described by Otokar Odložilík. The monograph by Uwe Tresp is devoted to the fifteenth-century mercenaries from Bohemia.

František Hoffman analyzed the military role of towns in Bohemia.

[See also Baltics, *subentries on* Historiography (1300–1500) and Hungary, *subentry on* Historiography (1300–1526).]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

SLING

See Weapons, Missile.

SLUYS, NAVAL BATTLE OF

The campaign of England's Edward III through the region of Cambrai and Thiérache in 1339 succeeded in destroying the countryside and terrorizing the people. It also helped solidify alliances with the Count of Hainaut and Holland; the Duke of Brabant; the Holy Roman Emperor; and Jacob van Artevelde, the Ghentenaar burgher who had wrested control of Flanders from Count Louis of Nevers in 1338. But Edward had failed to bring Philip VI and the French army to battle.

Back in England early in 1340, Edward petitioned Parliament for more funds and reinforcements. He was only partially successful, leaving England in June with fewer soldiers and funds than he had hoped. Knowing that the English king would be returning to the southern Low Countries—Edward's wife, Philippa of Hainaut, had recently given birth in Ghent to their son, John of Gaunt (Ghent)—Philip had moved his army into Cambrai. He had also sent a fleet of French, Norman, and Genoese ships, under the command of Hugh Quiéret and Jean Béhuchet, to the port of Sluys in Flanders, where Edward was likely to sail.

Edward learned that the French fleet was at Sluys, and he became determined to fight a naval battle there. The battle was fought on 24 June 1340. Several accounts of the battle exist, written from all sides of the conflict, including three slightly different versions in the three separate redactions of Jean Froissart's *Chroniques*, and these allow us to construct a fairly complete narrative of the battle.

Neither the English nor the French were experienced in naval combat. Edward III had never led a fleet into action, and Quiéret and Béhuchet were far better acquainted with piratical activities and raids than with naval battles. Quiéret and Béhuchet placed the French fleet across the entry of Sluys harbor and chained the ships together. As a result the fleet would present a solid line that enemy ships could not penetrate. But it also meant that it would be difficult for any individual French ship to maneuver or to flee. Of course, the French admirals thought the need for flight highly unlikely, especially because they outnumbered the English.

Edward placed his fleet in three lines, alternating one ship with men-at-arms and two ships of archers. They were smaller ships than those of his opponent, but they were fast and far more maneuverable than the larger French vessels, even had they not been chained together. The French may also have had difficulty seeing the approaching English fleet until it was almost upon them. Several sources indicate that the English sailed into Sluys with the sun behind them, hiding them in the glare. In addition, other sources suggest that Edward duped the French admirals by performing a feigned retreat, reacting as though they were surprised that the French fleet was at Sluys and were trying to flee.

At first the two fleets traded archery fire, longbows on the English side facing French crossbows. The longbow was a more accurate weapon and, according to English chroniclers, more deadly in this battle, thus allowing the English fleet to close with the French. These English ships, filled with an army and led by a king who fought among them, easily defeated the sailors opposing them in the hand-to-hand combat that followed.

During the battle the shore of Sluys became packed with Flemings, perhaps as many as eight thousand, if Froissart can be believed. Soon they began to play a pivotal role in the conflict as soldiers and sailors from both sides fell into the water or tried to leave their ships and escape to land. The Flemings saved the English and killed the French who tried to come ashore.

After a lengthy battle the French were defeated. With most ships unable to break free of their tethers, only a few, mostly Genoese, were able to escape. A short time later Edward III arrived in Ghent to see his newborn son and to plot further warfare against the French with his Low County and imperial allies.

[See also Edward III of England; Froissart, Jean; Hundred Years' War; Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479); Naval Combat and Tactics; Philip VI of France; and Ships and Sailing.]

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Kelly DeVries

SOEST, SIEGE OF

The siege of Soest from 30 June to 21 July 1447 represents the height of military action during the Soest Feud, a war of supremacy in northwestern Germany. Soest, an important economic center of medieval Westphalia, had ignited the feud by its push for independence. In June 1444 the town dissociated itself from its sovereign, Archbishop of Cologne Dietrich of Moers, and rendered homage to Duke John I of Kleve, who was supported by Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy. After a few years of inconclusive fighting, the archbishop sought a decisive victory. In May

1447 he reached an agreement with Duke William III of Saxony, landgrave of Thuringia, who was willing to enter into the archbishop's service with twelve thousand mercenaries. Dietrich was to pay the duke fifty thousand florins and to bear all the costs of the army.

At the end of May 1447 Duke William gathered his men not far from Weimar in Thuringia. The army consisted of two almost equally strong detachments: the Thuringian forces in the duke's service and Bohemian mercenaries, likewise recruited for this operation. According to payrolls, the so-called "Bohemian army" comprised 2,600 infantry, around 2,800 men-at-arms and mounted crossbowmen, as well as 1,200 carthorses. Similarly, the so-called "German army" consisted of more than 3,000 infantry and some 4,000 horsemen and carthorses, probably comparable to the figures in the "Bohemian army".

On 1 June 1447 they left Weimar and, passing Göttingen, Einbeck, and Holzminden, approached Blomberg, a small town belonging to the counts of Lippe, who were associated with the dukes of Kleve. The town was captured on 14 June in one short attack. The army, which the archbishop's forces had in the meantime joined, now marched toward Lippstadt and besieged it from 20 to 29 June. Here, already, the campaign suffered visibly from the deplorable organization of the archbishop, who neither paid nor adequately supplied the soldiers of his army. Thus it was decided to lift the siege of Lippstadt and take direct action against the actual enemy—the town of Soest.

When on 30 June or 1 July the archbishop's more than fifteen thousand men arrived to besiege Soest, the town was well prepared for the fight. Arms, ammunition, and provisions had been laid in to supply some ten thousand inhabitants during the siege. Accompanied by eight hundred men-at-arms and reinforcements, Duke John of Kleve stayed in town as well. But most importantly, Soest had taken care to establish a far-reaching system of assistance amongst Germany's northwestern towns, so that they would more or less openly refuse to trade with the enemy, thus creating shortages that would considerably impede any longer siege.

For the town's defenders the siege nevertheless commenced with a defeat. Their sally against the archbishop's approaching forces was repulsed by the Bohemians, who then captured a monastery right beneath the city walls. This bridgehead proved ideal for bombarding the town, but apart from the ongoing gunfight between the monastery and the city walls, the following three weeks of the siege saw little further action. From time to time sallies by the garrison or attacks on the besieger's supply convoys led to smaller skirmishes between the enemies. But, because his forces were not numerous enough, Dietrich had not entirely encircled Soest, instead concentrating on securing the town's vital approaches.

The besiegers' situation grew worse the longer the siege lasted: necessary supplies had to be brought from greater distances and were often intercepted by Soest's allies. Having soon stripped bare the town's vicinity, the mercenaries now further extended their risky raids, often suffering heavy casualties in the resulting fights. Above all the army's morale sunk considerably as it became evident that the archbishop lacked funds and would be unable to pay the soldiers until a later date. When the mercenaries finally declined to believe the promises of their commanders and openly considered mutiny, Archbishop Dietrich resolved to stake everything on one last attack: the town should be taken by storm.

On the early morning of 19 July 1447 the assault on Soest was launched simultaneously from three directions: the archbishop of Cologne had his own men approach from the northwest, Duke William of Saxony advanced with his Thuringians from the northeast, and the Bohemian mercenaries advanced from the southeast. The preliminary bombardment with firearms and crossbows was immediately followed by a direct assault, using special connectable scaling ladders to mount the city walls. According to Duke William's battle order, each assault troop was followed by a small group of knights to either send back to battle or execute any hesitant or escaping mercenary.

The townsmen, having noticed the besiegers' preparations, had taken precautions against

the attack. They greeted the enemy with a shower of crossbow-bolts and poured boiling water and quicklime on the attackers' heads. The assault on Soest lasted for about ten hours before the exhausted and demoralized besiegers gave up. Their losses were estimated at some fifty killed and more than a thousand wounded, while the defenders' losses were probably much less.

It was impossible to sustain the siege after this disaster, and on 21 July Duke William broke up the encampment and marched back to Thuringia. During their retreat the defeated, still unrewarded, and hungry mercenaries, especially the unruly Bohemians, abandoned all discipline and caused considerable unrest. Shortly before the army's arrival in Thuringia, several Bohemian noblemen mutinied and, with some three thousand mercenaries, left the duke and set off for their native country on their own.

While its victory had finally secured the town of Soest lasting independence from the archbishop of Cologne, he and his defeated allies were left to settle their bills. The final account of war costs, as presented to the archbishop by Duke William, amounted to 242,000 florins. Dietrich of Moers was clearly unable to pay this sum; in 1492 his successor and Duke William's heirs agreed to reduce the debt to 31,000 florins—though even this sum was never fully paid.

[See also Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1415–1493).]

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Uwe Tresp

SOFIA, SIEGE OF

Sofia occupies a central position in the geography of the Balkans. During the Middle Ages it was the crossing point of important roads leading to Constantinople, Belgrade, Thessalonica, Skopje, Durrës (formerly Dyrrachium), and Dubrovnik. Following the capture of Adrianopolis (1369), Philippopolis (Plovdiv; 1371), and Serres (1383), the Ottoman Turks focused their efforts on the capture of Sofia, because this important fortress would have opened the road for them to the inland Balkan Peninsula and to central Europe. The task of taking Sofia was assigned to Lala Şahin, Beylerbey of Rumelia, who as early as 1382 made the first assaults to capture it. Following several unsuccessful attempts he submitted a report to the sultan in which he described the stronghold, its wealth, its courageous defenders, and their outstanding leader, Ban Yanuka. He recommended that Indže Balaban, governor of Philippopolis, should replace him.

According to a seventeenth-century Ottoman source, Indže Balaban made use of a falconer who had converted to Islam to lure Ban Yanuka out of the city on a hunting trip and capture him. Indže Balaban took him along as a prisoner, and together with his army, he set off for Sofia. When the citizens of Sofia saw their leader in captivity, they begged for mercy for him and voluntarily opened the gates of the fortress. Archaeological excavations in the remnants of the medieval fortress, however, offer a different explanation. A hole was discovered at the town's western gate, filled with stone and lime. This reveals that the defenders were making efforts to fill the hole in the wall caused by battering rams. That suggests that they did not surrender willingly, but only after attempting a defense. One way or another, Sofia fell in 1385.

Immediately after Sofia the Turks took Pirot and Niš. In the Turkish expansion on the Balkan

Peninsula, the conquest of Sofia is second only to the capture of Adrianopolis in significance.

[See also Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Tactics and Technology; and Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Vassil Gjuzelev

SOISSONS, BATTLE OF

With the battle of Soissons, Clovis I, "King" of a relatively small Salian Frankish kingdom centered around Tournai in the ancient Roman province of Belgica Secunda, began the expansion of his territory. With his ally and cousin Ragnachar, "King of Cambrai," Clovis defeated Syagrius, "King of the Romans," in a battle near his residence, Soissons, about 150 kilometers (about 93 miles) southwest of Tournai. After his defeat, Syagrius fled to the court of Alaric II, King of the Visigoths, who handed him over to Clovis.

Clovis, like his father before him, was a Roman general as well as a barbarian king, and the battle must be understood in that context. Clovis integrated parts of the beaten army of Syagrius into his own army and confiscated the land of the Roman *fiscus*, which until that time had been exploited by Syagrius for himself. By this battle, Clovis I expanded drastically the geographical dimension of his former zone of influence. The old Roman town Soissons, with its institutions of public authority (mint, garrison, arms factories) was now the center of his new realm. Subsequently, Clovis became the unfriendly neighbor of the Visigoths in the southwest and of the Alemans in the East.

Practically nothing is known about the battle itself because the main source, Gregory, bishop of Tours (d. 594), writing already a century later, is

not a reliable authority. Therefore, nothing can be said about the number of Clovis's warriors. Perhaps Gregory's famous anecdote about the partition of the booty after this victory reflects something about Clovis's understanding of kingship. After the combat, all the rich booty was exposed in public at Soissons for division. Clovis wanted to have a precious pitcher for himself to offer it to the Church as acknowledgment of his gratitude for divine help. But a Frankish warrior insisted that the king follow the traditional method of sharing out the plunder, and then the warrior split the vase with his axe to ensure that the king could not appropriate it. According to Gregory of Tours, the arrogant warrior was killed by Clovis with an ax during a muster some time later.

[See also Clovis I.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

SORBARA, BATTLE OF

In mid-June 1084, Emperor Henry IV left Italy after a successful three-year campaign at Rome. He was crowned emperor by his chosen pope, Clement III; Gregory VII, who had refused to perform the coronation, was forced to leave the city. Countess Matilda of Tuscany had supported Pope Gregory throughout the campaign. The Otbertines, an extended noble family with large holdings around Parma, supported Henry. During the campaign Henry conducted raids against Matilda's possessions, and she sent her forces against his supporters, maintaining Gregory's communications and providing him with needed funds. Thus the report that the Otbertines were encouraged to give themselves a reward from Matilda's large holdings is credible. They may have intended to reinforce the antipope Clement, also a nobleman of Parma, at Rome after securing the north, something that Henry had been unable to accomplish.

Whatever the Otbertines' ultimate goal, the invading force moved openly across Matilda's territory, perhaps attempting to lure her into battle, and marched unopposed as far as Sorbara, although she was clearly aware of its movements. Her small attack force assembled within a single day. The countess may have acted when scouts reported that the invaders' camp was carelessly guarded. It has been suggested that she kept hidden and did not oppose the advance in the hope of such an opportunity. Alternatively, the danger of betrayal outweighed any advantage of taking the time to assemble a larger strike force. She had clearly maintained readiness.

None of the accounts specifies where Matilda's troops gathered, but the attackers had to reach Sorbara, where her enemies had encamped, in a night's ride and have their horses fresh for battle or, should the surprise fail, for escape. This imposed a maximum of about twenty miles (thirty kilometers). The countess had a number of castles within this range, and travel involved at least one river crossing at night.

At dawn on 2 July 1084 the battle cries that awakened Henry's supporters in their camp announced that despite Matilda's losses in defense of the pope, she could still mount a vigorous defense of her territory. The four descriptions of the battle, including that of a possible eyewitness, come from Matilda's side and depict a total victory for the countess. The defeated common soldiers suffered high casualties and were left unburied on the field. Few of Matilda's troops were wounded, and only three died. Six greater nobles (*capitaneos*) and more than one hundred lesser nobles (*bonis militibus*) were taken prisoner, including Bishop Eberhard of Parma. The leader of the expedition, the Otbertine marquis Oberto, fought his way free and fled. Bishop Gandulf of Reggio hid in the bushes and may thus have avoided capture. The victory was capped by booty that included more than five hundred horses, all the armor and equipment, and, presumably, substantial ransoms. Matilda and the papal reform party that she supported were greatly strengthened.

Matilda not only resisted fresh attacks on her territory but also began to recover what had previously

been lost. A number of pro-Gregorian bishops were installed, and after the death of Gregory VII the following year, Matilda took an active role in the election of a reformer as successor pope. The struggle at Rome continued, and five years later Henry IV returned to Italy personally to campaign against her.

[See also Canossa, Battle of; Italy, subentry on Narrative (1000–1300); and Mantua, Siege of.]

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Valerie Eads

SPEARS

See Weapons, Hand-to-Hand.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

A special operation is a combat operation that intends to achieve significant strategic or political results by means of a disproportionately small investment of time, lives, and resources. This is most often accomplished by the use of unconventional and covert methods of fighting. Special operations involving assassination, abduction, sabotage, infiltration, and betrayal were an integral and central part of medieval warfare. These operations can be divided into several types, according to their aim: capturing fortified places, assassinating and abducting leaders, rescuing leaders, and destroying infrastructure facilities.

Capturing Fortified Places. Capturing fortified places by means of regular warfare was often a costly

undertaking in terms of time, lives, and resources. Special operations aimed to capture strongholds at a fraction of that cost. Failure was a minor setback, whereas success could be a major coup. Most special operations aiming to capture a stronghold followed the same pattern: A small force, comprising from one to several dozen persons, tried to seize part of the fortified perimeter by escalade, ruse, or treason. A much larger force usually followed on the heels of the advance party, ready to enter the stronghold through the captured section and subdue any remaining resistance by regular combat. Notable examples of the capture of major strongholds by means of special operations include Antioch (1098), Berwick (1355), Chartres (1432), and Pontoise (1437).

The capture of fortified places was the most widespread contribution of special operations to medieval warfare. On many occasions, particularly when the attackers had neither the time nor the resources to undertake a regular siege, special operations were the only option (small raiding parties and freebooter companies were particularly reliant on them). Even when regular sieges were undertaken and armies engaged in a protracted campaign of blockade, bombardment, and assault, they tended to mount a parallel clandestine campaign of espionage, betrayal, and escalade. The latter type of campaign often proved to be most important. A stronghold that successfully withstood months of blockade and regular assault might suddenly fall to some clandestine operation.

Treachery was a particular hazard for besieged strongholds. Many military manuals listed treachery as the most serious danger threatening the garrison, and besieged commanders normally kept only one eye on the enemy outside, while watching their own forces warily with the other.

Assassinating and Abducting Leaders. The highly personal character of medieval politics and wars meant that political, military, and religious leaders were the other major targets of special operations. A successful strike against an enemy leader could at least confuse and hamper the enemy actions, and it might occasionally lead to the complete disintegration of the enemy army or war effort.

or even the enemy polity itself. Particularly during inheritance conflicts and succession wars, killing or abducting the enemy prince could terminate the war.

The effectiveness of targeting enemy leaders was most clearly demonstrated by the Shiite Nizari sect, better known as the sect of the Hashshashin (Assassins). This small persecuted sect, which commanded no significant territorial, economic, demographic, or military resources, nevertheless managed to become an important power in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Middle East by its systematic use of subterfuge and assassination. Though no European polity or movement imitated the Nizaris' success, a large number of European princes adopted assassination as a political and military tool, and the list of assassinated and abducted medieval princes, prelates, and notables is long and varied.

The main drawback of assassination and abduction was its negative effect on the political culture. By flouting the sanctity of rulers, the values of chivalry, and the norms and laws of inheritance, widespread usage of assassination could destabilize the political system to the detriment of all members of the ruling caste. It was a classical case of "the Prisoner's Dilemma," and medieval elites in most cases limited the use of assassination and abduction against enemy leaders, even when they showed no similar restraint in their treatment of ordinary civilians. (Thomas More famously argued in favor of assassination as a military method, saying that it saves thousands of innocent lives at the cost of a few guilty ones.) It is probably no coincidence that the most spectacular successes of European assassination and abduction operations happened outside the European political system, namely the abductions of the Mexican ruler Montezuma II (1519) and the Inca ruler Atahualpa (1532), which contributed greatly to the collapse of those American empires.

Rescuing Leaders. In contrast to assassinating enemy leaders, rescuing one's own captive leaders was usually a legitimate and laudable enterprise. In economic terms, it could save much money, for the ransom of a captive prince was often larger than a

kingdom's yearly income. The political and military benefits were potentially even greater, for it could save armies and kingdoms from paralysis and disintegration. Since captive leaders were usually held in secure strongholds, most rescue operations were tactically similar to operations aimed at capturing fortified places. Notable examples include the rescue of King Baldwin II of Jerusalem from Khartpert fortress (1123), of King Charles the Bad of Navarre from Arleux fortress (1357), and of Duchess Jacqueline of Holland from Ghent (1425).

Destroying Infrastructure Facilities. Occasionally, special operations were aimed at destroying infrastructure facilities such as bridges, dams, and mills. Such attempts, however, were relatively rare, because of the absence of worthwhile targets in a preindustrial world and the lack of explosives with which to destroy them. The absence of explosives meant that most targets could be destroyed only if the raiders brought with them a large working party, or if they spent a lot of time in the target area. In most cases, this made such operations impractical. Special operations aimed at the destruction of infrastructure facilities include the torching of the markets of Aleppo (1180), a French raid on the dam on the river Aa at Watten (1347), a Scottish raid on Kelso Bridge (1333), the destruction of the flour mill of Auriol (1536), and the raid on the Po Bridge at Carignano (1544).

Special Forces. Though special operations were an important part of medieval warfare, special forces hardly existed, with the possible exception of the Nizari assassins. Individuals and groups occasionally acquired considerable experience in special operations, but no units were raised and trained specifically for the performance of assassination, infiltration, or rescue operations.

Cultural Aspects. Special operations occupied an important but complex place in medieval military culture. On the one hand, special operations involving betrayals, deceptions, assassinations, and abductions ran counter to chivalric notions of fair play and were often thought odious. On the other hand, special operations occasionally enabled the fulfillment of chivalric fantasies far better than conventional

battles and siege operations. Particular types of special operations, most notably the storming of fortified places and the rescue of captive leaders, were the bread-and-butter of chivalric romances and chansons de geste. For instance, the *Charroi de Nîmes* focuses on the capture of the city of Nîmes by a special operation, and countless other chivalric narratives focus on the rescue of kidnapped princesses (and the occasional prince) from impregnable fortresses.

[See also Antioch, Siege and Battles of; Assassins; and Prisoners and Ransoms.]

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Yuval Noah Harari

SPIES AND INTELLIGENCE

In both biblical and classical times, spies were employed in intelligence-gathering in wartime. In his *De Re Militari*, written in the late fourth century C.E., Vegetius recommended their use for the acquisition of information useful to a military commander planning an action. Two centuries later, their importance was stressed again in the *Strategikon* of the Byzantine emperor Maurice. Spies came in many disguises, some of which conceal their true identity to this day: *explorator* (Latin), *coureur* (French), *aspie* (obsolete English), and *scourer* (English), are among the terms used.

Asked why they had agreed to spy, some—prisoners for example—might have admitted being recruited in return for their freedom granted without payment of the ransom they owed. Others were promised material reward for their work. Spies (or

scouts) might be sent before an advancing army to reconnoiter the situation ahead, as the man seen on the eleventh-century Bayeux Tapestry was clearly doing. Or they might be merchants congregating in an important center, such as Calais, a port and a vital meeting place close to where jurisdictions met. Here they could seek and exchange information—military (including news of troop or ship movements), economic (information about prices, commerce, and harvests), or political—any of which might be useful to those making decisions about war. Merchants traveled easily and had extensive networks of contacts that could provide valuable information. Women, too, are found regularly in the records as being sent on missions to obtain information about enemy troop movements. Among others who acted as spies were clergy, students going abroad to study (as they increasingly did), and pilgrims—all, with the benefit of immunity, able to move fairly freely across frontiers from one territory to another. Ambassadors and heralds were often regarded with the gravest suspicion, for they also enjoyed immunity, which the less scrupulous might abuse in the search for information. In time of imminent conflict or of war itself, steps were sometimes taken to limit the freedom of travel of visiting ambassadors, thus denying them the opportunity to gauge opinion or to see and report on military preparations taking place. The English “hosting” laws, which controlled where visiting aliens might stay, were likewise intended to regulate the free movement of foreign merchants within the country, particularly at moments of political or military crisis.

Such feelings of suspicion against the enemy, fueled by fear of spies residing within a community, might encourage xenophobic reactions that could be used to rouse sentiment and action against the enemy. The threat presented by spies was clearly regarded as real, the countering of which was considered by Philippe de Mézières, in the late fourteenth century, to be worth the expenditure of a third of a military “budget.” Yet, whether the outcome of any major battle, not to speak of a war, was decided by effective espionage or the by the information it provided is something we may never know.

[See also Immunity from War and Scouts and Scouting.]

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Christopher Allmand

SPOLETO, BATTLE OF

In 940, Hugh of Arles, King of Italy (r. 926–947), sent an army under the command of Sarlio, the count palatine, against Anscar of Ivrea (c. 915–940), the marquis of Spoleto and Camerino. Anscar was defeated and killed after heavy fighting. The only description of the battle comes from Bishop Liudprand of Cremona (c. 920–972). It emphasizes both Anscar's personal courage and impulsiveness but gives few specifics, such as the date or location of the battle. Liudprand is more informative about the larger picture, and it is possible to discern amid the quotations and allusions to classical authors that there existed a well-constructed plan to gather information, suborn treachery, and exploit personal traits.

In 936, King Hugh appointed his nephew Anscar of Ivrea as marquis of Spoleto and Camerino. Installing relatives in important positions was a central part of Hugh's policy, but he was also quick to remove them, and within four years he was determined to replace Anscar. The reasons are unclear, but Hugh's ambitions in Rome were bitterly and successfully opposed by the *patricius* Alberic II, who drove Hugh from Rome and imprisoned his own mother, Hugh's third wife, Marozia, called the Senatrix. By 939, Hugh's influence extended to the Exarchate of Ravenna. The king could not afford to doubt the security of the marches, which are situated on the

route of the Via Flaminia through the Apennines, the main road between Rome and Ravenna.

Hugh supplied Sarlio with money and told him to raise opposition to Anscar, an enterprise in which he could expect the support of the widow of the late Marquis Theobald, Anscar's predecessor and one of Hugh's kin (*nepos*). Sarlio was successful in obtaining both support and information. He moved against Anscar with six *acies* (units) of troops. The marquis had only one *acies* at his immediate disposal. Anscar received prudent advice from Wikbert, his standard-bearer, who observed that the enemy was much larger and composed of experienced troops. Anscar accepted the advice and sent messengers for reinforcements, but a Burgundian named Arcod goaded him into leaving the security of the unnamed city, presumably Spoleto, and making a premature attack on Sarlio's encampment. Sarlio had a clear numeric advantage, but this could have changed quickly had Anscar defended the city and waited for relief. During the battle, Arcod fled.

Sarlio sent three of his *acies* against Anscar's one, while he himself observed at a distance from the other side of an unnamed river, possibly the Tessino or Clitumno. He is described as being afraid of Anscar, who personally led his outnumbered forces and was victorious in the first encounter. Sarlio then sent in two more units but still stayed out of the fighting. Wikbert, badly wounded, advised Anscar to save himself by fleeing and then died. Anscar ignored this sound advice and instead attacked Sarlio's two units, led by a turncoat count named Hatto whom Anscar first berated for his treachery and then killed by sending a broken lance shaft through his mouth. Anscar then fought on with his sword, virtually alone, until his exhausted horse fell into a ditch. He was pinned under the horse and killed by his enemies, who hurled missiles from a distance. Sarlio was appointed marquis but became a rebel and was removed from power in 943.

[See also Italy, subentry on, Narrative (476–1000).]

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Valerie Eads

STANDARD, BATTLE OF THE

See Northallerton, Battle of.

STANGEBJERG, BATTLE OF

See Helgeå, Battle of.

STAVEREN, BATTLE OF

William, Count of Hainault, Holland, and Zeeland, was a paragon of chivalry, and since the highest exercise of chivalry was war, he was more than willing to use force to secure what he considered to be his rights. He viewed himself as the rightful lord of the Frisians and had been accepted as such in one of the coastal towns of the region, Staveren, in 1338. His family had traditionally exercised their jurisdiction there lightly, but William intended to bring the area firmly under his control. When the Frisians, although willing to make significant concessions, proved determined to maintain their freedom, he decided to attack.

The force William took by water to Staveren from Enkhuizen (just ten miles across the Zuider Zee) seems not to have been very large, but important noblemen from his territories were part of it. The precise course of events is impossible to determine, but for some reason the fleet split into two divisions, one under William and another under his uncle, the veteran soldier Jean de Hainault. Although some of the bold count's men advised against it, he decided to land his contingent in two separate parts. The ships stood in to shore and the men piled into boats, which brought them to land; the count even leapt into the surf to lead his men forward. However, the Frisians had known of the attack and had gathered men from across the region.

It appears that some were stationed in a concealed position near the count's landing point. When these men, who wore heavy gambesons for protection, saw that the invaders were pushing inland in haste and disorder, they suddenly charged into the Hainaulters with great ferocity, wielding long pikes, axes, glaives, and maces "like madmen." Additional Frisians rushed from Staveren and a nearby abbey to join the combat. William's relative handful of men were overwhelmed, and killed almost to a man—the fugitives were pursued into the sea, and few boats came to rescue them. The count's body was later taken into the town and set on a mock throne, with the banners of his slain companions around him.

Meanwhile the other division of Hainaulters discovered what was happening just in time to prepare themselves for another attack by a large body of Frisians. The first push was repulsed, but as more men joined the fight, the invaders began to fall back toward their boats. Jean de Hainault was wounded and his banner bearer killed. A panic ensued. According to one chronicle, so many Hainaulters held onto the gunwales of the few boats in reach that they threatened to sink them, and "those who were inside, to save themselves from peril, cut off their hands—for at this point, no one acknowledged father or friend." Jean did escape, but Frisia's independence was secured.

[See also Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479).]

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Clifford J. Rogers

ȘTEFAN CEL MARE

(1435–1504, r. 1457–1504), voivode (prince) of Moldavia. Ștefan cel Mare (Stephan the Great) took over the government of Moldavia at a difficult time, just a year after his country had agreed to pay tribute to the Ottomans. He made great efforts to maintain the independence of Moldavia against its dangerous neighbors, two of which, Hungary and Poland, were Christian kingdoms with aggressive external policies. It was difficult for Ștefan to maintain a balance between them, because kings Mátyás Hunyadi and Casimir IV were in conflict in the 1470–1480s. To the east, the newly created Crimean Khanate of the tatars posed a constant threat to Moldavia, especially after 1475, when the country became a vassal of the Ottomans.

The Ottoman Empire, however, represented the most serious danger for the independence of Moldavia and the rule of Ștefan. Sultan Mehmed II was eager to conquer the northeastern coast of the Black Sea, especially the castles of Kiliya and Akkerman (present-day Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky, Ukraine) and to secure Moldavia as a vassal state. In 1474, he sent the *beylerbey* (governor-general) of Rumelia against Ștefan and in 1476 tried himself to remove the Moldavian prince, who refused to pay tribute from 1473. Even though the Ottomans never obtained a decisive victory over Ștefan, the Moldavian prince finally agreed to sign a peace with them and to resume paying tribute.

Although Ștefan ruled a small state, he was admirably successful in fending off aggressors, employing both Vegetian harassment and direct confrontation. In 1467, he compelled the king of Hungary to retreat from Moldavia. In 1476, this situation was repeated with the Ottomans and in 1497 with the king of Poland. Behind his continual successes was a well-conceived external policy not to confront two enemies at the same time. Ștefan always maintained a balance between his neighbors and ensured the support of one of them against the other. The army he relied on consisted of units gathered under the banners of the voivode and boyars. In addition, mercenaries were used for the first time.

However, the great need for soldiers required enlisting peasants in the army, which produced a force of about twenty to thirty thousand men. Ștefan was also a good strategist and tactician. Facing the impressive Turkish campaigns, he tried first to weaken the Ottoman army. He devastated the plains in the path of the enemy, cut the supply lines behind them, and used harassing tactics. For the final battle, he chose narrow valleys where the enemy could not deploy his forces effectively.

[See also Cosmin Forest, Battle of; Hunyadi, Mátyás; and Vaslui, Battle of.]

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Radu Lupescu

STEPHEN

(Stephen of Blois, c. 1097–1154), King of England (1135–1154). Stephen left a complex legacy as king of England that military historians have mined profitably over recent decades. As a result, Stephen's former reputation as a mediocrity has been much recast, and his role in military developments more fully appreciated.

Like many of his peers, this grandson of William the Conqueror entered quickly into the military and political apprenticeship of northwest Europe's conflicts. He was soon involved in the often insoluble frontier wars between the Capetians and his uncle Henry I of England. Because of his own personality and family connections, he had command in 1118 at Brie and again the following year when Evreux was burned. But he saw mixed results: often starting with ample resources, as with Alençon in 1119, or Flanders in 1127, he had to accept the triumphs of his opponents.

Stephen became king through his speedy reaction to Henry's death in 1135, especially by gaining the support of key magnates and the citizens of London, and, most of all, by acquiring access to the real base of royal power—the treasury. Again, his personal charm seems to have played a key role in swaying the undecided. But Henry's daughter, the empress Matilda, soon pressed her claim.

As king, Stephen recognized the vital role of castles. From June to August 1136 he besieged Baldwin de Redvers vigorously at Exeter in a show of resolve despite his barons' divided opinions. Similar concern over castles may have toppled Roger of Salisbury's faction, most of whom bought their own liberty by surrendering key fortresses to the king. Throughout the reign, Stephen prosecuted numerous difficult sieges, often successfully.

Perhaps from a desire to appear chivalric, however, Stephen was merciful to the point of self-injury. He let Baldwin de Redvers go into exile; despite victory at Northallerton, he gave the Scots terms worthy of victors; and most inexplicably, when Empress Matilda was surrounded at Arundel in 1139, he gave her a safe-conduct to reach supporters in the west.

Stephen could muster imposing forces and resources but often with results that did not match expectations. Thus, he settled for a truce in 1127 with William Clito. In 1137 his forces in Normandy seemed to melt away without cause, and in England, the divided baronage typically hamstrung his desire to be a strong monarch. The clearest example of this behavior came at Lincoln in 1141, when none of the king's troops, feudal or mercenary, seemed inclined to outlast the earliest combats, resulting in Stephen's capture after an exemplary show of individual bravery.

Stephen's cause remained alive primarily because of the energy of his queen, supported by one of the king's mainstays: mercenaries. Both sides turned to paid soldiers as feudal ties proved insufficient to yield a decisive advantage. Such warriors were vital in the sieges and counter-forts that marked much of the rest of Stephen's reign once he regained his liberty.

In the end, though, political compromise, not military triumph, ended the conflict. Besides settling the succession on Matilda's son after Stephen's death, the settlement highlighted military concerns by mandating the expulsion of mercenaries and the destruction of unauthorized castles.

[See also Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Lincoln, Battle of; Mercenaries; and Northallerton, Battle of.]

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Steven Isaac

STEPPES, BATTLE OF

The battle of Steppes, which took place on 13 October 1213, was part of a long rivalry between the dukes of Brabant of the House of Louvain (Leuven) and the bishop-princes of Liège. The battle followed a war during which Henry I, Duke of Brabant, had taken Liège and sacked it (3–7 May 1212). The bishop-prince Hugues de Pierrepont, after launching the construction of new defenses for his city, prepared to counterattack.

In the autumn of 1213, Bishop Hugues and his ally, Ferrand of Portugal, Count of Flanders, decided to launch a joint expedition against Brabant. But the two princes did not attack together: the Count of Flanders invaded Duke Henry's lands without waiting for the forces from Liège. His offensive did not last long, because at the same time the troops of Philip II Augustus, King of France, who was at war with Ferrand, attacked the cities of western Flanders. The count was thus obliged to pull back

in order to counter the French invasion. Freed from the Flemish threat, the Duke of Brabant launched a counteroffensive, invading the principality of Liège as he had done the previous year. His army probably consisted of three to four hundred cavalry and three to four thousand infantry provided by the municipal militias of Brabant.

The Duke of Brabant entered enemy territory on 10 October and immediately marched on Liège. On 11 October he fought the militias of Tongeren, which tried unsuccessfully to block his route. Meanwhile Hugues of Pierrepont had mobilized his principality's troops and concentrated them at Liège. Because the bishop-prince could count on only about thirty knights, the contingents that met there on 12 October were provided mainly by the cities of Liège, Huy, and Dinant. But Hugues's vassal Louis II, Count of Looz, and his ally Henry III, Duke of Limburg, put their troops at his disposal, troops consisting of three hundred to four hundred cavalry plus urban infantry of unknown strength. Warned of the reinforcement of the Liège defenses and the mobilization of his enemies, the Duke of Brabant decided to return to his duchy. But during the night of 12–13 October the bishop-prince's troops, coming from Liège, and those of the Count of Looz and the Duke of Limburg, coming from Brustem, met up near Montenaken, at a place called "Warde de Steppes," an hour's march from Duke Henry's army. From there a messenger was sent to Henry, challenging him to battle; he accepted, hardly able to do otherwise.

Henry arrayed his army for battle on the morning of the 13th: he established his line on high ground, facing west, with their backs to the rising sun—although because the day was overcast, this measure had little effect on the fight. He probably divided his cavalry into three battalions, arranged in thin lines two or three riders deep, and placed them in front, relegating his infantry to the second line. Opposite him Hugues de Pierrepont arranged his men similarly. The mounted troops were set in front in three unequal battalions: on the right flank, the battalion of the Count of Looz and the Duke of Limburg; at the center, the bishop of Liège's small battalion

with most of the knights from his principality; and on the left flank, another small group of mounted fighters. The infantry, equipped mostly with improvised weapons, was placed in the rear, also divided in three: on the right, the Count of Looz's foot soldiers; at the center, the largest contingent, made up of the Huy and Liège militias; on the left, the Dinant troops.

The action began at 9:00 A.M. with a charge by the Brabant cavalry, followed immediately by a counterattack by the Liège right flank, led by the Count of Looz. Then the entire army of Hugues de Pierrepont attacked, cavalry as well as infantry, first the left flank and then the center. Only the Count of Looz's infantry, disoriented by rumors of defeat, fell to the rear without fighting. This general assault overwhelmed the Brabant charge. The army of Duke Henry broke up, and his soldiers began to flee. The Liège fighters set off in pursuit and chased them for about four miles (six kilometers). The victors, still fuming over the sack of Liège the year before and the ravages committed by the Brabant army on their approach, massacred most of the troops whom they caught up with. The defeated side lost twenty-five hundred to three thousand men; probably the majority of the infantry was killed. The Liège side lost about two hundred.

In the wake of this victory Hugues de Pierrepont went on a destructive expedition through Brabant until, on 22 October, Duke Henry sought a truce and solemnly reconciled with the bishop-prince. The battle of Steppes, which struck a rude blow to the power of Brabant, was considered by Liège as the most brilliant victory in its history.

[See also Low Countries, subentry on Narrative (855–1300).]

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Bertrand Schnerb
Translated from the French by
Johanna M. Baboukis

STIKLESTAD, BATTLE OF

The battle of Stiklestad (Stiklastaðir) on 29 July 1030 may be considered paradoxical as it saw the death of the Christian king Olaf Haraldsson but also established Christianity in Norway for good. In 1027, Olaf had won a battle in western Norway against his most important opponent, Erling Skjalgsson. However, he got the blame for the crime when the wounded Erling was killed in the aftermath of the battle. In 1028, western Norway rose against him—no doubt kindled by promises made by the Danish king Cnut to Norwegian chieftains, and Olaf had to flee the country, taking shelter in the Rus' with Duke Jaroslav, his relative. Cnut became king of Norway, which was then ruled in effect by his earl, Erik Hakonarson of Hlaðirin western Norway. However, Erik Hakonarson did not survive long, drowning in 1029. With him died the old line of the earls of Hlaðir, and Cnut put his son Svein in charge of Norway. His rule proved highly unpopular, and Olaf took a Swedish army into Norway in the summer of 1030 to regain power. The remaining insurgents in the west managed to muster a farmers' army of supposedly twice the size, and King Olaf died early on in the short battle on 29 July.

He received three wounds, which were soon likened to the wounds of Christ (facilitated by the fact that one was inflicted by a lance), and a poem (by Hallfreðr Óttarsson vandræðaskáld) composed in the following year already celebrated Olaf as a martyr and saint. Unfortunately, the hagiography surrounding Olaf's death has also overlaid any historical facts about the battle itself, and descriptions of it both in Snorri Sturluson's *Heimskringla* and other sagas stress the martyrological rather than the historical events. In any case, Olaf's death helped to integrate Norway and establish Christianity once and for all.

[See also Cnut and Olaf II Haraldsson.]

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Rudolf Simek

STIRLING BRIDGE, BATTLE OF

By 1296, Edward I had defeated the Scots at Dunbar and had accepted the resignation of their king and many others, but by May 1297 rebellion had broken out both in the north, led by Andrew Murray (or Moray), and in the south, where William Wallace gathered a mixed force in Selkirk Forest and with this laid siege to Dundee. On 23 July the English treasurer of Scotland claimed to have three hundred cavalry and ten thousand infantry at Roxburgh. The ten thousand is without doubt an exaggeration: the English army probably did not exceed five thousand. A similar expedition against Robert Bruce in 1306, also launched from Berwick, mustered only about twenty-three hundred paid men.

By 9 September the English force was at Stirling under the command of John de Warenne, seventh Earl of Surrey—no ball of fire—and the Scots were in Abbey Crag above, commanded by Murray and Wallace as leaders of the army of Scotland for King John de Balliol. Two Scottish nobles came to Surrey and offered themselves as mediators, and Surrey agreed. They came back the next day, reporting failure in their negotiations with the Scots but promising to join the English with forty knights.

On 11 September the English began to cross the stone bridge, wide enough to take only a cart or two horses abreast. But soon they were recalled to await Surrey, who had overslept. When he awoke, Surrey conferred the rank of knighthood on several

aspirants (as was the custom) and heard from the mediating Scottish nobles, who came without the promised forty knights, that they could not persuade even their own men to leave the Scottish army. Now Surrey sent two Blackfriars to talk Murray and Wallace into submission, but the Blackfriars also met a firm refusal. So Surrey ordered an advance over the bridge, rejecting as too costly a crossing upriver at a ford to take the Scots in the rear. The van, led by the treasurer Hugh de Cressingham, crossed the bridge into an area constricted by a loop in the river, where the wet ground offered cavalry no secure footing.

Their commanders finally released the Scots—who had been held back until the English crossed—and they rushed the mile from the crag on foot and took possession of the north end of the bridge. The English who had crossed had no chance: many who took to the river drowned, and those remaining on land were killed by Scottish spears. Cressingham's corpse was later flayed, Wallace reportedly making a scabbard of Cressingham's skin. Many of the Welsh, unencumbered by armor, did swim to safety, but the troops on the south side, fleeing toward Falkirk with baggage trains, were waylaid by the two Scottish nobles and their men, plundered, and killed. Ultimately this shocking defeat brought Edward I back from the Low Countries to lead his army to victory over the Scots at Falkirk in 1298.

Andrew Murray, wounded at the battle, died in or after November 1296. Wallace was chosen guardian of the kingdom and may have been heartened by his victory to risk battle against Edward I at Falkirk in 1298.

[See also Falkirk, Battle of and Wallace, William.]

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A. A. M. Duncan

STIRRUPS AND STIRRUP THESIS

The stirrup is a loop, usually of metal, with one side flattened to act as a platform to bear the weight of the rider. Suspended by straps on either side of the saddle, the stirrup depends for its effectiveness on a saddle with a tree, the wooden frame of the saddle. The stirrup in combination with a treed saddle forms a tripod with the rider's feet in the stirrups and his buttocks in the saddle, thus distributing the rider's weight over a wider area of the horse's back and stabilizing the rider's seat. The stirrup assists the rider in maintaining balance by centering the weight of the rider on the horse's back and also imparts flexibility by enabling the rider to extend his torso to the left and right of the horse more easily and safely while wielding a weapon. Without stirrups, a rider had to achieve balance and control with steady application of thigh and knee pressure. Equipped with stirrups, a mounted archer could turn in his stirrups and shoot to the rear with greater flexibility than gripping the horse with his knees and thighs allowed.

The Stirrup Thesis. In trying to place the stirrup in its historical context, historians and archaeologists have been divided on issues surrounding the introduction and diffusion of the stirrup into western Europe. Another controversy is whether the stirrup sparked the military revolution that resulted in the emergence of feudalism, a socioeconomic system that united a warrior elite (vassals) with lands (fiefs) awarded by the king in exchange for the performance of military obligations. Certainly, the cavalry shaped the development of feudalism among the Franks. Heinrich Brunner (1887) saw the Muslim invasion that culminated in the battle of Tours in 732 as the turning point in the emergence of feudalism. In this battle the Frankish infantry defeated the Muslim forces, but the flight of the Muslim

cavalry on horseback prevented Charles Martel's infantry from pursuing them to win a decisive victory. As a result, Martel sought to check the Muslim advance by increasing his mounted forces. As war horses were expensive to purchase and maintain, this tactical change required large estates, which Martel obtained by appropriating extensive tracts of church land for distribution to his military retainers. In exchange for the use of the land, the king required these retainers to provide a specified number of mounted warriors whenever he mobilized an army. According to Brunner, the transformation of the Frankish army from largely an infantry to a cavalry force had been accomplished by the battle on the river Dyle in 891.

Drawing inspiration from Brunner's thesis, Lynn White, in his *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (1962), saw the critical issue as tactical decisiveness, the critical striking force of the army, rather than numerical preponderance. White argued that the stirrup, together with the couched lance, enabled a blow to be delivered with the momentum of the charging horse and rider, effectively substituting animal power for human strength in combat. Departing from Brunner, White attributed Martel's tactical reforms to technology rather than the Muslim incursions. Accepting the historian Michel Baudot's redating of the battle of Tours to 733, White argued that the outcome of the battle could not have induced Martel to create a cavalry force, because the confiscations had begun a year earlier, in 732. White proposed instead that Martel or his advisers recognized the military potential of the stirrup and in 732 began creating an elite force of heavy cavalry. The stirrup, not the battle of Tours, led Martel to develop his cavalry and seize church land for support, according to White.

White argued that the stirrup enabled the rider, holding the lance in the couched position, to withstand the impact of his own lance on the enemy without being thrown off the back of his own horse. The effectiveness of the stirrup was enhanced by two changes in the saddle. In the second century the Romans developed the first tree saddle, having four horns, two in the front and two in the back, to secure

the seat of the rider. A saddle with a proper tree made the stirrup functional. The tree distributed the weight of the rider over the back of the horse through a stirrup strap fastened just behind the horse's withers. In addition, the appearance of the high-backed enveloping cantle saddle in the eleventh century helped to prevent the impact of a lance from knocking the rider off the back of the horse. Scholars speculate that all these elements—widespread use of the stirrup, couched lance position, elongated shield, and high-backed saddle—came together around the eve of the Crusades, or the early twelfth century, but to date no detailed study has documented these developments.

The Demise of the Stirrup Thesis. Subsequent research has undercut the entire idea of a military revolution aimed at expanding the cavalry in the mid-eighth and ninth centuries. Specifically, Donald Bullough (1970) and Bernard S. Bachrach (1970) questioned the viability of Brunner's thesis as modified by White. Bachrach cited, but did not exploit the implications of, new evidence from Arabic sources that moved the battle of Tours back to 732. This redating revives the connection between the battle of Tours and the seizure of church lands, and casts doubt on White's thesis that the stirrup, rather than the battle, was Martel's reason for developing his cavalry and appropriating church lands to support it.

Florin Curta has reevaluated the archaeological and earliest written evidence for the appearance of the stirrup. The archaeological evidence associates the introduction of the stirrup into Western Europe with the Avars, a tribe of steppe nomads who invaded Pannonia in the sixth century. The earliest stirrup finds in western Europe, those found in the middle Rhine area, date to the late sixth and early seventh centuries and either were brought in from the Avar Empire in eastern Europe or were local imitations. Bachrach believes that the stirrup was introduced into Europe no later than 700. The Avars probably transmitted the stirrup to the Byzantines by the end of the sixth century, for the *Strategikon*, a war manual dated to the reign of Emperor Maurice (582–602), mentioned the stirrup

as required equipment for a cavalryman. This treatise recommended the practices of the Avars as a model for the organization and equipment of the Roman cavalry. Stressing the versatility of Avar horsemen in rapidly switching from bow to spear to sword, maneuvers that would have required a treed saddle, the *Strategikon* shows that the Avars were not exclusively a force of mounted archers, as Bachrach maintained. Curta's study of Avar burials reveal a symbolic association of stirrups with an elite class of professional warriors. Integrating information from the *Strategikon* with Avar grave assemblages, which showed an association of stirrups with lance heads, Curta discovered that stirrups were used primarily by lancers, but found no evidence that they engaged in mounted shock combat (in White's narrow sense).

Moreover, the sources describing Carolingian campaigns contain little evidence of mounted shock combat as the tactically decisive element in set battles. In fact, Charlemagne, the great warrior-king, fought only two cavalry battles, losing both of them. Sieges predominated in the military operations of this period.

In 1967 Frauke Stein published an archaeological study on warrior graves. The catalog of this work identified 704 graves of fighting men in eastern Francia, ranging in date from the late seventh through early ninth centuries. Of the 704 graves, 135 could be identified as those of equestrians, yet stirrups were present in only 13. In his capitularies (legislative and administrative acts) Charlemagne set down the foundation of Carolingian military organization with regulations that placed an elite force of heavy cavalry at the top of the military hierarchy, but he did not plan for the numerical superiority of the cavalry.

With the demise of feudalism as an overarching concept to unify the complex regional variations of land tenures and military obligations, the theoretical connections among the battle of Tours, the stirrup, and the confiscation of church lands have collapsed. The stirrup question nonetheless still has pedagogical value as an intellectual exercise in evaluating the evidence. Scholarly consensus now views the stirrup

question in the context of discussions about the origin of the obsolete term "feudalism."

[See also Cavalry; Charles Martel; Feudalism in Europe; and Tours, Battle of.]

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C. M. Gillmor

STOSS, BATTLE ON THE

The battle on the Stoss was a central event in the Appenzell Wars. These wars, which lasted from 1401 until 1429, with varying intensity and interrupted by truces, pitted Appenzell (in Switzerland) and

its allies (including the city of St. Gall) against the Benedictine monastery of St. Gall, certain noble rulers, and the Lake Constance cities. These disputes were triggered by the demands of the monastery of St. Gall for feudal taxes. The people of Appenzell, whose political structure was steadily improving, had been struggling against these demands since the second half of the fourteenth century. The conflict escalated with the destruction of the fortress of Klanx, a possession of the abbot of St. Gall in 1402. Mediation failed, and in 1403, the Appenzell forces marched into the territory of the confederated region of Schwyz, which harbored its own expansionist desires into the area of present-day eastern Switzerland.

The Appenzell fighters won a great victory in the battle of Vögelinsegg on 15 May 1403. This action did not end the war, although truces were concluded between individual parties. In particular, the war with the Benedictine monastery of St. Gall expanded, and its abbot was able to gain the Habsburgs as his allies. In the spring of 1405, the Habsburg duke Frederick IV assembled a an army of knights in the Austrian border regions. Even before the combined St. Gall–Austrian army was fully deployed, the Appenzell forces began their offensive and besieged the village of Altstätten, which belonged to the monastery of St. Gall. To lift the siege, Frederick divided his army and sent part of his troops to fight the Appenzell besiegers. In the face of this approaching army, the Appenzell troops withdrew on 16 June 1405, and the relief army entered Altstätten unopposed. On the next day, which was rainy and cold, the St. Gall–Austrian army set out, up the mountain toward Gais. This army, about twelve hundred strong, consisted of knights and troops from the cities of Winterthur, Constance, and Feldkirch. It crossed the undefended *Letzi* (a simple defensive work stretching across a valley floor) toward the Stoss Pass and at that point was suddenly attacked from above by the Appenzell army. The St. Gall–Austrian army panicked and fled toward Altstätten, hindered in their retreat by the wall. Depending on the source, this army lost either 350 or nine hundred men, whereas Appenzell is said to have lost only a few.

This victory strengthened Appenzell's confidence, and it entered into an alliance with the city of St. Gall, which became the nucleus of the Bund ob dem See (League on the Lake). This alliance, formed as a confederation, enjoyed short-lived military and political success in the Lake Constance area and eastern Switzerland and briefly threatened the rule of the nobility and of Austria. After Appenzell's unsuccessful siege of Bregenz, German king Rupert forced the dissolution of the alliance in 1408.

[See also Bregenz, Battle and Siege of and Switzerland, *subentry on Narrative*.]

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Oliver Landolt

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

STRADIOTS, BALKAN

Referring to light armed mercenary cavalry from the western Balkans, the name “stradiots” derives from the Greek *stratiotes* as combined with the Italian word *strada* (meaning “street”). Other variants are *stratioti* or *stradioti*. Most stradiots were of Albanian origin, whereas many others, especially officers, had Greek names (Palaiologos, Laskaris, and Comnenos), with a minority coming from various South Slav, Vlach, or Romanian peoples.

In the fourteenth century many Albanians migrated to Greece and reached the southern Peloponnese. This ethnic group would be the last important Byzantine force in this region. After the fall of the empire, these former Byzantine troops would make their names famous in Venetian service, fighting the Turks in the Peloponnese, Dalmatia, and Friuli and later during the Italian wars at the end of the fifteenth century.

The first Venetian stradiots appeared on the Italian mainland in 1482. Afterward they settled

in the *terra firma* (mainland territories) of Venice with their families, and later other refugees fleeing from the Balkans moved to Naples and became part of the Spanish military force. In the sixteenth century the stradiots fought in Habsburg service in Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. Other states also tried to win these mercenary groups over to their own armies. France recruited stradiots in 1497 who became known as *estradiots* and *argoulets*. England under Henry VIII also employed stradiots in the wars waged at home and in France.

The stradiots employed Near Eastern methods of cavalry warfare, which included hit-and-run, ambushes, feigned retreats, and counterattacks. Philippe de Commynes, who fought at Fornovo, wrote that they were similar to the Spanish light cavalry, or *jinetes*. They were armed with scimitars, or one-edged swords, maces, and short lances (*arzagaye* or *assagaye*) that could also be thrown, and an ancient type of "eared" dagger (*estradiot*). According to most sources, the stradiots wore chain mail or a padded coat, and used small shields and later small helmets called *capeletti de Albanese*.

[See also East Central Europe, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1500).]

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János B. Szabó

STRATEGY

Historians have long been reluctant to admit that during the Middle Ages there might have been something resembling strategic knowledge and planning of military operations. Besides evident prejudice,

much ingrained, regarding the rudimentary nature of medieval military practice, one of the reasons for this misperception perhaps lies in the difficulty of making sense of the piecemeal nature of most long conflicts in the Middle Ages. To develop an accurate perception, one must understand the various levels of the conflicts: grand politico-military strategy, operational or campaign strategy, tactics and technique—all of them different and oftentimes contradictory. An important difficulty is that this multiplicity of levels leaves ample room for confusion and controversy, as demonstrated by the endless revision of the history of war. In historiography it is common to find confusion between strategy and tactics and vice versa, as well as to find misperceptions over the various levels that strategies acquire. As commonly happens with most terms related to human actions, strategy is a concept that is easier to explain than to define in a reductive way, among other reasons because of its changing character through time.

Very infrequently do medieval sources provide something like a memorandum explaining, step by step, the development of a particular strategic program. As Michael Prestwich points out, "Evidence for the discussion of strategy is rare, partly for the very good reason that it was often kept secret. It is necessary to rely largely upon examination of the course of events to deduce what plans had been made—a procedure which obviously has its dangers" (p. 187). Even so, it is possible to find documentary testimonies that show, with more or less clarity, the great deal of strategic thought that was behind every important military operation or series of campaigns as a whole. Such testimonies include the writing of the Mentz annalist (c. 805) on the early Carolingians; Ambroise's *L'estoire de la guerre sainte* on the methodical and careful strategic guidelines developed by Richard I of England during the Third Crusade; Gerald of Wales's discussion of how Ireland should be conquered; the detailed plan that two advisers presented to Sancho IV of Castile in 1294, outlining all the steps necessary to defeat the Muslims in the war for control of the Strait of Gibraltar; and the well-known 1435 report by

Sir John Fastolf on how the war in France should be conducted.

Nevertheless this "elusive concept," as Bernard S. Bachrach called it, can be divided into two types: long-term or grand strategy, and campaign or operational strategy. The basic idea underpinning both was who to fight, when to fight, and where to fight. The purpose of both was also the same: to defeat the enemy and to ensure one's own success.

Grand Strategy. Grand, or long-term, strategy did not only involve military matters: other important components were also involved. Grand strategy was not primarily about winning pitched battles, taking fortresses by storm or siege, or even winning or losing during a period of open hostilities. In an agrarian society, as the medieval one was, grand strategy was about how the polity developed the complex of its resources, including military resources, in order either to dominate both new territories and its own inhabitants or, lacking that, to create an effective defense against an aggressor. Hence the pace of grand strategy was normally slow and tended to reap its objectives in the long term. For instance, if that objective was the occupation of a disputed theater of operations, then such a project could turn into a prolonged military effort that might last years, if not decades. Not infrequently a leader who first designed the fundamental strategy and then directed initial operations did not live long enough to see how his decisions accomplished the proposed goals. This process, which also may be called long-term policy, brings together diverse military and nonmilitary factors, identifying the organization of the military, the people who must serve in the war and under what conditions, the economic resources that would sustain the long-term strategy and maintain high morale among both the warriors and the rest of society, and an efficient diplomacy that knows how to treat the adversary—in short, a long-term strategy requires a clear comprehension and application of all the means at one's disposal in trying to accomplish a series of goals.

But the modern concepts of "total war" or "nation at arms" were alien to medieval grand strategy. Through its indirect approach, the goal of medieval

grand strategy was to provoke, through a combination of politico-military guidelines, a distinct asymmetry between an offensive initiative and a defensive response capacity. The method to achieve that goal consisted of a slow erosion and persistent wearing out of all and every means that the enemy could count on to make war, and then being able to maintain those circumstances more or less indefinitely. In other words, the objective was to drive the adversary, by means of repeated pummeling, to a high level of systemic exhaustion. Developing a grand strategy meant that the way to break the will of the enemy did not have only a military dimension: it could, and should, include the use of other tools, such as diplomacy, multilateral alliances and counteralliances, provoking internal divisions and benefiting from them, and exploiting political, social, doctrinal, and ethnic tensions that could arise within the enemy camp.

Therefore, in the development of a grand strategy, the patient administration of tempo was fundamental. It was necessary to accept that some objectives were medium- or long-term and also gradual. Some examples, although obviously there are many, include the early Carolingian effort to reconstruct the *regnum Francorum*, the centuries-long struggle of the Iberian Christian kingdoms to conquest the territories of al-Andalus (the so-called *Reconquista*), the anguished struggles after the First Crusade of the Latin East not to be annihilated by successive stronger Muslim political powers, and the multiplicity of conflicts between the crowns of England and France over the continental dominions.

Campaign Strategy. In terms of campaign, or operational, strategy, it is well known that, except in those cases with a great imbalance of force between the aggressor and the attacked, in the Middle Ages the conquest of territorial space against determined resistance was not usually characterized by a slow process of constant and gradual advances. On the contrary, the advances were usually spasmodic. When a great military operation or series of campaigns achieved a clear success, this happened more often because of the collapse, implosion, or political fragmentation of one side in the conflict—which

then was unable to offer a united front—than because of the other side's intrinsic capacity repeatedly to strike the enemy until its complete defeat.

The norm was conflicts characterized by military efforts and stages of conflict of varying intensity and length broken by tense truces—agreements that, of course, played an important role in strategy. When offensive operations were carried out, they had to cause as much disruption as possible in the enemy's ability to resist attack at one point in its front line. Consequently this strategy's highest expression was the conquest, safeguarding, and beneficial use of the adversary's principal strongholds. In this manner there could be a slow but steady progression into foreign territory. These were wars of position. The great majority of campaigns were undertaken to capture one or more specific strongholds, depending on their size and importance, not to pursue a chimerical destruction of the enemy's resistance leading to an immediate, complete victory and the total acquisition of the territory in dispute.

The basic structural reason causing this characteristic form of conducting war lay in the social, economic, and institutional elements that supplied the human, financial, and logistic resources necessary to maintain constant open hostilities against the enemy until its definitive defeat—that is, until all enemy territory was conquered by capturing or wearing down the strongholds dotting the area. During such military efforts, all means of conducting warfare were chronically insufficient to sustain operations *sine die*. Although certainly the political and doctrinal will to defeat a rival always existed, with few exceptions no medieval commander ever had at his disposal, let alone for the long term, all the necessary military mechanisms and instruments to achieve such a goal, at least in a short period of time. Usually any rapid advance in a theater of operations resulted more from the defeated side's internal problems than from the victor's ability or crushing force. Undoubtedly there were partial triumphs, at times even notable ones, often thanks to individual commanders' strategic and tactical talent, the quality of the soldiers fighting under their orders, and the resources that could be gathered at any specific

moment. But these triumphs were quite different from a total victory.

During the Middle Ages and well into the modern period, at least three essential problems impeded armies on the offense from long remaining at a high degree of operational capacity in any military theater. First, the age's economic systems had serious limitations, a factor ensuring the chronic lack of financial resources to sustain hostilities indefinitely. It meant that the logistical apparatus needed to maintain large numbers of infantry, cavalry forces, and material resources—either in combat, ready to engage the enemy, or beyond a certain distance from friendly bases—was hardly ever, if ever, available.

Second, restrictions were imposed by medieval technology. These included, for example, lines of communication that were rudimentary, difficult, or even nonexistent; inefficient means of transport and shipping; lack of precise cartographic information, a thorny situation that could be ameliorated only by obtaining the cooperation of the local peoples or by procuring scouts, deserters, or spies versed in the territory where a campaign was to take place; the enormous effect of climate and seasonal conditions on operations; mediocre hygienic practices that made it impossible to prevent or impede the easy spread of illnesses or to care properly for the wounded or sick; and the irregular quality of materials from which weapons were forged, not to mention the setbacks related to siege engines' mechanical difficulties, slow firing rate, lack of power, and inherent inaccuracy.

Third, splits, denaturalizations, seditions, and rebellions frequently occurred within each of the political powers involved. In addition to the internal problems that these episodes led to, they frequently served as a severe restraint on the quantity and/or quality of the forces available for campaigning, diverted military resources that were needed elsewhere, delayed an operation's start and general momentum, and in a few extreme cases even caused the suspension of a campaign already under way.

War of Positions. Consequently it was quite typical during the Middle Ages that the defeat of an enemy from the viewpoint of operational strategy

could be obtained only through the “three P’s”: presence, patience, and persistence—that is, a slow yet stubborn aggressive effort, undertaken close to one’s supporting enclaves. This military practice’s principal goal was to erode the adversary’s human, material, and psychological ability to resist. This explains why any partial victories, no matter how significant, translated into neither the total conquest of the territory in dispute nor the complete annihilation of the enemy as a functioning power. This also explains why the pitched battles fought had limited consequences and typically were clashes brought about by other military actions, in particular sieges. One must consider battles as part of larger siege operations. As Raymond C. Smail has said: “The acquisition or successful defense of strong places was the highest prize of warfare, besides which success in battle was of secondary importance” (p. 138).

In terms of the strategic perspective discussed here and the several ways of conducting war in the Middle Ages—sieges, pitched battles, and raids—one fundamental issue related to war of positions was that fortresses, when encircled by the enemy, could not resist on their own and indefinitely without help from their overlords. This limitation meant that it was always necessary to organize and execute diverse relief operations for those who were under siege, so that they would be able to withstand the pressure or, ideally, force their attackers to abandon their offensives for various reasons, among which was the threat of facing a relief column in open combat—that is, having to fight a battle.

Note that the Middle Ages did boast decisive battles in the open field: Hastings (1066), the Hattin (1187), and Bouvines (1214) are good examples. But in general a careful reading of events shows that the majority of battles were clashes brought about by other military operations—especially sieges, but also *chevauchées*—and therefore they need to be understood more as elements of siege warfare than as self-contained military actions. “A few minutes of confusion or panic and the patient work of months or years might be undone,” as John B. Gillingham explains (“Richard I,” p. 83). For the period’s

commanders, this principle was so fundamental that only at a very late stage, and only if no other options existed, did they dare to seek a pitched battle with their adversary. Many kings and magnates, considered during their time and for posterity outstanding warriors and great conquerors, never fought a single battle. For instance, from the first battle of Lincoln (1141) to the battle of Lewes (1264)—that is, during more than a century—no reigning English monarch directly participated in one battle in western Europe. When Philip II Augustus achieved victory at Bouvines, no king of France had seen the face of battle for about a century before him—and in 1214 he himself had been trying to avoid combat. From the time that Alfonso VIII of Castile emerged victorious at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) until the time that Alfonso XI defeated the North African and Granadan armies at Guadalteba (1330)—118 years—no king of the principal expansive military power on the Iberian Peninsula rode at the front of his armies in a battle against the Muslims.

Because territorial dominance was determined by the control of strongholds, battles had a very reduced ability, strategically speaking, to determine by themselves the overall result of the conflict, unless all the garrisons of the fortifications were required to reinforce the armies, left the enclaves that they guarded practically empty, and then lost the battle. (The victorious army could then presumably occupy almost without a fight all the walled towns and castles.) Perhaps a triumph or defeat in a direct confrontation would have the effect of temporarily animating or slowing down the operations of one power in a theater of war. A battle was also an effective method of lifting, or lowering, the confidence and spirit of one side or the other. During the Middle Ages, however, battles rarely were absolute military actions that had the power to provide, thanks to a single mortal blow, a definitive triumph over the adversary and its complete destruction. The *Hauptschlacht* about which Carl von Clausewitz and the military schools prior to World War I so fervently wrote, and that military historians with equal zeal attempted to find in the Middle Ages, was a rare event in the majority of medieval military struggles.

Raiding expeditions were an integral part of war, and of course they played a very important strategic role, as well as being the most routine way of practicing warfare. In terms of manpower, time, and other considerations, they were a comparatively inexpensive form of warfare. And from a strategic perspective, *chevauchées* could be used as a reprisal against enemy activity, to maintain or exact tribute from a neighbor, to ensure adequate supplies during an expedition, and as means of damaging enemy morale. In short, they were a means of eroding the resources of the enemy; of creating internal divisions among the enemy, because they proved that the enemy rulers could not fulfill one of their main duties, the protection of lands and inhabitants; and of paving the way for future siege operations. Perhaps the aims of the raiders are best conveyed in the advice given by Count Philip of Flanders to William the Lion of Scotland, who was invading Northumbria as an ally of Louis VII of France during the so-called Great Rebellion of 1173–1174. The advice was recorded by a medieval source, Jordan Fantosme:

Destroy your foes and ravage their country,
By fire and burning let all be set alight;
That nothing be left them outside, either in wood
or meadow,
Of which in the morning they could have a
dinner.
Then with his united force let him besiege their
castles.
They will have nor succour nor aid within thirteen
leagues.
Thus should wars be begun: such is my advice.
First destroy the land and then one's foe. (lines
444–451)

[See also Battle, Historiography of; Castles; Raids and Raiding; Siege Warfare; and Tactics, Battle.]

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Manuel Rojas Gabriel

STRATIOTES

A special branch of troops in the Byzantine Empire, the stratiotes were closely related to the building of the *thema* organization. They existed in classical form from the seventh to eleventh centuries, and represented a new type of armed volunteer corps formed from the free peasantry in the individual military-administrative regions or *thema* that made up the nucleus of the early Byzantine army. Every peasant stratiot was obliged to appear upon call-up

of a detachment or initiation of a campaign with his own horse and complete armament, having been assigned to a particular military unit subordinate to the military commander of the *thema* (the *strategos*). The army of stratiotes soon became the main support of the empire and replaced foreign mercenaries. In order to make the peasant stratiotes materially independent, imperial rule provided them with land that had a special status and was called *stratitika ktemata* (meaning "stratiots' possessions"). Such land was acquired by inheritance, obliging its owner to fulfill his military service.

The owners of stratiotic lands were exempt from the payment of taxes in money and in kind. In certain cases, their fellow villagers were forced to shoulder the cost of providing their armaments. Over the course of time, the farmer stratiotes established themselves as a closed social group, the appurtenance to which was fixed in special lists. Stratiotes were used in military operations and also to build roads, fortresses, bridges, and ships. Gradually, they turned into ordinary warriors who ceased to personally cultivate the lands granted to them. A rich, heavily armed subgroup formed among them—the cataphracts (*kataphraktoi*), who became the fighting nucleus of the Byzantine army. Beginning in the tenth century, the decline of the stratiot-based army was brought on by the ruin of a considerable number of farmer stratiotes at the expense of the enriched cataphracts derived from their numbers. Even though the stratiotes were still in existence from the thirteenth through the fourteenth centuries, they were gradually displaced by foreign mercenary detachments that started to play an increasingly important role in the Byzantine Empire.

[See also *Kataphraktoi*.]

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Vassil Gjuzelev

STRONGBOW

See Clare, Richard FitzGilbert de.

SUGER OF SAINT-DENIS

(c. 1081–1151), abbot and renowned historian. Born in 1081 into a minor knightly family, Suger was brought to the abbey of Saint-Denis to be raised and educated as a child oblate. Saint-Denis was perhaps the most prestigious monastery in France, long serving as the royal abbey and burial ground. As the power of the Capetian monarchs grew, so did the influence of Saint-Denis. Suger served as secretary to the abbot, then provost for the abbey's holdings at Berneval and Toury. In the latter capacity, he became involved in disputes both diplomatic and military between King Louis VI and various enemies. By 1118 he had served first as King Louis's envoy and later ambassador to the pope. In 1122 he was elected abbot of Saint-Denis; although Louis was initially angry about the election (conducted without his permission), he came to accept it, and the abbot frequently accompanied Louis on his campaigns. The relationship between king and abbot was often strained when Suger's dedication to the church and its interests conflicted with Louis's efforts to increase Capetian royal authority, but Suger seems to have remained a relatively important councilor to the king until the latter's death in 1137. Although Suger continued in royal service to Louis VII, acting as diplomat and even coregent for a stormy term during Louis's absence while on Crusade, he was never as close to the young king as he had been to Louis VI.

Suger was a prolific author, writing two books on his tenure as abbot, a biography of Louis VI, and a

fragmentary biography of Louis VII, as well as a sizable number of letters and charters. In terms of military history, his most important work by far is *The Deeds of Louis the Fat*, with its extensive descriptions of many of the king's campaigns. *The Deeds*, however, is not a balanced examination of Louis's career. It is biased heavily toward activities in which Suger participated or witnessed, and those that pertained to Saint-Denis. Many of the events covered are very minor; an unwary reader could give them much greater weight than their actual importance merits as a result of their extensive discussion in *The Deeds*. But, this is also a virtue of Suger's book—detailed accounts of minor military campaigns are rare, and Louis's penchant for fighting unruly lesser subjects gives us uncommon glimpses into the diplomatic and military activities of a king on a very local scale. It is fortunate for the military and political historian that Suger was so deeply involved in these affairs both as a diplomat and as a participant in campaigns. Although the gaps in his account frustrate attempts to build a comprehensive picture of Louis's reign, what we benefit from is a far more complete characterization, and better understanding, of the king and his military activities than we would otherwise have.

Suger's discussions of military affairs are detailed and knowledgeable. Although the stated purpose of the book was to praise Louis and he exaggerates the king's strengths while downplaying his weaknesses, in general even within the context of royal propaganda his work is fairly accurate, holding up well when checked against other sources.

[See also Louis VI of France.]

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Robert Helmerichs

SVEN FORKBEARD

(c. 960–1014), Scandinavian warrior and wide-ranging ruler. By the time of his death in February 1014, Sven Forkbeard had made himself king of Denmark, king of England, and ruler of Norway. Also, through an alliance with his stepson, Olof Skötkonung, he had enormous influence over the Swedes. Sven was an excellent politician and strategist with an aptitude for choosing successful generals.

Saga accounts suggest that Sven became king of Denmark in 986 or 987 through an alliance with the powerful Jomsvikings and in rebellious opposition to his father, Harald Bluetooth. His rule over Denmark was consolidated by his marriage to the dowager queen of Sweden and an alliance with the Swedes. The strategy adopted by Sven made victory at the battle of Svold (1000) possible. As a result of this victory over the king of Norway, Sven was able to extend his influence to Norway, where his son-in-law and protégé, Erik Hakonarson, ruled on his behalf. Following the mixed fortunes of his English campaign in 1003–1005, Sven sent armies commanded by Tostig, Hemming Strut-Haraldsson, and Thorkell the Tall that brought the English establishment to its knees during a series of campaigns between 1006 and 1012.

Sven's own campaign in England in 1013 was underpinned by diplomacy and an alliance with leaders of northern England. Men from northern England augmented his army for his invasion of southern England to such an extent that the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* describes the army as a *fyrð* (native army). Unable to capture London, Sven conducted a brilliant campaign during which he forced the leading burghs to submit to him: by the end of the campaigning season Sven controlled all England except the London region. Fearful of being cut off if he lost control of the Thames, King Aethelred II, "the Unready," fled into exile, leaving the burgh of London to capitulate. Thus Sven Forkbeard conquered England without fighting a major battle.

[See also Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Svold, Battle of; and Thorkell the Tall.]

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Ian Howard

SVOLD, BATTLE OF

King Olaf I Tryggvason of Norway summoned a fleet for an expedition into the Baltic. His reputation brought many adventurers to join him and he entered Baltic waters in 1000 with a fleet containing some of the biggest ships seen there to that date. His fleet numbered some sixty vessels including large warships with high sides and platforms fore and aft allowing them to dominate opposing ships in a sea battle, some smaller ships suited to coastal raiding, and some ships that were relatively wide in the beam to carry supplies and booty.

In the southern Baltic, Olaf formed an alliance with Bolislav, King of the Wends (Poland). Olaf's ambitions were opposed by Sven Forkbeard, King of Denmark, who, with the support of Swedish allies and Norwegian exiles, also brought a fleet into the Baltic. There was a Danish enclave on the southern Baltic coast controlled by Viking warriors known as the Jomsvikings. Such was the power of Olaf's fleet that the Jomsvikings thought it politic to ally themselves with him. However, they helped King Sven by delaying Olaf in Wendland. This enabled Sven to gather his allies and plan his attack.

Not knowing the whereabouts of King Sven's fleet and unaware of its strength, Olaf Tryggvason's fleet left harbor in open order, the smaller ships going ahead. King Sven's fleet lay hidden by an island off Svold. (The geographical location of Svold is debatable.) The smaller ships were allowed to pass, but, as Olaf and his large ships came near, Sven's fleet attacked them. It was a classic maneuver in which the weaker side made itself stronger at the point of battle by dividing the enemy.

When Olaf Tryggvason saw ships bearing down, he had his own ships lashed together in line abreast.

King Sven and his ally, Olof Skötkunung, King of the Swedes, led the Danish and Swedish ships in a frontal attack. Earl Erik Hakonarson led his ships, manned by Norwegian exiles and Vikings of various nationalities, against the enemy flank. Systematically, Erik's men boarded amidships and cleared ships of their defenders, cutting them adrift so that they could be towed away.

King Sven and Olof Skötkunung were unsuccessful in their frontal attack. Olaf Tryggvason's ships were tied together so that only their prows could be attacked. These had high sides and platforms from which his men could throw stones and spears and fire arrows on their attackers. Some of the Danish and Swedish ships turned away to join Earl Erik in attacking the enemy flank.

Eventually, Erik's men cleared and removed the flanking ships until they came alongside and boarded Olaf Tryggvason's ship, the Long Serpent. Erik and his men were repulsed after heavy fighting, but they were reinforced from other ships and boarded the Long Serpent again. This time they maintained their position and superior numbers began to tell, although Olaf Tryggvason's men still had the advantage of high platforms fore and aft. Eventually, with defeat certain, Olaf Tryggvason leaped overboard and probably drowned.

[See also Olaf I Tryggvason and Sven Forkbeard.]

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Ian Howard

SWANTOPELK

(1200–1266). There were massive changes under way along the Baltic coast in the early thirteenth century.

Swantopelk (Świętopelk), the eldest of the three dukes of Pomerellia, saw the opportunity to make himself the region's strongman. His subjects were mostly Kashubians, a Slavic people living at the mouth of the Vistula River.

He planned to expand eastward, across the Vistula, into Prussia, a lightly populated region whose tribesmen, though poorly organized for self-defense or trade, made raids into Pomerellia and northern Poland that were becoming such a nuisance that the neighboring duke of Mazovia had asked for crusaders and the assistance of a German military order, the Teutonic Knights. Swantopelk claimed that his wars were defensive—to protect the convents at Peiplin and Oliva and the town of Gdańsk (Danzig)—but he was also ambitious.

He delivered the decisive blow against the Prussians at the battle on the frozen Sirgune (Dzierzgoń) River in 1233, cutting them off as they fled the combined army of Polish dukes and Teutonic Knights. But he felt cheated when his allies claimed most of the conquered territories for themselves. When the Prussians revolted in 1242, he made himself their head. He proved to be a doughty warrior, never discouraged by defeat or difficulties.

Swantopelk ceased fighting only in 1253, after being repeatedly beaten by the Teutonic Knights, who defeated him on land, on the Vistula River, and, through their merchant allies, on the Baltic Sea. He was also attacked by his brothers, his relatives, and his neighbors, and was threatened by powerful crusaders.

He refused to aid the Prussians in later rebellions. His son, Mściwój (Mestwin) II (c. 1220–1294), so hated the Teutonic Knights that he willed Pomerellia to Poland. In 1308, when the Teutonic Knights came to mistrust King Władysław I Łokietek (1306–1333), they occupied this territory, which would later be known as West Prussia.

[See also Orders, Military, *subentry* on Northern Orders and Slavic Lands, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300).]

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William Urban

SWEYN I

See Sven Forkbeard.

SWITZERLAND

[This entry contains three subentries, on Swiss sources, an overview of Swiss military history, and on Swiss historiography.]

Sources

The first Swiss chronicles in which the presentation of armed conflicts plays a very important role date from the late Middle Ages. Although there are other chroniclers and historical works, the following authors are especially valuable: Konrad Justinger of Bern, with his references to the early history of Bern up to the early fifteenth century; Hans Fründ of Schwyz and his description of the so-called Old Zurich War (1440–1446); Bendicht Tschachtlan and Heinrich Dittlinger, both councillors from Bern, important for the Freiburgian war and the campaign against the Sundgau and Waldshut; Diebold Schilling the Elder of Bern, with his description of the Burgundian wars; Diebold Schilling the Younger, a chaplain in Lucerne, also important for the Burgundian wars, as well as for the Swabian war; and the *Klingenbergr Chronicle*, attributed to Johann von Klingenberg, which contains many details about the Old Zurich War.

Other sources for information about military conflicts are historical folksongs, which were written mainly as propaganda. But neither the chronicles nor the folksongs give many details about the course of events of a particular battle: usually they are limited to general descriptions of the events of various military campaigns.

Swiss battles and campaigns were also reported now and then by foreign chroniclers. The *Bellum Suitense*, a description of the Swabian war of 1499, written by the famous Nuremberg humanist Willibald Pirckheimer (1470–1530), is well known. Pirckheimer himself was the leader of the troops of Nuremberg in the fight against the Swiss Confederates. Similarly there are fairly rich Burgundian sources for the Swiss wars against Charles the Bold.

There are difficulties in using these sources to reconstruct detailed battle narratives. Chroniclers usually described the events only after a certain time had passed; truly contemporary accounts of the battles are rare. In most cases the exact course of events must be reconstructed by comparing a large number of sources.

The correspondence of that time, which is found in many archives, contains frequent references to warfare and offers much insight into its impact on everyday life. These letters describe the guerrilla warfare that dominated many campaigns, including cattle rustling and the pillaging and burning of villages. Most of this material, unfortunately, remains unpublished.

Invoices, muster rolls (*Mannschaftsrodel*), and rolls of booty (*Beuterodel*) are also important sources for the reconstruction of past events. In addition the military ordinances containing the disciplinary rules and instructions for the behavior of the troops are very valuable. In the so-called Sempach Letter (*Sempacherbrief*) of 1393, such directions were issued for the first time for the whole territory of the Swiss Confederacy. Several towns adopted and modified these orders into their own military ordinances.

Other sources for the names of those killed and sometimes for the course of events include *Schlachtjahrzeiten*: registers in churches in which the date of every single combat was mentioned. Especially in central Switzerland this kind of source is very well documented in the *Jahrzeitbücher*: parish registers containing lists of the dead registered by the churches; every year the day of death was celebrated during a special Mass. During church celebrations on the anniversary of a battle, these

descriptions were read publicly or even celebrated in processions. An example is the *Näfelerfahrt* (procession to Näfels), which commemorates the 1388 battle of Näfels; this procession has taken place every year up to the present.

In the vicinity of several battlefields, chapels were built in memory of the fallen. Uniforms and arms of the Confederate soldiers are shown in Swiss illuminated chronicles that appeared in the late fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century. These pictures show valuable and often very specific details, especially for the time between the Burgundian wars of 1474–1477 and the battle of Marignano in 1515.

When describing the events of former times, chroniclers tended to embellish the reports and pictures in an unhistorical way by portraying equipment and uniforms of the time around 1500 rather than of the time of the battle.

The war cult of the Old Swiss Confederacy is also documented from the end of the fifteenth century through stained-glass windows, in which martial motifs play an important role. These windows were in public buildings such as town halls, churches, or inns and in private houses.

Other valuable goods showing the equipment of the Swiss army are contemporary offensive arms such as halberds, daggers, swords, crossbows, and firearms, defensive arms such as armor and helmets, and also standards and flags, all of which are preserved in numerous museums, including the Swiss National Museum in Zurich, the Historical Museum in Bern, and the Old Arsenal Museum in Solothurn. Captured standards have been held as war trophies up to the present; they were usually kept in the parish churches of the rural and urban communes of the Old Swiss Confederacy and were sometimes copied in cloth or drawn in flag books to preserve the gradually decaying pieces.

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Oliver Landolt

Narrative

The origins of the Swiss Confederation go back to the association of the three original Swiss cantons—Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden (Nidwalden)—in 1291; at the time, it was not clear whether even this association could last long. The network of alliances gradually strengthened as other cantons joined, between

the fourteenth and the early sixteenth centuries: Lucerne (1332), Zurich (1351), Glarus (1352), Zug (1352), Bern (1353), Freiburg (1481), Solothurn (1481), Basel (1501), Schaffhausen (1501), and Appenzell (1513). In particular, the cities of Bern, Zurich, and Lucerne acquired a great deal of additional territory in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and thus gained decisive influence within the confederation, in spite of the express opposition of the rural areas, some of which also gained territorial strength within the small area of present-day Switzerland. An additional loose network of other communes and rulers was formed, known as “associate members” (in German: “Zugewandte Orte”): the city of Biel, Graubünden, the count and city of Neuenburg, Valais (Wallis), the bishop of Sitten, the abbot of St. Gallen, the city of St. Gallen, and the Gotteshausbund. The Swiss League of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries cannot be understood as a nation, nor even as a confederation of states; rather, it was a network of allied communities whose members differed greatly in terms of their legal structures, along with conquered areas, ruled either by the confederation as a whole or by individual members. A feeling of common identity was rudimentary or nonexistent; each locale jealously protected its rights and exercised individual sovereignty in political, economic, and military concerns.

Early Formation and Disputes. Within the territory of modern Switzerland, around 1300, there existed a number of competing powers—noble, spiritual, urban, and rural—among which the great princely domains held political prominence: in western Switzerland, from 1250, Savoy built up a defended territory, while in southern Switzerland the Milanese dukes, the Visconti, enjoyed a controlling influence. Meanwhile, Habsburg Austria played a major role in the north and east, reaching deep into central Switzerland. After the Zähringer (1218) and Kyburger (1264) lines died out, the Habsburgs were able to expand their power considerably within the region of modern Switzerland. At the same time, regional noble dynasties (the counts of Toggenburg, Thierstein, Greyerz, and Neuenburg, as well as the lords of Hallwil and Landenberg) also declined, as

these families lost influence during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, gradually disappearing from the political stage due to extinction or the territorial ambitions of their various opponents. Spiritual lords, too, especially the bishops of Chur, Basel, and Sitten and a few abbots of monasteries (St. Gallen, Einsiedeln, Disentis, Engelberg, etc.), also controlled many smaller and medium-sized domains.

Above all, the conflicts with Habsburg Austria essentially defined the history of the confederation during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The aggressive Swiss policy against the Benedictine abbey of Einsiedeln, which was under Habsburg dominion, led to the Swiss victory in the battle of Morgarten in 1315. Thereafter, the territorial interests of the Habsburgs and those of the urban and rural regions of the confederation continued to clash: the battles of Sempach (1386) and Näfels (1388); the conquest of Austrian Aargau in 1415; the development of Austrian interest in the Old Zurich War in the mid-fifteenth century; the conquest of Thurgau in 1460. The hostilities between Habsburg and the confederation ended only with the so-called "Eternal Settlement" in 1474. Nonetheless, subsequent confederation historiography—particularly under the influence of Aegidius Tschudi from Glarus (1505–1572)—characterized this hostility as an actual "hereditary enmity," which shaped to a great degree the historical understanding of later generations.

Threats from the mercenary armies idled by cease-fires in the Hundred Years' War, which had devastated the area of present-day Switzerland, became infrequent. In December 1375, French and English mercenaries led by Enguerrand de Coucy, who claimed Austrian territory in Switzerland through Habsburg descent on his mother's side, entered the Swiss heartland. Troops from Bern and central Switzerland dealt these mercenaries heavy losses in nighttime attacks, whereupon—not least because of the winter cold—the latter withdrew. Because of the cowl-shaped (Latin *cuculla* or *cucullus*) helmets that the mercenaries wore, these disputes came to be known as the "Gugler War." Beginning in the second half of the 1430s, the so-called Armagnacs devastated Alsace, and then responded to King Frederick III's


call for help in the summer of 1444 under the leadership of the dauphin (later King Louis XI of France) in the disputes of the Old Zurich War as well as the conflicts between the city of Basel and the surrounding Habsburg nobility. Although a confederation army of about fifteen hundred men was nearly destroyed fending off this Armagnac army in the battle near St. Jakob an der Birs, the dauphin concluded a peace at the end of October 1444 with Basel and the confederation, and this mercenary army took no further part in the internal disputes of the Old Zurich War.

In the first half of the fifteenth century, the still-fragile confederation was exposed to several destructive crises that, on various occasions, even led to intra-Confederate armed conflict: the Zug Seal and Banner Affair in 1404; the Raron Affair, 1415–1420; the Ennetbirg campaigns in the 1420s; and the Old Zurich War, 1436–1450. The so-called Appenzeller Wars of 1401–1429 also led to numerous political conflicts, drawing the various confederation members into these disputes to different degrees.

Tensions repeatedly arose between rural and urban areas. In the course of the fifteenth century, as a result of joint conquests of territories that were then jointly governed, the individual confederated regions found themselves drawn more closely together by their *Tagsatzung* (legislature), where envoys from the political leadership of each of the full members met periodically as well as on an ad hoc basis. The reciprocal military obligations of the alliances between individual members were precisely written and regulated. Despite these obligations, the interests of the individual regions were often very selfishly guarded, particularly territorial and political ambitions. These different territorial and political interests became especially clear in the expansionist policies of individual confederated regions south of the Alps, which at times determined the expansion policies of the confederation as a whole from the fifteenth to the early sixteenth centuries. Uri, like some of the other interior regions, was interested in Ticino, the region south of the Gotthard Pass. Bern, and also Valais, which was allied with the confederation, wanted the Eschental, which ran parallel to the Gotthard Pass

and led into the Simplon Pass. Graubünden, which was loosely allied with the confederation, had its eye on Veltlin, Chiavenna, and Bormio. This territorial policy reached its peak with the defeat of the confederation at the battle of Arbedo against Milan in 1422; all the previously-won territories south of the Alps were lost. Uri, unwilling to accept this, went back into Ticino with partial success, despite a few defeats. The confederation victory in the battle near Giornico in 1478 established Uri's rule in the Leventina, but a Valais campaign into Eschental in 1478 was unsuccessful. In the late fifteenth century, the confederation expanded its territory in Ticino considerably (Bleniotal, the Riviera), and crowned these conquests with its victory over Bellinzona in 1500, which was ruled thereafter by the confederated regions of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden.

Tactics and Weaponry. In the fourteenth century, the victories of the confederated states as well as of individual regions were based on clever tactical use of the topography (battles of Morgarten, 1315; Sempach, 1386; Näfels, 1388). Similarly, the major fifteenth-century victories, particularly the great victories in the Burgundian Wars (battles of Grandson and Murten, 1476) and the Swabian War of 1499 (battles of Schwaderloh, Frastanz, Calven, and Dornach), rested upon precise knowledge of the territory. Besides this, the tactical actions of the confederated military units were also decisive in battle. The victories of the confederated infantry against cavalry forces, beginning in the early fourteenth century, were not, however, unusual experiences in Europe; foot soldiers were defeating traditional cavalry forces elsewhere in Europe.



Battle of Grandson. Swiss Confederate troops pillage the camp of Charles the Bold following his defeat in the battle of Grandson, 2 March 1476. Illustration from the *Berner Chronik* by Diebold Schilling the Elder, 1483.

In the fifteenth century especially, the confederated armies developed a particular infantry tactic. On the outside edges of a solid company, several rows of soldiers were positioned, armed with pikes up to five meters long, who led the charge against the opposing forces, protecting the halberdiers in the center. The pikemen made the first breaches in the enemy lines and eventually broke them, when the tactic succeeded. Moreover, the pikemen could wreck a cavalry charge. The fairly complicated Swiss battle tactics could be executed only by trained troops.

The halberd and the pike, the latter originating in northern Italy, were the standard weapons of the confederated armies. They also used other offensive weapons such as war clubs, war hammers, and battleaxes. For hand-to-hand combat, the confederated soldiers were armed with swords, daggers, and similar weapons; the so-called "Swiss sword" gained particular fame and eventually came to be regarded as a sort of "official" weapon. Protective weaponry, such as shields and armor, played only a secondary role in the confederated armies.

Day-to-day warfare in the late Middle Ages consisted mainly of small actions, whose purpose was to force the opponents to their knees economically through pillaging and fire. By destroying the enemy's territory (*vastatio*), each party sought primarily to damage the poorly-protected peasantry, whose means of subsistence were seriously threatened when their villages and farms were burned, their fields and other agricultural assets ruined, their cattle stolen, and their possessions plundered.

The assemblage of military forces in the city and region of Zurich in 1442–1443 gives an example of the distribution of weaponry.

There were probably large differences among the confederated cities and regions with respect to

the arming of their troops, and change over time. Nonetheless, these figures give an idea of the way in which troops were armed in one part of the confederation in the mid-fifteenth century.

Crossbowmen and—increasingly from the fifteenth century—handgunners formed standing units of their respective weaponry in the military organizations of the individual confederated regions in the Middle Ages; they even fought under banners of their own. Although they rarely played a decisive role in battle, marksmen enjoyed considerable status in the confederated regions beginning in the late fourteenth century, and were subsidized with public funds.

Innovations in firearms technology during the fifteenth century brought an increase in the numbers of handgunners. Periodic shooting contests brought archers and handgunners from different places into competition with one another. These major events served as opportunities to promote cohesion among the confederated states, from the second half of the fifteenth century. Shooting societies were formed in many communities, which pursued shooting as a hobby and met regularly for target practice.

Artillery carried no great weight, quantitatively or qualitatively, in open battle on the confederation side; it was used mainly in sieges and in the defense of forts and cities. At the end of the fifteenth century, all of the confederation members together probably had at their disposal about a thousand guns of various calibers, the majority seized as spoils of war and mostly of Burgundian origin. In addition, some of the cities invested in their own weapons production, setting up special foundries for the purpose. For military campaigns, special gunmasters were often appointed on a temporary basis; they were

Crossbow Archers	Handgunners	Pikemen	Short Weapons	Total
			(including halberdiers)	
473	61	635	1591 (minimum 856 halberdiers)	2760
17%	2.2%	23%	57.8% (minimum 31% halberdiers)	100%

usually well paid and were responsible for artillery support during that particular war.

Practically speaking, the cavalry was insignificant. In the earliest times, the confederated cities and the knightly families associated with them provided cavalry troops occasionally. It should be kept in mind that the mass tactics developed by the confederation were in fact designed to repel cavalry troops, and that these tactics had been used successfully for generations. The formation of cavalry units was therefore not permitted; at most, the mounted troops of allies were called upon. On the other hand, horses were important as transport among the confederated armies; numerous horses, as well as other draft animals, were used for carrying supplies and transporting artillery weapons. Nonetheless, it was often difficult to provide adequate supplies to confederated troops in the field, so that requisitioning and plundering were common.

The numerous fortresses located in present-day Swiss territory were increasingly abandoned in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and fell into disuse, as their importance decreased and the armed nobility declined. Meanwhile, the cities in this area built up their own fortifications, at great expense; specifically, the technical development of artillery in the fifteenth century required stronger defensive constructions.

In the Voralpine and Alpine regions the so-called *Letzinen*, or linear defenses, served to repel enemy

forces from an entire territory. They consisted of long walls, along with trenches or palisades. Sometimes towers were also incorporated into these defenses; such towers are preserved in Rothenthurm and Morgarten in the canton of Schwyz, and in Stansstad in the canton of Unterwalden.

Although the confederation was not a maritime nation, ships still played an important role in troop transport and occasional lake combat, because of the abundance of lakes and rivers in the territory. In the 1440s, at the time of the Old Zurich War, there were frequent lake operations on Lake Zurich, which was sharply disputed between two of the confederation members, Zurich and Schwyz. In the Burgundian Wars of the mid-1470s as well as in the Swabian War of 1499, several actions took place on lakes, with greater or (mostly) lesser success.

Manpower. The Benedictine hermit Albrecht von Bonstetten reports the approximate troop strengths of some individual confederation members in 1479, giving information only on the eight oldest cantons. No data are provided on the proportions coming from the associate members or the so-called Common Rule, the subjugated regions ruled in common by the confederation members. For the Graubünden, which were loosely allied with the confederated regions, the Abbot of Disentis estimates a potential fighting force of twelve thousand men in 1487.

Estimated Military Strength of the Confederated Troops at the End of the Fifteenth Century (according to Albrecht von Bonstetten, including the Abbot of Disentis's data for Graubünden)

Place	Men Available for Military Service
Zurich	10,000
Bern	20,000
Lucerne	9,000
Uri	3,000
Schwyz	4,000
Unterwalden	3,000
Glarus	3,000
Zug	2,500
Graubünden	12,000

Most soldiers came from rural areas, either the Swiss midlands or the Alpine and Voralpine regions. Even the contingents from urban areas contained a majority of soldiers from subjugated rural areas. Figures are available for the Zurich region. In the battle of Murten (1476) against the Burgundian duke Charles the Bold, the Zurich troops consisted of 254 city dwellers and 1,161 country dwellers (18 percent versus 82 percent); in the so-called War of St. Gallen (1490), 442 came from cities and 3,735 from the country (10.6 percent versus 89.4 percent). The high numbers of soldiers from the mountain regions relates to economic developments of the late medieval period. Specialization in cattle and dairy production for export required significantly less labor than a grain-based agrarian economy. Young, unmarried men in particular had to find new livelihoods in military service.

Despite the success of the confederated military forces in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in various campaigns and battles, their conduct of war reveals numerous deficiencies. Above all, the operational conduct of the confederated troops was frequently marked by grave errors. The different strategic interests of the individual confederation members, already mentioned, often made it difficult for its joint war council to reach a common consensus. Especially problematic was the fact that a unified leadership was often lacking. On the one hand, military decisions were made by the so-called war council, a committee consisting of the leaders of the contingents from each of the confederation members; on the other hand, the united authority of the ordinary soldiers could impair an optimal plan of action, in that their frequently ad hoc decisions might be followed, and might even force a battle to begin, contrary to the decision of their superiors. Military agreements and tactical coordination could often be reached only with the greatest difficulty; occasionally an individual member would even withdraw.

Disciplinary problems must also be mentioned. It can often be confirmed that, in the course of a campaign, large numbers of troops would gradually leave. The motive was less often cowardice in the face

of the enemy than other reasons, such as insufficient food, war-weariness, and the like. Greed for war booty was also a discipline problem: occasionally an individual soldier or even entire groups would stop fighting in mid-battle to rob enemy corpses, thus endangering the outcome of the battle. As a result of experiences of this kind in various fights, especially the 1386 battle of Sempach, the so-called Sempach Letter was issued in 1393. It laid down rules for the conduct of war (*ius in bello*), such as the protection of places of worship, clerics, and women, as well as military discipline, such as punishment for desertion. Subsequently, various confederation members also issued rules of war, which partly modified the Sempach Letter and completed it by the addition of further articles.

Mercenaries. Partly because of their military successes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, especially the confederation victories in the Burgundian Wars of the mid-1470s, soldiers from the confederated regions became sought after as mercenaries by various European powers. The beginnings of this practice for certain areas within the borders of present-day Switzerland can be traced as far back as the thirteenth century, and possibly earlier. In any case, traveling off to fight as a private mercenary was not kindly looked upon, and the authorities of the individual confederation members, as well as those of the confederated *Tagsatzung*, sought to forbid such service to foreign powers, or at least to direct it in an orderly way. Countering these measures, from the 1470s quite a few foreign rulers offered pension payments—bribes, actually—in some of the confederated areas, which made it possible for them to recruit mercenaries from these regions. Not infrequently, from the end of the fifteenth century, mercenaries from the confederation opposed each other in the same battle, in the service of foreign powers. Several rulers recruited permanent guard troops from among confederation mercenaries, for their personal protection and for symbolic purposes. The French king Charles VIII established a bodyguard of one hundred confederation soldiers in 1497, which lasted until the time of the French Revolution. Pope Julius II followed suit in 1506, founding the Swiss

Guard of the Vatican, which survives to the present. The pension payments from foreign powers remained a problem for the confederated regions for some time thereafter. Nevertheless, quite a few of the confederated regions were able to balance their public budgets in the late fifteenth and especially the sixteenth centuries because of these payments, and were largely able to avoid levying direct wealth taxes and other kinds of taxes for a long time.

Civil Disturbances. Besides the regular confederation war expeditions, there were also the so-called "non-state" wars and feuds. Groups of soldiers repeatedly banded together to fight out wars and feuds on their own, with no instructions from above, more or less as a private matter. The so-called "Plapphart War" of 1458 against the city of Konstanz, and the "Saubanner Expedition" against the city of Geneva in 1477, are famous examples. These expeditions were mostly about blackmailing cities for protection money (against pillaging and burning), and probably an expression of male bonding as well. The confederated regions sought very quickly, by means of various directives, to counter such warlike eruptions and to punish them. Confederation letters in 1291 and 1315 attempted to subject the settling of feuds to legal measures and arbitration. In the so-called "Pfaffenbrief" ("Pastoral Letter") of 1370, all unauthorized military expeditions were forbidden. The Sempach Letter of 1393—the confederation's first real "law of war"—outlawed mercenary service. Above all, the "Stanser Verkomnis" ("Stanser Incident") of 1481 made unauthorized outbreaks of war punishable. Despite repeated efforts at the levels of both the confederation *Tagsatzung* and the individual regions, the problem of non-state wars remained unresolved into the sixteenth century. Even within official confederation wars, so-called "free groups" kept forming, who followed the official troops into the fight and frequently became an unrestrained mob, extremely difficult to discipline. These soldiers were motivated chiefly by the hope of booty.

The Decline of Swiss Military Power. The military might of the confederation saw its zenith and its end in the war of Italy, in the early sixteenth

century, following Charles VIII's 1494 expedition to Naples. After yet another victory was achieved with heavy losses, in the battle of Novara in 1513 against a French army, the confederation suffered a devastating defeat in the two-day battle of Marignano in 1515 against a French army under King Francis I and his Venetian allies. Further defeats followed, at the battle of Bicocca in 1522 and the battle of Pavia in 1525, with heavy loss of life. These were fatal defeats, signifying the end of the military superiority of the confederated armies. The hitherto successful military tactic of overwhelming power came to an end with these lost battles; the combined effect of various types of weapons, with firearms taking on major importance, was to be the future of military success. Despite these defeats, confederation mercenaries remained sought-after soldiers for various European powers into the nineteenth century.

[See also Arbedo, Battle of; Artillery; Cavalry; Discipline; Dornach, Battle of; France, *subentry on* Narrative (1328–1483); Frederick III of Habsburg; Grandson, Battle of; Infantry; Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1493); Mercenaries; Morgarten, Battle of; Murten, Battle of; Näfels, Battle of; Sempach, Battle of; Strategy; and Weapons, Hand-to-Hand.]

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Oliver Landolt

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

Historiography

For a long time, Swiss historiography extolled the origins of the confederation in the late Middle Ages, placing military history in the forefront of historical portrayals. This can be seen in the late medieval chronicles, in which a great deal of space is devoted to the depiction of battles. These representations continued to dominate into the first half of the twentieth century. Typically, the period from the origins

of the confederation until the defeat of the confederated regions in the battle of Marignano in 1515 is described by historians as the "heroic age." A comprehensive survey of Swiss military history from its beginnings to the start of World War I appeared in four volumes under the title *Schweizer Kriegsgeschichte* (History of Swiss wars) between 1915 and 1935; the medieval period, comprising two volumes, was disproportionately represented. Various monographs, Festschriften, and articles appeared regularly on the anniversaries of individual medieval battles; this tradition persisted into the second half of the twentieth century. Among the best of these are the volumes published on the battles of Sempach, Saint Jakob on the Birs, Murten, Calven, and Dornach. This representation was used politically in the ideology of the so-called Geistige Landesverteidigung (spiritual national defense), particularly in the period immediately before and during World War II. By means of this ideology, war was declared on both the fascist and communist worldviews, and an independent path for Switzerland was promoted.

After the end of World War II, correction of this image of history was long overdue. The task was taken up by Walter Schaufelberger, who since the 1950s has produced a new picture of the confederation's military history in the late medieval period. Whereas, up until then, individual battles had taken priority in military histories, Schaufelberger emphasized the great significance of guerrilla warfare, adducing new sources such as correspondence, financial accounts, and reports of looting. By means of looting and destruction, the opponents sought to force an end to wars through economic ruin. The great battles might be decisive in a war, but they should not be considered separately from the guerrilla warfare. Schaufelberger and his students (among them Christian Padrutt and Albert Sennhauser), as well as Hans Georg Wackernagel before them, researched more closely the everyday effects of war and the anthropological aspects of the medieval conduct of war. Among other things, they studied the importance of leadership resources (e.g., officers) and their relationship to their subordinates. Regional research, such as studies of military

relationships in the late medieval and early modern *Graubünden*, also provided deep insights into the characteristics and the war mentality of Confederation soldiers.

As a consequence of the changes brought on by the social and political movements of 1968, the study of war and military history fell into discredit in Switzerland and had to fight for its right to exist. Nevertheless, military history in Switzerland received a new lease on life with the introduction, often from other countries, of new lines of research: new points of view, strongly influenced by the study of cultural history since the 1990s, have sparked new interest in the field of confederation military history in the medieval period. Recent work by Hans Rudolf Fuhrer and Robert-Peter Eyer specially emphasizes research on confederation mercenaries serving foreign powers, as well as military employers—a subject hitherto little studied for the medieval period. This type of foreign service was by no means uncontroversial in the public consciousness of the late medieval confederation. Beginning in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, foreign pension payments (from France, the Papal States, and elsewhere) were sent to the rulers of the confederated regions, who allowed foreign powers to employ their soldiers as mercenaries. The rest of society viewed these payments as blood money, and the issue occasionally caused unrest, especially in the early sixteenth century. The “culture of commemoration” should also be mentioned in this connection: research into the battle anniversaries, commemorating individual battles, is of particular interest.

[See also Dornach, Battle of; Murten, Battle of; and Sempach, Battle of.]

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Oliver Landolt

Translated from the German by

Johanna M. Baboukis

SWORDS

See Weapons, Hand-to-Hand.

SYLLAION, BATTLE OF

This engagement was supposedly fought between Byzantine and Arab forces near the coastal city of the same name in Pamphylia. In fact, the Arab fleet was destroyed in a storm as it sailed back to Syria, and the story of a battle here is probably a later myth, perhaps based on hagiographical accounts. It is reported only in a later-twelfth-century source, compiled by Zonaras, in reference to the action of the general of the Kibyrrhaiot fleet, but there is no evidence for the existence of this division until a little later. Syllaion itself occupied a strategically important situation with a sheltered anchorage and was the center of a military and civil administration; by the mid-ninth century it had become the second most important fortress in the Kibyrrhaiot theme (military district). As the residence of the second-in-command of the theme, it played an important role and had become the seat of the metropolitan bishop for the region (replacing nearby Perge) by 815. It is closely associated with St. Anthony the Younger, who had been the military commander of the fortress circa 821–829, before becoming a monk. It remained an important local ecclesiastical center but probably fell under Turkish control during the later twelfth century.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry* on Narrative (500–900).]

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John Haldon

SYRACUSE, SIEGE OF

In 1084, Ibn el-Werd, the emir of Syracuse, attacked Nicotera, the outskirts of Reggio and Rocca d'Asino near Squillace on the Calabrian coast. The emir had already taken advantage of Norman disunity and overextension when he gained control of Catania from its Muslim governor in 1081. He was, however, quickly defeated by Jordan, the son of Roger I, Count of Sicily, and lost the city. The count then reinforced the fortifications of Messina to secure both his primary base on Sicily and his transit point to the mainland. This effectively discouraged any further such attempts. Then, during the raids in 1084, churches were destroyed and the nuns of a convent carried off. These actions reignited religious hatreds, and a tolerant policy that had been very useful in the Norman takeover of Sicily was now threatened. Count Roger prepared a full-scale campaign against Syracuse.

The fleet left Messina on Wednesday, 20 May 1085, and anchored near Capo Santa Croce, only fifteen miles (twenty-four kilometers) north of Syracuse, by Friday evening. Jordan had already reached the same location with the cavalry. Presumably the foot soldiers were transported by ship. Roger sent a reconnaissance team of Greek- and Arabic-speaking Sicilians led by Philip, son of Gregory the Patrician. No doubt mistaken for local fishers or traders, this

team was able to sail at night through the emir's fleet, and by Sunday Roger knew the size, composition, and battle-readiness of the enemy fleet. The battle was joined at daybreak the next morning, with both the count and the emir personally commanding their fleets.

The only source for this battle is the Norman historian Geoffrey Malaterra, who does not give any information as to the size of any fleets or armies. The emir decided on a direct attack. He was wounded by a javelin in the heavy fighting as he sought to close in on Roger's flagship. As it turned out, it was the count who boarded the emir's flagship. Ibn el-Werd tried to escape by jumping onto another of his vessels. He jumped short, fell into the sea, and drowned. The loss of their leader took the heart out of the people of Syracuse. Most of the ships were captured with great loss of life, and the rest fled back into the harbor.

In the meantime Jordan was ready to undertake an immediate attack on the city, but Count Roger forbade this and began a siege by land while maintaining a blockade. As the summer heat continued, the defenders released all their Christian prisoners, to no effect other than having fewer mouths to feed. Roger demanded unconditional surrender. The siege lasted from May until October, when the emir's wife with her son and a number of more important citizens escaped by outrowing the Norman blockade ships. Left without leaders, the remaining citizens surrendered themselves and their city.

[See also Italy, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300); Palermo, Sieges of; and Roger I.]

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Valerie Eads

SZEKLEERS

The Szeklers, or Székely (Hungarian: *Székelyek*; Latin: *Siculi*), are a people who have lived in eastern Transylvania since the thirteenth century who

possess their own folkways and legal customs but speak Hungarian. Their origin is still debated, but they were most likely a distinct auxiliary military people that joined the Magyars before their arrival in the Carpathian Basin. They may have been of Turkish (Volga Bulgar) origin, assimilated to the Hungarians in language but retaining their own ethnic identity. They are first mentioned as an auxiliary military force. At the battles of the river Olšava (1116) and the river Fischa (1146), the Szeklers constituted the vanguard of the Hungarian army, together with the Patzinaks (Pechenegs) living in Hungary. Their main weapons were the bow and arrow, and they fought as light cavalry.

After the Hungarian Conquest (895) the Szeklers settled along the borders and performed border-patrol duty. The exact time and course of their settlement into Transylvania (Székelyföld, or Szekler Land, in modern Romania) are debated; this process may have been completed by the end of the thirteenth century. Subsequently those Szekler groups that stayed at their original place of settlement were assimilated with the surrounding people, while the majority, who settled in Transylvania, acquired extensive privileges and a considerable degree of self-government. The basis of these privileges was their obligation to serve in the army per capita. In exchange the Szeklers were free from taxation and could live under their own legal customs. Their main military leader and judge was the count (*comes Siculorum*), selected by the Hungarian king from Hungarian (i.e., non-Szekler) barons. In wartime the *comes Siculorum* led the Szekler army into action, and in peacetime he was responsible for maintaining their military readiness. The *terra Siculorum* consisted of seven military, judicial, and administrative districts, called *sedes* (seats). Each *sedes* was jointly headed by a military lieutenant (*maior exercitus*) and a judge (*iudex terrestris*). These officials were chosen from among high-ranking Szeklers and were rotated on a yearly basis in an order defined by the clan system.

The military system and obligation of medieval Szeklers can be reconstructed on the basis of regulations dating from the fifteenth and

sixteenth centuries. These sources also stress the role of Szeklers as vanguard and rear guard, as well as their border-patrol duties. The sources also reveal that if the king led a campaign against Moldavia—or if a foreign invasion threatened Transylvania—then all of the Szeklers had to accompany his army; but if the king led a campaign against Walachia, half of them had to, and in a western campaign, even fewer had to.

By the fifteenth century, extensive social stratification had developed among the Szeklers, as a result of which many of them could participate in the campaigns only as infantry, while some, reduced to serfdom, became so poor that they were unable to fulfill their military obligation at all. Moreover, as military service was being demanded more and more often, attempts were made to abolish the Szeklers' freedom from taxation. All this led to serious tensions within Szekler society, as the aristocracy sought to oppress the impoverished common Szeklers. Tensions also arose between the Szeklers and royal power because the Szeklers bitterly defended their increasingly anachronistic privileges at a time when they were unable to fulfill their military obligations. Accumulated tension led to the 1562 Szekler uprising, which was quickly crushed by the ruling John II Sigismund. John then made the Transylvanian Diet abolish the majority of Szekler privileges. This marked the end of the Middle Ages for the Szeklers.

[See also Auxiliary Peoples, Military; Hungary, subentries on Narrative (1000–1300) and Narrative (1300–1526); Patzinaks; Romanian Principalities; and Transylvania.]

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Zoltán Kordé

SZLACHTA

The Polish term *szlachta* (nobility) derives from the etymon of the German word *Geschlecht* (family). The gentry as a social group arose from the knights (Latin *nobiles, milites*). In the fourteenth century knights began to receive general privileges from the kings, because they had a privileged status in the state that distinguished them from the clergy, peasants, and burgesses. They consisted of the 7 or 8 percent of the population that owned landed estates. In return for these privileges, they were obliged to give military service at their own expense. The mobilization of the entire gentry on military expeditions was called *pospolite ruszenie* (common movement). The defense of the country was obligatory for the nobility, but the knights had to consent to go to war in foreign lands.

The size and equipment of a knight's retinue depended on his financial resources. The general rule was that a knight went to war equipped "to the best of his ability." The mobilized gentry was almost entirely cavalry. From the fourteenth century on, the kings issued numerous documents reducing the knights' duties of military service. In the Privilege of Kassa (1374), Louis I of Anjou, King of Hungary and Poland, promised to ransom knights from captivity if they were captured during a foreign expedition. The king also guaranteed compensation for possible

losses in such campaigns. In 1386 King Władysław II Jagiello decided to pay noblemen in advance for their participation in a campaign and in 1388 began to pay five coins (*marca, grzywna*) for a "lance" (i.e., one heavy cavalryman and two light horsemen). In practice, however, noblemen often fought abroad without receiving payment. Noblemen served in small units called banners, representing various voivodeships. The nobility took advantage of its predominant role in the defense of Poland to demand more political and economic power.

[See also Feudalism in Europe; Knighthood and Knights; Rewards for Military Service; and Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Tadeusz Grabarczyk

T

TACTICS, BATTLE

As all sociopolitical and military leaders have done over the ages, the leaders of the Middle Ages also sought to adapt the means at their disposal toward their own ends, ends that went beyond using and disposing of their resources in the most profitable manner possible for the purpose of imposing their will on or defending against their adversaries. They also valued and promoted elements that would make their tactical initiatives more effective. For example, they ensured that discipline, respect for hierarchical rank, evaluation of forces and positions, information on terrain, division of troops into units and their corresponding cohesion, combat training, coordination of maneuvers, boosting morale, and gathering intelligence were the norm among the armies they commanded. The constant—and on occasion almost obsessive—preoccupation with the combination of these facets demonstrates that during the medieval centuries tactical warfare was considerably more complex and planned-out than simply a brutal, chaotic faceoff between men and animals.

Only the existence of ignorance and prejudice explains the persistence of certain studies' claims that medieval battles took place without any tactics beyond direct confrontation and the search for glory. The generals of the Middle Ages demonstrated great

concern for the ordered and effective deployment and use of their forces when faced with the enemy on the battlefield. Aside from their personal talent and experience, generals relied for their understanding of effective tactics both on late Roman military epitomes, especially that of Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, *Epitoma rei militaris* (also known as *De re militari*), and also on the counsel of many contemporary authors of the Middle Ages who analyzed military operations from a theoretical viewpoint.

Attending to all of the above, for their advantage military leaders took into account the terrain, the sun's position in the sky, and the direction of the wind, which affected the range of missile weapons and might blow dust into the enemy's eyes. In arraying their forces, leaders first took into account their numerical superiority or inferiority to the enemy, as well as their troops' skills, their troops' experience, and the type and the proportions of available troops—cavalry, heavy infantry, archers, and crossbowmen. Then they divided the troops into large corps, usually intended to enter into combat in succession and with a preestablished rhythm. They organized wings for enveloping maneuvers and ensured that they had reserve units that would remain on standby until a critical moment of battle. As throughout the history of warfare, medieval commanders might lose partial or even total control

once the battle was unleashed, but they did all they could to ensure that developments during battle would resemble the planned tactic.

Tactical Roles of Cavalry and Infantry. In the popular imagination the dominant image of medieval warfare is of heavy cavalry. Armored lancers were formed in single ranks, in small units of some ten riders; each unit was known as a *conrois*. These lines (altogether called the *acies*) charged to collide with the enemy, striving to break their formation; if the charge failed to sweep the enemy away, it would lead to fighting characterized by one-to-one combat. When these duels took place between peers of the same caste, their aim was typically, not the opponent's death, but his capture for later ransom. But when the cavalry charge struck Muslims, pagans, heretics, or (in some cases) rebels, the aim was to eliminate the greatest number of enemies—either during the battle itself or, if the adversary was vanquished and took flight, during the subsequent chase.

Nonetheless the tactic of the cavalry charge was not the sole, or even the predominant, one used. Over the centuries and in various geopolitical areas, many armies were made up mainly of infantry that fought in phalanx formation, presenting a tight-knit wall of shields. Usually the battle began with the shooting of all sorts of projectiles from behind this wall; then the “storm of swords and fodder for crows,” as a pair of old Anglo-Saxon kennings puts it, was unleashed.

In Italy during the second half of the twelfth century, the militias from some cities were made up basically of infantrymen who fought in close formation. Relying on long lances, they were capable of stopping a cavalry charge, as demonstrated by the Milanese at Legnano in 1176. In Scotland at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century, men on foot would squeeze into a circular formation called a “schiltrom,” which resembled a porcupine of lances; these were capable of bringing down the English cavalry on several occasions, especially at Bannockburn (1314).

Effective Tactics. Even when evidence shows that tactics involving heavy cavalry dominated the

battlefields—as they did from the eleventh to the thirteenth century—clashes on the open field were seldom resolved exclusively with a series of charges. At the battle of Hastings (1066), considered the paradigmatic victory of cavalry over infantry, the role of the infantry archers of William II of Normandy (William the Conqueror) was prominent. The bowmen served to thin the close formations of the *fyrð* (national militia) of England's Harold II. Moreover the fundamental tactical maneuver by the Norman cavalry, the one that ultimately brought them victory that day by breaking the dense block of the Anglo-Saxon phalanx, was not the final charge, but rather the feigned retreat. That is, the Normans' success was actually based on maneuvers that were characteristic of light rather than heavy cavalry.

In reality it was a frequent practice for knights, with or without a separate infantry contingent, to dismount and take on the tactical formation of heavy infantry. These close-ordered formations were capable of bringing to a dead halt the charge of the enemy cavalry if the need arose. On the battlefield of Hastings, the Normans learned a hard lesson when they were almost defeated, and so in the handful of battles waged in the subsequent decades the usual tactics were to dismount before combat began and to fight in a standing formation. At Tinchebrai (1106), Brémule (1119), and Bourghérulde (1124), the elite Anglo-Norman cavalry fought on foot in a central corps flanked by archers, with a mounted cavalry force as reserve ready to back up the success of this infantry. In a similar fashion the knights of the First Crusade at Dorylaion (1097) dismounted and fought as an infantry force would have fought.

Thus warriors commonly battled on foot throughout the Middle Ages. Consequently the question of whether there occurred an eclipse of the infantry—as a method of combat, not as a social class—from the fifth century forward needs to be thoroughly reexamined. There is no doubt, however, that beginning in the fourteenth century and despite some victories by the heavy cavalry, the infantry—not only as a class of combatant but also as a social class—had an ever-increasing role on the battlefield, being especially effective when acting en masse, forming large

groupings both in density and in combination with the heavy cavalry.

On occasion, close formations of foot soldiers armed with pikes, lances, and halberds demonstrated their capacity to halt and then, by means of a counterattack, to destroy a heavy cavalry charge. Examples of this can be found at the battles of Courtrai (1302), Bannockburn (1314), Morgarten (1315), and Dithmarschen (1319). On other occasions archers played decisive battlefield roles, as at Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), Nájera (1367), and Agincourt (1415). In these battles the mission of the English and Welsh archers was not so much to deter a frontal attack by knights as it was to dismantle the knights progressively as they approached their own lines. The only element needed was a long-range weapon, one that could fire rapidly (several arrows per minute) and be used on a massive scale. The bow was the answer: it was used not so much to kill the enemy in man-on-man combat as to deliver a shower of arrows on the approaching army, felling, demoralizing, and causing havoc among the knights and especially among their horses.

Once the cavalry charge had been confused and broken, the remainder of the battle was left up to the knights in reserve. At Aljubarrota (1385), however, along with the Anglo-Welsh archers who fought in the Portuguese army, the open ditches and trenches and the *covas-de-lobo* (covered ditches known as "wolf pits") also helped to defeat the heavily French-influenced army of Juan I of Castile.

Introduction of Handguns. During the fifteenth century the introduction of portable firearms—which were also sometimes used in battle during the previous century—created a notable tactical advantage for those who had them and used them well. But it was not until the last decades of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the next that handguns really assumed a prominent place on the battlefield; this was a factor in the controversial so-called military revolution. In their conflict with the German Empire at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Hussites made use of firearms transported by cart from one position to another on the battlefield. These proved to be useful against

closed formations moving slowly, but their rate of fire was low and their effectiveness was limited. The full development of tactics derived from these new weapons took place after the medieval period.

[See also Agincourt, Battle of; Aljubarrota, Battle of; Artillery; Bannockburn, Battle of; Bourghtheroulde, Battle of; Brémule, Battle of; Cavalry; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Crécy, Battle of; Dorylaion, Battle of; Hastings, Battle of; Infantry; Legnano, Battle of; Morgarten, Battle of; Nájera, Battle of; Plans, Military; Poitiers, Battle of; Strategy; Theory, Military; and Tinchebrai, Battle of.]

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Manuel Rojas Gabriel

Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

TAGINAE, BATTLE OF

In the final stage of the Byzantine-Ostrogoth war, the army of Narses, composed of around twenty-five thousand men (six thousand Lombards and four thousand Heruli among them), departed on 16 June 552 from Ravenna southward, along the Adriatic sea-shore. Totila was also marching on the Via Flaminia in the same direction. When he learned that Totila's army was approaching, Narses established a camp at Taginae, or Busta Gallorum (near modern Gubbio), 11 miles (18 kilometers) from the enemy. He awaited Totila's advance near a hill that could be reached only by a narrow passage. In the center were deployed the Heruli and the Lombards as a phalanx-like compact formation of foot soldiers, while the Byzantine heavy cavalry and infantry were put on the flanks. At the ends of each flank were four thousand archers. Narses commanded from the left. Behind the hill was a reserve of fifteen hundred cavalrymen.

When the approximately eighteen thousand Goths arrived near the Roman camp, the passage in front

of the hill was occupied by a detachment of fifty men that blocked any attempt at penetration. Because he was waiting for new forces, Totila withdrew to prepare a surprise attack. The Goths returned after few hours, but they found the Byzantines ready for defense. Totila launched a massive cavalry attack against the center, but it was repelled by the phalanx, as well as by the archers from the wings, who were disposed in crescent formation. As the Goths retreated, the Byzantine infantry moved toward them, while the cavalry attacked from the flanks. The Goths fled in disorder before this advance, followed by the Byzantine cavalry and blocked from behind by their own infantry. The cavalry reserve made the final strike. About six thousand Goths, including Totila, were killed. The battle illustrates the value of well-organized infantry formations in clashes with cavalry charges.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry* on Narrative (500–900); Cavalry; Infantry; and Narses.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

TAGLIA

See Leagues, Italian Military.

TAGLIACCOZZO, BATTLE OF

The battle of Tagliacozzo was fought on 23 August 1268 on the Palentini plain in the present-day Italian province of L'Aquila. The battle was between the army of Charles of Anjou and the army of Conradin, the sixteen-year-old duke of Swabia who claimed the throne of Sicily. The battle took its name from the nearby castle of Tagliacozzo.

After the short and insignificant reign of Conrad IV (d. 1254), the legitimate heir of the Crown of

Sicily was his son Conradin, who was only two years old. At first Conradin's uncle Manfred, the illegitimate son of Frederick II, was his regent in Sicily. Then in 1257, Manfred declared himself king, claiming that he had heard rumors of Conradin's death.

In an effort to check Manfred's growing power, Pope Clement IV excommunicated him and called for Charles of Anjou to replace the Hohenstaufens in Sicily, especially after the Ghibelline victory at Montaperti (1260). Bolstered by papal resources—including a crusade launched against the Hohenstaufens, who were presented as “demonic”—Charles entered Italy hailed as an *athleta Christi* (champion of Christ), defeated Manfred at the battle of Benevento (1266), and began to call himself king of Sicily. After Benevento, Pope Clement IV continued to use the Angevins and the Guelphs to resist the power of the Ghibellines, though this came with a risk: would Charles, like the Hohenstaufens, attempt to dominate both northern and southern Italy and menace the pope's temporalities? But the papacy considered its ancient enemy, the Hohenstaufen line, to be the more pressing threat, and when Conradin and the Italian Ghibellines under his flag challenged Charles and his claim to Sicily in 1267–1268, Clement turned to the Angevin and appointed him papal vicar in Tuscany.

Conradin entered Verona in February 1267 with three thousand German knights. In this town of the Scaligeri he encountered great Italian Ghibellines such as Guido da Montefeltro, Guido Novello, and Galvano Lancia, and he planned an invasion of the Kingdom of Sicily. From Verona they moved to Pavia and at that moment divided the army in two. From the port of Varazze near Genoa, Conradin sailed with twenty-five boats to Ghibelline Pisa in May 1268. Led by his cousin Frederick, Duke of Baden, the rest of the army marched through the Apennines. The reunited army then moved toward Siena, and on 25 June 1268, at Ponte a Valle near Arezzo, the Ghibellines defeated an Angevin army of five hundred knights led by Jean de Brayselve. Conradin marched toward Rome with an army of five thousand knights, of which eight hundred were Spanish

troops under Enrique of Castile; because the way to Naples was defended by the Angevins, he decided to enter the Regno through the Abruzzo region.

Conradin's invading army met Charles on the Palentini plain near Tagliacozzo. Charles divided his army of three thousand soldiers into three divisions. The first division primarily comprised Italian Guelphs with some Provençal knights led by Henry of Cousances under Charles's standard. The second division comprised French knights under Jean de Clary and Guillaume l'Etendard. The final division, led by Charles, Guillaume de Ville, and the veteran crusader Erard de Saint-Valery, comprised eight hundred veteran French knights. At Erard's suggestion, Charles deployed the final division hidden behind a hill in order to constitute a tactical surprise against his enemies.

Conradin also divided his army of five thousand soldiers into three divisions. The first division comprised Spanish and Italian knights led by Enrique of Castile; the second division, led by Galvano Lancia, comprised Italian Ghibellines with some German knights; and Conradin himself, along with his cousin Frederick of Baden and many other barons, led the final division, containing the largest part of the German knights.

Between the armies there was a shallow river crossed by a fortified bridge. The first objective of both armies was to conquer the bridge. Conradin's forces prevailed during the initial phase of the battle, and broke up to pursue Charles's first two divisions. By a hidden maneuver the troops of Enrique of Castile passed the river and struck one flank of the enemy from the rear. The Angevins were put to flight, and Conradin's troops proceeded to pillage the Angevin camp. At this point, however, Charles sprung his trap: his hidden reserve forces entered the fight, massacring Conradin's scattered forces. Enrique of Castile, returning from his pursuit of the Angevins, made a final attempt to reverse the tide of battle. Charles was nevertheless able to defeat him with a counterattack. Conradin was forced to flee to Rome, but he was later captured in Torre Astura, imprisoned in Genazzano, and, after a show trial, executed in Naples in October 1268 along with

Frederick of Baden, Galvano Lancia, and many other barons.

[See also Benevento, Battle of; Charles of Anjou; Conradin; Germany, *subentry on* Narrative (1250–1415); Italy, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); and Montaperti, Battle of.]

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Federico Canaccini

TAGMA

See Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Regiments.

TAGUS, BATTLE OF THE

See Lisbon, Siege of, and the Battle of the Tagus (1384).

TAILLEBOURG, BATTLE OF

More of a skirmish—or even a standoff—than a battle, this encounter of 20 July 1242 was part of the Anglo-French contest for control of Poitou and Gascony. Henry III of England, hoping to regain land lost by his father King John but also to halt further French incursions into remaining English territory, joined rebels under the Count of La Marche against

Louis IX of France. Henry arrived in Poitou on 13 May with a small expeditionary force of fewer than two hundred knights. Delays caused by diplomacy and calls for reinforcements cost Henry dearly, as it allowed Louis to take the initiative. The English moved north to block the successful French march south, the armies meeting at Taillebourg, strategically important for its stone bridge over the Charente River. Troop numbers are impossible to ascertain, but the armies were large, both being led by kings in the field: Matthew Paris puts Henry's army at an inflated strength of sixteen hundred knights, twenty thousand infantry, and seven hundred crossbowmen; Joinville, for the French, extravagantly claims that the English outnumbered them twenty to one. Henry's ally, the lord of Taillebourg, Geoffrey de Rançon, guarded the castle and town while Henry took up his position on the left bank. However, Geoffrey deserted Henry and handed over Taillebourg and its bridge to Louis. The English were in danger of being outflanked when Louis ordered a wooden bridge to be constructed over the river further downstream. The chronicler Joinville writes that the French engaged with the English by crossing the river on boats and pontoon bridges and that some French knights were captured while pursuing the fleeing English; Matthew Paris writes that Richard of Cornwall urgently sought a twenty-four-hour truce, granted largely on account of his status as a respected crusader. The English retreated hastily to nearby Saintes, where they reassembled for a larger engagement the next day.

[See also John, King of England; and Louis IX of France.]

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Sean McGlynn

TALBOT, JOHN

(c. 1387–1453), English field commander. John Talbot, first Earl of Shrewsbury, was born around

1387, the second son of Richard, fourth Lord Talbot of Goodrich, Herefordshire. On his father's death, his mother married Thomas Neville, Lord Furnival, and Talbot married Furnival's daughter Maud. His formative years were spent in Wales fighting against rebels under Owain Glyn Dŵr, and in 1414 he was appointed lieutenant of Ireland, where he quickly gained a reputation for being ruthless. He was briefly imprisoned in the Tower of London in 1413 for a feud with the Earl of Arundel, and in 1419 he was summoned to attend Henry V in Normandy. Another brief spell in Ireland followed before he was retained by John, Duke of Bedford and regent of France, in 1427. Talbot established his reputation as a field commander during the recovery of Maine in 1427–1428. He also gained a reputation for terrorizing the civilian population. Captured at the battle of Patay in 1429, he was released in 1434 and accused his fellow commander, Sir John Fastolf, of cowardice in fleeing from the battle. Talbot spent the next eleven years defending the borders of English Normandy as marshal of France and lieutenant general of the lands bordered by the Seine, the Oise, and the sea, before traveling to England with the new queen consort Margaret of Anjou in 1445. He returned to Normandy in 1448 and was again captured, this time at the siege of Rouen in October of the following year.

On 17 July 1453, in his mid-sixties, Talbot was killed leading a forlorn attack against the French siege camp outside the Gascon town of Castillon. "The terror of the French" and "the English Achilles," Talbot was perhaps the premier English field commander in the latter stages of the Hundred Years' War, and it was largely thanks to his efforts that the English maintained their position in Normandy during the 1430s and early 1440s. He was a violent man who led from the front, the nature of his death exemplifying the daring, but at times reckless, character of the man.

[See also Castillon, Siege and Battle of; Glyn Dŵr, Owain; Henry V of England; Hundred Years' War; Patay, Battle of; and Rouen, Siege of (1449).]

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David Grummitt

TANCRED

(1075 or 1076–1112), Norman crusader. Tancred, born probably in 1075 or 1076, was the son of Marquis Odo the Good by Emma, daughter of Robert Guiscard and the latter's second wife, Sichelgaita. Tancred, as one of the highest Norman nobility in southern Italy, probably learned not only Latin but also some Arabic and Greek in the course of his training as a soldier and administrator.

When Bohemond, the half-brother of Tancred's mother Emma, took up the cross in 1096, he appointed his nephew as second-in-command of his Norman and Italian crusading force. Tancred served under Bohemond's command during most of the First Crusade. In the late summer and fall of 1097, Tancred led a small force into Cilicia where he liberated a series of Byzantine towns, including Tarsus, from Turkish control, in the process quarrelling sharply with Baldwin of Boulogne, who had also left the main army, but with a larger force. During the final push to Jerusalem, Tancred, now leading an independent command, captured Bethlehem and participated in the capture of Jerusalem itself on 15 July 1099.

After the capture of Jerusalem, Tancred was appointed Lord of Galilee by Godfrey, now ruler of Jerusalem. Tancred held this office from 1099 to 1101 until he was summoned to Antioch to serve as regent there following the capture of Bohemond by the Danishmend ruler Malik Ghazi. Tancred ruled as regent in Antioch until 1103, making little effort to assist Bohemond's liberation, which came in 1103. Tancred then operated as an independent landowner in Cilicia under Bohemond's nominal lordship until again being summoned to serve as regent when Bohemond departed for Europe in late 1104. Over the course of the next four years Tancred served loyally as Bohemond's regent. However, when the latter

concluded the Treaty of Devol with the Byzantine emperor Alexios in 1108, Tancred refused to accept the terms and became de facto ruler of Antioch. He had considerably strengthened the principality by the time of his death on 12 December 1112.

[See also Bohemond I; Byzantine Empire, *subentry on Narrative* (900–1204); Crusades, *subentries on Sources* (1095–1183) and *Narrative* (1095–1183); Godfrey of Bouillon; Jerusalem, *Siege of* (1099); Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; and Robert Guiscard.]

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David Bachrach

TARTU, SIEGE OF

In 1223 the military order of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword (German: Schwertbrüderorden; Latin: Fratres Militiae Christi Livoniae) was driven from the southern part of Livonia—which it had occupied since 1207—when the Estonians rebelled. Eager to regain possession of the area, the order sought the assistance of its founder, bishop Albert of Riga, and his brother, Hermann, bishop of Leal (including Tartu), promising the Livonian Brothers areas in southern Estonia. With their combined armies, the brothers marched against Tartu (Tarbatu, Dorpat) in August 1233. Tartu was the largest fortress in Livonia and was held by the Russian prince Vyachko (Vjačko) of Kukeinos (Koknese, Kokenhusen) with a force of around one thousand men, of whom two hundred were Russians, well provided with the arms, armor, crossbows, and catapults captured from the order.

Under the command of the bishops Albert and Hermann, the army set up camp on the banks of Lake Restjerw while an elite mounted troop made preparations for the siege. On 15 August 1224 the main army joined the siege and began building a siege tower, which reached to the height of the walls and was ready for use within a week. Prince Vyachko expected relief from Novgorod and thus refused an offer allowing him to withdraw without bloodshed. Meanwhile each side bombarded the other by day and attempted to intimidate its foes with drumming, screaming, and playing martial music by night. According to the chronicle of Henry of Livonia, the pilgrim Fredehelm of Poch (Poyg) exhorted the troops to storm Tartu, promising the first man over the wall the most valuable captive, although no other enemies were to be spared. The attack was launched in the morning hours but failed to penetrate the defenses until 3 P.M. when the defenders opened the drawbridge in order to attack the siege tower with fire wheels. This attack backfired, as the wheels were thrown down and John of Apeldern, a brother of Bishop Albert, led the charge against the gate and took the fortress. As had been planned, the victors spared none but the women and children, all men being executed with the exception of a vassal of the Grand Prince of Suzdal, whom the Livonian Brothers captured and sent back to Russia to carry the news of the fall of Tartu.

The capture of Tartu, which was renamed Dorpat, led directly to the final subjection of the mainland Estonians under Christian rule. One year after the battle, Livonia and Dorpat became imperial marches under the rule of the bishops of Riga and Dorpat.

[See also *Baltics*, *subentry on Narrative* (500–1300) and *Orders, Military*, *subentry on Northern Orders*.]

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Julia Knödler

Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

TELL DANITH, BATTLE OF

See Sarmin, Battle of.

TERMES, SIEGE OF

Fresh from the successful siege of Minerve, Simon of Montfort tried to extend his control as viscount and crusade commander by attacking, in 1210, the Albigensian-controlled castle of Termes. Located in the Corbières Mountains of south-central France, even today Termes is a remote and rugged site, accessed by a single road. The castle was built on a solid piece of rock, making it impossible to undermine. Its one real weakness was that it had no source of water beyond cisterns. Simon began the siege with a small army, as the civic militia of Narbonne had left after the siege of Minerve. In fact, one of the biggest problems he faced was the constant coming and going of his troops. Most served only for forty days to win the indulgence pardoning them their sins, the main incentive to campaign in the south. Though scholars debate when the forty-day service period was institutionalized, papal legates seemed to have officially made it the requirement at the siege of Termes.

The siege lasted for almost four months (from approximately 1 August to 23 November 1210) and was the longest and toughest contest experienced by the Crusade army up to that point. The crusaders initially could not surround the base of the mountain, so the defenders, led by their lord Raymond of Termes, continued to bring in water and supplies until the Crusade army eventually acquired enough men to cut off this

source. Since the crusader army was constantly short of supplies and the country around Termes was deficient agriculturally, the army maintained a supply line back some thirty-four miles (about fifty-five kilometers) to Carcassonne along narrow, steep roads and switchbacks. Southern forces undermined crusader morale by picking off isolated parties, executing or mutilating them. The crusaders built siege weapons and soon took a small tower, Termetet, located a distance northeast of the main fortifications. Subsequently, the siege bogged down for several more months. By October, Simon of Montfort was at his wits' end as men left after their forty days, replacements dwindled, and supplies grew short.

As autumn progressed, the weather deteriorated, and the garrison ran low on water. Parleying then began between the two commanders. Raymond of Termes essentially agreed to surrender, but during the night a heavy rain fell, refilling the garrison's cisterns. Raymond then withdrew his surrender and held out several more weeks until dysentery broke out among the defenders. After unexpected reinforcements arrived for Simon, the defenders decided to make a run for it on a cold November night. Owing to the deprivations the garrison had suffered, no doubt exacerbated by the dysentery, most failed to escape, including Termes' lord, Raymond.

Termes enhanced the reputation of the crusaders and especially of their commander. Simon of Montfort proved he could take tough fortifications in the worst of conditions, no matter how long it took. The defeat at Termes further sapped Southern morale and suggested that the people of the south were no match for the crusader army.

[See also Carcassonne, Siege of; Castelnaudary, Siege and Battle of; Montfort, Simon (IV) de; and Toulouse, Sieges of.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

TERTRY, BATTLE OF

This battle marks a decisive point in the political comeback of the early Carolingians in the 680s. The Carolingian family had lost their influence because the coup d'état undertaken by Grimoald (died after 656, perhaps as late as 662), son of Pépin I (d. 639 or 640), failed. Even earlier, in the late 670s, Grimoald's nephew, Pépin II "the Middle" (d. 714), together with a certain Martin, were deeply involved in armed hostilities against the Neustrian army under the command of Ebroïn, who won the battle of Lucofao (also called the battle of Bois-du-Fay) near Laon. Martin was killed and Pépin fled from the battlefield. Ebroïn himself was killed in 680. Subsequently, political troubles shook Neustria, the western part of the Merovingian kingdom. After the death of Waratto (d. 686), his son-in-law Berchar (d. 688) followed as the Neustrian Mayor of the Palace. Backed by opponents in the Neustrian nobility, Pépin II, as the leader of the Austrasian nobility, dared to attack Berchar and King Theuderic III, who was dominated by Berchar. Pépin won against him in the battle of Tertry (687) at the river Somme. The only source for the battle is the *Liber Historiae Francorum*, a very laconic source written around 726–727. It is therefore impossible to say anything specific about the battle itself, in contrast to its far-reaching political consequences. After 687 the gradual political ascent of the Carolingians began: starting from Austrasia, the eastern part of the Merovingian kingdom, they extended their claim of political supremacy over Neustria as well.

[See also Franks, Carolingian, *subentries on Sources* (751–899) and *Narrative* (751–899); and Franks,

Merovingian, *subentries on Sources* (482–751) and *Narrative* (482–751).]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

TEUTONIC KNIGHTS

See *Orders, Military, subentry on Northern Orders*.

TEWKESBURY, BATTLE OF

See *Roses, Wars of the*.

THANE (THEGN)

The word "thane" (Old English, *thegn*), like the later term "knight" (*cniht*), originally meant a "young man," specifically one serving in the household of a lord in order to develop the military and social skills he would need as a leader in his maturity. In the later Anglo-Saxon period, a "thane" was an independent landowner with responsibility for local defense and military service, as well as more mundane matters such as collecting taxes and administering justice in the courts. When witnessing land grants, the Latin term *miles* (soldier) was sometimes used for men of thanely status, as was *minister* (officer, manager, or executive), implying that the rank was not purely military in nature.

A tenth-century document specifies that a free-man could qualify as a thane if he owned five "hides" of land, a church, a kitchen, a bell tower, a stronghold, and a royal appointment. (The five "hides" represent five dependent farms, each supplying the thane's residence with such provisions as timber, firewood, thatching materials, meat, dairy products, produce, and bakery products, as well as mead, ale, and wine, and the farms were also liable for providing services such as the carriage of goods.) The impression of a thane's hall is of a defensible site with its own social and religious facilities,

capable of catering for public gatherings—not unlike a manorial house of later medieval times.

The *wergild* (legal worth) of a thane was twelve hundred shillings, six times that of his subordinate, the *ceorl* (free landholder); in this sense, thanes were minor nobility. Some held their land directly from the crown (king's thanes), whereas others held it from the *ealdorman* (head of the shire). The king's thanes were probably direct royal appointees and of higher social status, holding bookland (a royal charter assigning permanent ownership of territory).

Thanes were responsible for local military organization and for the muster of troops when the *fyrð* (local militia) was summoned. They showed considerable autonomy, at least in earlier periods, and were capable of waging war on their own account as well as supporting both the *ealdorman* and the king in their military endeavors. Raiding their neighbors for booty or revenge in the pre-Alfredian military system evolved into raiding the Danelaw or the Welsh in the king's service. Successful Anglo-Saxon kings were aware of the sometimes precarious nature of the relationship between the crown and its supporters, and the rulers used the opportunities that war offered for personal enrichment and glory as a means of ensuring loyalty.

Thanes were the backbone of the military forces. The attacking warriors in mail and Coppergate-style helmets on the lid of the Franks Casket and the horse-borne, spear-wielding warriors on the picture-stone at Aberlemno (Angus, Scotland) are probably all of thanely status. It is also likely that the majority of the English troops shown on the Bayeux Tapestry represent thanes and their companions. Characteristically, they were equipped with knee-length mailcoats; conical helmets with nasals (nosepieces); and teardrop-shaped, circular, or rectangular shields. They wielded spears, two-handed axes, and hefty swords. They differ little in appearance from their Norman opponents, except that they sport moustaches and beards.

[See also Britain, *subentries* on Narrative (500–1000) and Historiography (500–1066) and Infantry, Mounted.]

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Stephen Pollington

THEMATA (THEMES)

Following the defeats of the later 630s, imperial field armies were withdrawn back to the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus ranges. The regions across which they were based were determined by the ability of these districts to provide for the soldiers in terms of supplies and other requirements. The imperial field army, now established in northwest Asia Minor and Thrace, became known as the Opsikion division; those of the eastern and Armenian commands occupied southern central, and eastern and northern Asia Minor respectively, and were known as the Anatolikon and Armeniakon divisions. The army of Thrace, transferred to the eastern theater in the mid-630s, was established in the rich provinces of central western Anatolia and known as the Thrakesion army. The Aegean regions continued to function as a source for men, ships, and resources, and a maritime corps, known in the later seventh century as the "ship troops," or *karabisianoï*, seems to have been based on Rhodes at first. In the light of the considerably increased threat to the empire's exposed coastline and its hinterlands, these "ship troops" were to develop into the core of middle Byzantine provincial naval power. In addition to these naval units, the imperial fleet at Constantinople, equipped from the 670s with "liquid fire" projectors, was complemented by squadrons from the *thema* of Hellas. The armies of the *magistri militum* or exarchs of Italy and Africa (which included Sardinia) continued to function, although the latter disappeared with the

completion of the Arab conquest of North Africa in the 690s; the army of Italy survived, on an ever more localized basis, until the demise of the Exarchate of Ravenna in the middle of the eighth century.

By the last decades of the seventh century, the districts across which these armies were garrisoned were known collectively by the name of the army based there and by about 730 had acquired a clear geographical identity, although the late Roman provinces continued to subsist within them. The term *thema* was not used, however; these commands were called in the contemporary sources "commands," or, in Greek, *strategiai*. Under Nikephoros I (r. 802–811) a series of fiscal reforms related to tax liabilities and military service was introduced, by which those soldiers who were allocated to a given district were tied into its fiscal assessment. Only then was the word *thema* applied to the establishment of soldiers in the provinces—more particularly, to the establishment of a new type of military force in a particular "designated area," which is effectively what *thema* meant.

The number of *themata* expanded as the empire's economic and political situation improved, partly through the original large military divisions being split up into different "provincial" armies (a process begun under Leo III and continued by his successors) and partly, in the last years of the eighth century, through the recovery of, and the reimposition of imperial authority over, lands once held in the southern Balkans (begun under Eirene and Constantine VI). The *themata* were complemented along the eastern frontier by a series of special militarized districts intended to control key passes and roads into and out of the empire, known as *kleisourai*. As the empire went back onto the offensive in the later ninth century and after, these were converted into *themata* in their own right.

The offensive warfare of the period from the mid-ninth century, however, had important effects upon imperial military organization. As the provincial *thema* forces became less able to meet the needs of aggressive warfare, regular field armies with a more complex tactical structure, specialized fighting skills and weapons, and a more offensive spirit

began to evolve. This process was aided by and was also one of the stimuli toward the growth of a social elite in the provinces, landed military officers whose dominance of the regional military system gave them both expertise and political weight at the imperial level. Full-time professional units played a growing role as the state began to commute *thema* military service for cash payments, which were then used to hire mercenaries. By the later tenth century *themata* had little military value; by the late eleventh century the term was used simply to mean "province," whether it had a military capacity or not, and thereafter it no longer had any direct military implications. Under the Komnenoi and to the end of the empire, the forces stationed in each of these regions were commanded by "dukes"—Byzantine *doukes*—who were also the governors of their districts, or *themata*.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentries* on Narrative (500–900) and Regiments; Greek Fire; Leo III, Emperor; and Naval Combat and Tactics.]

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John Haldon

THEOPHILOS

(b. 812/13, d. 20 January 842), Byzantine emperor (r. 829–842). Theophilos was born while his father, Michael, was an officer of the future emperor Leo V. He was crowned coemperor with his father in 821. Although he had more defeats than triumphs in fighting the 'Abbasids in eastern Anatolia, the Bulgarians in the Balkans, and the Arabs in Sicily,

Theophilos did institute military reforms and helped reassert Byzantine military authority.

Theophilos reorganized the eastern defenses of the empire into smaller districts. He subdivided the large eastern themes (military districts) of the Anatolics and the Armeniacs, adding three new themes (Cherson, Paphlagonia, and Chaldia) and three border districts (known as *kleisourai*, Charsianon, Cappadocia, and Seleukeia). This reorganization was an effort to increase the effectiveness of the response to Arab raids by localizing military command.

Theophilos campaigned successfully against Arab raiders on the Anatolian frontier in 831 and 837. These successes, however, prompted large-scale invasions by the 'Abbasid caliphs. Caliph al-Ma'mun (813–833) invaded in 832 but died unexpectedly the following year while he was fortifying Tyana. In 837 the caliph al-Mu'tasim (833–842) invaded massively, with two armies (a reported eighty thousand men), through the Cilician Gates and the pass of Melitene. In 838 al-Mu'tasim defeated Theophilos decisively at the battle of Anzen, near Dazimon, and sacked Amorion, the hometown of Theophilos's father. Al-Mu'tasim retreated only after receiving news of a revolt against him requiring his immediate presence in Baghdad. Archaeological investigations of Amorion show extensive destruction of the city in the ninth century, followed by the rebuilding of a smaller fortification on top of the old collapsed walls.

Theophilos supported the Byzantine navy, which fought persistently, if generally unsuccessfully, in Sicily. The Arabs in Sicily, supported by the Aghlabid emirate in North Africa, conquered Panormus (Palermo) in 831 and defeated a Byzantine fleet in 835. Theophilos also built a fortress, Sarkel, on the Don River at the behest of his allies, the Khazars, a Turkic-speaking people of the Black Sea steppes.

[See also Anzen, Battle of and Khazars.]

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Leonora Neville

THEORY, MILITARY

Was there a theory of warfare in the Middle Ages? Writers proposed various justifications for war. Vegetius wrote, "If you want peace, prepare for war," and advised that battle should be engaged only as a last resort and that a general should fight only if he had the advantage. He did not, however, consider why wars should be fought; he clearly considered wars unavoidable. The late-fourteenth-century clerical writer Honoré Bouvet considered war to be conflict arising out of "things displeasing to the human will," with its purpose being to bring about "agreement and reason." He added that as war originated in heaven, when Lucifer and his angels fought the good angels, it could not be avoided on earth.

The inevitability of war was a theme in many works. The fifteenth-century *Débat des hérauts d'armes de France et d'Angleterre* regarded war as a natural state of affairs that should not be stopped and held that it did not matter who lost or won, provided that those who took part were bold. Famously, the poet Bertrand de Born, who died around 1214, wrote that the sight of armed men and warhorses filled him with joy: "Better a dead man than a live one who is useless." According to this point of view, wars were essential for men to show their courage and skill, and they fought for the joy of fighting. In the second half of the twelfth century, the Anglo-Norman poet Wace expressed the concept that a long peace was bad for young warriors, because they became idle and lazy. However, he also gave the alternative view: "Peace is better than war; the land is more beautiful and improved by it."

There were also different theories of how war should be fought. Bishop Augustine of Hippo wrote that war is justifiable only if it is waged with the right intention, to defend the vulnerable. In this case, force should be limited to an absolute minimum. Throughout the Middle Ages, canon lawyers

debated the circumstances under which law was legal and the circumstances under which killing in war was a sin. In contrast, those who believed that wars were an opportunity to display courage and military skill would argue that a good warrior should never avoid an opportunity to fight. So in the *Chanson de Roland*, the hero Roland refuses to call for reinforcements, and his warriors declare a curse on anyone who runs away, while Roland's comrade Oliver urges caution and argues that Roland should summon aid. The outcome of Roland's view, as revealed by the poet, is that though Roland certainly won the glory he craved, the emperor Charlemagne lost his best warriors and general. While a few writers urged prudence and that one should not fight if it could be avoided—the view of Vegetius—others wrote that a good warrior should never flee the field but should triumph or die. Though writers of treaties on warfare might insist that war should only be fought according to the laws of war, the successful commander had to be pragmatic and ready to abandon theory in the face of the actual demands of the situation.

[See also Chivalry; Laws of War and the Just Conduct of War; Manuals, Military; Plans, Military; Treatises, Byzantine; and Vegetius.]

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Helen Nicholson

THESSALONIKE, SIEGE OF (586)

The year of the siege was established by Paul Lemerle based on evidence in a single source, *Miracula Sancti Demetrii*, I. 13–15, and by comparison with other accounts of the Avar and Slavic inroads that

ravaged the eastern Balkan Peninsula between 581 and 586. The Slavic expedition against Thessalonike was decided upon by the Avar khagan as revenge for the failure of an embassy to Maurice.

The invaders (the figure of 100,000 is exaggerated) arrived at the city in the night of 22–23 September 586 and started the siege in the morning. The defenders were few because many had been killed by the plague two months earlier. The traction trebuchet, a Chinese invention borrowed by the Avars, was used here for the first time in Europe; it was completely different from the Roman ballista. This is the only reason the battle is significant in military history, since the siege itself was a minor event, not attested by other sources.

The Slavs installed trebuchets, tortoises, and rams to strike the walls and the gates, but they were not sufficiently experienced to use them efficiently. They also had insufficient supplies, and were thus compelled to search around outside the city for food; some of them deserted. It took five days to set up the trebuchets; fifty of them were set along the eastern edge. By the next day they were protected with oxen skins against the fire launched from inside. Large stones were launched over the walls, with no major results. In the evening the besiegers retreated around the city, and some of them were killed by the Thessalonians, who attacked by surprise. On the seventh day the Slavs took a break to prepare the final assault, but they gave up, being starved and afraid that a large army was hiding in the city. They departed on 30 September 586.

[See also Avars; Byzantine Empire, *subentries* on Sources (500–900) and Narrative (500–900); Maurice; Siege Warfare; Slavic Lands, *subentry* on Narrative (500–1000); and Weapons, Missile.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

THESSALONIKE, SIEGE OF (904)

Thessalonike, the second city of the Byzantine Empire, was captured by Leo of Tripoli in 904. Leo of Tripoli was a Greek from Attalia captured as a child and raised as a Muslim within the household of Zurafa, who was governor of Tripoli in the later ninth century. In Arabic sources Leo is known as Ghulam al-Zurafa (servant of Zurafa). Leo was probably the naval commander at Tarsus in 903. Greek sources say that he took advantage of the distraction provided by a Bulgarian incursion to attack Constantinople.

On his way to the capital, Leo succeeded in taking Abydos, the major port on the Dardanelles straits. The entry of his fleet into the Hellespont was unopposed by the Byzantine navy under the command of the *droungarios* of the fleet, Eustathios. As the Arab fleet approached the capital, Emperor Leo VI dismissed Eustathios and appointed Himerios naval commander. Before the two fleets met, Leo changed course and sailed out of the Hellespont. One of the Arabic sources implies that shallow waters caused him to change course. Himerios pursued and found him anchored at Thasos, but felt unable to engage because of his numerical inferiority. After gathering further resources, Leo attacked Thessalonike. In July 904 the city fell after a siege, and its general Leo Katzilakios was captured. In addition to many prisoners and much materiel, Leo of Tripoli captured a large sum of money that was being taken to Sicily by Rhodophyles, a *kouboukilarios* (eunuch official of the imperial household).

A long and detailed firsthand narrative of the siege exists in the form of a purported letter written by John Kaminiates. It is likely that "Kaminiates's letter" was actually composed in the fifteenth century. Although not universally accepted, this argument has sufficient merit that scholars should examine the matter closely before using Kaminiates as a source for tenth-century military history.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentries* on Sources (500–900) and Narrative (500–900); Leo VI, Emperor; Naval Combat and Tactics; and Siege Warfare.]

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Leonora Neville

THESSALONIKE, SIEGE OF (1185)

This Norman attack was provoked ostensibly by the usurpation of Andronikos I (r. 1183–1185). William II of Sicily crossed the Ionian Sea and captured Dyrrachium without resistance. With no time for the Byzantines to man the Albanian mountain passes or launch a naval counteroffensive, Norman forces converged by both land and sea upon Thessalonike.

Eustathius, the archbishop of Thessalonike, composed a long, emotional account of the capture of Byzantium's second city, partly delivered as a lament to his congregation at Lent in 1186. He blames Andronikos for inspiring the hatred of his enemies and the fear of his officers, principally the *doux* (Duke) of Thessalonike, David Komnenos, who abandoned the city. People from Constantinople were obliged to leave before the siege commenced, but the city was defended by a garrison of Alans, Iberians, *Chounavitai*, Germans, and Bulgarians.

The struggle was brief but bloody: thousands died, some by the sword, others trampled while seeking the security of the citadel or churches. From the Normans, Eustathius learned that their army had numbered eighty thousand, including five thousand cavalry, and a large number of freebooters. Their fleet numbered two hundred royal ships and numerous pirate vessels. Niketas Choniates was wrong to claim that the Normans suffered no casualties; Eustathius notes that more than three thousand Latins died of disease and another three thousand in battle.

Constantinople became the Normans' next target, where Andronikos lost the people's support

and was deposed. The new emperor, Isaac II Angelos, sent a scratch army under Alexios Branas against the Normans. William kept his forces divided: the first part garrisoned Thessalonike, the second occupied the lands around Serres, blocking passage between Constantinople and Thessalonike. The third part advanced toward the capital, and was defeated by the Byzantines at Mosynopolis, Thrace. Branas pressed on to the River Strymon, where he won a second battle on 7 November 1185. Fleeing Normans joined a general withdrawal by sea from Thessalonike, but those who arrived later were put to death as they wandered the city's streets. Choniates singles out the Alans for devising cruel deaths for the Sicilians. William was able to hold Dyrrachium for a while longer, but eventually he was driven out by lack of provisions.

[See also Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion.]

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Paul Stephenson

THESSALONIKE, SIEGE OF (1383–1387)

By the late fourteenth century, diminished Byzantium's second city, Thessalonike, was a target of the Ottoman Turks. Dynastic civil war (1376–1382) had weakened Byzantium before the advances of Sultan Murad I (r. 1362–1389). Manuel II Palaiologos, the disaffected second son of Emperor John V Palaiologos (r. 1341–1391), in November 1382 set up a separatist regime in Thessalonike, which he had ruled previously as a family appanage. Making the city a center of anti-Turkish resistance, he won some initial victories. Murad, however, sent his general Khairadin-Pasha to counterattack, and in the

autumn of 1383 Manuel found himself besieged in Thessalonike.

A prosperous mercantile city, Thessalonike nevertheless had a long history of bitter factionalism, class conflict, and social strife. Beyond dealing with that, Manuel had to provide protection not only to its own citizens but to refugees from the surrounding countryside. The Turkish siege soon shifted from assault to a blockade lasting over three years. As Manuel struggled to control the precarious situation, he actively sought outside alliances to sustain his anti-Turkish stance.

A writer and intellectual, Manuel himself has left a "Discourse" assembling the arguments with which he tried to rally Thessalonian support for his program. In his letters, however, he complained angrily of the unrest and opposition he faced. Beyond the dread of pillage and massacre, the mercantile elements feared the destruction of their commercial life, which they thought they could preserve under Turkish rule. Eventually, on 6 April 1387, the Thessalonians forced Manuel to leave, an embittered exile, and three days later the Turks entered the city, not by storm but by capitulation.

The nature of Turkish rule thereafter is unclear. It apparently was reimposed in 1394. In 1403 the Turks returned Thessalonike to the Byzantines who, unable to sustain subsequent Turkish threats, transferred it to the Venetians, from whom the Turks seized it definitively in 1430.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (1204–1453); Ottoman Armies and Military Methods; and Siege Warfare, *subentry on* Byzantine Siege Warfare.]

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John W. Barker

THIELT, BATTLE OF

Less than a year after the siege of Bruges, two claimants battled over the county of Flanders. William Clito, son of Robert Curthose, initially became count. Within months William had alienated his subjects, providing pretext for a rival, Thierry of Alsace, to fight for control. Thierry and approximately three hundred knights, the civic militia of Bruges, and infantry from other areas, perhaps about fifteen hundred in total, besieged one of William's vassals near Thielt or Axspoele. William rode to Thielt with about 450 knights. On 20 June he carefully reconnoitered Thierry's army near Thielt. On 21 June William organized his knights into three divisions, a common tactic. His first two went into battle side by side, with William on the right, but he hid his third line in reserve behind a hill. Thierry also organized his mixed army of knights and infantry into three divisions. The two armies engaged in intense hand-to-hand combat. By design or chance, William's line gave way first, his men hotly pursued by Thierry's knights. As Thierry's knights chased their opponents, outpacing the infantry, William's reserve horsemen emerged from behind the hill, surprising and utterly routing Thierry's startled and exhausted men. In their panic Thierry's men threw their weapons away and fled, so that he found himself with only ten knights. He skulked back to Bruges with William the clear victor as Count of Flanders. Ironically William died less than six weeks later from sepsis after a foot soldier stabbed him in the hand during another siege. In spite of his poor showing at Thielt, Thierry of Alsace became Count of Flanders after William Clito's death.

William's victory resulted largely from planning and his use of terrain and surprise. It appears that he intended to fall back if there was trouble, thus showing his ability to use feigned flight and demonstrating good tactical sense in his defeat of a less experienced foe.

[See also Bruges, Siege of and Galbert of Bruges.]

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Laurence W. Marvin

THIETMAR OF MERSEBURG

(c. 975–1018), chronicler and bishop of Merseburg. Born into the comital house of Walbeck, a well-connected aristocratic lineage in the German duchy of Saxony, Thietmar was educated in the monastic school at Quedlinburg and the cathedral school at Magdeburg. A member of the cathedral chapter at Magdeburg from circa 1000, he was elevated to the episcopacy, as bishop of Merseburg, in 1009.

Thietmar compiled the eight books of his history, the *Chronicon*, between 1012 and 1018. While the work's earlier books draw heavily (though not uncritically) on the works of other historians, such as Widukind of Corvey, the later books chiefly rely on Thietmar's own experience and knowledge. In general, Thietmar's interests focus on the deeds of Ottonian kings, the histories of Magdeburg and Merseburg, and the trials and tribulations of his own extended family. As far as military matters are concerned, his work is chiefly valuable for its descriptions of the wars and pervasive violence that defined the life of the Ottonian empire. Ottonian expeditions in Italy and beyond the empire's frontiers are a constant point of reference. Thietmar provides extensive commentary on Otto II's disastrous defeat at Cotrone (in Calabria), for example, and provides lengthy descriptions of Henry II's Italian campaigns and rivalry with Arduin of Ivrea. Military expeditions in France–West Francia are noted as well. It is not

unusual for descriptions of campaigns to include details of strategy and logistics.

Reflecting his own regional loyalties, Thietmar devotes much attention to conditions on the Ottonian empire's eastern borders and especially to its often violent relations with various Slavic peoples. The great Slavic uprising of 983 and Emperor Henry II's ongoing feud with Bolesław I Chrobry (the Brave), Duke of Poland, receive particular attention. Finally, Thietmar provides much information regarding internal warfare; the uprisings and feuds that might involve members of the Ottonian house and sometimes included Thietmar's own relatives. Although Thietmar's viewpoint was far from dispassionate, his institutional and familial connections ensured that he was well informed in military matters. Recent scholarship (see Bachrach) has emphasized Thietmar's reliability, at least when his own interests and agenda were not at stake.

[See also Bolesław I Chrobry; Cotrone, Battle of; and Henry II, Emperor.]

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David A. Warner

THORKELL THE TALL

(d. 1023), Scandinavian mercenary commander. Son of the chieftain Strut-Harald, Thorkell the Tall learned about warfare in the company of his elder brother Sigvaldi, who was the leader of the famous Jomsvikings. Thorkell followed Sigvaldi on lucrative Viking expeditions in the Baltic and joined him in an invasion of Norway, where they were on the losing

side at the sea battle of Hjørungavåg in about 989. Later Thorkell undertook piratical activities off the coast of Denmark with Olaf Haraldsson, the future king of Norway, attacking and plundering ships as they returned from Viking expeditions.

Thorkell became famous as a military commander. One version of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* refers to the great Scandinavian army that attacked England in 1009 as "Thorkell's army." This army waged a vicious campaign, burning Oxford, Thetford, Cambridge, and Northampton and inflicting defeat on an English army in East Anglia, eventually forcing the English to make a truce and pay a massive tribute.

In 1012, Thorkell turned mercenary to lead his Scandinavian forces in the service of King Aethelred of England, remaining loyal to his paymaster when the king was driven into exile in 1013 by Sven Forkbeard. The following year, after Sven's unexpected death, Thorkell played an important part in the campaign leading to Aethelred's restoration. But when he saw the kingdom divided by disputes over the succession to the aging King Aethelred (who died in 1016), he left England and took service with Sven's son, King Cnut.

Thorkell devised the strategy for Cnut's successful invasion of England, and his friendship with Aethelred's widow, Queen Emma, was an important factor in bringing about her marriage alliance with King Cnut. In the *Encomium Emmae reginae*, which was inspired by Queen Emma, he is given credit for his leadership and bravery at the battle of Sherston, maintaining the impetus of Cnut's invasion. Cnut rewarded Thorkell by making him Earl of East Anglia and regent during his absences from England.

[See also Olaf II Haraldsson and Sven Forkbeard.]

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Ian Howard

TINCHEBRAI, BATTLE OF

The division of the Anglo-Norman realm after the death of William the Conqueror between two of his sons, William, in England (William II), and Robert, in Normandy (Duke), seems to have pleased nobody. The cross-channel Anglo-Norman nobility did not like having to please two masters, and the two rulers coveted each other's territories. On William II's death in 1100, with Robert absent on crusade, the younger brother Henry was able to gain the English crown (as Henry I). Thereafter, the two brothers were each intent on reunifying and controlling the Conqueror's realm. Neither made serious progress until outright war broke out between them in 1105, when Henry campaigned in Normandy and captured Bayeux and Caen. He also succeeded in winning many of the Norman nobles over to his side. Hostilities continued in the following year, culminating in Henry's siege of the castle at Tinchebrai. When Robert attempted to relieve the siege, the brothers faced each other on the field of battle for the first time. Before the battle began, a mediator tried to encourage a peaceful settlement, but Robert found Henry's proposed terms insulting. It seemed that both men were ready to settle the matter once and for all by combat.

Robert had more foot soldiers, although Henry had more mounted men and the overall edge in numbers. Robert's forces were led by Robert himself, William of Mortain, and Robert of Bellême. Henry's troops were arranged in three columns, led by Ranulf of Bayeux, Robert of Meulan, and William of Warenne. Henry himself headed the front line. Both sides dismounted for combat, in order to encourage the troops to stand and fight rather than flee on horseback. Helias, Count of Maine, Henry's ally, led a mounted auxiliary force hidden at a

distance. The battle began with a charge of Robert's knights against Henry's line. They managed to make some progress initially, pushing back Henry's front line, but soon became mired down; both sides became so tightly packed that there was little room even to strike at each other. At this point, Helias's cavalry came out of hiding and charged the flank of Robert's troops, routing them completely. Robert of Bellême, commanding Duke Robert's rear guard, panicked and fled, and Duke Robert's entire army collapsed. Reportedly, two hundred of Duke Robert's men were killed, and only two of Henry's (although the latter figure may refer only to knights). After only an hour of fighting, the most important battle since Hastings was finished. Henry wrote to Anselm that he had captured four hundred knights and ten thousand foot soldiers; his prisoners included William of Mortain and Duke Robert himself.

In a single battle, Henry became duke of Normandy and reunited his father's realm. Robert would remain in captivity for the last thirty years of his life, and although his son William Clito would conspire to regain his inheritance, Normandy and England remained united for the rest of Henry's days.

[See also Britain, *subentry* on Narrative (1000–1300); Robert of Bellême; and Robert II Curthose of Normandy.]

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Robert Helmerichs

TOLBIAC, BATTLE OF

The importance of this battle, fought in 496, is much disputed among historians. Our main source,

Gregory of Tours (d. after 593), is responsible for the traditional and widespread assessment of this battle as a decisive one. According to Gregory, this battle, in which Clovis defeated the Alamanni, was important because after his victory the Frankish king decided to become a Christian. The date of his baptism is uncertain: 496, 498, 499, and even 508 have been proposed. Many historians give no credit to Gregory's narrative because his report of Clovis's battle against the pagan Alamanni near Tolbiac (now Zülrich, near Cologne) is obviously stylized, modeled after Emperor Constantine's victory at Milvian Bridge (312). Like his predecessor Constantine, Clovis as "a new Constantine" also won the victory in the sign of the Holy Cross, which appeared at the decisive moment when the battle was in doubt.

In any event, Gregory links the battle with Clovis' decision to be baptized. His baptism, whenever it occurred (and whether he was truly a pagan beforehand, as Gregory asserts, or, as is more likely, an Arian Christian), was crucial because it guaranteed the backing of his Catholic subjects, and especially that of the very influential Catholic bishops, with whom he already had good relations.

According to Gregory the king of the Alamanni was killed in the battle. Nevertheless, this was not the end of fighting against the Alamanni. Two independent fifth-century sources report their defeat by Clovis in 508.

[See also Christianity; Clovis I; Franks, Merovingian, *subentries on Sources* (482–751) and *Narrative* (482–751); and Gregory of Tours.]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

TOLDI, MIKLÓS

(fl. 1320–1390), otherwise known as Nicholas Toldi or Nicolaus de Told, commander of Alba Societas. Miklós Toldi is significantly represented in Hungarian literature as a romantic folk hero, noted for his superhuman strength. The real Toldi was a knight of the household of King Louis (Lajos) I the Great of Hungary (r. 1342–1382) who took part in expeditions in Italy starting in the 1350s. From 1360 to 1363 he aided the papal legate, Cardinal Albornoz, against the *signor* of Milan, Bernabò Visconti, and won an important victory at Salaruolo, forcing the tyrant to surrender Bologna, which he had occupied. Toldi, with four hundred Hungarians, switched to the Milanese side, but then defected from Konrad von Landau's force at the battle of Canturino in April and joined Albert Sterz's White Company. From 1363 to 1364, under the captaincy of John Hawkwood, Toldi served Pisa in campaigns against Florence (he won at Rifredi; clashed with Siena at the battle of Poggibonsi; attacked Prato; seized Pian de Ripoli, Vinci, and Figline; laid waste to Fiesole and Montughi).

The majority of Miklós Toldi's men deserted Pisa for Florence, and in July 1364 formed a new Anglo-Hungarian White Company, of which Hugh Mortimer de la Zouche was captain-general; *dominus* Toldi was his deputy. The Hungarians amounted to one-third of the five thousand cavalry and one thousand infantry. Toldi had a personal unit of twenty-five lances. Under Galeotto Malatesta, they defeated Pisa at Cascino in August 1364. The Alba Societas then fought as an independent band of mercenaries (*compagnia di ventura*) pillaging in Umbria. In 1365 they served Queen Joanna of Naples and Pope Urban V, although the pope dismissed them and employed Germans instead. They were finally crushed by the German *Compagnia della Stella* (Company of the Star) at San Mariano in July 1365. They fled to a nearby castle at Lago Trasimeno, where, short of water and supplies, "refreshing themselves with the blood of their horses" (*Memorie di Perugia dall'anno 1351 al 1438*), they surrendered. Toldi was a prisoner of war in Perugia for about a year. Back in Hungary,

he was rewarded with high state offices throughout the 1370s and 1380s.

[See also Alba Societas; Great Companies; Hawkwood, John; Louis I of Hungary; and Mercenaries.]

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Attila Bárány

TOLEDO, SIEGE OF

Toledo is a Spanish city situated in a bend of the Tagus River and surrounded by a fertile basin. The city is mentioned by Livy, and it became Iberia's capital under the Visigoths. After the Arab conquest it was the principal city of al-Andalus, which revolted repeatedly against the Umayyad dynasty. By the eleventh century, Toledo had a population of twenty-eight thousand.

After several years spent in making preparations and solidifying alliances, Alfonso VI of Castile and León (r. 1065–1109) set up his camp beside Toledo in

1084, either to the south (King's Orchard) or, more likely, at the castle of San Servando, on the hill opposite al-Qantara bridge, from where he could cut off supply routes into the city. Alfonso then traveled north to secure supplies and funds, collecting the *fossataria*, a tax paid in lieu of military service.

Alfonso brought his principal force to Toledo in mid-March 1085. The siege lasted roughly two months, during which the Castilians faced serious problems in supplying both a large army and a royal court. Although Christian rearward garrisons were stationed at Canturias, Canales, and Zorita, supplies had to be brought from frontier posts north of the central mountain range (Arévalo, Ávila). The besieged Muslims suffered from hunger and disease. There was no serious fighting, only a few skirmishes: diplomacy was Alfonso's greatest asset. King Yahya al-Qadir of Toledo was under pressure from other *taifa* rulers who coveted his lands and were therefore unlikely to answer his calls for help. Unable to pay for the Christian king's protection or to defend the city, he had to surrender. The terms, accepted on 6 May 1085, included guarantees for the Muslims' lives, property, freedom, and religious expression. A separate agreement was reached with Toledo's Jewish population. Alfonso made his formal entry on 25 May. By August the king had finished off the conquest of the Toledan lands, while organizing the conquered towns of the Tagus basin and distributing spoils. A number of neighboring towns, including Madrid, were thus incorporated into Castile.

[See also Alfonso VI of Castile and Iberia, subentry on Narrative (500–1100).]

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Ana Echevarria

TOMORI, PÁL

(1475?–1526), Hungarian nobleman, later Franciscan friar, archbishop of Kalocsa, captain-general of the lower parts of Hungary, commander of the Hungarian army at the battle of Mohács.

Early in his career, Pál Tomori held various offices in the Hungarian treasury and was in charge of royal estates. In 1505 he became castellan of Făgăraș, in 1515 that of Mukacheve. As a military officer he participated in the suppression of the peasant uprising of 1514. He rose to prominence when, in 1518, he expelled the nobles from under Buda Castle, where they were gathering to express their dissatisfaction at the Diet and preparing to attack the royal castle.

In despair over family tragedies and the halt of his professional career, Tomori joined the Franciscan order in 1520. With papal support, King Louis II of Hungary requested that he take over the archbishopric of Kalocsa in 1523, when the position of Hungary became critical. Never quitting the gray habit of the Franciscans, Tomori also became the captain-general of the lower parts of Hungary. Tomori attempted to reorganize the Hungarian defense system, structurally damaged after the Ottomans had captured Belgrade and Šabac in 1521. Although Tomori did not personally participate in the battles, under his command a four-thousand-strong Hungarian army was able to destroy, piece by piece, an Ottoman army of ten to fifteen thousand soldiers in the Srem region in 1523.

Despite his success, the situation of Hungary remained hopeless, and Tomori supported the idea of unconditional peace with the Ottomans. He even wanted to use the sultan's envoy, who had been held in custody in Hungary since 1520, to this effect. The Hungarian government tried to negotiate peace through mediators in 1526, but failed.

In summer 1526 Tomori tried to defend the line of the Danube, but his inferior forces could not prevent

the Ottomans from occupying Petrovaradin and Ilok. The main Ottoman forces soon crossed the Drava River. The Hungarians now had to decide whether to undertake a battle with their modest forces or, relying on the forts along the military route, to slow down the Ottoman campaign and postpone the battle. In the absence of the most experienced leaders, Pál Tomori and György Szapolyai were appointed commanders in chief.

The constant failures made the king so unpopular and the morale of the troops so low that the withdrawal necessary for the concentration and joining of forces—which may have led to the abandoning of Buda, the capital—could easily have caused the dissolution of the army assembled with so much difficulty. This was probably the reason that at the last war council the otherwise cautious Tomori voted for fighting, even though he estimated the size of the enemy at 300,000 soldiers, while he had only twenty thousand.

On 29 August 1526, the Ottoman troops met the Hungarian army south of Mohács. Tomori and Szapolyai, as well King Louis II and many prelates and barons, fell in this bloody battle. Contemporaries and historians of later generations condemned the commanders of the Hungarian army, and especially Tomori, for fighting an already lost battle and held him responsible for the death of the king. In fact, even if the Hungarian forces had persisted in the other tactics, it could only have prolonged the struggle; defeat would have been likely anyway, as the enemy outnumbered the Hungarian troops by three to one.

[See also Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526) and Mohács, Battle of.]

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János B. Szabó

TORNIKIOS, LEO

(d. after 1047), ambitious Byzantine commander, leader of a spectacular but fleeting rebellion.

The Byzantine commander Leo Tornikios came from a distinguished army family based around Adrianople (modern Edirne). He was also cousin to Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos. In the mid-1040s Tornikios was governor of the province of Iberia near the eastern frontier. Accused of plotting a coup, he was dismissed and placed under confinement in Constantinople. On 14 September 1047 fellow officers from the Macedonian theme (military district) spirited Tornikios out of the capital to their home base, Adrianople, and proclaimed him emperor there.

Tornikios benefited from family connections and gained the backing of most of the *tagmata* (regiments of full-time soldiers) based in the eastern Balkans. He attracted under- or unemployed soldiers and commanders by proposing to resume military expansionism once he was emperor, raising hopes of loot and better pay. "Barbarian" auxiliaries were also recruited. Tornikios relied on surprise, speeding to Constantinople before Constantine IX could recall the eastern army.

According to an eyewitness, Michael Psellos, Tornikios mounted "a real siege," enveloping the city's land-walls and positioning siege-engines. His massive show of force panicked Constantinople's citizens, yet he hesitated to take the city by storm. The emperor, staying calm, ensured minimal manning of the walls and, as ever, time was on the defenders' side. Tornikios was nearly hit by a projectile, his forces' morale slumped, and units began to disperse. He withdrew, tried in vain to capture the port of Rhaidestos on the Sea of Marmara and other towns, and suffered further desertions once the eastern army's approach was known. Tornikios surrendered and was blinded on Christmas Day, 1047.

[See also Byzantine empire, *subentry* on Narrative (900–1204).]

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Jonathan Shepard

TORO, BATTLE OF

With the death of Enrique IV of Castile (r. 1454–1474), a war of succession broke out between the supporters of his daughter, Juana—who had been betrothed to Afonso V of Portugal (r. 1438–1481)—and his half sister Isabella, who in 1369 had married Fernando II of Aragon (r. 1479–1516). In May 1475, Afonso captured some Castilian cities in the vicinity of his own kingdom. Fernando mounted a counterattack, and in November he recovered the city of Zamora, although he was unable to capture its castle, where the Portuguese garrison took refuge.

In February 1476 the Portuguese king set out from Toro to aid the defenders of Zamora. The proximity of Fernando's army, however, made it impossible to conquer the city, and on 1 March, Afonso was forced to break camp. Hours later Fernando began to pursue the retreating Portuguese forces. To keep them from seeking refuge, the Aragonese king sought to force a battle. The move was a success, and Afonso's troops were obliged to fight at the walls of Toro. His army was organized into three large corps: the central contingent with the king at its head, and two wings. Though also organized into three corps, Fernando's army was smaller; he commanded the center behind the vanguard.

The confrontation was essentially a cavalry combat that lasted for three hours. The Portuguese left wing defeated Fernando's vanguard on that side, but the battle's decisive point was the cavalry charge of the Castilian right wing and center, which broke the Portuguese central corps. Afonso fled from the field, while his army, broken, pursued, and massacred, took refuge in Toro.

The battle of Toro had significant political consequences, marking a definitive turn in the war of

succession. Castilian nobles loyal to Juana and Afonso changed sides in the following months, signaling the beginning of victory for the Catholic Monarchs.

[*See also* Catholic Monarchs, The; Granada, Siege of; and Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Francisco García Fitz

Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

TORTOSA, SIEGE OF

Tortosa is twelve miles (twenty kilometers) from the mouth of the Ebro in the province of Tarragona, in northeastern Spain. On 13 April 1147, Pope Eugenius III (1145–1153) authorized the Second Crusade, permitting the taking of cities in Spain, including Almería and Tortosa. A multinational force began a siege on 1 July 1148 that ended with the city's unconditional surrender on 30 December 1148.

The crusaders besieging Tortosa included military units of Occitans, Aragonese, and Catalans, under the command of Ramón Berenguer IV, Count of Barcelona (1131–1162), and his seneschal, Guillem Ramon de Moncada. Other participants were English and Norman mercenaries, Knights Templar from Mont Blanc, and soldiers who had fought at Tarragona and Lisbon. The land forces were supported by a Genoese fleet commanded by consuls Oberto Torre, Filippo di Platealonga, Balduino and Ansario Doria, and Ingo and Ansaldo Piso. The fleet had already entered the Ebro by the first of July and stopped two miles short of the city.

Ramón Berenguer and the Genoese commanders inspected Tortosa's defenses and stationed half of the Genoese contingent and some of Berenguer's knights next to the river below the city. The count and the rest of his men assumed positions above the

city on the Mount Bagnara side. The English and the Templars were stationed at a mill near the river.

According to the Genoese military chronicler Caffaro de Caschifellone, a group of impatient Genoese soldiers attacked the defenders first, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Learning from this mistake, the Genoese built and set up movable siege towers (*castellae*) and eventually breached the city walls. Once inside, the Genoese used one of the towers to destroy houses and to fight their way to the mosque.

From the Mount Bagnara side the besiegers filled a ravine forty-two meters (about 138 feet) wide by thirty-two meters (about 105 feet) deep with wood and stones and then brought in another tower, which had an artillery piece and three hundred soldiers on top, to attack the citadel (La Zuda). The Muslims countered by hurling two-hundred-pound stones at the tower, temporarily damaging one corner, but the Genoese quickly repaired the tower and continued the attack.

Ramón Berenguer's men withdrew from the offensive when he failed to pay them. About twenty knights, however, remained steadfast, and, along with the Genoese, eventually used mangonels to breach the Zuda's walls. The Muslims then called for a truce, during which time they sent envoys to Muslim rulers on the Iberian Peninsula asking for help. Forty days later Tortosa surrendered.

Tortosa was partitioned into thirds as a spoil of war. Guillem de Moncada received the Zuda area and the right to govern the city. The Genoese acquired the port area. Ramón Berenguer kept the remaining third. From the count's share, the Templars were ceded one-fifth of the revenues from the countryside and outlying castles to maintain perimeter defenses. Muslims who remained at Tortosa were eventually granted property rights and allowed to retain their own customs and officials, but they had to live outside the city walls.

[*See also* Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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Arnold Odio

TORVIOLLI, BATTLE OF

A 1444 battle between the Ottomans commanded by Ali Pasha and the Albanians commanded by George Kastrioti (also known as Skanderbeg), the battle of Torviolli was the first significant military encounter of the ten-thousand-strong Albanian army organized by Kastrioti after the formation of the so-called League of Lezhë. The League of Lezhë united the forces of Albanian lords headed by Kastrioti and was in effect the first all-Albanian state. The battle of Torviolli (Torviol, Torvioll) occurred several months after the victories of the Hungarian commander János Hunyadi against the Ottomans in 1443–1444 at Niš, Sofia, and Pirot and during the so-called long campaign.

Because the Albanian resistance movement headed by Kastrioti began directly after the Hungarian crusade of 1443–1444, the Ottoman sultan Murad II (r. 1421–1444 and 1446–1451) decided to nip it in the bud. An Ottoman army consisting of twenty-five thousand and led by Ali Pasha was sent to Albania. It entered Albanian territory along the flow of the Drin from the north to the south and headed for the region of the important Albanian fort of Krujë. The Albanian army of ten thousand stood face-to-face with the Ottoman troops in the plain of Domosdove, in southeastern Albania. On 29 June 1444 the Albanian forces, divided into three groups, pretended to retreat, drawing the Ottomans into the gorge of Torviolli. They themselves withdrew into the surrounding mountains and forests. Ali Pasha accepted what happened as a retreat of the Albanians and prepared to announce his victory over Kastrioti. Meanwhile the Albanians regrouped

and attacked the Ottomans deployed in the gorge. In a short while the Ottomans were defeated, with seven thousand dead and five hundred taken prisoner. The Albanian losses were calculated at thirty-eight hundred dead and wounded.

Kastrioti's victory at Torviolli confirmed his authority in the League of Lezhë, boosted Albanians' confidence in their unequal struggle against the Ottoman Empire, and encouraged Pope Eugenius IV and Hunyadi to organize a new crusade against the Ottomans in the fall of 1444.

[See also East Central Europe, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; and Kastrioti, George.]

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Christo Matanov

TOULOUSE, SIEGES OF

Toulouse occupies the elevated east bank of an alluvial bend in the Garonne River. Blessed with a strategic position commanding navigation and trade routes, the city won greatness through its more than fifteen thousand residents whose banking and commercial skills contributed to its prosperity and its formidable horse militia, which assured regional ascendancy. Nominally subject to the counts of Toulouse, the city had by the early thirteenth century become a virtually independent city-state occupying approximately one hundred hectares divided into the older *cité* and the newer bourg north of the Roman walls. Toulouse was surrounded by about three miles (about five kilometers) of walls punctuated by fortified gates and further protected by a perimeter. The *cité's* walls, anchored by the ancient Château Narbonnaise, were built on the stone



Siege of Toulouse, 1218. Detail from a thirteenth-century stone carving of a trebuchet used during the siege. Musée de la Guerre au Moyen Âge, Castelnaud-la-Chapelle, France.

PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

remnants of Roman walls, while the earthen palisades of the northern bourg ended at the Château du Bazacle. Across the river was the low-lying, unfortified suburb of Saint-Cyprian, which was connected to Toulouse by two wooden bridges suspended between fortified towers integrated into the town defenses.

Tolerant but largely orthodox, the city was internally divided. Dominating the *citê*, the orthodox bishop Folquet assembled a faction hostile to the more prosperous bourg over the issue of usury. Rival confraternities produced a virtual civil war that the coming of the crusade intensified. The temporizing diplomacy of Count Raymond VI had initially diverted the Albigensian Crusade, but once Simon (IV) de Montfort was triumphant in Carcassonne, Toulouse was threatened as the sole remaining center of resistance. Crisis ensued when Montfort besieged nearby Lavaur in March 1211. Bishop Folquet led his confraternity to reinforce the crusaders, leaving the city in the hands of his adversaries. A now united Toulouse, doubtless stiffened by the fate of

cities already fallen, prepared for the onslaught. The city would prove a formidable military obstacle, and both Simon and his successors undertook more than they could achieve in besieging it unsuccessfully three times between 1211 and 1218.

The first siege commenced upon the fall of Lavaur 3 May 1211. Toulouse was reinforced not only by refugees but also by contingents rushed to the city by the counts of Foix and Comminges. Crusader forces were far too small to encircle the city, though supply raiding wrought regional havoc. Soon, within two miles of the southern walls, crusaders launched a rash attempt to take the city by surprise through the gates of the Château Narbonnaise on 16 June. The attack was easily repulsed and the crusaders camped before the chateau proved vulnerable to counterattack on 27 June. The crusaders quickly abandoned the siege and withdrew to the south on 29 June, but this initial repulse proved anything but decisive.

Montfort gradually encircled the city from afar, occupying Agen and Moissac to the north and Auterive and Muret to the south. The city again

benefited from Raymond's diplomacy as King Pedro II of Aragon intervened, bringing significant reinforcement to the Occitan resistance. Assuming a more active role in the campaigning, Toulouse committed its militia to the field army that was crushed by crusader forces at the battle of Muret in September 1213. Montfort's superlative battlefield skills resulted in an epic defeat ending not only in the death of Pedro and the massacre of the militia, but also in the eclipse of Raymond and the inevitable surrender of the city. By the spring of 1214 Raymond and the city had made their submission, with the Château Narbonnais returned to the control of Bishop Folquet. In June 1215 Simon de Montfort, reinforced by newly arrived northern crusaders under Prince Louis of France, entered the undefended city in triumph. Simon was acknowledged as Count of Toulouse and the stern new master sought to render the city defenseless by destroying city walls and towers, filling in the moat, and separating the Château Narbonnaise from the urban walls. It was not enough.

Resistance flared repeatedly, but even Montfort's savage repression could not forestall the return of the exiled Raymond VI, who reentered the city on 13 September 1217. Thereafter, his forces grew daily, with reinforcements from throughout the south swelling a fully mobilized urban population. Montfort's troops held the now detached Château Narbonnaise, while the Toulousans wisely concentrated on reinforcing the walls to restore city defenses in anticipation of the inevitable riposte. In October Montfort's sizable force encircled the city to begin a bitter siege that would last ten months. This second siege began as before, with an unsuccessful full-scale assault on the south. Afterwards, Simon shifted tactics, ferrying half his force across the Garonne in an attempt to seize the left-bank quarter of Saint-Cyprian whose bridges made possible the reinforcement and supply of the city. After several weeks spent failing to win control of the bridgeheads, he abandoned the attempt and instead concentrated his forces anew before the south gate. Hard winter fighting punctuated by sorties and assaults focused on the Château Narbonnaise, which served as the crusader

headquarters and citadel. Northern reinforcements reached the strained forces of Montfort beginning in January, but so also did they reach the city as the Count of Foix led a company over the bridges to join the defenders. In May Simon again tried the assault on the west bank, but Saint-Cyprian had been further defended by moats sufficiently deep to preclude cavalry assault. In May terrible rains carried away all the bridges and filled in the west bank moat, giving Simon the final victory there. However, the bridge tower closest to the city remained in the defenders' hands after a staunch fight. In mid-June Simon again abandoned the west bank. The technology of thirteenth-century siege craft is well illustrated by Montfort's renewed attack on the south gate, where he employed a particularly large "cat" or mobile tower to protect a force of perhaps five hundred seeking to fill in the moat and undermine the city walls. Trebuchet artillery was also used to effect by both besiegers and defenders. Its most celebrated impact came during a desperate sortie against the cat when Montfort himself was killed, on 25 June 1218, while defending it by a missile from a trebuchet reportedly worked by women of the city. Bereft of dynamic leadership, the siege quickly foundered. Simon de Montfort's death was soon followed by the abandonment of the siege on 25 July.

Toulouse was besieged one last time by Prince Louis, whose army encircled the city in June 1219. Again, the city held fast and this third siege was abandoned forty-five days later on 1 August after a single failed assault. It was an illusory victory for Toulouse. Subsequent events demonstrated the limits of even the most dramatic of victories in the service of an ill-conceived strategy. This militarily impregnable bastion of resistance to Montfort's overweening ambition remained hostage to the failed policies of a pusillanimous Count of Toulouse and divided Occitan nobility. The Church remained hostile to Raymond VI and his heir and, once the de Montfort family transferred its claims to the crown, the subjection of Toulouse was inevitable. Yet another crusade was launched in 1226, this time effectively directed by the now-king Louis VIII and blessed with the support of the Church. Against such

an alliance Raymond VII was helpless. He wisely surrendered to royal demands that paved the way for the elimination of Catharism and the eventual transfer of all his lands to the royal domain. Toulouse could only accede to the *fait accompli*, tear down its walls, and accept that it was destined neither for greatness as the capital of an independent Occitania nor even for autonomy as a city-state, but rather to comfortable but disciplined prosperity as a privileged municipality within a centralized, orthodox Capetian monarchy.

[See also Montfort, Simon (IV) de.]

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Paul Solon

TOURNAI, SIEGE OF

Tournai stands on the southernmost extremity of the Flanders plateau, on the Schelde (or Escaut) River. In 1340, its 457 acres were protected by a fortified wall more than three miles (4.8 kilometers) long, pierced with ten gates and flanked by some sixty towers, fronted by a broad, dry ditch. At the start of the Hundred Years' War—after his victory on 24 June 1340 at Sluys, where he destroyed the French king Philip VI's fleet—the king of England, Edward III, sought to further his military advantage in Flanders and in the northern part of the French kingdom. He therefore besieged Tournai, no doubt with the aim of persuading his adversary to relieve the city by engaging him in battle, certain he could defeat him just as he had the Scots who had come to defend Berwick, when it was under siege in 1333.

Edward III, accompanied by an army of some twenty-three thousand men, most of whom were Flemish soldiers led by Jacob van Artevelde and Guillaume, the Count of Hainaut, Holland, and

Zeland, began to invade the Tournai region on 22 July 1340, heading up the Scheldt valley. Despite the defeat of his ally, Robert of Artois, near Saint-Omer, where he had hoped to immobilize some of the French troops, Edward decided to continue the siege of Tournai: the city was completely invested on August 1. Over the next few days, he ordered his troops to plunder and burn Saint-Amand, Orchies, Seclin, and Marchiennes to cover the southern approach to his position. Tournai's defense forces were commanded by Gaston, the Count of Foix; Constable Raoul de Brienne; and marshals Robert Bertrand and Mathieu de Trie. They had four thousand men-at-arms, one thousand foot sergeants, and some three thousand Tournaisian infantrymen—in all, close to eight thousand men.

Throughout the month of August, French sallies and Anglo-Flemish attacks followed each other in daily succession, with no notable result. Artillery duels opposed the assailants' seven engines to the defenders' eight, which scored several hits against their targets. During the siege, the Anglo-Flemish troops were provided with ample food supplies, yet they never managed totally to block those of the besieged. Nonetheless, the latter had almost completely depleted their reserves by the time the military operations ended.

In early August, the relieving army led by Philip VI left Arras with twenty-two thousand men-at-arms and at least three thousand foot soldiers, arriving in early September to position itself not far from Tournai, in the vicinity of Bouvines. Edward III and his troops came to meet it, but since neither adversary wanted to risk a decisive battle, the two armies merely remained face to face for two weeks before concluding a truce in Espiechin, on 25 September. Because the campaign that was coming to an end had emptied the treasury of the king of England, his room to maneuver had been greatly reduced, while the heavy taxes that had been raised to finance the campaign had aroused vehement protest. Upon his return to England, this situation led to a profound constitutional crisis that placed the king in direct conflict with a parliament now determined to limit his financial and administrative powers.

[See also Edward III of England and Philip VI of France.]

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Nicolas Savy

Translated from the French by Carol Macomber

TOURNAMENTS AND JOUSTS

The tournament had its origins in the late eleventh century, probably in Picardy (France), Flanders, and the surrounding regions. A central element in chivalric culture, it spread rapidly in the next century, and northern France was its heartland. A twelfth-century tournament could be virtually indistinguishable from a battle. A tournament could provide men with opportunities to try out the skills they needed in war, and with its ostentatious pageantry and show it also met some of the wider needs of society for entertainment and sport. However, unlike in warfare, there was no issue to be settled; this was fighting for its own sake, for honor, and for the material rewards that could be won. In contrast to battle there was, with rare exceptions, no involvement of common soldiers in a tournament.

In 1179 a great tournament held at Lagny, in northern France, was described in the *History of William Marshal*, the future Earl of Pembroke. He was one of the knights with Henry II's son, the Young King. His retinue was estimated at two hundred, and all his knights were paid wages. There were perhaps three thousand in all engaged in the fight.

There you might have learned something of armed combat

there you might have seen knights taken
by the bridles of their horses, and others being
rescued.

On all sides you would have seen horses running
and sweating with their exertions.

In this period, the tactics in the tournaments were those of a full-scale battle; there would be a massed charge at the start, followed by a *mêlée* in which every man fought for himself. The tournament might take place over a wide area, but there were usually enclosures, or lists, which served as bases for the opposing teams. Temporary stands were constructed for spectators, who included women. A mid-thirteenth-century romance, *La Manekine*, described an event similar to that at Lagny. The day started with a review of the troops, to establish who was in which retinue and what coats of arms they bore. Once the fighting began, a general *mêlée* took place. Lances were soon broken, and some men fell from their horses and lost them. Injuries were many, but this type of tournament continued. The "Little War of Chalons" in which Edward I participated in 1274 saw the conflict become increasingly vicious; contrary to convention, the Burgundians used infantry as well as knights on this occasion.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, tournaments were so similar to battles that it was possible to take prisoners in them and hold them for ransom. Horses could be captured as booty. William Marshal treated tournaments as a route to wealth as well as honor; in one year he entered into a business partnership with a Flemish knight, the two men agreeing to share the profits that they made from ransoms.

Beginning in the twelfth century, efforts were made to regulate tournaments. Heralds played an important part in their organization. They helped advertise events; provided advice; drew up lists of the participants, often detailing their coats of arms; and probably even gave commentaries. Richard I promulgated an edict defining where tournaments should take place, which also aimed to prevent misbehavior by those traveling to take part in them. Edward I's *Statuta Armourum* of 1292 took matters further, limiting the numbers of attendants for each knight to three and forbidding spectators from carrying weapons.

Tournaments were far from being the only type of fighting game. Young men who lacked the experience for the tournament proper might participate in the *tirocinium*, where participation was limited to



Joust. William Marshal (c. 1147–1219) unhorses Baldwin Guisnes at a joust. Illustration from Matthew Paris's *Chronica maiora II*, MS 16, fol. 88r, thirteenth century. THE MASTER AND FELLOWS OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

aspiring or newly established knights. The *béhourd* was much less formal than a tournament and normally involved blunted weapons. At one *béhourd*, at Boston (Lincolnshire) in 1288, one side dressed up as monks and the other as canons. However, the main alternative to the tournament was the joust. Initially, this had complemented the *mêlée*. It was common for knights to challenge each other to ride in single combat, on the day before a tournament, or at the start, just as individual fights might take place before a battle. But as early as 1224 the author of the life of William Marshal regretted the way in which the *mêlée* had given way to single combat. Increasingly, in the thirteenth century, there were occasions when jousts took place with no *mêlée* tournament to follow. The joust provided a better opportunity for the display of individual prowess than the tournament; it was also a means of avoiding the prohibitions that were often placed on tournaments by the rulers of England and France. Round tables were another type of gathering, and although the character of these grand social events was not always clear, jousting was a normal part of the celebrations, along with dancing and dining.

In the thirteenth century some of these events had a play-acting element, which linked militaristic sports to the world of romance. A celebrated figure (by his own semiautobiographical account) in the thirteenth century was Ulrich von Liechtenstein, who achieved many tournament successes in his unsuccessful pursuit of his ladylove. In one journey

he took to cross-dressing and presented himself as Venus; later he appeared as King Arthur. At Le Hem, in Picardy, a great jousting tournament in 1278 was thoroughly Arthurian in concept, with the initial procession led by a lady dressed as Queen Guinevere. Dramatic pageants punctuated the proceedings.

In the fourteenth century, such elements developed further. Edward III was a chivalric enthusiast, and under his rule tournaments prospered. They could have a propaganda role and were used to celebrate military successes. Ritual and ceremony became increasingly important; masked participants in elaborate costumes acted out allegorical fantasies. On one occasion, knights dressed as the pope and twelve cardinals defended a wooden castle against all comers. The king himself was an eager participant, often appearing ostensibly incognito. Women were summoned to these events and had a full role in the feasting and dancing that accompanied them. Tournaments were not purely aristocratic occasions; in the Low Countries, there was a strong tradition of associating them with grand urban festivals. In the predominantly urban society of Italy, jousting and other military games were occasions both for the nobility and the citizens.

In the fourteenth century as well, the desire to perform great feats of arms often led to single combat between French and English knights; these might develop from incidents of warfare into more formal jousting tournaments. Among these, the Jousts of St. Inglevert (in the Pas de Calais) of 1390

were particularly notable. Three French knights, including the famous Jean I le Meingre (Boucicault), challenged all comers over a three-week period in a major test of skill and stamina.

In the fifteenth century, jousts and tournaments remained highly popular throughout Europe; they were an important part of the complex ritual and ceremony of the age. The joust became more stylized with the introduction of the tilt barrier, which ensured that opponents rode past each other, with no danger of the horses crossing. The traditional *mêlée* tournament was no more, although there might be fights between small teams. Jousting dominated, but there were also conflicts on foot of various kinds. The *pas d'armes* involved one group holding a mock castle or specific ground against all comers. Display and spectacle were important. René of Anjou wrote a treatise in the mid-fifteenth century. In it, he lays far more stress on the formalities of challenges, the display of coats of arms, and the dancing and feasts than on the actual fighting. Elaborate theatrical scene setting was common; Arthurian and other romances continued to provide the scripts. In Germany, many knightly confraternities were set up specifically to hold tournaments. In 1485, fourteen of these groups united and agreed to hold just one general tournament a year, so as to keep costs down. In Italy, grandiose festivals featuring tournaments were important to maintain the prestige of cities such as Florence. One Venetian tournament took the form of a battle between two groups of seventy men, fighting for control of a wooden castle standing in front of the Doge's Palace (Palazzo Ducale). This was an international world; regulations followed similar patterns in different parts of Europe. Those from Milan in 1465 were very like those produced by John Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, in England in the following year.

As jousting became increasingly different from war, so the armor and equipment needed became more specialized and distinct. In the thirteenth century, light armor, often made of hardened leather or *cuir bouilli*, was used for *behourds*, along with whalebone weapons. In the fourteenth century, the massive great helm continued in use for jousting, long

after it had been abandoned for war. Men might even have different helmets for war, for the tournament, and for the joust. Jousting breastplates were developed, and specially designed shields were used.

Tournaments and jousts were scored in various ways. The author of the *Vita Edwardi Secundi* noted somewhat sarcastically that "It is a recognized rule in this game that he who loses most and is most frequently unhorsed, is judged the most valiant and the stronger." The evidence of the Jousts of St. Inglevert suggests that style, as assessed by judges, counted as much as, say, a lance broken by a good hit on a shield. In his treatise René of Anjou suggested that the top prize should go to the knight who struck the best blow, the second to the man who broke the largest number of lances, and the third to the man who succeeded in keeping his helmet on the longest. Tiptoft's ordinances of 1466 provided an elaborate list of deeds that counted toward victory. Status, not skill, might bring the prize. Lorenzo Medici wrote of a tournament in 1469 that "Although I was not a vigorous warrior, the first prize was adjudged to me; a helmet inlaid with silver, and a figure of Mars on the crest." Prizes varied but were not often as splendid as this; more remarkable, however, was an urban tournament at Magdeburg, Germany, in which a woman was offered as the prize.

There were dangers associated with participating in tournaments; death was always a possibility. An early example was Roger of Gloucester; in 1105, he was killed in jousting at the castle of Falaise, Normandy. In 1186 Geoffrey, Count of Brittany, son of Henry II of England, was killed in a tournament, when he was trampled by horses. Count Florence of Holland died when he fell from his horse in 1234. There was always a danger that a tournament might become the occasion for settling scores; in Germany, a feud led to twenty-six deaths at Darmstadt in 1403.

Tournaments were not universally popular. Such large assemblies of vigorous young men were a threat to public order. They might serve as a cloak for political gatherings. And, for all that they offered opportunities to practice skills in arms, they might be a distraction from the business of war. As early

as 1130, the Church condemned tournaments at the Council of Clermont because of the dangers involved. In 1193, tournaments were again forbidden, because the participants ought to be going on crusade. Eventually, in 1316, the papacy abandoned its hostility; it was now argued that the prohibitions in practice had the reverse effect from that intended and had dissuaded men from taking the Cross. Secular monarchies might also view tournaments skeptically. It seems likely that in England Henry II forbade the holding of tournaments and Henry III issued many prohibitions because they led to disputes between magnates and to plots against the king and members of his family. Tournaments were forbidden during Edward I's final years on the throne, because they drew men away from the business of the war with the Scots; in addition, the political situation under his son led to prohibitions. In France, Louis IX forbade tournaments between 1260 and 1262, and his example was followed by Philip III in 1278 and 1280. However, there was no prospect of effectively banning so popular an activity on a permanent basis.

[See also *Chivalry and Knighthood and Knights.*]

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Michael Prestwich

TOURS, BATTLE OF

The battle of Tours, or Poitiers—the battle was fought somewhere between the two cities in 732—is one of the most famous battles in medieval history, but this point of view is a modern and specifically Western one. The few contemporary sources in the West, especially those written in Francia, do not reflect the widespread modern opinion that this victory of Charles Martel, Mayor of the Palace (d. 741), and of his ally Duke Eudes (Eudo, Odo) of Aquitaine (d. 735) saved Christendom and spared the Europeans the Islamic yoke. Recent historians tend not to overemphasize the consequences of this victory, especially when it is regarded in the historical context of the 730s. The victory at Tours is similar to other victories won by Charles Martel in the same period. In 737, for example, Arles was liberated from the Arabs by Martel, as was Avignon in 737 and again in 739. Also in 737, Narbonne was besieged by Martel, who won a brilliant victory over the Muslims nearby. Already in 721, Duke Eudes had won a great battle against the Muslims, which was noted in many contemporary sources. Thus a systematic and successful strategy of the Muslims to conquer Western Christendom is not a subject for discussion.

It seems possible that in 732 the Muslim troops were interested only in sacking the rich town of Tours after they had burned the conquered Poitiers. According to the interpretation of the great Orientalist Bernard Lewis, they were planning only a typical raid, a *razzia*. Little is known about the battle itself: the exact place of the battle near Poitiers is unknown, as are the numbers of the soldiers involved in the battle on each side, but we do know that the Arab commander was 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abd Allah al-Ghafiqi, who had been Umayyad governor of al-Andalus since 729. In 731, 'Abd al-Rahman had successfully eliminated his rival Munnus, a Berber who commanded the Muslim troops in the southeast Pyrenees (now Catalonia) and who had allied himself with Duke Eudes against 'Abd al-Rahman. Also in 731, Martel had invaded Aquitaine to fight his old

enemy Eudes. In this uncomfortable situation Eudes decided to seek protection from Martel. 'Abd al-Rahman possibly began his march toward Poitiers and Tours "as a reprisal for Eudos's [Eudes's] dealings with the ill-fated Munnus, and it may also have been motivated by a personal desire for vengeance" (Collins).

The battle took place on a Sunday in October, after seven days of mutual observation, and lasted until nightfall. The Franks apparently fought mainly on foot in a "shield wall"—which was likened in a contemporary source to a wall of ice—and the Arabs fought mainly on horseback. 'Abd al-Rahman was killed. The next morning Martel and his troops waited for another attack, but none came: the Arabs had fled, and their camps were empty. Martel decided not to persecute the enemies; he was satisfied with the rich booty that his forces had obtained from them. This is the substance of the most detailed source, a contemporary Spanish one, the so-called *Continuatio Hispana* (or *Chronicle of 754*) of the *History of the Goths* by Bishop Isidore of Seville. In the source the Franks are described as "Europeans."

[See also Charles Martel and Franks, Merovingian, *subentry on Narrative* (482–751).]

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

TOWARZYSZE

See *Rota*.

TOWTON, BATTLE OF

See *Roses, Wars of the*.

TRAINING

It is hardly surprising that military training is not given much attention in medieval chronicles and other sources, for it was for the most part a routine matter, unworthy of much attention. Vegetius stressed its importance in his late Roman manual on the art of war, written in about 390, but though this was read and copied extensively in the Middle Ages, very many of its precepts were ignored.

For a knight, most training was a matter of honing individual abilities, usually from the age of fourteen. It was common for young men to be sent away to a noble household to acquire the skills needed. Expertise was acquired with lance and sword. Many skills, particularly those of horsemanship, were acquired for the hunt as well as for war, though for the upper classes archery was a sport rather than a warlike activity. As a young man in the fourteenth century, the future Marshal Boucicault put much effort into developing his physical abilities. Long-distance running gave him stamina; weight training gave him strength. As a result, he could do a somersault in full armor (without a helmet), climb a ladder from the underside without using his feet, and even jump, fully armed, into the saddle.

Young men needed little encouragement to improve their military skills. A twelfth-century description of London tells how the youths of the city would engage in such sports as practicing archery, throwing javelins, and fighting with sword and buckler (a small round shield)—all useful training for war. Individual knightly skills were enhanced by a range of activities, such as tilting at the quintain (a target fixed on a post) and swordplay. In the late fifteenth century Dominic Mancini described how young Englishmen would fight with blunted



Training. A group of youths train for war. Illustration from the *Mittelalterliches Hausbuch*, 14r, c. 1480.

swords or staves, and also practice in the fields with bow and arrow. In this period, university statutes at Oxford forbade two-handed swordplay and fencing with sword and buckler, activities that were clearly popular.

Tournaments could serve as a form of training. Richard I hoped to improve the quality of English knights with his ordinance regulating the activity. Even when tournament fighting became an increasingly specialized art in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, requiring equipment different from that for war, most of the basic skills were the same.

Infantry troops as well as knights needed training, but there is very little evidence of what was provided. Fourteenth-century Italian crossbowmen must have been well trained both in the use of their weapons and in deploying their great protective *pavises*, or shields. Archery required much practice to build up strength and acquire skill. A well-known picture in the Luttrell Psalter (c. 1320–1340) shows men shooting at targets. In 1363 Edward III, attempting to make such training compulsory, forbade such games as football and hockey, along with cockfighting.

Individual skill was important, but for an army to be effective, collective training was needed. There is surprisingly little indication of this type of drill taking place until the late fifteenth century, though Robert Guiscard is said to have drilled his troops daily in Sicily in the eleventh century. It would not have been possible for the Normans to have used the tactic of a feigned retreat without much practice. Some training must have taken place when men were performing garrison duty, though details

about this are lacking. Military ordinances, such as those issued by Henry V of England, say nothing about training. In 1473, however, Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, laid down detailed instructions for what troops were to do when serving in garrisons or when sufficient time was available. These presaged army training in the sixteenth century and later. The cavalry was to practice charging, withdrawing, and rallying. Archers and pikemen were to be trained to fight in various formations; the latter were to learn how to advance in front of the former, kneeling down when shooting started. Charles thus aimed to develop the tactical skills of his forces, though these proved sadly inadequate when these forces faced the Swiss.

[See also *Knighthood and Knights*; *Schools and Masters of Arms*; and *Tournaments and Jousts*.]

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Michael Prestwich

TRANSYLVANIA

The eastern part of medieval Hungary (called Erdély in Hungarian) was known to the Romans as Transylvania, the land beyond the forest. It was governed by a royal official, the voivode, a word of Slavic origin. Migrating Hungarians (Magyars)

from the east crossed Transylvania in 895 but did not occupy it then, probably because of its mountainous and heavily forested terrain. Later, in the tenth century, they invaded the Transylvanian basin from the west. After the founding of the Christian Hungarian state in the year 1000, King Stephen I (St. Stephen) attacked his uncle Gyula, who was the tribal chieftain ruling over the Transylvanian territories. Stephen integrated Transylvania into the new Christian kingdom, establishing a Catholic bishopric and several counties.

The Hungarians found a sparse Slavic and Bulgarian population in Transylvania, well documented today by toponyms and archaeological finds. The immigration of Romanians probably began before 1200, as the first written evidence of their presence in the south of Transylvania dates from the beginning of the thirteenth century. King Géza II (r. 1141–1162) settled Saxons in the south of the basin, while the Szeklers, or Székely (by then Hungarian-speaking but probably of Volga-Bulgarian origin), were transferred to their present-day territory in the eastern part of Transylvania. King Andrew II issued the *Andreanum*, a famous charter granting the privileges of the Saxons in 1224. He also settled the Teutonic Order in the southeastern corner of Transylvania to help defend the realm from eastern nomadic tribes like the Cumans, but as the Knights sought to build up an independent state for themselves, the king expelled them in 1225.

The Mongol invasion of 1241–1242 devastated Transylvania and caused partial depopulation. During the reign of King Béla IV (1235–1270) another wave of immigration, mainly from Germany and the surrounding kingdoms of Bohemia and Poland, started to fill the vacuum left by the Mongols. At the same time many castles were built to withstand another Mongol invasion. In the late thirteenth century Transylvania—like the rest of Hungary—fell into anarchy, finally terminated by the Angevin King Charles I (r. 1308–1342). In the fourteenth century Transylvania remained a strong bastion in the defense system of medieval Hungary, along with the Romanian vassal principalities of Walachia and Moldavia to the south and the east respectively.

Ottoman raids penetrated Transylvanian territories at the beginning of the fifteenth century. From that period onward the Transylvanian military system, consisting of Hungarian *banderia* (battalions belonging to prelates and barons) as well as Szekler and Saxon contingents, bore an increasingly heavy burden of defending the realm against the Ottomans. János Hunyadi, who ruled Hungary as regent in the mid-fifteenth century, was one of the most notable Transylvanian voivodes, but others, including István Báthory and János Szapolyai, were also prominent in the anti-Ottoman struggles. The three most important “nations” of Transylvania—the Hungarian nobility, the Saxons, and the Szeklers—allied themselves formally against all threats in 1437. Transylvanian troops won a spectacular victory at the battle of Kenyérmező (Câmpul Pâinii, Romania) in 1479, where they annihilated an Ottoman raiding force. Transylvania eventually became a principality under the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the debacle of Mohács (1526), but only after 1541.

[See also Béla IV; Câmpul Pâinii, Battle of; Cumans; Hungary; Hunyadi, János; Mongols; Orders, Military, *subentry* on Northern Orders; Romanian Principalities; and Szeklers.]

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Ferenc Sebök

TREATISES, BYZANTINE

The Byzantines inherited a tradition of military manuals that influenced their approach to the genre. The earliest extant manual in the tradition is that of Aeneas Tacticus, *On Siegewcraft*, dated to the mid-fourth century BCE. Other influential manuals include those of Athenaeus Mechanicus and Apollodorus of Damascus on siege machines, the treatise by Onasander entitled *On Generalship*, Aelian's *Taktika*, and Asklepiodotos's *Taktika*—all

dating from the first or second centuries CE. As a result of their use of the tradition, the Byzantine manuals have been seen as concerned more with the preservation of a cultural heritage than with practical application. The view has validity, but individual manuals differ in their reliance on the tradition and most contain material representing contemporary concerns and practices. Some of the most influential manuals are described below.

The earliest distinctly Byzantine manual—and one of the most original—is the *Strategikon*, attributed to the emperor Maurice (r. 582–602). The treatise is primarily concerned with cavalry and deals with issues of organization and ranks, strategy and tactics, drills and ambushes. It notably provides ethnographic characterizations of the contemporary enemies (Slavs and Avars) and their strengths and weaknesses.

Three treatises originally published separately—the *De re strategica*, the *Rhetorica militaris*, and the *Naumachiae*—are now considered part of the *Compendium* of Syrianus Magister, most probably compiled in the ninth century. The *De re strategica* sets the subsequent material in a general social context, introduces “strategy” as the essential element of government, and deals with such topics as the skills required of a general, city construction and siege defense, armaments, camps, battle, and spies. The *Rhetorica militaris* draws on the work of the rhetorician Hermogenes to provide techniques for a general exhorting the troops. The *Naumachiae* deals with naval landings in hostile territory, signaling, and sea battles. Cosentino argues that the *Compendium* is more a literary product than a practical manual, an assertion of Byzantium’s cultural heritage and superiority.

The *Taktika* of Emperor Leo VI (the Wise) was written around 905. Leo presents his work, addressed to general officers, as having legally binding authority. It covers a broad range of topics, including the nature of a good general, organizational structures and ranks, weapons and defensive armor, training, encampment, battle, siegecraft, and naval warfare. Leo draws heavily on the *Strategikon* of Maurice and on Onasander yet is clearly concerned with the

threat posed by the Arabs and the Bulgarians in his own time. Notably he adds a detailed discussion of the Arabs to the ethnographical sections of Maurice and indicates that he is composing the treatise specifically because of the dangers the Arabs pose.

An anonymous treatise known as the *De obsidione toleranda* (On enduring sieges) is dated in its present form to the early tenth century but incorporates earlier material. Addressed to an unnamed general, it begins with a series of recommendations, including removing those unfit for combat to safety, securing necessities, organizing craftsmen (the list includes arms manufacturers, smiths, rope makers, etc.), rebuilding walls and blocking tunnels, assigning guards, and training troops. The terminology used in this section clearly reflects a contemporary outlook, while later sections use extensive examples drawn from Arrian and Josephus to illustrate recommendations and to encourage the reader.

Another anonymous author, wrongly called “Heron of Byzantium,” compiled two treatises in the mid-tenth century, the *Parangelmata Poliorketika* and the *Geodesia*, the former dealing with the construction of siege machines and the latter with measurement methods for application to the devices. The author indicates that he is primarily updating the work of Apollodorus of Damascus; for the *Geodesia* he relies on the *Dioptra* of Heron of Alexandria. He does, however, introduce some contemporary devices. He is particularly concerned with modernizing the technical terminology and improving the quality of the illustrations (he asserts the value of his “finished-product” illustrations). He covers such machines as siege sheds, battering rams, siege towers, and observation ladders, and suggests geometrical methods of measuring the height of enemy walls from outside the range of fire. He asserts that his work will be useful against the Arab enemy, although his highly rhetorical approach weakens this assertion.

The *Praecepta militaria* was written by the general and emperor Nikephoros II Phokas or at his direction about 965. This is a pragmatic treatise on operations against the Arabs of northern Syria. The five extant chapters provide descriptions of

the new *menavlatoi*, infantry equipped with a heavy spear (*menavlion*) to thwart enemy cavalry charges, and of a new infantry formation designed to serve as a secure base for the cataphract cavalry. Specific details of body armor and weapons are provided, and there is an emphasis on morale and, in particular, on religious observances.

The *De velitatione* of the later tenth century is anonymous despite the personal tone of its extensive preface. The author remarks that he had commanded Byzantine troops on eastern and western fronts, had learned the method he describes from Bardas Phokas, the brother of the emperor, and writes at the direction of the emperor himself. The treatise addresses earlier conditions in border areas in Asia Minor. The approach recommended is guerrilla warfare, shadowing the enemy from higher ground, and responding to various-sized enemy incursions with ambushes, particularly in mountain passes. The treatise addresses itself to a general, suggests flexibility in the application of the recommendations, and makes little use of earlier manuals.

The *De re militari*, again anonymous and dated after 970, primarily focuses on operations in Bulgaria. Its author indicates that he was an experienced field officer. He covers encampment and marching in enemy territory with various security measures, as well as armament, siege warfare, and the logistics of supplying the army from the homeland.

Finally, the *Taktika* of the general Nikephoros Ouranos, written about 1000, is heavily dependent on earlier sources, both Byzantine (particularly the *Praecepta militaria*) and classical or Hellenistic. However, some chapters of the treatise are clearly original. McGeer has argued that Ouranos's intent was to supplement Nikephoros Phokas's work in order to respond to the new situation in the eastern theater, that is, keeping control rather than establishing it, particularly through offensive raids and siege tactics.

The various manuals thus reflect a variety of approaches, from heavily literary to highly pragmatic and grounded in field experience. The methods of presentation also vary, with some making extensive

use of diagrams or illustrations and historical examples, while others omit these completely.

[See also Arabs; Byzantine Attitudes to War; Byzantine Empire, *subentry* on Military Ranks, Army and Navy; Cavalry; Infantry; Leo VI, Emperor; Maurice; Nikephoros II Phokas; Strategy; Tactics, Battle; Theory, Military; and Weapons, Byzantine.]

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Denis F. Sullivan

TREATISES, MILITARY ENGINEERING

Although treatises on the military arts had a rich history in the ancient world, the later Middle Ages saw an intensification of works specifically devoted to mechanical military arts in the fourteenth and especially fifteenth centuries. Treatises that could be considered engineering treatises, that is, treating technologies as mechanical problems of their own rather than simply tools to be applied in, say, a siege, only appeared in the fourteenth century sporadically, and with increasing frequency in the fifteenth century. Although the classical, Byzantine, and Arabic cultures produced numerous written texts on military engineering, most of these were imperfectly transmitted to the West and although artillery and siegecraft machines remained in use throughout the Middle Ages, new writings on these

technologies were rare and even their indebtedness to earlier treatises is contestable. Medieval treatises explored both mundane and fantastic proposals for mechanical and gunpowder devices for war, including such devices as scaling ladders, elevating towers, mobile defensive structures, crank- and wind-powered battleg wagons, and numerous projectile-throwing engines. The rise of perspective drawing in the fifteenth century, particularly in the northern Italian states, strengthened the visual exploratory investigation and transmission of mechanisms within the technological community. The bulk of the engineering community (the *ingeniators* working with complex technologies) was by definition engaged with “engines” for military activities or, at the very least, planning offensive and defensive military actions, rather than typically civil engineering tasks as we think of today. Thus, the distinction was indistinct and these treatises spoke partially of strictly military technologies (siege weapons), partially of civilian ones (mills), and explored the types of machines that could be useful in both realms (e.g., screw jacks).

Treatises from the classical world from Vitruvius and Heron that included sections on military engineering survived in very small numbers with exceedingly limited circulation in the Middle Ages, although many of the ideas that they described (particularly with respect to siege engines) seem to have continued in practice throughout the period relatively unabated. There were numerous Arabic and Byzantine treatises that copied and expanded upon these and other ancient authors, although their influence in Western Europe is slim at best. By the later Middle Ages, however, European engineers in a culture of courtly patronage began to produce illustrated treatises that explored the possibilities of elaborate engineering devices. More often with pictorial rather than detailed textual information and oriented to practical use rather than theoretical frameworks (e.g., mechanics), these courtly treatises seem to have been written for knowledgeable readers who could have understood how to build the described devices, as construction details are often frustratingly absent. The earliest of these was

Guido da Vigevano's *Texaurus Regis Francie* (c. 1335), which described inventive devices the French king might take on crusade such as cranked- and wind-mill-powered battleg wagons, siege shelters, and even inflatable bladders as flotation devices for crossing water obstacles with heavy armor.

Engineering treatises characteristically must rely on pictorial description to convey meaning in a way that many other fields do not. The difficulty of conveying technical complexity often meant that renderings that we must assume seemed self-evident to their authors fail to convey their meaning across the generations, or even regionally. By the fifteenth century, distinct Italian and German traditions in military engineering illustration had developed. The Italian tradition was characterized by people such as Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Mariano Taccola, and eventually Leonardo da Vinci, while the German tradition began with the *Feuerwerkbuch* and Konrad Kyeser's *Bellifortis*, and spawned numerous named and anonymous fifteenth-century machine treatises. In all cases, drawings ranging from rudimentary to precisely depicted mechanical contrivances such as hoists, siege wagons, wind- and watermills, boring machines, crossbows, windlasses (the compound pulley apparently being seen as a novel rediscovery at the time), chariots, and developments in artillery including catapults and trebuchets as well as gunpowder artillery.

The Italian style opted for perspectival renderings of machinery and siege equipment (as well as, notably, in Leonardo's case, cannon-founding techniques) that often included exploded views of the inner workings of geared machinery. More so than the German style, the Italian style also included the machinery rendered in scenes of use and was more likely to result in a full “treatise” rather than a series of notes and drawings, such as Taccola's *De ingenis* and *De machines*, and Giovanni da Fontana's *Bellicorum instrumentorum liber* (only partially about military machines, despite the title). The German tradition tended to favor flatter, cartoonlike drawings, often colored with washes, that abstracted the equally inventive machinery on the page. Here operators are more often than not depicted “posing”

with their machinery and individual "spare parts" of the machines are sometimes shown off to one side. These works derive from the "recipe-book" literature of the early and high Middle Ages. The German tradition began with a series of late fourteenth-century works such as the *Mittelalterliches Hausbuch* (domestic and military machinery), *Büschmeisterbücher* (master gunner's treatises), and the *Feuerwerkbuch* (a collection of gunpowder and fireworks recipes). By midcentury, both traditions had developed some works that formed stand-alone "treatises" (sequential chapters on different machines, occasionally with textual elaboration) that were intended to be passed from reader to reader, though presumably in a courtly context. Both traditions merged after the Middle Ages in the printed "Theaters of Machines" tradition of technical illustration that explored hypothetical and often fantastic mechanical engineering creations for the sake of invention, rather than use.

[See also *Battlewagons and Siege Warfare*.]

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Steven A. Walton

TREBUCHET

See *Siege Warfare, subentry on Tactics and Technology*.

TRIBUTE

In all ages, booty from the conquered was a vital part of the wages of a soldier. Kings were expected to lead plundering expeditions, which in early medieval Europe were a primary cause of war. While plundering was a chaotic business conducted by individual soldiers and small groups, tribute was a formalization by which the threatened party made regular payments in return for immunity. Threatening invasion and rapine, the Merovingian kings of the Franks extorted an annual tribute of twelve thousand solidi from the Lombards, while they took payment in cows, horses, and pigs from the poorer tribes of Germany. Sometimes tribute took the form of military service, as when Lombard troops were sent to aid the Franks in their attack on the Slavs in 630. For rulers, tribute, extorted under threat of war or as a consequence of an agreement to end such a threat, had the enormous advantage that the victims plundered themselves and the proceeds were paid to these rulers. Simply because rulers had to enlist the support of great men and their military retainues, much of this income had to be distributed. But unlike

plunder, the distribution of tribute was entirely in the hands of the ruler and could be directed for best political effect, and substantial amounts were always retained. In addition, payments could be represented as acts of subordination by the payer, enhancing the prestige of the recipient.

In early medieval Europe two groups were particularly notable for their pursuit of tribute: the Vikings, sea raiders in longships who preyed upon their neighbors, and the Magyars, steppe horsemen settled in the Hungarian plain. Such mobile warriors were both dangerous enemies and useful allies. Charles the Bald employed Vikings against his enemies and paid them off when their raids threatened to become serious. To raise the money, he demanded taxes from "traders and people living in *civitates* according to their means, in proportion to their resources" (capitulary of 877, quoted by Nelson, *Charles the Bald*, p. 37).

Viking raids on England reached a climax in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. In 994 the rivals for empire in Scandinavia, Olaf Tryggvason and Sven Forkbeard, jointly extorted sixteen thousand silver pounds from England, which they used to pursue war against one another. A further twenty-four thousand silver pounds was extorted in 997, thirty-six thousand in 1006, and forty-eight thousand in 1012. So frequent were these demands that danegeld became a regular tax imposed by English kings.

But paying had its uses. Rulers were not always free to concentrate on raiders. By paying off the Norsemen, Alfred of Wessex (r. 871–899) bought time to build up his forces and ultimately defeat them. Henry the Fowler of Germany (r. 919–936) paid regular tribute to the Magyars to keep them from raiding his duchy of Saxony in the 920s, but he used the respite to create an army and crushed them at the battle of Riade in 933.

The payment of tribute was not simply economic loss but also acceptance of an inferior status. The great epic *Beowulf* opens by introducing Scyld, the first king of the Danes:

He grew great under the heavens,
Waxing still to wonder,

Till every people in the ring
Of waters, must obey and yield him plunder.

To dangerous neighbors, rulers often paid something close to tribute, in the form of gifts freely offered. The distinction was a fine one but one to which all great kings were highly sensitive. To pay tribute could be a step on the path to absorption. In the eighth century the Frankish kingdom levied cattle, and later horses, from the Saxons, but Charlemagne transformed this tribute domination into political control, albeit only after a thirty-year war. In 1013 the Danes, who had so often taken geld, conquered the English kingdom.

In Spain the tiny Christian kingdoms faced a weakening Islam after 1000. War to the knife was hardly an option for them because the Arabs were still strong. Instead of conquest, the expanding Iberian kingdoms often focused on the exaction of tribute, or *parias*, from their Moslem neighbors. This was an end in itself, but also perhaps a means to an ulterior end, as supposedly explained by a Christian ambassador collecting tribute from the king of Granada:

Al-Andalus belonged first of all to the Christians until the time when they were conquered by the Arabs who drove them up to Galicia, the region of the country least favoured by nature. But now that it is possible, they want to recover all that was taken from them by force: and so that they may do so definitively, they have to weaken you and exhaust you over a period of time. When you have no money or soldiers left, we shall take possession of the country without trouble.

Raiding to extract tribute solidified support for Christian kings and enabled them to pay more soldiers, and thus mount more raids, while establishing a supremacy over enemies that could be transformed into sovereignty. This virtuous circle illustrates the importance of plunder and tribute in medieval warfare. Much the same dynamic applied on a more localized scale in the ransoming of places.

[See also Hundred Years' War, *subentry* on Costs and Ransoms of Places.]

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John France

TRYAVNA PASS, BATTLE OF

On 14 February 1190 in Adrianople, Frederick I Barbarossa, the Holy Roman emperor and leader of the Third Crusade, accepted the peace treaty offered by the Byzantine emperor Isaac II Angelos, according to which the Byzantines were to aid the expedition on its way to Asia Minor. The withdrawal of the crusaders gave Isaac II Angelos the opportunity to concentrate his efforts on stopping the consolidation of the Bulgarian state restored to the north of the Balkan Mountains in 1185.

Thus in the spring of 1190 the emperor attempted a large-scale campaign against the Bulgarians by sea and land. He himself headed the land forces, which, according to Georgios Akropolites, besieged Strinavos (identified with the new Bulgarian capital Tŭrnovo). A rumor that the Cumans had crossed the Danube led Isaac II Angelos to decamp with his army and retreat.

Misled by a pretended Bulgarian deserter, the Byzantines did not take the eastern passes they had come through on their way north, but chose another. The army's marching column was divided into a vanguard headed by Manuel Kamitza and Isaac Komnenos, a main body commanded by the emperor himself and his brother, the *sebastokrator* Alexios, and a rearguard led by John Doukas, the emperor's uncle. The Bulgarians let the vanguard go and attacked from both sides of the rocky pass the phalanx of which Isaac II Angelos was a member. Because of the narrowness of the pass and the

confusion, the Byzantines could not form into battle array, and many of them were slaughtered like "cattle in a barn." The emperor, who lost his helmet, was personally defended by a great number of noblemen who encircled him with their horses, while many soldiers assured his escape from the ambush to Berrhoe (present-day Stara Zagora, Bulgaria), and from there to Constantinople. The Bulgarians, however, captured precious items of the imperial treasury, such as the pyramidal crowns and the personal reliquary cross of the emperor, which contained a piece of the Holy Cross, saints' relics, and a piece of the Holy Belt of the Theotokos. Receiving the news about the ambush of the Byzantine forces in the pass, the rearguard commanded by John Doukas safely chose another pass.

The defeat of Isaac II Angelos is generally believed to have taken place in the Tryavna pass, which was one of the most common routes between Tŭrnovo and the valley of Tundzha. The landmarks and the toponymic evidence about Krinos (present-day Krŭn, Kazanlŭk region, Bulgaria) and Berrhoe provided by Niketas Choniates, as well as a number of coin hoards buried in 1190, have helped to identify the battlefield. It seems that the Byzantines were surprised by the Bulgarians along one of the two Roman routes from Novae (present-day Svištov, Bulgaria) to Augusta Traiana (i.e., Berrhoe) through the Tryavna pass, namely the route that ran by the town of Plačkovtsi. The fact that Berrhoe was mentioned in the sources as the place to which Isaac escaped has led some Western historiographies to refer to this battle as "the battle of Berrhoe."

[See also Isaac II Angelos.]

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Rossina Kostova

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ÚBEDA, SIEGE OF

Úbeda is situated in the foothills of the Sierra Morena mountains, approximately 217 miles (350 kilometers) southeast of Madrid and fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) east of Jaén. King Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158–1214) had briefly occupied it after the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, then abandoned it. When Fernando III (r. 1217–1252) sought to launch his campaign to conquer upper Andalusia, Úbeda was a natural target, threatening as it did the eastern flank of Jaén, the major Muslim city in the region, as well as securing the safety of recently-captured Baeza and Quesada. The dissolution of the North African Almohad Empire—along with squabbling between the peninsular kings Ibn Hud and Ibn al-Ahmar—reduced the likelihood of a large Muslim relief army being raised to break a siege. In 1230, Fernando had recently inherited the Kingdom of León from his father Alfonso IX (r. 1188–1230) and thus had the full resources of León-Castile at his disposal.

Fernando undertook the siege of Úbeda during winter (beginning 6 January 1233), an unlikely season for warfare, doubtless catching the town unprepared. Although Úbeda was small, it was surrounded by exceptionally strong walls, requiring the use of war machines in difficult hilly terrain or an especially long period of investment. Fernando chose the latter course and reinforced his army with the

urban militias of his newly-acquired Leonese towns, Zamora, Toro, Salamanca, and Ledesma, some of them with long frontier-service records but drawn from the distant western Duero river valley. These units departed the siege when their three-month obligation expired, perhaps requiring Fernando to raise more militias and rotate them into service when he besieged Córdoba three years later. The remainder of the king's forces remained at Úbeda, which surrendered in July after a six-month siege. Its residents were allowed to leave with anything they could carry.

[See also Alfonso VIII of Castile; Córdoba, Siege of; Fernando III; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); and Las Navas de Tolosa, Battle of.]

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James F. Powers

UCLÉS, SIEGE AND BATTLE OF

Located in the province of Cuenca in southern Spain, Uclés was in the domain of al-Mu'tamid, the *taifa*

ruler of Seville (1069–1090). In 1090, when al-Mu‘tamid realized that the Almoravid emir, Ali ibn Yusuf (1106–1117), was planning to depose him, he forged an alliance with Alfonso VI of León-Castile (r.1065–1109) and sent to him Sa‘ida, the widow of his son. Sa‘ida became a Christian and the mother of Alfonso’s only son, Sancho, and her dowry included various castles and the town of Uclés, whose citadel guarded the main approach to Toledo and provided a perimeter defense post for Alfonso’s capital.

The siege of Uclés began on 27 May 1108. The Almoravid army, composed of Cordobans, Murcians, Valencians, and North Africans, was led by Tamir ibn Yusuf, Ali’s brother, who had been appointed the new political and military leader of al-Andalus. Tamir’s forces overran the town’s outer defenses but could not take the citadel, high on a hill.

King Alfonso sent a relief force of about three thousand knights led by his son Sancho. The military commander was Álvaro Fañez, El Cid’s nephew. Other participants were the mayors of Alcalá, Toledo, and Calatañazor, and seven barons of the realm, including Count García Ordóñez of Nájera.

Expecting the relief force, the Almoravids formed lines southeast of the citadel. The battle began on 29 May 1108, when the main body of Sancho’s cavalry charged heedlessly against a compact vanguard of Cordobans who were trained to fight in unison following signals delivered by the rhythmic beating of drums and who were supported by archers.

As losses mounted, the Leonese cavalry retreated to its encampment, while the large Almoravid army advanced on both flanks and encircled them. The troops of Murcia and Valencia attacked the camp and trapped the cavalry from behind. Well versed only in individual combat, Christian troops were unsuccessful in battle against the military tactics used by the Almoravids who fought in organized parallel ranks, with the result that Uclés was a disastrous defeat for the Christian army.

Only a few escaped the encirclement. Álvaro Fañez broke through with a group of knights and headed north toward the middle and upper reaches of the Tajo River. Prince Sancho escaped with a handful of knights to Belinchón, twelve miles (twenty kilometers)

northwest of Uclés, but all were killed there by the local Muslims.

Although the battle ended on 29 May 1108, leaving Toledo exposed to attack from the east and south, the citadel was taken not by siege but by trickery. Tamir returned to Granada, leaving the governors of Murcia and Valencia in command of troops who feigned a retreat. Feeling safe, the citadel’s defenders attempted to escape and were ambushed and killed. One year later, Alfonso VI died. He had arranged for his widowed daughter, Urraca, to marry Alfonso I of Aragon (r. 1104–1134), so that the war against the Muslims should be continued. According to Reilly, the loss of Alfonso’s male heir and a sizable contingent of wise and powerful Castilian magnates affected the stability of the region for many years.

[See also Alfonso I of Aragon; Alfonso VI of Castile; Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); and Urraca.]

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Arnold Odio

UJEBARDHA, BATTLE OF

The battle of Ujebardha (or Abulena), fought on 2 September 1457, saw an Ottoman expeditionary force commanded by Isa Bey Evrenoz and the Albanian renegade Hamza Kastrioti thoroughly defeated by the Albanian forces of George (Gjergj) Kastrioti, known as Skanderbeg.

In 1453 Sultan Mehmed II “the Conqueror” (r. 1451–1481) occupied Constantinople. Thereafter the

Ottomans renewed their advance to the northwest, but in 1456 were stopped at Belgrade (Nándorfehérvár) by the Hungarian commander János Hunyadi. Then the sultan turned his attention westward to Albanian territories with a view to a future attack on Italy. In 1455 the Albanians were defeated at Berati in south-central Albania, and some of the most important Albanian chieftains, including relatives of Skanderbeg, left their confederation, the League of Lezhë, and switched sides.

Meanwhile, the sultan resumed his advance into Albanian lands. In the summer of 1457 he dispatched a force numbering between fifty thousand and eighty thousand, led by Isa Bey Evrenoz and Hamza Kastrioti, Skanderbeg's nephew. Both were competent commanders. Evrenoz had previously defeated Skanderbeg at Berati, and Hamza was thoroughly familiar with every military tactic used by the Albanian commander.

The Ottoman force entered the valley of the Mat River and proceeded slowly toward Krujë. Skanderbeg preferred guerrilla warfare and withdrew. After several weeks Evrenoz and Hamza believed that Skanderbeg had taken refuge in the mountains and did not have the force to resist them. Skanderbeg circulated rumors that he had been deserted by his army and intended to seek asylum in the Venetian coastal domains around Durrës (Durazzo). By August the Ottomans had control over a large portion of Albania. Soldiers protected the supply routes while besieging the forts of Cidhna, Dibra, Guri i Bardhe, Mat, Rodon, and Petrela. Some 30,000 Ottoman soldiers moved to the region of Ujëbardha (Whitewater), northwest of Krujë and south of Lezhë. There they made camp. In consequence of their successes, the vigilance of the Ottoman army had lowered significantly.

At the end of August, Skanderbeg went on the offensive. Small Albanian detachments harassed the outer Ottoman patrols while the main body of the Albanian army—infantry and cavalry—attacked the main Ottoman camp on 2 September. The main Albanian force did not exceed twenty thousand. The attack was at midday, with the infantry approaching from the north side of the camp and heading for its center, while the cavalry attacked from the west.

The Albanians used special metal-clapping devices to produce constant noise and give the enemy the impression that they were facing a large force. Skanderbeg took special care to defeat Hamza Kastrioti, sending his personal guard of two thousand cavalry against him. Within two hours the Ottoman camp was entirely in Albanian hands, while the remnants of the defeated army made their way through the valley of Tirana and on southward to Elbasan. The Ottoman casualties were believed to be as high as ten thousand, whereas the Albanians lost some three thousand men.

The victory at Ujëbardha was important in view of the additional consolidation of Skanderbeg's authority after his failures in 1455–1456. In addition, the defeat of the army of Isa Bey and Hamza Kastrioti stopped the Ottoman advance toward the Albanian coast and the Apennines. Sultan Mehmed II was forced to sign an armistice with the Albanians that lasted for three years (1460–1463).

[See also Constantinople, subentry on Siege of (1453); East Central Europe, subentry on Narrative (1300–1500); Hunyadi, János; Kastrioti, George; and Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Siege of.]

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Christo Matanov

ULSTER CYCLE, THE

The earliest Irish heroic stories are part of the Ulster Cycle. These works center on the warriors of Ulster (the Red Branch heroes) led by king Conchobar, who had his court at Emain Macha. The primary foes of the Ulster heroes are the warriors of Connaught. The majority of the Ulster Cycle comes from

the twelfth-century *Book of Leinster* and *Book of the Dun Cow* and the fourteenth-century *Book of Lecan*, but scholars generally believe that the tales reflect material from pre-Christian Ireland that was first written down around the eighth century. The conflict between Connacht and Ulster might also represent events surrounding the growth and emergence of the Uí Néill in the midlands. These stories provide valuable material for a period about which there are few written sources.

As depicted in the Ulster Cycle, heroes dominate warfare. The warriors of the king's court patrol and defend the territory of their lord and raid neighboring kingdoms. These heroes ride chariots (in battle and for travel) and display impressive feats of arms with a variety of weapons, with the spear being dominant. When large forces meet, the heroes challenge each other between shield-wall formations. Although the archaeological record does not yet support this, the depictions of chariot warfare are similar to those given by Roman authors writing of the Celts in Britain.

These stories provide an invaluable picture of the most common form of early Irish military expedition—the cattle raid. The raids and engagements were frequent, but violence was limited. Although the warriors fought and boasted, few outside the elite were killed, although the continual raids were disruptive. The greatest epic of the cycle is the *Tain Bo Cuailgne* (Cattle Raid of Cooley). The *Tain* illustrates the assembling of a force, logistics, and fighting. Many of the other tales in the cycle, the *remscéla* (pre-tales), provide background information for the *Tain*, such as the gathering of allies by Aillil and Mebh in the *Tain Bo Fróech* (Cattle Raid of Fróech). How Fergus, a key ally and provider of information, as well as several Ulster leaders, were exiled from Ulster and came to the court of Connacht is revealed in *The Exile of the Sons of Uisliu*.

The best known hero of the Ulster Cycle is Cu Chulainn. He played a crucial, heroic role in the *Tain Bo Cuailgne*, single-handedly defending Ulster for days. He earned the nickname Cu Chulainn—the Hound of Chulainn—when he killed an innkeeper's guard dog. Promising to take the dog's place until another

was reared and trained, the youth, formerly known as Sétante, fulfilled his promise. His early exploits are recounted in *The Boyhood Deeds of Cu Chulainn*, which provides significant information on the Irish systems of fosterage and warrior training as well as court life. The entire cycle suggests a style of warfare similar to that of other early Celtic peoples of Europe.

[See also Celtic Styles of Warfare and Raids and Raiding.]

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David B. Beougher

UNSTRUT, BATTLE AT THE

The battle at the Unstrut (also called the battle of Homburg) on 9 June 1075 was the decisive encounter in the second phase of the Saxon Wars of Emperor Henry IV, in which forces led by Henry defeated the Saxons under Otto von Northeim. Later political events led to a renewal of the war.

Beginning in 1073, when the Saxons revolted against Henry IV's program of building fortifications (*Burgen*), the Saxon Wars' first phase ended in 1074 with a negotiated treaty. Henry, however, looked to overturn the settlement. Delays in the negotiated destruction of the *Burgen* led to a renewed uprising, during which the Saxons desecrated a chapel at the Harzburg. This gave Henry the propaganda advantage he needed to renew hostilities and convince the German nobility to help defeat the Saxons.

Henry moved more aggressively, in forced marches, and surprised the Saxons at their camp along the Unstrut. While the Saxons deployed in good order despite being surprised, Henry sent the Swabian division ahead but kept most of his army in reserve. The imperial army maintained

discipline: when the Saxon cavalry attacked the Swabian unit, only the Bavarians moved up in support. By mid-afternoon the Swabians and Bavarians were exhausted and desperate, several of their leaders having been killed. But the Saxons were fully engaged, and Henry led a general attack that overwhelmed them. With the help of his infantry, Henry took the enemy camp and pursued the Saxons until nightfall. While the Saxon nobles escaped with few losses, the infantry suffered heavy casualties.

Numbers in medieval warfare are always problematic, and neither Lambert von Hersfeld nor Bruno of Magdeburg give any for the battle at the Unstrut. Elsewhere Lambert reports the Saxons fielded fourteen thousand armored troops (*armati*) at Gerstungen in 1073 and deployed a net twenty-nine thousand along the Werra in 1074. Unstrut seems more like the Werra campaign, with fifteen to twenty thousand as a reasonable upper limit for the main Saxon camp. Lambert calls the imperial army equal to the Saxons, which makes sense if Henry was leading a combined expeditionary force while the Saxons were able to call on the general levy. This is consistent with Henry's apparent advantage in cavalry as shown in the narrative, as a general levy likely would have a higher proportion of infantry. Casualty estimates are likewise difficult, because the written sources concentrate on deaths among the leadership, though Bruno of Reichenau reports that the Saxons lost eight thousand men.

Henry's victory belies the once typical depiction of medieval combat as undisciplined and primitive. His army demonstrated mastery of space and time in deploying to the battlefield and showed good discipline in waiting for the right moment to attack. The Saxons likewise deserve credit—they remained steady in the face of surprise, and the low number of casualties among their leadership suggests an organized retreat, at least by the cavalry. The Unstrut also, however, demonstrates the limits on military success in the eleventh century: while Henry was able to devastate Saxony and force his enemies to surrender within months, political events in the investiture controversy soon gave them a chance to try again.

[See also Bruno of Magdeburg; Henry IV, Emperor; and Lambert von Hersfeld.]

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Edward J. Schoenfeld

URBAN DEFENSES

In addition to physically enclosing and defending urban centers, medieval town walls came to symbolize the wealth, self-confidence, and independence of their communities. Representing far more than features of military architecture, city defenses were also prominent symbols of the vitality of urban life in the Middle Ages and were constructed around thousands of settlements across Europe. The period between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries witnessed the greatest period of wall construction, building on a Roman legacy and early medieval traditions of urban defense to create throughout Europe fortified centers that played a prominent role in military strategy and siege warfare.


Urban defenses differ in character from the other main forms of fortification known in the Middle Ages because of their communal character. The defenses of a castle essentially protected the private residence of an individual; in contrast, town walls were built to safeguard entire communities and protect their wealth and commercial functions. Kings and other rulers, lords, wealthy merchants, urban authorities, and the church were all driving forces behind the construction of town walls in certain contexts, but urban defenses were, in essence, the castles of communities. Building and funding town walls were community activities, while populations supplied forces for their defense through the organization of citizens' militias. Walls were invariably financed, at least in part, through taxes levied on trade within

the town, although rulers provided financial assistance where it was in their interests. In Britain, a system of "murage tax" developed beginning in the thirteenth century, whereby kings permitted urban communities to raise funds for wall building and repair by levying tolls on goods imported for sale into the town. In many regions of Europe the organization and expense involved in the construction of town walls acted as a stimulus to the development of municipal government institutions, while urban oligarchies and guilds retained a strong interest in walls because of the security and control over commerce they allowed.

Sites, Plans, and Contexts. Medieval urban defenses were varied greatly in character: settlements of diverse size and status were provided with fortifications that employed a wide range of technologies depending on time and place. Thus, at one extreme an internationally important medieval city such as Florence, with a population approaching 100,000 by the end of the thirteenth century, outgrew its two earlier walls and was encircled in 1284–1333 by a great new enceinte some 5.3 miles (8.5 kilometers) long, embracing 630 hectares (1557 acres) and punctuated with monumental gates and mural towers. In contrast, on the borderlands between England and Wales in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, many small medieval towns possessed defenses consisting of earthen banks topped with timber palisades, encompassing no more than a few hectares and with populations measured in scores or hundreds rather than thousands. The threats these defenses were built to counter were similarly varied. As well as sometimes countering external aggression from foreign armies, urban defenses also resisted insurrection in the countryside and threats from rival urban centers and internal factions and helped pacify and colonize conquered territories. Citadels and castles were commonly integrated into town defenses, being used as points of refuge as well as for the control of populations by lords and other authorities. They also guarded populations against lower-level forms of threat including criminality and banditry, while town gates were places where the nightly curfew was enforced and where carriers of plague were turned away.

The location of many towns and cities at junctions between communications routes, river crossings, and other sites with commercial advantages lent them natural strategic significance and rendered defenses essential. The establishment of other walled towns had a more explicit military rationale. The fortified *bastides* (or planted grid-plan towns) of Cadillac, Domme, and Monpazier in southwest France and Caernarvon, Conwy, and Rhuddlan in north Wales, for instance, are classic examples of settlements, often with accompanying castles, established by kings or nobles to secure and colonize conquered territory or to fortify border zones. Medieval populations often reused antique circuits that were upgraded and in some cases extended. At places such as Butrint, Chester, Koblenz, Le Mans, and Metz, Roman walls were rebuilt, while the great medieval city of London retained its Roman enceinte on an essentially unchanged line throughout the Middle Ages, even though its population spilled far beyond the circuit. Many other late Roman or early medieval walls were replaced by larger circuits as populations expanded: cities such as Brugge, Cologne, Paris, and Siena developed concentric rings of defenses in this way. In contrast, at Dubrovnik, Edinburgh, Toledo, and Visby, walls were entirely of later medieval origin and their construction symbols of civic pride for wealthy settlements without classical foundations.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries most major urban centers in the Crusader states possessed fortifications; sites such as Ascalon have extensive remains. These were concentrated mainly on the Mediterranean coast and focused on harbors that were afforded their own defenses, often overlooked by castles. Very few of these places were fortified for the first time by the Franks, however, and many underwent significant reuse and alteration after the collapse of the crusader states. The Franks refurbished the ancient enceinte of Jerusalem, for instance, but the standing walls of the city date primarily to the sixteenth century, being attributable to Sultan Süleyman I "the Magnificent". The coastal walled town of 'Atlit is rare in that its defenses were first built by the Franks; elsewhere, walls were already in existence when these places fell to early crusader



Carcassonne. The medieval fortified town of Carcassonne was protected by a double wall and 42 towers. PHOTOGRAPH BY CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

armies, who marveled at their size and sophistication. The walls of Nicaea, for example, were some four miles (6.5 kilometers) in length and studded with 240 towers, while the 3.5 kilometer (2.2 miles) circuit of Antioch had four hundred towers.

Architecture and Technologies. Castles, citadels, and the tower houses of urban residents sometimes contributed to the security of a town, but the most important means by which an urban settlement was fortified was through its enclosing defenses. The essential element was a masonry wall or timber palisade, punctuated by mural towers and pierced by defended gateways and usually with an accompanying external ditch. In many cases, masonry walls were built to replace earlier lines of timber defenses, while timberwork was also used to revet or strengthen enclosing earthen embankments. Less commonly, towns were equipped with gates spanning the main roads, without any enclosing wall or palisade, or a ditch around the backs of plots, as was common in medieval Scotland.

The plans of circuits were designed to embrace populations rather than for maximum military efficiency, and many were irregular in shape as they incorporated suburbs. Cittadella's circuit of 0.9 miles (1.5 kilometers), built in the 1220s as an outpost of Padua and defense against the opposing stronghold

of Castelfranco, is unusual in having an elliptical plan, studded with thirty-two towers and four great gates at the cardinal points. At Bologna and Florence the enceinte was polygonal, with straight stretches of curtain wall joining gates and towers. The curving circuits of cities such as Brugge, Norwich, and Reims, however, were more typical. A small but important number of medieval towns possessed concentric defenses, with contemporary double walls built so that the inner one overlooked the outer. Oxford possessed concentric defenses for part of its perimeter from the thirteenth century, and double walls were particularly characteristic of the crusader kingdoms, with Acre, Jerusalem, and Tyre (Sur) cases in point. Carcassonne provides a striking surviving example, restored in the nineteenth century by Viollet-le-Duc. Circuits were not necessarily complete, however, as in the case of many port towns with partial enceintes built against the coastline, or places where rivers formed part of the defenses. At Lübeck and Metz, for example, the lines of rivers partly dictated the defensive perimeter. Illustrative examples of particularly well preserved medieval circuits include Ávila (perimeter of 1.6 miles [2.5 kilometers], with eighty-two towers), Visby (2.2 miles [3.5 kilometers], with twenty-seven towers), Lugo (1.3 miles [2.1 kilometers], with forty-six towers),

Carcassonne (one mile [1.65 kilometers], with forty-two towers), Aigues Mortes (one mile [1.6 kilometers], with twenty towers), and Conwy (1.3 kilometers [0.8 miles], with twenty-one towers).

Gates were the most prestigious and expensive elements in the circuit and were the focus of architectural display as well as defense. They were also points for the collection of tolls and were used variously as guildhalls, jails, and high-status residences. The number of gates varied: Siena's enormous circuit of seven kilometers, for example, was pierced by no fewer than thirty-six gates, although more usually a town had four principal entrances. The plans and elevations of town gates are immensely varied and cannot be organized neatly into an evolutionary sequence. A high level of individuality is apparent in their design, and the larger and more elaborate examples, such as the monumental Eigelsteintor in Cologne, are small castles in their own right. One entrance was the norm, but sometimes there were two portals, one for vehicular traffic and another for pedestrians. The principal gates were often flanked by projecting towers, while lesser gates were typically pierced through single towers, with postern gates (simple openings) through the wall. Architectural details in the gate portal might include a slot for a portcullis and murder holes above; the frontal elevation sometimes featured a rebate for a drawbridge and, directly above the gate passage, a display of the city's arms. Gunports, arrow loops, and, occasionally, projecting machicolations, were built for ostentatious display as well as practical defense and deterrence. In front of the gate a barbican or defended passageway often provided an outer defense and means of controlling access, often with a second smaller gate in advance. In cities as diverse and far apart as Jerusalem and London, town gates contained or stood next to churches or chapels, lending the defense of these places a spiritual dimension.

The thickness of a town's curtain wall depended on money and materials, but few serious examples were less than 6.5 to 9.8 feet (two or three meters) thick, and they typically rose between five and nine meters above the ground. Walls were usually thicker toward the base; a typical means of construction

used a central core of rubble encased on either side by lime-mortared facing stones. Walls were invariably topped by crenellations, sometimes themselves pierced with arrow loops, and backed with a wall-walk (or *chemin de ronde*), usually of masonry but sometimes of timber construction and carried on beams. Additional details might include large rectangular or square joist-holes in the external face of the upper part of the wall for timber hours (galleries) that projected from the wall-top. The construction of a talus of sloping masonry in front of the wall is particularly well represented in the crusader territories in the thirteenth century. Embrasures with arrow loops or gunports were also sometimes set within the body of the wall, although city walls do not in general exhibit the sophistication of military architecture displayed in the finer castles of the period.

Gates, towers, and walls of brick became common from the fourteenth century on, representing some of the first monumental brick buildings since the Roman period. The walls of Kingston upon Hull, for example, built from the 1330s on, incorporated almost 5 million bricks. In other cases, layers of brick were used to level masonry courses or for decorative effect. Another building tradition, using *pisé* (rammed earth) is well represented by sites such as Cáceres and Madrigal de las Altas Torres in Spain, where walls and towers built of blocks of this material survive, showing Arabic influence. The walls of Madrigal de las Altas Torres date largely to the thirteenth century; those of Cáceres are Roman in origin and were rebuilt in the Middle Ages.

Medieval mural towers projected forward from the wall face, with arrow loops or gunports within them allowing for flanking fire. Square or rectangular forms provided constructional and functional advantages, although circular or rounded examples became favored, proving less vulnerable and providing better opportunities for active defense, while polygonal and triangular forms are also not unknown. At Visby, for example, octagonal "shell towers" were built in the fourteenth century, each twenty meters (sixty-six feet) high, open at the back toward the town and provided with wooden platforms over five or six stories. Particularly innovative were "gap-backed"

towers, as seen at sites such as Caernarvon in the late thirteenth century, where wooden planking forming part of the wall-walk behind the tower could be removed in order to isolate elements of the circuit. Detached towers linked to the main circuit with spur walls are also sometimes present, overlooking vulnerable points and blind spots. The largest mural towers, as at Dubrovnik and Pembroke, sometimes resembled castles.

While the city wall defined and defended the urban population at large, other fortifications within the urban area represented separate interest groups. The circuits of numerous medieval "new towns" (commercial settlements established by lords) were attached to powerfully defended castles, and town and castle usually shared a common line of defense. The residences of merchants and urban oligarchs might be provided with trappings of military architecture, as exemplified by a place such as San Gimignano, in Tuscany, where patrician families built scores of tower houses, some up to fifty meters (164 feet) high, rising above the thirteenth-century town wall. A final defense within the medieval town was provided by the church; walled precincts around palaces, monasteries, and cathedrals often occupied large areas and were provided with their own fortifications and gates.

The masonry wall was often only one element in a multilayered system by which movement into and out of towns was controlled. Beyond the outer face of the city wall, wooden bars or freestanding gates in advance of the main gates might mark the edge of the urban jurisdiction. Where topography allowed, towns had an outer ditch, not often less than ten meters (thirty-three feet) in width, although these were notoriously difficult to maintain and keep free of development. In some cases the ditch was water-filled and doubled as the town's sewage outfall. Ditches cut out of rock were common in the Crusader states. At places such as York, the city wall stood on top of an artificial bank that formed part of the defenses, with an earthen berm occupying the space between the wall and the city ditch. In other cases an earthen bank was piled behind the wall to strengthen it or to support a walkway. Within the

enceinte, an intramural road following the interior of the wall was another common component of the urban defensive system, enabling the defenses to be reached rapidly.

Changing approaches to siege warfare placed new demands on walled towns. At the siege of Jerusalem in 1099 the city was stormed using siege towers brought up to the walls by filling in the ditches. Bombardment by stone-throwing engines was another favored tactic, especially after about 1200, when the more powerful counterweighted trebuchet was developed, but it is not until the later Middle Ages that city defenses started to transform in obvious ways in response to new technologies. Gunpowder artillery had a profound but not revolutionary impact on the design of town defenses, at least initially. Toward the end of the fourteenth century town gates and mural towers started to be equipped with gunports, often of the "keyhole" type, comprising a circular aperture below a vertical slot and located low in the wall. Canterbury's West Gate (c. 1380), with three tiers of gunports, is a particularly fine example. Another solution was the type of freestanding artillery tower built at Norwich in the late fourteenth century and known as the "Cow Tower."

Characteristic fifteenth-century techniques to improve the defensibility of towns in the face of gunpowder artillery included the thickening of walls and widening of ditches as well as the construction of accompanying earthworks such as the low boulevard added outside one of the gates of Orléans by the English in 1426. The fifteenth-century artillery defenses of the Hussite capital of Tábor were particularly innovative, featuring gun towers on an outer wall, about 250 meters (820 feet) apart and designed for lateral fire. Across much of continental Europe the science of artillery fortification and the practice of urban design continued to develop in partnership far beyond the Middle Ages. Toward the end of the fifteenth century, Italian military engineers had developed the bastioned trace system, comprising angled projections from which defensive fire could sweep the line. This ultimately gave rise to the distinctive form of "fortress towns" exemplified by places such as Palma Nova, equipped with Renaissance-inspired

artillery defenses, geometrically designed and radically different in appearance and function from those of the medieval tradition.

Oliver Creighton

[See also *Bastides*; Border Defenses, Earthwork; Castles; Engineers and Architects; Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview; Harbor Defenses; Jerusalem, Siege of (1099); and Siege Warfare.]

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URRACA

(c. 1080–1126), queen of Castile and León, daughter of Alfonso VI (1065–1109) and his second wife Constanza of Burgundy. She was married twice. The first union, with Raymond of Burgundy, produced two heirs, Sancho (b. 1095) and Alfonso Raimúndez (b. 1105), who reigned as Alfonso VII (r. 1126–1157). Her second marriage, to Alfonso I of Aragon (r. 1104–1134), was

dissolved in 1114 by Pope Paschal II (r. 1099–1118), who charged them with consanguinity.

From the beginning of her rule in 1109, Urraca's reign was full of strife among the nobility, class conflict among the people, and warfare between Urraca and either her second husband or her half-sister Teresa, countess of Portugal (1096–1128), who wanted to replace Urraca on the Castilian throne.

Her marriage to Alfonso I made Urraca the Aragonese king's successor in case of his death, and vice versa. This removed her son, Prince Alfonso, from Castilian succession. Several anti-Aragonese, Galician noblemen, including Pedro Froilaz, supported Alfonso's royal candidacy. Santiago's bishop, Diego Gelmírez, other noblemen, and Galician townsmen supported Alfonso I. The nagging succession problem led Queen Urraca to ally herself first with Diego Gelmírez and then with Pedro Froilaz. In 1115, when Gelmírez and Froilaz decided to make Alfonso king of Galicia, Urraca allied herself with Santiago's townsmen, protecting the city with her troops. When Gelmírez and Urraca attempted to make an alliance, the furious townsmen rose in rebellion, surrounding the Church of St. James and destroying some royal buildings. In 1116, when the queen tried to escape, she was overtaken by the mob, who tore her clothes and stoned her. She escaped by agreeing to a peace pact that she later repudiated. Urraca recognized her son as the eventual heir to the kingdom in 1117, and, after a further nine years as sovereign marked by disputes with her barons and several minor expeditions against Muslim Spain, she died in 1126.

[See also Alfonso I of Aragon; Alfonso VI of Castile; Alfonso VII of Castile; and Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300).]

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Arnold Odio

V

VALENCIA, SIEGE OF (1238)

The siege of Valencia in 1238 culminated a four-year campaign of conquest by Jaime I of Aragon (r. 1214–1276). The Almoravids had reclaimed Valencia from Christian control in 1101 and ruled it until the 1220s when internal strife led the kingdom's ruler to negotiate with his Christian neighbors. With this treaty and with crusades preached by Pope Gregory IX (r. 1227–1241), Christian kings moved to conquer large portions of southern Castile and Valencia.

In 1233, Jaime, completing the conquest of the Balearics, received word that a new Valencian leader, Zaen, had broken the treaty. After winning northern Valencia, Jaime for four years maintained a small force (two thousand infantry, one hundred light cavalry, and thirty armored cavalry) at the keep of Puig de Cebolla. Not ready simply to give up Valencia, the Moors attacked Puig in June 1237 with a large army—reportedly forty thousand foot soldiers and six hundred cavalry. The Christian defenders of Puig, determined not to lose their king's fortified position, were warned in advance and ambushed the enemy force with fifty knights and one thousand foot soldiers. Their attack, in combination with a flanking strike by the remaining force from Puig, routed the Muslims, who retreated to Valencia. Jaime arrived within a few days and replenished the garrison's loss

of eighty-five cavalry, but then he had to return to Catalonia.

In December 1237 the commander at Puig, Bernat Guillem d'Entença, was killed. At this news Jaime returned and publicly swore to his soldiers that he would not leave again until Valencia was captured. These events led Zaen, who now feared the loss of Valencia, to send an envoy to Jaime offering a compromise. Zaen's proposal included the surrender of all the remaining fortified towns in northern Valencia, a palace for Jaime within the citadel of Valencia, and an annual tribute of ten thousand bezants (gold coins). Jaime replied that he now intended "to have both the hen and the chickens."

Valencia sits on a bend of the Rio Turia approximately three miles (five kilometers) from the Mediterranean. The city was well fortified, with twelfth-century walls, a moat, and a centrally located ninth-century castle-keep. The city enclosure was one and a half square miles (almost four square kilometers) and contained a population of around fifty thousand people. On 26 April 1238, Jaime, with an advance force of two hundred knights, one hundred and fifty light cavalry, and one hundred footmen, took a position between the port, Grau, and the city. The next day he moved into the suburbs, where his force encountered a large force of Moors. The Muslims were not prepared to engage the king

and withdrew inside the city walls. Within the next week, men and arms from across Europe arrived to reinforce Jaime's army. When the siege began the Christian army consisted of sixty thousand foot soldiers and one thousand knights.

Jaime's force began battering the walls with three trebuchets (one counterweight, two traction). When a small Muslim fleet arrived at Grau from Tunis to support the besieged Moors, Jaime quickly sent a force of knights and foot soldiers to ambush any landing parties. After this landing was blocked, the Muslim flotilla sailed up the coast, hoping to offload supplies at Peñíscola. Repulsed there, they returned to North Africa. The siege continued as Jaime's men attacked the urban gate of Boatella. When the defenders refused to surrender, Jaime commanded his men to "burn them all alive there."

As Jaime's army grew, so did the opportunity for confusion. In late May a force of Moors challenged about six hundred Christian knights to combat near the city walls. In an attempt to enforce his orders regarding engaging the enemy, Jaime charged out and personally turned his men back. In doing so he received an arrow wound to the head. He paused to wipe the blood from his face and laughingly led his men back to camp. In reality he was wounded badly, though he did recover.

Seeing no reinforcements by 15 September, Zaen began to fear that his people might be massacred, and he sent an emissary to reopen negotiations. Jaime refused to leave without possession of Valencia. Zaen agreed to surrender if those who wished to leave could do so safely. The king agreed, and on 28 September 1238 a treaty was signed to that effect. Jaime celebrated this amazing victory by facing Jerusalem, crying in thanks, and decreeing the singing of *Te Deum*. On 9 October, Jaime and his army entered the city and the Valencian crusade came to an end.

[See also *Iberia, subentry on Narrative (1100–1300)*; *Jaime I of Aragon*; and *Valencia, Twin Sieges of (1094)*.]

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Richard C. Gay

VALENCIA, TWIN SIEGES OF (1094)

Valencia is located in a bend of the Turia River approximately three miles (five kilometers) from the Mediterranean Sea. The ninth-century castle-keep was located in the center of the city and was well fortified with a tenth-century wall encircling the entire city. The city enclosure was approximately eighteen square miles (thirty square kilometers) and held a fluctuating population of about three thousand. Muslim and Christian inhabitants. It had an active market, trading in Mediterranean seafood and goods produced by the farms of the surrounding villages. Following the political void left after the death of the Almoravid ruler, Abd al-Aziz al-Mansur, in 1061, Valencia came under the control of various Muslim factions.

In the spring of 1093 Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar ("El Cid") and approximately three thousand troops, acting for Alfonso VI of Castile and León (r. 1065–1109), had been campaigning throughout the region north and west of Valencia to quell unrest, procure supplies and money, and remove Muslims from control of the towns in that region. These campaigns included the encirclement of Valencia to keep it from being supplied from its hinterland. Ibn Jahhaf, the Muslim official in charge of Valencia, appealed for help to the Almoravid military leader, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin. The Cid's forces successfully captured Valencia in June 1094, after an eighteen-month siege that all but starved the inhabitants into submission.

In October 1094, Yusuf and a large force (supposedly fifty thousand men-at-arms) challenged the Cid and his troops by attempting to besiege Valencia. At Cuarte, a small encampment approximately six miles (ten kilometers) east of the city, the Cid's

scouts discovered the approaching Muslims and outflanked and broke their formation before they could form for a major engagement. This maneuver deterred the Muslims from pursuing the Spanish adventurer and his small army. Valencia was held by the Cid until his death in 1099 and eventually fell back into Muslim hands in 1102.

[See also Alfonso VI of Castile; Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo; and Iberia, *subentry on Narrative* (1100–1300).]

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Richard C. Gay

VAL-ÈS-DUNES, BATTLE OF

When Robert I, Duke of Normandy, died in 1035, his seven-year-old illegitimate son William succeeded him. Despite many challenges, William survived the next decade, largely because the Norman nobility were busy fighting each other. But in 1046 most of Central and Western Normandy united around William's cousin, Guy of Brionne. William was forced to abandon Normandy and seek the aid of Henry I of France. Henry and a French army accompanied William back to Normandy in 1047, where they were joined by a small number of William's loyal troops from Upper Normandy. The loyalist and rebel armies met at Val-ès-Dunes in central Normandy, southeast of Caen.

Little is known about the battle itself. It seems that the rebel forces outnumbered the royal army. According to a much later account, the twelfth-century chronicle *Roman de Rou*, one rebel baron, Ralph Tesson, defected before the battle began, throwing the rebels into some disarray. There does not seem to have been any formal battle plan on

either side, the battle consisting of a number of skirmishes between small groups of cavalry. There is no mention of infantry or archers. Although at first the fighting was inconclusive, as the loyalists gradually gained the upper hand the rebels began to break off and flee. The *Roman de Rou* reports that the tide turned when the resistance of the rebel viscounts Rannulf of Bayeux and Nigel of the Cotentin collapsed. The battle turned into a rout as the escaping rebels were pinned against the Orne River. Guy himself escaped to his castle at Brionne, where after a three-year siege he was captured and banished from Normandy. Although William's position immediately after Val-ès-Dunes remained tenuous, in retrospect it represents the beginning of the process by which he gradually established and consolidated his power over Normandy.

[See also William I of England.]

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Robert Helmerichs

VALOR, MORALE, AND COWARDICE

In his magisterial *War in the Middle Ages*, Philippe Contamine asked if there could be such a thing as a history of courage. In the next few pages, he effectively answered his question in the affirmative and called for more work in this area. However, his admonition has only been fitfully answered, and this is odd, given the attention of medieval writers to the theme in their historical and fictional works. Sometimes that interest is more of an exhortatory hyperbole, but often it is a carefully considered approach, which should be no surprise.

Rather early in the *Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal*, the poet declares, in what might almost be a thesis statement: "I can tell you for certain that one brave man's prowess puts heart into a whole great army; because of him, and skill at arms, they fought so bravely that they were worth twice the force they were." Similarly, Vegetius's military

manual, which was known widely across medieval Europe, declared that "victory is always customarily won by a few men and above all by men of courage." Examples and quotations could be produced nearly ad infinitum, seemingly justifying the stereotypes of medieval warfare that still dominate the popular imagination. However, such passages do not actually prove that the medieval knight carried the day on the battlefield by his individual prowess; on the other hand, they do demonstrate that a society organized for war, as is so often (and rightfully) called, had an abiding interest in the questions of courage and cowardice: what made each one appear or fade, and most especially, how they might be mastered and manipulated. From Vegetius alone, a contrary list can be produced of his explicit reliance on factors other than courage, such as ambush, use of topography, and skillful exploitation of opportunities when they presented themselves. Then courage recedes as a vital element.

But Vegetius was a late antique Roman, some might say, drawing on that heritage and certainly a stranger to the great ethos of medieval warfare: chivalry. Certainly, chivalry as manifested in the tournament-associated world of jousts and melees ritualized and rewarded the deeds of the individual. As a preparation for the realities of combat—and the litany of noble fatalities attests its verisimilitude—for the military elite, the tournament conditioned up-and-coming knights mentally and physically. Repeatedly facing moments of fight-or-flight, the play-combat sought to lead participants to choose the latter, hopefully without hesitation. Even though a shameless panegyric to its subject, William Marshal's biography demonstrates the behavior expected of this "flower of chivalry" regardless of whether he actually behaved thus all the time. Time and again, William Marshal attacked when many expected him to withdraw, often when such a retreat was considered tactically wise. Almost two centuries later, Geoffrey de Charny mapped out the path to valor in his *Livre de Chevalerie*: brave, accomplished men were those who in their youth preferred tales of deeds and arms, who then progressed to an apprenticeship in jousts, and finally entered into the grave

and serious risks of an actual battlefield. Each step confirmed the valor of the warrior and prepared him for the next.

That the focus of medieval writers was typically on how the knightly class thus performed reflected not their monopoly of the battlefield but their relationship with those who produced histories, biographies, and the imaginary literature that tried to dissect martial behavior. Still, knights and, in later centuries, well-equipped men-at-arms, were society's first choices as leaders, and their bravery was of paramount importance, especially since it was assumed to affect the morale of the troops they led. Alcuin of York wrote at the close of the eighth century that "if the leader is fearful, how shall the soldier be made safe?" A century later, Alfred the Great commented that an army's will depended on its general. Successful leaders such as William the Conqueror or Richard the Lionheart (and obviously, the medieval interest in martial epithets is another barometer of the importance attached to brave accomplishments) husbanded this kind of prestige once it had been earned. John Gillingham has argued that Richard's impetuosity in combat was actually a calculated risk meant to drive his followers' own morale and performance ever higher. In effect, these men understood that success bred success, and maintenance of their troops' morale could thereby require less investment. Likewise, Robert Bruce's dramatic single combat with Henry de Bohun before the armies collided at Bannockburn must have been of immeasurable worth to the Scottish morale, confirming his role as leader.

Of course, individual and corporate morale rested on an assessment of the risks to be faced. Managing that risk assessment came most often in two forms: the prebattle speech and the overall discipline instilled in the troops. The prebattle speech is a difficult mechanism to assess, being so often just a rhetorical set piece. Vegetius believed in such speeches and suggested several themes to cover: the cowardice of the enemy and their lack of skill, plus any argument that might incite healthy indignation against the foe. The sources show this in action repeatedly. According to Wace and William of Malmesbury,

William the Conqueror roused his troops before the battle of Hastings by having the minstrel Taillefer perform passages from the *Chanson de Roland*. The appearance of the Normans, apparently marching in good order and several companies, accompanied by song, began to unnerve the English. At least, Wace would have us believe it transpired thus. Harold's own disciplined formations, plus the length of the battle, would indicate otherwise. At the other end of the Anglo-Norman period, Henry of Huntingdon presents a pair of prebattle speeches at Lincoln that, on a first appearance, are imaginary constructions of what ought to be said on such occasions. But an interesting touch of realism is inserted when Henry notes that King Stephen deputized Baldwin fitzGilbert to deliver his speech because he "did not have a good speaking voice." Along with all the omens that preceded the battle, which Henry carefully enumerates, the stage was set for Stephen's forces to collapse even as the king's own personal bravery could not turn the tide.

The battle of Lincoln highlights another element in the mixture of how bravery and fear moved across the battlefield. J. F. Verbruggen and others have pointed out the fear of knights on the battlefield when they faced their social inferiors, knowing that if they fell, the odds of being killed instead of ransomed quickly rose. This was undoubtedly so as the Middle Ages progressed, but at Lincoln, Tinchebrai, Brémule, and many other battles, generals often dismounted their knights and mixed them in among the regular levies of infantry. This maneuver sought to increase the discipline of the common troops, both by providing them with skilled co-combatants and by sending the message that the elite were eschewing the opportunity to abandon the battle should it go badly.

However, recent studies of cowardice have shown that flight in and of itself was not considered a manifestation of cowardice; the context mattered greatly. At the battle of Maldon, those who fled before (or right at) the death of Byrhtnoth were accounted cowards. But for those who broke afterward, thinking Byrhtnoth either was dead or had fled, no shame was attached. As Richard Abels has shown, with the leader's death breaking the personal bonds of

loyalty, there was no sense of disloyalty in abandoning the fight. However, there was glory for those who chose to remain and die alongside their dead lord. In a similar way in the conflict of 1173–1174, the siege of Brough witnessed two stages of surrender by the vastly outnumbered garrison. After being pushed back into the keep, six members of the garrison surrendered without opprobrium; a seventh, younger man, continued to resist for a while longer. Eventually he surrendered as well, but his defiance did not cast the earlier surrender into any obvious disrepute. In fact, as Stephen Morillo has shown, for the tactic of the feigned retreat to succeed, there needed to be an expectation of flight by one side or the other. If this is true, then Harold's forces at Hastings clearly were not unmanned by William's approach since their breakouts indicated an expectation of victory over the Normans.

Finally, one must note the obvious role of youth in both tournament and actual combat. The great tournaments that came to dominate northwest Europe and drew in the households of many magnates were especially the haunts of those men still "on the make," the ones that Geoffroi de Charny would note as meriting reward so long as they continued to prove their mettle repeatedly. Vegetius disparaged the desire of young, hot-headed warriors to rush to battle; only "strangers" to battle would find it agreeable, he argued. However, in the Middle Ages, the charge of cowardice leveled by younger knights often brought older warriors into situations they regretted. Thus, Stephen offered battle at Lincoln instead of drawing back, and William the Lion could not avoid the 1173–1174 war with Henry II that ended in his capture.

[See also Chivalry, *subentry on* Overview; Vegetius and Youth, *subentries on* Before 1000 and After 1000.]

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Steven Isaac

VARANGIAN GUARD

The Varangian Guard comprised warriors of Rus', Scandinavian, and Anglo-Saxon stock who formed elite units in the Byzantine military. "Varangian" in Byzantine Greek meant anyone arriving from north-west Europe via Rus' ("the Way from the Varangians to the Greeks") or, specifically, warriors hailing from there. Deployment patterns varied according to strategic requirements, and the Varangians' numbers fluctuated, earlier generations probably envisaging only a few years' imperial service. Although the authorities periodically tried to recruit fresh war bands, the supply from "Varangia" was unpredictable. Varangians were supposed to get permission before departing Byzantium, but they did not always comply: after several years there, the Norwegian warrior-prince Harald Hardrada made off, unauthorized, circa 1042.

War bands of Rus' sought employment in Byzantium from the beginning of the tenth century, and sizable Rus' units campaigned in Syria in the 950s. A military manual of the 960s presupposes their availability, and Old Norse sagas begin to mention the service in Byzantium of apparently historical personages for the decades that followed. It was, however, the dispatch of six thousand warriors

by the Rus' prince Vladimir to help Emperor Basil II against rebel generals around 988 that established the northerners as a permanent presence in Byzantium's forces. Most of the six thousand were probably recent arrivals from Scandinavia, recruited by Vladimir in his bid to seize the Kievan throne. Basil II kept his military operational after dealing with his generals. Russo-Varangians accompanied him to the Caucasus and, most frequently, against the Bulgarians. Numbers were reduced, but Basil continued to rate northerners highly, allotting "the Rus' serving as allies" one-third of the spoils in 1016. The Russo-Varangians served in other expansionist ventures of Basil and his successors, for example, Romanos III's Aleppo expedition. Their principal role was as heavy infantry, but they also undertook naval operations and formed a spectacular element in the palace guard. The Byzantines termed them "the axe-bearing barbarians," referring to their distinctive, two-edged weapon; large shields were also characteristic. The Varangians were organized under their own commanders, who maintained discipline and resolved disputes partly through recourse to Scandinavian norms.

By the mid-eleventh century, a bodyguard comprising these northerners was a symbol of imperial authority: when rebel general Isaac Komnenos asserted his legitimacy during negotiations with emissaries of Emperor Michael VI, he seated himself on a throne, surrounded partly by northerners. They pointed their long spears forward, resting axes on their shoulders.

Fresh blood arrived soon after the Normans conquered England. Anglo-Saxons began to seek the emperor's service: in the mid-1070s a Byzantine writer complained of court titles lavished on "the foreigner coming from England." That William the Conqueror countenanced the emigration is suggested by the unearthing in London of Byzantine treasury officials' seals, datable to between 1060 and 1090. These perhaps funded journeys eastward.

The relative proportions of Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavians in the Byzantine army from the late eleventh century onward are controversial.



Varangian Guard. Byzantine emperor Theophilos (c. 812–842) and his Varangian Guard (right). The emperor's guard was made up of Franks, Russians, Germans, and Vikings. Illustration from the *Skylitzes Chronicle*, fol. 43v, eleventh century. WERNER FORMAN/ART RESOURCE, NY

Sharp distinctions are—and were—hard to draw: men from the English Danelaw had Scandinavian characteristics, while bands from the Norse-speaking Orkneys sometimes joined up, as did, for example, members of Earl Rögnvald's company in the early 1150s. The English probably plied "the Way from the Varangians to the Greeks," supplementing rather than displacing Scandinavian-born guards. Both groups were substantial, probably numbering in the thousands. Anglo-Saxon foot soldiers were numerous by the time Alexios Komnenos seized the throne in 1081. His daughter Anna, recounting the coup, supposes that Varangians' "from the island of Thule" were then renowned for loyalty to the emperor, passing it on "from one to another like an ancestral inheritance." Anna was probably ascribing commonplaces of the mid-twelfth century to the palace guards of 1081. In her time, as in the eleventh century, Byzantium employed guardsmen from Scandinavia and Iceland. But now the English, having nowhere else to go, formed a distinctive, long-term unit. The earliest migrants probably included

women, perpetuating their language: English was considered the Varangians' native tongue in the fourteenth century. Emperor Alexios probably assigned the Anglo-Saxons settlements on the Crimean coast, some of which became lasting catchment areas. Anna Komnene's sentiment was fostered by personal ties: in the twelfth century the Varangians' quarters were at Blachernai, the palace where she was raised. Their commanding officer (*akolouthos*) was, apparently, of Byzantine stock, but subordinate commanders were Varangians. In addition to serving as palace guards, they accompanied Komnenian emperors on the many expeditions they led in person. Numerous Varangians, for instance, ceremonially escorted Manuel I into Antioch in 1159. Varangian units were also stationed in outlying strongholds like Paphos (Cyprus). Their die-hard qualities were manifest when confronting the forces of the Fourth Crusade. They manned the walls near Blachernai, fending off such Frenchmen as managed to scale them in July 1203; and gaining the axe-bearers' support was indispensable for successful

palace coups in the ensuing months. For the Anglo-Saxons, at least, regular pay was assured by the survival of the empire, and they fought on until the last duly enthroned emperor fled.

After Constantinople's fall in April 1204, Varangian guardsmen were still emblems of legitimate sovereignty, and they resumed a prominent role after Michael VIII Palaiologos restored Constantinople as the imperial capital in 1261. A mid-fourteenth-century treatise on ceremonial mentions Varangian guards often: they accompanied the emperor on expeditions as well as at court. At state receptions and on processions, they brandished their axes, striking them together with a clash when acclaiming the emperor. Besides guarding the main treasury (as they had for the Komnenoi and Nicaean emperors), they acted as police and jailers in the palace complex. Thus, an officer named Harry kept watch over an imprisoned adversary of Andronikos II, Michael Komnenos, and his sister. Girl and jailer fell in love, and they planned an escape. Pulling rank, Harry bluffed his way past the outer guards, and the threesome sailed away. They were soon arrested, Harry presumably being executed. Michael was slain eight years later by axe-wielding Varangians while making another escape bid. The tale illustrates the privileged standing of Varangian guardsmen, their officers' trustworthiness being presupposed. The axe-bearers "from Britain" were still a functioning unit in the early fifteenth century but thereafter are known neither in Constantinople nor in Byzantium's Peloponnesian possessions.

[See also Azaz, Battle near; Constantinople, *subentry* on Rus' Attacks (860, 907, and 941); Isaac I Komnenos; and Raban, Battle of.]

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Jonathan Shepard

VARANO, THE DA

The Da Varano family of Camerino originated in the Marche, a province of the Papal States, and established a lordship, a *signoria*, based on the city of Camerino in 1272; their lordship lasted—apart from periods of exile (1434–1444 and 1502–1503)—until 1539. Their rule in Camerino was probably first sanctioned by their overlord the pope with a vicariate in 1393; in 1515 Leo X granted Giovanni Maria da Varano the title of duke. Over time, the Da Varano assembled a number of lordships, fiefs, and properties within the Marche and beyond. Like many other *signori* in the Papal States they served as condottieri, or mercenary captains; their principal employer was their overlord, the papacy, but they also served the kings and queens of Naples and the republics of Florence and Venice.

The traditional, and obvious, explanation for the condottiere prince is that he ruled a relatively impoverished state and that he and his subjects sought employment by the greater and wealthier

Italian powers. However, the case of the Da Varano questions this view. Camerino appears to have been a relatively prosperous city of traders and craftsmen, and nothing in its records suggests that it was "a military society." Certainly their earnings as condottieri benefited the Da Varano and some of their subjects and allies. They celebrated their military history, even claiming to have received the Order of the Garter from Edward I, King of England! But *condotte*—contracts—with the greater Italian powers brought more than prestige and financial benefits.

This can be seen—for example—in the relationship between Rodolfo III (r. 1399–1424) and the Crown of Naples, then the major power in the peninsula. On 31 December 1408 they entered into an alliance of mutual defense. The king of Naples employed one of Rodolfo's sons as an ambassador and councilor, and appointed him as the governor of one of the kingdom's provinces, probably to offset unpaid military contracts. Again, support given by Giovanni Maria da Varano (r. 1503–1527) to popes Julius II, Leo X, and Clement VII earned various concessions and privileges, including being appointed papal admiral (1521).

However, the Da Varano were never major condottieri; their armies seem to have varied between two hundred and four hundred lances, and between eight hundred and twelve hundred men, a third of whom were regarded as front line troops. As soldiers, they were never associated with a major victory; Giulio Cesare's appointment as captain general of the Venetian armies on 5 May 1484 quickly ended in humiliation as he failed to provide effective leadership against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, in the Trentino. The fact that the duchy passed to a daughter in 1527 seriously undermined the military credibility of the family.

Most of all, as subjects of the papacy, the Da Varano were exposed to changes in papal policy, driven either by papal dynasticism or by a desire to exert greater control over the Papal States. These interests caused the temporary expulsion of the dynasty in 1434 and 1502, and its fall in 1539.

[See also Condottieri.]

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John Law

VAREY, BATTLE OF

For more than a hundred years, from 1242 to 1355, the counts of Savoy, Geneva, and Dauphiné fought each other in a feudal war for the ownership of territories of the western Alps and up to Lyon. Within a perimeter 870 miles (1,400 kilometers) long, the armies of these three rivals waged a war of attrition involving looting, *chevauchées*, and sieges. The battle of Varey is the only important general engagement in this conflict. In 1325, Édouard of Savoy besieged the Genevan castle of Varey with an army of Savoyards and Burgundians. The garrison warned the Dauphin Guigue VIII and his ally the Count of Geneva, who immediately mustered their vassals.

On 7 August the dauphin's army surprised the aggressors in the plain at the foot of the castle, where they had encamped. The outcome of the battle remained uncertain for a long time. The Burgundians resisted the vanguard's attack but were driven off by the dauphin's main body. The second Savoyard line failed to stop the attack. Varey's garrison then attacked the enemy from behind, ensuring the dauphin's victory. In the struggle Édouard narrowly escaped capture. Saved in extremis by two knights, he took refuge in a nearby castle. This battle caused two thousand deaths, but few of noble rank; the objective was not to kill but to capture enemy knights. Hundreds of Savoyards were, however, made prisoner and robbed.

The war ended in 1349 with the Dauphiné's alignment with France. From that date the eldest sons of the kings of France bore the title of dauphin. In 1355 the Treaty of Paris finally ended the conflict between Dauphiné and Savoy. Savoy henceforth spread its domain in Italy, where the counts, and then the dukes, established themselves (in Turin) before founding the dynasty of the kings of Italy.

[See also France, *subentry on Narrative* (900–1328).]

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Philippe Gaillard

VARNA, BATTLE OF

After the success of János Hunyadi's "long campaign" in 1443–1444, Sultan Murad II offered a truce with favorable conditions for the Christians. King Władysław III of Poland (Ulászló I of Hungary) decided to accept the offer, but then, at the instigation of the papal legate Giuliano Cesarini, violated the agreement and launched a new campaign in the fall of 1444, with the aim of reconquering the Balkan Peninsula from the Ottomans.

Władysław crossed the Danube on 22 September with about fifteen thousand crusaders, mostly Hungarian but also including Polish and Walachian soldiers. The army consisted almost entirely of cavalry for the sake of quick movement. The Christian thrust went along the Danube, probably for reasons of supply. The plan was to destroy the Ottoman forces garrisoned in Europe and occupy Adrianople (present-day Edirne, Turkey) before the sultan could come to their aid. In order to achieve this, Genoese and Burgundian galleys should have blockaded the straits between Europe and Asia. Miscommunication, however, led the Genoese to believe that a peace agreement had been made in the meantime, and instead of closing the straits, they transported the Ottoman troops into Europe for a considerable sum of money. The Turks took advantage of the element of surprise and, with around forty thousand troops (many more than their opponents), pushed the Christians into the seaside town of Varna, Bulgaria.

The battle itself began favorably for the Christians, as Hunyadi's heavy cavalry swept away the irregular Ottoman forces. But they then got bogged down in a clash with the Anatolian troops. From then on the events of the battle are difficult to reconstruct because of contradictory sources. Hunyadi most likely managed to break down the resistance of the Anatolians with fresh Christian troops. Victory, it seemed, was in the hands of King Władysław, who at that point decided to end the battle with a determined thrust through the Ottoman center. With his Hungarian and Polish heavy cavalry, he attacked the Janissaries lined up in front of the sultan, who had planned to retreat after seeing his cavalry defeated by Hunyadi. The charge failed to break the Ottoman lines, however, and Władysław lost his life in the attack. The Turks beheaded his body and paraded the head around on a lance, demoralizing the Christian forces. Though Hunyadi attempted to restore order with harsh measures, his troops could no longer withstand the victorious Ottomans. The remnants of the Christian army, including Hunyadi and other main leaders, had to flee, with great difficulty, through Walachia to Hungary. The Christians lost seven to eight thousand men, but the Ottomans must have suffered heavy losses as well, as they did not even attempt to pursue the fleeing Hungarians. The battle cannot be regarded as a decisive setback for the Christians, as Hunyadi resumed the offensive in four years' time. The Ottoman victory did, however, allow Sultan Murad to reconsolidate his power over Serbia.

[See also Hungary, *subentry on Narrative* (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; Romanian Principalities; and Slavic Lands, *subentry on Narrative* (1300–1500).]

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Ferenc Sebök

VASLUI, BATTLE OF

The battle of Vaslui was one of the most important victories of Prince Ștefan cel Mare (Stephen the Great) against the Ottomans, and it maintained the independence of Moldavia for several years afterward. Its origins lie in a dispute between Ștefan and Radu cel Frumos (the Handsome), Prince of Walachia, over territories in the region of the Lower Danube and the Black Sea, which played important strategic and economic roles. The main focus was on the castle of Kiliya (Chilia), a key fortification and central port of the Danube delta. The conflict started in 1469 and lasted several years without a decisive victory for either side. Radu was constantly assisted by the Ottomans, and Ștefan, after a series of small-scale victories, realized that he had to remove the Walachian prince in order to secure a decisive victory. The international political context was favorable to his ambitions, as Sultan Mehmed II was distracted by his conflict with Uzun Hasan.

Ștefan refused to pay further tribute to the Ottomans and overran Walachia twice, in November 1473 and October 1474, together with Laiotă Basarab, pretender to the Walachian throne. Radu took refuge with the Ottomans, seeking their help. The sultan now took the problem of Walachia seriously and directed Süleyman, the *beylerbey* of Rumelia, to reinstate Radu and punish the prince of Moldavia. Süleyman set off in December 1474. His army numbered between 30,000 and 120,000 soldiers, according to different accounts. The overwhelming Ottoman army faced no resistance in Walachia, and Prince Radu regained his throne. He joined the Ottoman army with his own contingent, and they marched together toward Moldavia along the River Bârlad (Birlad). Ștefan made desperate preparations

to repulse the attack. He accepted even peasants into his army, which consisted of about forty thousand men according to Jan Długosz, the Polish chronicler, plus a contingent of Székelys from Hungary. The Moldavian army waited for the Ottomans south of Vaslui, where the valley of Bârlad was narrow. Attacked by the Székelys, Süleyman was unable to set up his army properly. On 10 January, amidst the early morning fog, Ștefan initiated his attack. The Moldavians struck from several sides, drawing some of the Ottoman army into the nearby swamps, where they suffered an utter defeat. The rest of the Ottoman troops were massacred during the pursuit that followed. It was a great victory for Ștefan, who was able to preserve his throne and maintain the independence of Moldavia. He had lost Walachia, however, and some months later the Ottomans made the Crimean Khanate their vassal, creating an even greater threat to Moldavia.

[See also Ștefan cel Mare; Romanian Principalities; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); and Szeklers.]

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Radu Lupescu

VEGETIUS

(fl. late fourth, early fifth centuries), a Roman military expert. We cannot be certain when Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, an educated and thoughtful imperial official, wrote the work later known as *Epitoma rei militaris*, or, more often, as *De re militari*: a date between 380 and 450 is the most likely. By the ninth century it was already recognized as the leading authority on military matters. Latin manuscripts of the work were produced in ever-increasing numbers from that time; more than two hundred

survive today, mostly from the period 1300–1500. The work was translated into seven European languages between 1270 and 1460, and it was one of the first works by a classical author to be printed, around 1474.

Divided into four books, *De re militari* deals with the selection and training of soldiers in book 1 and with the administration, command, and career structures of the legion in book 2. Book 3 deals with aspects of leadership before and during battle, including the importance of logistical support, the need for a thoughtful approach to battle based on consideration of all available information and advice and leading to decisive action, battle tactics and strategies, the importance of good morale, and the need for commanders to take into account that soldiers, however well trained, experience fear and other emotions. Finally, book 4 takes up different forms of fortification, preparation for the siege, strategies of attack and defense, some general considerations regarding preparation for war at sea, and, briefly, naval warfare itself.

What accounted for the popularity and influence of *De re militari*? Based on written records of human experience in war, the work came to be regarded as possessing an authority that transcended time and caused it to become the military bible of the Middle Ages and beyond. Drawing attention to the effectiveness of Roman military discipline and organization, it conveyed the message that victory was achieved not principally through weight of numbers but by serious preparation reflecting investigation of the military situation and a cautious attitude toward battle, a lesson both timeless and potent, because it gave credit to the skills of both the commander and the well-trained soldiers he led. His influence is clearly visible in the *Siete Partidas* of Alfonso X, compiled in the second half of the thirteenth century, and in parts of the *Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, written by Christine de Pizan in the early fifteenth century.

Its emphasis on the contribution of the army to the good of society—transmitted through the works of such thinkers as John of Salisbury (c. 1159), Giles of Rome (c. 1277), and Niccolò Machiavelli (early

sixteenth century)—was later reflected in the political importance attributed to the armies of rising nation-states. Vegetian influence encouraged the development of the permanent army and the rise in society of the professional career soldier, who ultimately made possible the wars that ravaged parts of Europe in the early centuries of the modern age.

[See also Christine de Pizan; Naval Combat and Tactics; and Theory, Military.]

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Christopher Allmand

VELBUŽD, BATTLE OF

The battle of Velbužd (1330) marked the beginning of a short-lived Serbian hegemony in the Balkans. Since the beginning of the fourteenth century the Serbian kingdom had aspired to seize Macedonia. This infringed on the interests of both the Bulgarian kingdom and the Byzantine Empire. In 1329 the rulers of these two states concluded a military alliance and the following year their armies advanced toward Serbia. The Byzantine emperor, Andronikos III Palaiologos (1328–1341), advanced from the south and deployed his army in the outskirts of Bitola, waiting to see the course of military action. On 19 July 1330 the Bulgarian tsar Michael III Šišman (1323–1330) marched west from his capital Turnovo with fifteen thousand soldiers (twelve thousand Bulgarians and three thousand Alans and Tatars) and via Sofia arrived at Velbužd

(present-day Kyustendil, Bulgaria). The Serbian king Stefan Uroš III Dečanski (1321–1331), who had long been preparing for war, opposed the Bulgarians' advance with a fourteen-thousand-strong Serbian army and one thousand Catalan mercenaries.

As both rulers were still awaiting the arrival of some troops, a one-day truce was concluded between them on 28 July. It was a great surprise, on the very same day, to see the Serbian army, led by the heir to the crown, Stefan Dušan, rush on the Bulgarian camp and attack the Bulgarian detachments while they were dispersed securing food supplies in the neighboring villages. Although surprised by the treacherous attack, Tsar Michael III Šišman managed to rally the troops within his camp. The heavily armed Catalan mercenaries were sent against him. In the course of the unequal battle the tsar fell from his horse, seriously wounded, and was taken prisoner. Four days later, he died. Having learned the fate of the Bulgarian ruler, Andronikos III left Macedonia and abandoned Bitola and Veles to the Serbs.

After the battle Michael's brother Belaur, despot of Vidin, started peace talks with the Bulgarian boyars. The Serbian king raised no territorial claims but was content with the request to have John Stefan (1330–1331), son of Michael III Šišman by his first wife Anna Neda, a Serbian princess, succeed to the Bulgarian throne. The battle of Velbužd settled the dispute regarding Macedonia and "laid the milestone of Serbian supremacy" thereon (Ostrogorsky).

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on Narrative* (1204–1453) and Slavic Lands, *subentry on Narrative* (1300–1500).]

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Vassil Gjuzelev

VENETIAN ARSENAL, THE

During the medieval era, the Venetian Republic's official documents described the Arsenal—the city's naval shipyard—as the "the heart of our State." This imposing government-owned complex played an essential role in the military and trade conquest of the Mediterranean Basin. The communal Arsenal's existence is confirmed by records of the renovation, between 1220 and 1224, of the *darsena vecchia* (old arsenal), following the formidable naval operation waged against Constantinople in 1204, when Doge Enrico Dandolo commanded 72 galleys and 140 cargo vessels. A large area had since been set aside, well protected from any possible attack and near the outlet of the Piave and Tagliamento rivers, which were used to transport alpine timber. This Arsenal had three distinct components. First, there was a warehouse and a building for storing raw materials (wood-tar pitch for caulking, and hemp for ropes and sails) that were connected to a munitions foundry. There was also a workshop for repairing ships damaged at sea. Finally, the showpiece of the Arsenal's activity was its efficient shipyard for shipbuilding. The high numbers of qualified and loyal personnel—the envied *arsenalotti*—who were strictly supervised by government representatives assured productivity worthy of an assembly line, and excellent quality in building the vessels.

Early in the next century, in 1326, in order to cope with the increased demand for sea transport to serve a dispersed colonial empire and the never-ending naval war against numerous adversaries, the Arsenal was expanded to include the *arsenale nuovo* (new arsenal), designed for maintaining some eighty galleys. The entire facility became an area reserved for war or cargo vessels owned by the commune. In 1423 Doge Mocenigo mentioned that there were some sixteen thousand ship carpenters and joiners

working at the site! After Constantinople fell in 1453, the old arsenal's renovation signaled a transformation on a major scale.

The dreadful naval war against the Turks, which lasted from 1463 to 1469, followed by the defeat of Negroponte in Greece, obliged the government to strengthen the port facility. In 1470 the number of covered basins and dry docks was increased to double the shipbuilding capacity of the *arsenal nuovissimo*. The large area illustrated on Jacopo de' Barbari's map resembled a fortified zone within the lagoonal city that constituted a unique naval facility in Europe and earned the admiration of all foreign visitors. The Arsenal was managed by a board of directors composed of three senators and three directors (*patroni*) who were members of Venice's Great Council of Nobles. The latter lived on the site, guarded the keys to the warehouses, and supervised the watchmen. They were accompanied by a shipyard engineer called the "great admiral," who oversaw the master craftsmen and work crews. For all these reasons, the Arsenal remains the unsurpassed symbol of the military and commercial success achieved by the Venetian Republic.

[See also Constantinople, *subentry* on Siege of (1453).]

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Bernard Doumerc

Translated from the French by Carol Macomber

VERME, JACOPO DAL

(1350–1409), a leading Italian mercenary captain during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth

centuries. He came from the nobility of Verona; his father, Lucchino, was a renowned captain who was awarded honorary citizenship by Venice for his successful suppression of a revolt on Crete in 1363. Jacopo devoted almost his entire career to the city of Milan, establishing close personal relations with its ruler, Giangaleazzo Visconti. The constancy of his service to one employer distinguished Verme from most of his contemporaries, who worked for numerous states.

Verme's military career developed quickly. Already by age twenty-eight he had attained the rank of captain general of Milanese forces in the city's war against the marquis of Montferrat, John II Paleologus. Before that he fought in campaigns in Piedmont and participated in 1368 in the defense of Milan against the English lord Edward Le Despenser, who sought to avenge the sudden, suspicious death of Lionel of Antwerp, Duke of Clarence, which ended his brief marriage to Violante, daughter of Galeazzo II Visconti, ruler of Pavia. In 1372, Verme fought for Galeazzo Visconti against Pope Gregory XI, alongside the great English captain John Hawkwood and Galeazzo's nineteen-year-old son, Giangaleazzo, on whose patronage Verme's subsequent career would depend.

When Giangaleazzo became lord of Pavia in 1378, Verme settled into long-term service and became a fixture at the Visconti court. He accompanied Giangaleazzo in 1385, when the latter, pretending to be on pilgrimage to a shrine in Varese, seized his uncle Bernabò and took over the entire Milanese state. It was Verme who laid hands on Bernabò, who was imprisoned in a local fortress where he later died. Verme remained in Giangaleazzo's service until the latter's death in 1402, leaving briefly during a period of political intrigue.

Verme's considerable skill as a commander is sometimes overlooked by scholars, who have focused greater attention on his more famous native contemporary, Alberico da Barbiano. But Verme was a highly effective captain. He was cautious and conservative in the field and was successful at instilling discipline in the ranks. His greatest victory occurred in 1391 against an impetuous French force

in Florentine service at Alessandria, which rushed headlong into battle against him. He killed and captured nearly the entire force, a feat that was all the more impressive because it occurred just after Verme had fended off an advance from the south by a Florentine army led by Hawkwood that had sought to link up with the French force. Verme led a joint land and sea (along the Po River) attack on the city of Mantua in 1397, but this ultimately failed. He had greater success defending Brescia in 1401, with an army purportedly of twenty-three thousand men, including Barbiano. It was again with Barbiano that he fought at Casalecchio in 1402, a critical victory that allowed the Visconti to occupy Bologna and opened the prospect of the conquest of Tuscany. Giangaleazzo's death in that same year ended the offensive.

[See also Alberico da Barbiano; Alessandria, Battle of; Brescia, Fight near (1401); and Visconti, Giangaleazzo.]

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William Caferro

VERNEUIL, BATTLE OF

The battle of Verneuil was fought on 17 August 1424 just outside the town of Verneuil in southwest Normandy. An Anglo-Norman force of eight thousand men defeated a numerically superior force of French, Spanish, Scots, and Lombards of between fourteen and sixteen thousand. The English were led by John, Duke of Bedford, the regent of France for his nephew, King Henry VI, and Thomas Montague, Earl of Salisbury, while the French were led by Jean d'Harcourt, Count of Aumale. The Scottish

contingent was commanded by Archibald Douglas, Fourth Earl of Douglas.

The circumstances of the battle were determined by the breach of promise made by the French two days earlier. Harcourt had agreed to a *journée* (a prearranged battle fought according to chivalric protocol) outside the town of Ivry on the Norman border on 15 August. Bedford had been besieging the town, recently captured by the French, and had come to terms with its captain that it would surrender if not relieved by 15 August. Instead of attacking the prepared English position outside Ivry, Harcourt decided to lure Bedford to battle in the broad open fields outside Verneuil, where he could deploy his fully-armored Lombard cavalry to greatest effect. Bedford, incensed at the breach of chivalric protocol, determined to give battle on 17 August. He was also wary of further treachery and dismissed the Burgundian contingent, consisting of perhaps two thousand men, on the eve of the battle. The role of the Lombard cavalry was crucial in the ensuing encounter. Alfred Burne claims that they were drawn up on the flanks of the Franco-Scottish host, where they were defeated by an English mobile reserve. This allowed the English men-at-arms and archers to advance in two divisions (one commanded by Bedford, the other by the earl of Salisbury), rout the dispirited French, and slaughter the Scots, who alone remained to fight. Michael K. Jones has suggested a different and more probable account of the fighting based upon a broader range of contemporary chronicle sources. The exceptionally well-armored Lombard cavalry were instead drawn up in front of Bedford's army, expecting to smash the English just as they had done to the Burgundians at the battle of La Buisserie two years earlier. They charged through the English host, causing some contingents to flee the field and spread rumors of Bedford's defeat, but the rest of the army recovered and then closed on the Franco-Scottish host in a desperate and bloody melee. Many of the French were killed as they fled to safety in the town of Verneuil, including Aumale, who was drowned in the town's moat. The Scots, whom Bedford considered rebels, were given no quarter and slaughtered almost to a man.

According to the heralds, the Franco-Scottish army lost 7,262 men, while English casualties have been estimated at sixteen hundred. The battle was considered by contemporaries to have been a victory to rank alongside Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, and it allowed for a major English push south of the Loire to enforce the Treaty of Troyes and the authority of Henry VI as king of France.

[See also Britain, *subentries on* Narrative (1300–1500) and Historiography (1300–1500).]

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David Grummitt

VERSINIKIA, BATTLE OF

In this conflict, the Bulgars defeated Byzantine forces under Emperor Michael I in June 813. Impatience and indiscipline were rife among the imperial forces. The *strategos* (general) of Macedonia, John Aplakes, commanded one of the two wings with contingents from Thrace and Macedonia. The emperor commanded the center, with the imperial guards and the Thrakesion and Opsikion divisions; Leo, commander of the Anatolikon region, led the other wing that included his own troops and those of Cappadocia. There are no clear figures for the actual numbers involved. Although initially successful in his attack, Aplakes was not supported by the rest of the army, and the center and remaining wing stood and watched as his forces began to meet stiffer resistance from the Bulgar center, which, observing the lack of movement of the opposing forces, rallied to the support of the troops on their flank. At this point, the troops on the other Roman imperial wing, those from the Anatolikon *theme* (military district) most prominently, under their leader, the general Leo, suddenly began to withdraw, leaving

the field of battle in some disorder, a development that then caused the center divisions to lose heart. As these watched the massacre of Aplakes' division below them and the fleeing troops on their other wing, they too broke and abandoned their positions, leaving the emperor and his entourage to make their way in haste back toward Constantinople as best they could. The remaining units of the imperial army thereafter dissolved, and substantial losses were inflicted by the pursuing Bulgar troops. Losses were less than they might have been because the Bulgars were also tired from the long confrontation and because they were fully engaged in collecting the vast quantities of abandoned weapons and armor cast aside by the panicking imperial forces.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry on* Narrative (500–900).]

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John Haldon

VIDIN, SIEGE OF

Vidin (known in medieval times as Bodin, Bdin, and Bodony, and later as the fortress of Baba Vida), located at the great bend of the Danube River after the Iron Gate pass, was a strong border fortress, guarding an important ford. The earliest medieval wall, built in the tenth century, partly overlapped the Roman fortress of Bononia. The present quadrangular layout of the castle, defended by two concentric walls, displays the stages of its construction in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the Ottoman period (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). In fact, only the inner fortress dates to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It covers an area of about 53,820 square feet (5,000 square meters) and has nine quadrangular multistoried towers. The fortress was surrounded by a ditch full of water from the Danube, crossed by means of a wooden bridge.

That was approximately the appearance of Vidin at the time of the Hungarian siege of 1365.

The Hungarians knew the fortress quite well, since they had attacked it repeatedly in the thirteenth century because of its strategic location. By the time of the siege, Vidin was the center of the autonomous Bulgarian principality under Ivan Sratsimir, a son of the Bulgarian czar Ivan Alexander (r. 1331–1371). Ivan Sratsimir refused to become a Hungarian vassal, which resulted in an immediate Hungarian incursion.

On 16 May 1365, the royal army under the command of Louis (Lajos) I of Anjou started from Hungary, crossed the Danube through the Iron Gate near Orșova, and entered the territory of Vidin principality. After capturing a number of settlements and fortresses, the Hungarian troops marched to Vidin. Near the city walls they engaged in battle with a detachment of Iasians (Muslims of Iranian origin), routed them, and forced them to retreat into the fortress.

On 30 May 1365, the major part of the Hungarian army, led by the king himself, started the siege of Vidin. The city was captured after a single assault on 2 June. The only details for that rather short siege are provided by the poem of the troubadour Peter Suchenwirt dedicated to one of the participants in the campaign, the count Ulrich von Cilli (Ulrich of Celje). According to it, a great number of troops were lost in the course of the siege and the assault on Vidin. Indirect evidence for the serious efforts made for the capture of the city is provided by the royal charters granting landed estates to a number of Hungarian aristocrats who contributed to the victory.

After the capture of Vidin, the garrison and Ivan Sratsimir with his family were taken prisoner. The Hungarians continued their campaign and occupied the entire principality. When Lajos I returned to Buda at the beginning of July, Ivan Sratsimir and his family were brought to the fortress of Humnik on the territory of the Bishopric of Zagreb and spent four years there as captives. In 1369, Ivan Sratsimir was restored to his throne by Lajos I of Hungary, but he had to acknowledge effective Hungarian overlordship.

[See also Hungary, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1526), and Louis I of Hungary.]

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Rossina Kostova

VIGNOLLES, ÉTIENNE DE

See La Hire.

VIKINGS

"Vikings" is the usual generic term given today to all Scandinavians of the Viking Age, that is, the period between 793 (marked by the first recorded attack on the Benedictine monastery on Lindisfarne, Northumbria, mentioned in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle) and 1066 (battle at Stamford Bridge), although the original Old Norse *vikingr* simply meant "pirate" throughout the Middle Ages. The Carolingian, English, and Irish Latin sources called them pirates, heathens, and, more specifically after their origin, Northmanni and Dani.

The Scandinavians became notorious through their military incursions into England, and Northern Ireland as well as the Scottish Isles, but also into the Frankish empire of the Carolingians, following the long-established Scandinavian trading routes along the major rivers (Rhine, Maas, Seine, Loire). It is still a matter of debate whether these Viking attacks were the private enterprises of so-called sea-kings, who were basically gang leaders with small fleets, or whether the Danish royal struggle for succession and their ensuing military activity against the mighty Carolingian neighbor represented the cause for the main incursions into the empire.

Other reasons for the outbreak of the Viking Age already considered by medieval authors included the exceptional virility of Scandinavian men that was

responsible for a surplus of unprovided-for children, and also the poverty of Norway due to climatic deterioration; modern research, however, has not been able to substantiate these explanations. Today the outbreak of the Viking Age is seen as triggered not by a single factor, but rather by a bundle of reasons. These include Scandinavian inheritance laws (which favored the eldest sons); the political situation with the Carolingian empire exerting increasing pressure on its Scandinavian neighbors; the relatively recent development of an efficient rig for the ships as well as the excellent knowledge the Scandinavians had of the economic situations in the south due to long-standing economic contacts; and the by-no-means-new tradition of piracy around the North Sea. This led, toward the end of the eighth century, to a dramatic change in the long-standing trade relations between Scandinavia, the continent, and England, leading to two centuries of military struggle around the North Sea.

However, the Scandinavian attacks on the Atlantic seaboard were only one part of the Scandinavian expansion of the ninth and tenth centuries. Just as momentous—and certainly of greater historical permanence—was the settlement of the North Atlantic isles. Of these, the settlements on the islands around Scotland, in the Hebrides, and Orkney, seem to have had a minor military aspect, while the settlement on the Shetlands, Faroes, and Iceland as well as Greenland was mainly a peaceful affair.

The third direction of the Viking Age expansion movement was that of the Swedes in eastern Europe. They called themselves Varangians but came to be known as Rus' by the Greeks and Arabs and thus gave both name as well as political foundation to today's Russia. This movement east, carried out mainly by the Swedes, seems to have been dominated by trade, most likely a profitable slave trade that resulted in the small Scandinavian economic elite in the area of today's Russia and Ukraine gaining political power, resulting in the Scandinavian dukedom of Kiev in the Rus' area.


Even though the emerging Kiev empire launched repeated but ineffective attacks on Byzantium, and the Greenlanders (on their discovery of America on

and around Newfoundland) may have indeed had skirmishes with the indigenous population, the military action of the Viking period was mainly limited to England, Ireland, and Francia.

The military success of the Vikings in western Europe, although no doubt partly exaggerated by the (clerical) chroniclers of the Western kingdoms, had two reasons only: a number of simple, but efficient strategies on the one hand and the striking superiority of the Viking ships over any possible waterborne resistance on the other. Apart from the ships, there is no noticeable technical advantage of Scandinavian weaponry.

The Viking ship, of whatever type (not just the large royal dragon ships and other warships that formed part of the organized *leiðangr* [naval militia] in the Nordic countries) were equipped both for sailing and rowing and capable not only of relatively high speed due to their favorable length-width ratio, but due to the development of a long keel and an efficient way of handling the single square-rigged sail were also able to tack against the wind and thus were partly independent of the current wind direction. The ships known to the Carolingians, Frisian, and English at the outset of the Viking Age, however, were either flat-bottomed inland river craft (of the Prahm type), or else round-bottomed freight ships for coastal and inland use, incapable of either high speed or efficient use of a sail. Thus, whatever craft was mustered to fight the Vikings on water was disastrously inferior to the Scandinavian double-ended type vessel. Only within Scandinavia did the institution of the *leiðangr* result in a systematic naval policy with relatively standardized sizes and classes of warships.

Viking strategies were simple yet effective. The most obvious of these strategies was the element of surprise afforded by their superior boat speed, which remained instrumental to their successes despite the tendency to use terrestrial navigation and thus sailing routes within sight of the coasts. As mentioned, supremacy at sea due to their ships and their navigational experience was the only technical advantage they held over the neighboring peoples of the south; otherwise, both offensive and



Viking Ax. The Mammen ax might have served as a small throwing ax, tenth century. NATIONALMUSEET, COPENHAGEN, DENMARK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

defensive weapons were of very similar design and often inferior in quality to weapons produced along the Rhine, let alone to those imported from the Near East. Therefore, many of the surviving Scandinavian swords of the Viking Age are actually of Rhenian provenience as far as the blade is concerned. The axes differ in size and shape from the Frankish weapons as the latter were mainly intended for throwing, while the broader Scandinavian type was used as a striking weapon.

The second and highly efficient Viking strategy was the systematic use of islands, both as the aim of attacks (as relief for their victims was thus delayed) and as bases for future operations. On the continental rivers, there are repeated reports of stalemates between superior armies on the riverbanks and much smaller Viking units encamped on river islands.

Another strategy instrumental for Viking success was the avoidance of open battles with superior forces, relying instead on the mobility of their ships to plunder and attack elsewhere, preferably without opposition. There is some evidence that Viking

forces on the continent were not very successful in pitched battles, but considering their small numbers this is hardly surprising and may also have been exaggerated by official Frankish annalists. In England, on the other hand, the *micil here* ("great army") seems to have been extremely successful even in land battles.


The most effective fund-raising strategy of the Vikings, however, remained a combination of extorting large sums of ransom money in promise for peace and the mutual playing-off of adversaries. Thus, Viking armies operating in ninth-century Francia regularly took money both from Carolingian rulers for withdrawing and for protecting their territories against other Viking raiders, as well as accepting payment from these raiders for not defending the same territories. This strategy led, even at the very end of the Viking period, to the rapid establishment of the Norman kingdom in southern Italy, where a very small group of Norman knights pitted the Holy Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and the Italian city-states against each other in order to make territorial gains, which they managed to

consolidate into their own kingdom in Calabria from where Sicily was successfully conquered.

Yet another Viking strategy, which seems to have been highly effective, was the deliberate spreading of terror among their adversaries, thus creating an artificial aura of invincibility that stood in stark contrast with the actual numbers of Vikings operating abroad. It has been pointed out that even the *micil here*, the "great army" operating in Britain between 865 and 892, would not have amounted to much more than one to two thousand fighting men. Similarly, reports by continental chroniclers about Viking fleets of sixty or even one hundred or two hundred vessels sailing up the rivers must have been grossly exaggerated, but give us an impression of the fear of the victims. Also the Vikings themselves seem to have deliberately furthered their reputation by taking drastic measures of mutilation and killing hostages if the terms agreed on were not fully upheld by the other parties. It is thus not without reason that the famous entry on 793 in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle ranks the Vikings among natural

disasters such as storms and comets—and this not only for religious reasons.

Although there is, in Old Norse, a detailed description of weapons (in the *King's Mirror*), fighting techniques, and even siege weaponry, most of this (apart from some very general remarks) has turned out to be a translation from a classical source (Vegetius) and is thus of no value for even the late Viking Age. We are therefore limited to descriptions of fighting and battle techniques from historiographies and narratives, but these were also composed only in the thirteenth century and as such present us with an anachronistic, at the best a romanticized picture of Viking Age warfare, even though some techniques (e.g., naval battles) may not have changed greatly from the tenth/eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, although others (e.g., mounted combat) may have. Only occasionally do we get glimpses of Viking behavior in contemporary continental and insular sources, such as when it is repeatedly stated the Vikings used to shout and rattle their quivers at the opening of battles, but this, just as the ritualized



Viking Ship. Detail of a picture stone from the Isle of Gotland, ninth century. HISTORISKA MUSEET, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

exchange of insults, was not limited to the Vikings within the Germanic world. The famous "boar snout" as a wedge-shaped battle formation is mentioned only in Scandinavian sources and is not testified to by foreign chroniclers.

It would be totally wrong to see the confrontations between the Scandinavians and the remainder of western Europe as a religious struggle between the Germanic polytheism of the north and the advancing Christianity. Even though many of the early raids in Ireland, Britain, and the continent were directed against monastic establishment and also affected the churches within towns, this was mainly due to the fact that these were easy and unprotected targets on the one hand and very profitable sources for both objects of precious metals and much sought-after wine. Despite the ongoing confrontations, many delegations, particularly from Denmark, sought out the kings of the Holy Roman Empire during the ninth and tenth centuries, resulting in the baptism of many Scandinavian notables. In due course, this led to the conversion of King Harald Bluetooth in c.965 and the subsequent Christianization of all Denmark. Norwegian kings, too, were already converted to Christianity in the course of the tenth century, and only the Western Norwegian line of the Earls of Hlaðir put up an ostensive resistance to Christianity, mainly for political reasons, as it was against their interests to have Norway united under a single, central, and Christian king. Thus, the Viking Age should be seen as a period of change, as well as the coexistence of Germanic (and Slavonic) polytheism and Christianity.

[See also Christianity; Naval Combat and Tactics; Pagans; Scandinavia; and Ships and Sailing.]

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Rudolf Simek

VILLEHARDOUIN, GEOFFROI DE

(c. 1150–c. 1215), French nobleman. Geoffroi de Villehardouin was author of *The Conquest of Constantinople*, an eyewitness account of the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) and campaigns fought to establish the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1207). A prominent participant in the Fourth Crusade, he was "present at all the councils" that determined its controversial course; rather than fighting Muslims and aiding the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem as originally intended, this crusade resulted in the conquest of Constantinople from its Greek Christian rulers. Written by an experienced soldier and well-informed insider, *The Conquest* is of special value for the access it provides to the inner workings of a crusading army.

Villehardouin was a seasoned military official before he took the cross in 1199. Marshal of Champagne since 1185, he was a central figure in the county's administration and military affairs. When envoys were appointed to negotiate a contract for the crusade fleet, he was a natural choice; Villehardouin himself presented the crusaders' case in order to secure an agreement from the Venetians. He would continue to act as envoy and spokesman for the crusade throughout its troubled course. After the fall of Constantinople, Villehardouin was appointed marshal of the new Latin Empire, reconfirming his status as an expert soldier. There is no evidence he ever returned to Champagne, but through *The Conquest* (dictation of which probably began in late 1207 or 1208), he was able to inform his

fellow French speakers of the remarkable events he had witnessed.

Some caution is required when reading Villehardouin's work for an understanding of why the Fourth Crusade unfolded as it did. It is generally no longer believed that the leadership of the crusade was complicit in a plot to topple the Byzantine Empire and that *The Conquest* is its propagandist cover-up. But Villehardouin was clearly partisan. His central role in the crusade, particularly in negotiating the initial treaty with Venice, gave him good reason to present events in the most positive light possible. (This treaty was, arguably, the source of the Fourth Crusade's later difficulties: fewer crusaders joined the army at Venice than had been anticipated, and the leaders therefore could not meet their financial obligations. In order to pay their debts and fund a continuing campaign, they agreed to assist in the Venetian reconquest of the Christian city of Zara [Zadar], and then to a diversion of the crusade to Constantinople). Villehardouin glossed over or did not mention things that might reflect badly on the crusaders. But in understanding how the crusade functioned militarily, Villehardouin's insider status makes his work invaluable. However, unfortunately, he offers little comment on the experiences of the lower ranks.

Villehardouin is extremely reliable on points of detail. The accuracy with which he reported the terms of treaties agreed by the crusaders suggests that he may have made use of documents or his own notes as he composed *The Conquest*, although this cannot be proved. In Villehardouin's role as marshal he had mustered armies, and it has been said that this experience lends greater credibility to his assessments of the size of armies and other groups. A marshal's interest in knowing his forces and how they should be disposed shows in the precision with which he listed participants of the crusade and the contingents and battle orders designated for their deployment.

Villehardouin's descriptions of complex military engagements are admirable, providing a comprehensible overview of what took place and illustrating finer points. His account of the first siege of

Constantinople in 1203, for example, describes clearly the preparation and execution of an assault that took place by land and sea simultaneously, managing to give many details (including the use of engines and improvised camp defenses, provisioning difficulties, the organization of landing craft, and individual feats of arms) in the process. If there is anything missing from his description of the siege, it is Villehardouin himself; he did not report where he was or what he did, and the same is true of other engagements in the course of the crusade.

Villehardouin does appear as a military commander in his account of events after the initiation of Latin rule in Constantinople. He displayed calm decisiveness and sound judgment at the battle of Adrianople in April 1205. When the leaders of the army recklessly abandoned the agreed plan of battle and many combatants were killed or captured, Villehardouin took the initiative to gather up the fleeing survivors and made a plan for leading them away safely. He oversaw their lengthy retreat, ensuring their protection and offering reassurance on the way.

Events at Adrianople showed what could happen when group cohesion and steadfastness were abandoned in favor of individual ambition and vainglory. *The Conquest* ends with a report of the "grievous misfortune" of the death of Villehardouin's friend, Boniface of Montferrat, whose men abandoned him in battle. The martial values Villehardouin espoused in these episodes—loyalty, courage, knightly unity—recur throughout *The Conquest* and indicate its value as an account of the medieval military mindset as well as of events.

[See also Adrianople, Battle of (1205) and Crusades, subentry on Narrative (1180-1245).]

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Caroline Smith

VIMINACIUM, BATTLE OF

The fortress of Viminacium (524 × 426 feet [160 × 130 meters]) was built in the 540s between the Mlava and Danube rivers, in front of an island that today is called Ostrovo. It replaced the early Roman legionary camp on the opposite bank of Mlava, which had been destroyed by the Huns in 441. The location, at a short distance from the Margus (Morava) valley—a major route across the Balkan peninsula open to inroads from Pannonia—had a high strategic value. Conquered by the Avars in 584, recovered in 587, and conquered again by the Avars in 593, Viminacium remained a departure point for military operations in the Byzantine-Avar wars, such as those conducted in 596 by general Priscus toward Singidunum (Belgrade). In the summer of 599, a powerful strategic offensive led by Priscus aimed to expel the Avars from the Danube sector, which controlled the route to Constantinople. An expeditionary corps marched from Singidunum to the Viminacium island and landed on the northern bank of the Danube. According to the chronicler Theophylaktos Simokattes, the bridgehead camp was easily established after a battle with the Avars, who tried to defend the shore.

After ten days of clashes, which strengthened the position of his army in the enemy field, Priscus lured the Avars into a position between the Byzantine flanks. Because the Byzantine troops were deployed on higher ground and had the wind behind them, the speed of the Avars' arrows was diminished, giving a tactical advantage to the Byzantine forces. The Byzantine forces chased the surrounded Avars toward a lake, where many of them drowned, including the sons of their supreme ruler, the *qagan*; their total casualties were fifteen thousand. The following

Byzantine offensive over the Tisza (Timiș) River resulted in a major victory in which thousands of prisoners were taken. The military operations begun with the victory at Viminacium changed the course of the Byzantine-Avar wars of the Byzantine emperor Maurice.

[See also *Danube Fortifications and Maurice*.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

VISBY, BATTLE OF

The city of Visby on Gotland (the largest island in the Baltic Sea) was an autonomous peasant republic under the suzerainty of the king of Sweden. Upon being acknowledged as king of Denmark (1340), Valdemar IV Atterdag engaged in diplomatic and military campaigns to recover and expand Danish provinces. Among his objectives was Gotland and its strategic access to Swedish east-coast maritime routes.

On 22 July 1361, King Valdemar sent an army to Gotland. Little is known about the events of the campaign. Peasant levies lost three battles trying to stop the Danish army, which moved quickly toward Visby. On 27 July, levies of peasants and citizens met the Danish army outside Visby, with disastrous consequences. The confrontation was not a battle but a one-sided slaughter. An estimated eighteen hundred defenders were killed—a large proportion of the small number of warriors who could have taken part in the battle—while Danish casualties were minimal, though their exact numbers are unknown.

After the battle, Visby capitulated and had to pay heavy tributes to Valdemar IV.

While the battle of Visby is an important event in the history of the island of Gotland, the events that directly followed the fighting have led to gruesome yet significant discoveries by modern historians. Once the battle was over, the overwhelming number of bodies left on the battlefield, combined with the hot weather and fear of an epidemic, forced the victors to hastily bury the dead in mass graves without taking the time to strip them of their equipment and armor. In 1905, five mass graves were discovered outside the city at a site marked by a memorial cross. Two more mass graves were discovered in 1909 and 1928. Archaeological digs conducted between 1905 and 1912, and later in 1928, famously by Bengt Thordeman, led to discoveries about military equipment, the composition of the army defending Visby, and the nature of injuries and wounds inflicted during the battle. From the approximately eighteen hundred unearthed bodies, historians learned that about a third of the army defending Visby was composed of elderly men, young boys, and women. The defense of Visby was a desperate affair, and every able body was needed to fill the ranks. Digs have also shown that most of the peasant defenders of the city were equipped for war. Although their equipment was archaic, the army that took the field was not one of unarmed men. Coats of mail, coats of plate, and full suits of armor were retrieved from the graves in remarkably good condition. Skeletons retrieved from the mass graves were a good source for the study of battlefield injuries; they bore the marks of ferocious cuts and mutilations, sometimes inflicted after the combatant was killed.

Although contemporary sources do not allow a reconstruction of the battle or a study of its strategic features, the discovery of the mass graves has led to a greater understanding of the battle of Visby and of the ferocity of the medieval battlefield.

[*See also* *Armor, Body, and Battlefield Archaeology*.]

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Matthieu Chan Tsin

VISCONTI, GIANGALEAZZO

(1351–1402), Duke of Milan from 1385 until his death in 1402. During this period, he waged frequent hegemonic wars and significantly expanded the size of his state.

Giangaleazzo assumed leadership of the western half of the Milanese state in 1378, when his father, Galeazzo, Lord of Pavia, died. He gained control of the rest of the Visconti domain in 1385 when, under the pretense of pilgrimage to the shrine of the Madonna del Monte at Varese, he seized and imprisoned his uncle Bernabò in a local fortress at Trezzo near the Adda River. Bernabò died there, probably poisoned. In addition, Giangaleazzo possessed the title of Conte de Vertus of the Champagne region of France, which he gained from his marriage to Isabelle of Valois, daughter of King John II of France, in 1360.

Although described by contemporaries as a shy and studious man, Giangaleazzo is nevertheless best known for his aggressive and devious expansion policies, which apparently included the desire to seize all of northern and central Italy. Visconti preferred to do this where possible by means of diplomacy and subterfuge, rather than by direct engagement on the battlefield, which he saw as uncertain and risky. Nevertheless, Giangaleazzo constantly had armies in the field and distinguished himself from his contemporaries by relying on an established set of mercenary captains, whom he retained for the long term. The group included, among others, Jacopo dal Verme, Ottobuono Terzi, Facino Cane, and Ugolotto Biancardi, all of whom served Visconti well.

After deposing his uncle in 1385, Giangaleazzo moved quickly to take much of eastern Lombardy. In 1387, he defeated the della Scala family and captured the cities of Verona and Vicenza. He moved against Padua the next year and made covert attempts southward, against Bologna and Tuscany, forming an alliance with Siena in 1389. The actions led to war

in 1390–1392 with Florence, the economic leader of Tuscany, which allied with Bologna and much of northern Italy. The conflict, depicted by contemporary writers and modern historians as one of liberty (Florence) against tyranny (Milan), was broad and destructive but ultimately inconclusive.

After the truce, Visconti returned to his hegemonic ways, making both covert and overt attempts to destabilize governments in northern and central Italy. In 1395, Giangaleazzo purchased the title of duke from Wenceslas, the king of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor. The next year he initiated an assault on Mantua, which involved simultaneous land and river operations. The Mantuan campaign ended unsuccessfully in 1398. A year later, however, Giangaleazzo managed to consolidate his hold on Siena and Pisa and launched a full-scale assault on Bologna and Florence. Visconti's stunning victory at Casalecchio in 1402 gained him control of Bologna, leaving Florence isolated and defenseless, but at the point of his greatest victory, Giangaleazzo died, perhaps of plague or Florentine poison.

The impetus of the attack thus ended, Giangaleazzo's armies retreated. The following years witnessed an uneasy interregnum, in which Giangaleazzo's mercenary captains played a leading role in civic affairs.

[See also Brescia, Fight near (1401); Cane, Facino; Italy, subentry on Narrative (1300–1493); and Verme, Jacopo dal.]

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William Caferro

VISÉ, BATTLE OF

At the beginning of 1106 the nineteen-year-old German king Henry V seemed to have prevailed over his father, the Roman emperor Henry IV, in

their struggle for power. After his fall from power Henry IV fled to the city of Liège, where he was given a friendly reception by Bishop Otbert and the townsfolk. Members of the higher nobility of the duchy of Lower Lotharingia also adjourned to that city to support the old emperor. To cast out his father from his remaining center of power, Henry V called a meeting of the German princes at Liège at Easter. He himself went to Aachen, some 32 miles (50 kilometers) northeast of his father's location.

We can say little about the size of Henry V's army. The chronicler Ekkehard of Aura speaks of three hundred (mounted, as other sources imply) combatants, whom the king sent ahead, on 22 March 1106, to guard the bridge over the river Maas. Because the emperor's supporters had destroyed or blocked all other means of crossing the river, this bridge, situated to the west of the village of Visé, was the only way for Henry V's army to reach the left bank and from there turn southward to Liège. We do not know when the imperial party realized that the king's vanguard had reached the bridge. It may have been after the latter had already occupied Visé or even the bridge itself; alternatively, as the anonymous author of the *Life of the Emperor Henry IV* suggests, some of Henry IV's men may have awaited their opponents on the bridge while others prepared an ambush on the left bank. Also unknown is the identity of the commander of the king's forces; it may have been a certain Count Bruno, who lost his life during combat. On the other side, the emperor's followers were led by Henry, Duke of Lower Lotharingia; Walram, his son; and Count Godfrey of Namur. Thus neither the emperor nor the king was present during the fight. Using a tactical retreat, the supporters of Henry IV lured Henry V's advance guard over the bridge to fight on the wide plain on the left bank. There the Lotharingians managed to surround their enemies. Most of the latter were captured or killed, either in combat or when they tried to flee the battlefield; many drowned in the river Maas, pulled under by their heavy arms and armor.

King Henry V's main host at Aachen was not very numerous, so he did not attempt another attack after the defeat of his vanguard at Visé. Instead he left

the city. His military position in Lower Lotharingia was so weakened that the citizens of Cologne refused him access to their town. The king mustered a new army to return and besiege the rebellious city, but without success. Meanwhile his father remained at Liège, where he died on 7 August.

[See also Henry IV, Emperor, and Henry V, Emperor.]

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Martin Völkl

VITALIAN

(c. 470–521), Roman leader. Vitalian was born at Zaldapa (Abrit, Bulgaria), the son of Patriciolus, a Roman commander. The severe financial policy of the emperor Anastasios and his support for the Monophysites led to the rebellion of Vitalian, the Roman commander (*comes*) of the Bulgarian, Hunnish, and Gothic mercenaries (*foederati*) from the Thracian dioceses, whose payment was stopped in 513 by Hypatios, the commander of his army corps. The army that marched toward Constantinople under the command of Vitalian numbered about fifty to sixty thousand, including civilians allegedly disturbed by the religious and taxation policies of the emperor. The rebels advanced to the suburbs of Constantinople, but Vitalian agreed to retreat because he trusted the promises made by the field-army commander Patricius on behalf of the emperor. Anastasios gained some time, but the war continued in the south of Scythia in 514, where Vitalian

defeated the army of Cyrillus, the commander of the army of the Thracian diocese, who was killed.

The war was resumed in 514 in the east of Moesia Secunda, with major victories by Vitalian at Odessus (Varna) and Akres (Kaliakra, where the rebels made use of a camp surrounded by chariots) against the army of eighty thousand soldiers commanded by Hypatios, the new commander of Thrace. The army of Vitalian, which included Huns ruled by Tarrach and Ostrogoths sent by Theodoric the Great, then marched toward Constantinople. At the same time, a fleet sailed from the harbors of Scythia and Moesia Secunda. The rebels camped at Sosthenium, north of the Theodosian Great Wall of Constantinople. After eight days, Vitalian accepted a truce. He was appointed *magister militum per Thraciam*, but he later resumed the fight when he was replaced by Rufinus.

In the third offensive (autumn of 515), the field army of the rebels started a new siege near the capital at Sycae (Galata). However, the entire fleet was burned at the mouth of Golden Horn with a new weapon, the first form of the Greek fire, launched by the troops of Marinus, the prefect of the city. Vitalian took refuge at Anchialos, where he continued to exert some control over the Thracian provinces.

According to most sources, Vitalian intended to replace Anastasios. The unrest ceased after the emperor's death. The events are important, especially because they led to the first siege of Constantinople; they also demonstrated the danger posed by the provincial armies. In 519, Justinian I (518–527), the next emperor, appointed Vitalian *magister militum praesentalis* (commander of the field army), but Justinian, who feared that Vitalian would be a rival, killed him in July 521.

[See also Greek Fire and Justinian I.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

VITELLESCHI, GIOVANNI

churchman and soldier, (1395?–1440). Giovanni Vitelleschi came from a family prominent in Corneto (now Tarquinia) in Lazio, in the Papal States. Possibly an illegitimate son, he entered the church and acquired a degree in canon law at Bologna. By 1417 he had entered the service of the condottiere Tartaglia di Lavello before joining that of the papacy; in 1420 Martin V (1417–1431) appointed him protonotary and then castellan of Bologna, and later used him as his representative in Florence. He became close to Eugenius IV (1441–1447), who promoted him to bishop of Recanati and Macerata (1431), patriarch of Alexandria (1435), archbishop of Florence (1435), and, finally, to cardinal (1437).

His rise in the church, however, was due more to military and political ability than to religiosity. He directed most of his energy to attacking forces opposed to the recovery of papal authority in Rome and the Papal States. He was not always successful. In the Marche he was thwarted by the condottiere Francesco Sforza. Campaigns in the Kingdom of Naples—a papal fief—on behalf of the Angevins ended in failure, though he almost captured the rival claimant Alfonso of Aragon (Alfonso V of Aragon) in 1438.

Otherwise Vitelleschi was remarkably successful. He suppressed a Roman revolt in 1434 and pursued its ringleaders. He overthrew and executed a powerful "tyrant" in the Roman hinterland, Jacopo di Vico, prefect of Rome (1435). In 1436, he turned his attention to breaking the power of the Roman Colonna family, a successful campaign that ended in a triumphal procession through Rome. In 1439, his armies defeated Corrado Trinci, lord of Foligno in the papal province of Umbria; Corrado and most of his family were executed in prison.

On 12 September 1436, the Roman Senate decreed that an equestrian statue of Vitelleschi be erected

on the capitol, hailing him as the "third father of Rome after Romulus." This resolution was never implemented, and on 19 March 1440 the cardinal was ambushed outside the Castel Sant'Angelo in Rome, and died soon after from his wounds. Why the reversal in fortune? One explanation is that he used his success to promote himself, converting an accumulation of older buildings in Corneto into a palace. He also advanced his family, and the interests of Corneto and its citizens.

However the main reason for his fall may lie in his "Roman" policies, at a time when the pope was resident in Florence and under Medici influence. The forces Vitelleschi had under his control were focused on securing Rome and the Papal States, and he did not redirect them against the Visconti in the north, a cause that was of greater concern to Florence and the Medici. Francesco Sforza—an earlier adversary—was involved in that northern war and allied to the Medici; Sforza's family and the Medici also had ties with the Trinci whose regime in Foligno Vitelleschi had destroyed in 1439. The cardinal did not attend the papal court in Florence, and some contemporaries suggested that the pope and his cardinals were afraid to return to Rome because of his influence there, and his own papal ambitions.

Whatever the reasons for his fall, Giovanni Vitelleschi acquired a posthumous reputation as a ruthless champion of the church. Later, he was perceived as a precursor of Cesare Borgia and as encouraging an unrelenting attitude towards the church's enemies.

[See also Italy, *subentry on Narrative* (1300–1493).]

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John Law

VLAARDINGEN, BATTLE OF

Dirk III (r. 993–1039), Count of Holland, controlled Vlaardingen, a Frisian village located at the mouth of the Merwede. He grew rich by stopping ships and imposing heavy taxes on them. The excessive taxation caused great suffering for the merchants of Tiel, who beseeched the emperor Henry II to intervene. He organized a military expedition and entrusted the command of the imperial forces to Godfrey I (r. 1012–1023), Duke of Lower Lotharingia, and to Adalbold (r. 1010–1026), Bishop of Utrecht.

The imperial army disembarked at Vlaardingen on 29 July 1018. The Frisians surrendered the village and sought refuge in the marshy grounds, while Dirk and his men withdrew into a small fortified place. The invaders razed Vlaardingen before laying siege to the stronghold. In order to defend against a counterattack while besieging the fortification, the imperial army went in the marshy grounds to attack the Frisians. During the maneuver, a traitor present in the rear guard spread a rumor that the vanguard had been routed. This disinformation caused a mass panic among the soldiers. Witnessing the confusion in the imperial ranks, Dirk and his men launched their attack. Invaders who were not cut down drowned while attempting to flee in their boats. The number of victims amounted to approximately nine hundred. During the battle, Godfrey was captured; however, Adalbold was able to flee. The humiliation and loss of life were such that the emperor refused to send a second expedition.

[See also Henry II, Emperor.]

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Sergio Boffa

VLACHS

The name “Vlach”—derived from the Celtic word *Walh*, meaning “shepherd”—refers to population groups in southeastern Europe during the Middle Ages. “Vlach” was first mentioned in 976 in the region of Prespa in southern Macedonia. Thereafter sources localize separate Vlach groups in Thessaly, around Chalkidiki, along the river Morava, in the western parts of the Dinar Mountains, in the Balkan range, in the Carpathians, and elsewhere. In the early Middle Ages the largest concentration of Vlachs was in Thessaly, also called Great Walachia. Vlachs were organized in clan units called *katuns* (cantons). In the summer they took their herds to alpine pastures, and in the winter they went down to the river valleys or seashore.

Historical sources contain very limited information about the participation of Vlachs in the military campaigns of various Balkan states and rulers. Usually they are described as light infantry. Vlach infantrymen who first fought against and then fought under the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444–1446 and 1451–1481)—including during a siege of Constantinople—were regarded as high-quality troops. Vlach units in the Ottoman army continued to be mentioned even after the fifteenth century.

The origin and ethnic affiliation of Vlachs are among the enigmas of the Balkan Middle Ages, subject to prolonged and heated discussion. According to some, they were the descendants of Romanized and Christianized pre-Slav Balkan peoples who, during the incursions of the sixth and seventh centuries, withdrew to the mountains and were preserved as an ethnic group speaking barbarized Latin. Other scholars refer to a series of sources according to which the collective name “Vlachs” essentially means “transhuman shepherds,” regardless of ethnic and linguistic background. A Walachian principality emerged at the beginning of the fourteenth century; its first ruler (voivode) was Basarab I (r. c. 1310–1352).

[See also Isaac II Angelos; Romanian Principalities; and Walachia, Battle in.]

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Christo Matanov

VLAD ȚEPEȘ

(1431–1476), Prince of Walachia, Romanian ruler. A member of the Dracula branch of the Basaraba dynasty and the third son of Vlad II Dracul, a member of the Ordo Draconis (Order of the Dragon), Vlad III Dracula—known as Vlad Țepeș ("the Impaler")—was an exceptionally cruel and capricious man, a staunch fighter in the anti-Ottoman struggle, and voivode (prince) of Walachia in 1448, 1456–1462, and 1476. Between these periods he mainly lived in exile in Moldova and Hungary. His first reign, in 1448, corresponded to the absence of the voivode Vladislav II, the rightful ruler of Walachia, who was engaged in the campaign of János Hunyadi in 1448 against the Ottomans. Vlad's second reign started shortly after the Ottomans' great defeat at Belgrade in 1456. In August, aided by Hungarian military units, he took control of Walachia. Vladislav II having been killed on 20 August. In the period that followed, his main aim was to strengthen his position among the Walachian nobility (the boyars) to guarantee security in the nation, as well as to ensure as much independence as possible against Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. He established a good relationship with the Hungarian king Mátyás Hunyadi but entered into a serious conflict with the Saxon towns of Transylvania that were interested in transit commerce with the territory of Walachia.

After 1459, Vlad Țepeș refused to pay further tribute to the Ottomans, a situation that ended with the great campaign of Mehmed II in 1462. According to Petrus de Thomasiis, the sultan assembled an army of about sixty thousand soldiers and attacked Walachia from the south by land and from the east by water. Vlad retreated, destroying all the supplies that might have aided the Ottomans. He also unexpectedly attacked invading troops in search of food and water. The night attack of 16–17 June led to the sultan's chaotic retreat, rendering a decisive victory for Vlad's forces. In Walachia the sultan left behind Vlad III's older brother, Radu cel Frumos ("the Handsome"), who obtained the support of the boyars and assumed the throne. Vlad Țepeș retreated to Transylvania, waiting for the help of King Mátyás, but the monarch, influenced by the Saxon towns, decided to arrest him. After twelve years the Hungarian king agreed to send him back to Walachia, but two years later, in 1476, Vlad Țepeș was defeated and murdered by the prince in power at the time, Laiotă Basarab.

[See also Boyars; Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526); Hunyadi, János; Hunyadi, Mátyás; Romanian Principalities; and Vlachs.]

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Radu Lupescu

VOLTERRA, SIEGE OF

The Tuscan city of Volterra in the fifteenth century was nominally subject to the Republic of Florence, although it had long enjoyed considerable

autonomy. Volterra became a flashpoint for conflict after the discovery of alum on territory possessed by the commune in 1470. Initially, the priors of Volterra agreed to lease the mine to a consortium of investors connected with Lorenzo Medici (r. 1469–1492), the de facto ruler in Florence. The contract proved deeply unpopular inside Volterra, and by June 1471 opponents of the Medici lease of the mine had gained a controlling majority in the government of Volterra. In February 1472 a mob assaulted and killed two members of the Medici-led alum company.

Fearing the reaction from Florence, the government in Volterra called up its militia but also sent a delegation to Lorenzo Medici, offering to restore the alum mine to his company. By this time, however, Lorenzo was determined to end the affair with force, seeing an opportunity to punish the rebellious Volterrans, enhance his own military reputation, and punish his opponents in Florence, who were using the Volterra crisis as a proxy for their own disputes with Lorenzo.

Lorenzo assembled a war committee, which budgeted one million florins for a siege, and hired the Duke of Urbino, Federico da Montefeltro, as commander. In only three weeks, an army of more than ten thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, from Florence, Milan, and the Papal States, outfitted with guns from Florentine armories, was besieging the town. Although Volterra lacked modern artillery-fortress-style fortifications, it did boast an impressive natural aspect, with thick outer walls guarding a town perched high on a hill, topped with a strong medieval citadel. But the town was diplomatically isolated and internally divided—many in the town thought it folly to oppose Florence, with only about fifteen hundred mercenaries, few guns, and the Volterranean militia providing support.

By the end of May, the besieging army had completely surrounded the town and commenced its bombardment; a section of the walls was soon brought down. The Volterrans decided to seek a negotiated surrender. Federico da Montefeltro, like all condottieri of the age, did not wish to storm the town unless absolutely necessary, and an agreement

was reached on 16 June, which included guarantees that the city would not be sacked. There was apparently, however, considerable confusion among the various parties regarding the terms of the settlement, and it is likely that many in the besieging army looked forward to a profitable sack. On 18 June a detachment of the Duke of Urbino's troops was allowed into the city to occupy the citadel. Somehow, the rest of the besiegers entered through a breach in the walls, and a merciless sack ensued, carried out not only by Federico's army and his Milanese mercenaries, but also by portions of the Volterranean population. In the tumult that followed, hundreds were massacred. Although Lorenzo publicly expressed dismay and regret over the news, it is likely that he was keen on teaching Volterra a lesson. Federico da Montefeltro claimed that he had been unable to restrain his soldiers, but there is little evidence that he sought to do so.

In the aftermath of the siege, Lorenzo exiled several dozen families from Volterra, again going back on his previous promises, and seized complete control of the alum mines. He also ordered the construction of a massive new fortress at Volterra, designed by Francione and completed in less than two years, which would reflect the latest thinking in military architecture. The new artillery fortress was designed, however, to be a symbol of Medicean control rather than communal defense.

[See also Federico da Montefeltro.]

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Paul M. Dover

VOTTEM, BATTLE OF

Since its founding in 972 the prince-bishopric of Liège, while not as populous or economically prosperous as other states, had been a vital entity in the southern Low Countries. Liège held an important geographical position between France and the Holy Roman Empire. The prince-bishops were imperial appointees, and this determined their allegiance, but the Liégeois, linguistically and culturally, were more inclined toward France. Frequently this led to differences between the principality's leaders and population, and these increased in number and violence during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The rebellion that led to the battle of Vottem originated with the appointment of Englebert de la Marck as prince-bishop on 23 February 1345. He replaced his uncle, Adolf de la Marck, who was not well liked by the Liégeois. They had rebelled against his heavy-handed rule on numerous occasions, several of which ended in battles fought between citizen militias from the major towns of the prince-bishopric—Liège, Huy, Tongeren, and Saint-Truiden—and soldiers from the prince-bishop's retinue, and those from his relatives', reinforced by German mercenaries. Yet, these more professional soldiers were not always successful. In particular, three of these battles, at Erbonne, Waremmes, and Hoesselt, all fought in 1328, forced Adolf to concede much local power to the Liégeois. Rather than recognizing these concessions, the new prince-bishop, Englebert, assembled an army. So, too, did the Liégeois.

The battle was fought north of Liège at Vottem. Details of the fighting are quite well known, with several chronicles carrying narratives of the battle, among them the lengthy accounts of Jean le Bel, Jean d'Outremeuse, Mathias von Neuenberg, the *Récits d'un bourgeois de Valenciennes*, and the *Chronique de l'abbaye de Saint-Trond*. They report that the Liégeois gathered their forces just outside the city walls of Liège on the main road from Tongeren, where Englebert de la Marck had established his court while the rebels held his cathedral city. The rebels were there for two days before the arrival of

the prince-bishop, during which time they fortified their position by digging trenches large enough to stand in.

On 18 June 1346 the two armies fought. Original accounts make the rebel army much larger than the prince-bishop's, but all of the rebel soldiers fought as infantry while most of their opponents were cavalry. Englebert ordered this cavalry into three lines and charged the Liégeois, tightly bunched in their entrenched positions. The prince-bishop's forces were confident in their ability to defeat the rebels, but their charges were disordered and confused, and the impetus soon failed. Seeing this the rebels left their trenches, formed their line, and attacked them, bringing down horses and men, whom they offered no ransom. Fifty-seven cavalry and three hundred infantry were killed, the others fleeing from the field.

The Liégeois had won their sovereignty, but it was to be short-lived. A year later, at Tourinne on 24 July 1347, the prince-bishop faced the rebels with a new army, on this occasion with an entirely different result. Liège soon fell again into Englebert de la Marck's hands and he was restored to his prince-bishopric.

[See also Jean le Bel and Low Countries, *subentry on Narrative* (1300-1479).]

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Kelly DeVries

VYŠEHRAD, SIEGE OF

After the Hussites crushed the crusade organized by King Sigismund of Luxemburg in the battle of Vítkov

(near Prague) on 14 July 1420, conflict still simmered in the Czech lands as King Sigismund sought to have his coronation recognized by the Czech Diet. The Hussite faction of the Czech nobility and the burghers strongly opposed this. Prague played a key role in this conflict as the site of vigorous discussions between the Catholic and Hussite parties. The strongly fortified "Prague towns" (Old and New Towns and the Lesser Side) supported the Hussites, but large garrisons loyal to King Sigismund held the two key fortresses: Prague Castle to the northwest and Vyšehrad upon Vltava on the southern edge of the Prague settlements. Sigismund succeeded in retaining Prague Castle even after the battle of Vítkov. Vyšehrad, the seat of the Prague Chapter and a strong fortress, then became the new target of the Hussites. The imperial Vyšehrad garrison bombarded the nearby New Town of Prague and blocked the road and the river route between Prague and the Hussite town of Tábor to the south, used to supply Prague with food and Tábor with weapons.

Many of the Hussites were already familiar with the fortifications of Vyšehrad. In the autumn of 1419, Hussite pilgrims from southwestern Bohemia had entered Prague through this fortress. Many Hussite soldiers, including the commanding general Jan Žižka of Trocnov, had abandoned Vyšehrad because they supported the reform teachings. In 1420 Žižka called for besieging Vyšehrad. The Praguers initiated the siege on 15 September, when they blocked the only access from the south. The attackers were joined by Orebite troops from east Bohemia on 4 October and by Hussites from north Bohemia and from Tábor in mid-October. As in Vítkov they built field fortifications around the castle and blocked the flow of supplies on the Vltava. The Hussite troops were commanded by the Orebite captain Hynek Krušina of Lichtenburk; the Vyšehrad garrison was

under the control of Jan Všeměra of Boskovic, upon whose request King Sigismund started gathering a relief force. However, the king failed to assemble the army quickly enough. The defenders were nearing starvation when their commander called for a truce on 28 October. He agreed to surrender the castle on 1 November at eight in the morning, with the garrison to be allowed to depart peacefully, unless King Sigismund managed to resupply the defenders by then.

Sigismund's troops arrived too late, so, in accordance with the agreement, Všeměra's men did not participate in the ensuing bloody battle between Sigismund's troops and the Hussites. The Hussites had an advantageous position, commanding the access to the castle, the slopes of the steep hills under the castle, the valley of the New Town, and the banks of the Vltava. Documentary evidence indicates that dozens of Czech nobles and five hundred others were killed on the attacking side; Hussite casualties were much lower. Vyšehrad was subsequently destroyed and plundered by Praguers. The battle of Vyšehrad paralyzed for a long time the political and military power of Sigismund's party in the Czech lands.

[See also Sigismund of Luxemburg; Slavic Lands, *subentry on Narrative* (1300–1500); and Žižka, Jan.]

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Miloslav Polívka

W

WALACHIA, BATTLE IN

Known also as the battle of Posada, the battle in Walachia was a clash between the army of the Hungarian king Charles I (Charles Robert of Anjou) and Basarab, a voivode (prince) in the region later called Walachia. The cause of the conflict is unknown. Basarab had been the vassal of Charles I and had regularly paid taxes to the king. Two trusted men of the royal court, who instigated the king's campaign against the Walachian prince, were probably behind the conflict. One of them was Dénes Szécsi, Master of the Table (1322–1341), who was keen to obtain the castle and the district of Severin (formerly Szörény), on the border of Hungary and Walachia. He was already the castellan of some nearby castles and planned to extend the region he controlled to include a larger, strategically useful territory. The other instigator was Tamás Szécsényi, Voivode of Transylvania (1321–1342), who was interested in the territory of Walachia itself. Furthermore, the king was worried about the increasingly independent foreign policy of Basarab, who took part as an ally of the Bulgarians in campaigns against the Byzantine Empire (1323) and the Serbs (1330). The latter campaign took place just before the attack of Charles I. The Hungarian intervention in Walachia was probably related to Catholic proselytism as well, as Basarab was a schismatic ruler. There were several clerics, especially

Dominicans, as well as three high-ranking provosts, in the Hungarian army.

The most accurate account of the campaign—although with some mistakes—is in the *Chronicon Pictum*. The king set off in September 1330 with a large army, of which István Lackfi, the Master of the Horse (1326–1343), was appointed leader. They first took the castle of Severin, which was granted to Dénes Szécsi. Basarab immediately sent an embassy with the following peace proposal: he agreed to pay seven thousand marks of silver, to hand over the castle of Szörény, to pay taxes to his landlord, and to send one of his sons to the royal court at his own expense. He asked the king, however, not to continue his campaign. Charles firmly declined the proposal, saying Basarab “is the shepherd of my sheep, and I shall seize him by his beard and pull him out of his lair.” During the following weeks, the Hungarian army penetrated into Walachia without gaining a victory. Basarab and his army retreated, and he laid waste the territory lying before the attackers, weakening them as much as possible. After the Hungarians had reached the castle of Argeş—probably identical with the later Curtea de Argeş—they decided, in the end, to return home through the pass of Turnu Roşu. There they encountered the Walachian warriors who blocked their way and attacked them with arrows and stones. The fight



Battle in Walachia, November 1330. Illustration from the *Illuminated Chronicle* (*Chronicon pictum*), c. 1358. National Széchényi Library Budapest.

lasted for four days (9–12 November) and turned into a massacre. Charles was able to escape only by exchanging clothes with one of his knights. After the battle, Basarab stopped paying tribute to the Hungarian king, laying the basis for a new medieval state, Walachia.

[See also Charles of Anjou and Romanian Principalities.]

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Radu Lupescu

WALLACE, WILLIAM

(c. 1270–1305), a leader of Scots resistance against the English crown. William, apparently the eldest of three brothers, was the son of Alan Wallace, probably the crown tenant in Ayrshire who submitted to Edward I in 1296. William had a seal showing a gloved hand drawing a bow with arrow and was described by an English chronicler as a man of humble origin who made his living by the bow.

A man with his name was accused as accessory to a robbery at Perth in the aftermath of the battle of Dunbar, but our William is first known for certain for killing, in about May 1297, William Heselrig, the English sheriff of Lanark, and hacking his body into pieces—a deed that suggests vengeance for an act against William's family, possibly his wife.

He turned homicide into political rebellion by seeking, unsuccessfully, the English justiciar at Scone, then went to Selkirk forest, where his band, including outlaws, multiplied. He took these to besiege Dundee, then, having joined forces with the northerner Andrew Murray, humiliated the English guardian at Stirling Bridge by destroying part of his force (11 September 1297). A month later he ravaged northern England, burning churches and a group of young scholars, and returned by late November. A later source (1440s) ascribes to him reform of army levies into groups, each with a responsible man, and of sheriffs' demands for lists of those aged sixteen to sixty for compulsory service. If this happened, it would have been in the winter of 1297/1298, when he was knighted and chosen guardian of the kingdom for King John.

In the spring of 1298 he invaded Cumbria, but withdrew in some haste when faced by an English force. In the summer he chose to fight Edward I at Falkirk on 22 July and lost. Withdrawing might have saved men but sacrificed his authority, yet his defeat did not lead to the reestablishment of

English control. He resigned as guardian and possibly rejected an offer of Edward's mercy at this time. Soon thereafter he left for France and possibly journeyed to the papal curia and the Norwegian king. He returned, perhaps in 1302 in expectation that the French would bring back King John, certainly by 1303 just before Edward's campaign brought about submission of Scotland's leaders in 1304. Wallace had only the option of surrendering to Edward's will, while those who submitted, if they tried to capture Wallace, might ameliorate their treatment.

After a last skirmish near Abernethy in September 1304, he was captured near Glasgow by men of Sir John Menteith in August 1305, and was brought to and tried in Westminster Hall. The king's accusation, denying him the right of defense, was also a conviction. For his felonies, sacrilege, and outlawry, he was hanged, disemboweled, and beheaded. His body was then quartered, and the five parts displayed in five towns.

Wallace remained a folk hero in legend until his story was given literary form, "The Wallace," in the 1470s, a poem second only to the Bible as reading for Scots till 1800 or later. Modern comment has debated how much he was despised by the nobility.

[See also Edward I of England; Falkirk, Battle of; and Stirling Bridge, Battle of.]

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A. A. M. Duncan

WALL OF THRACE

This linear fortification (called the "Long Walls" by the Byzantines), thirty-five miles long, is located between the Black Sea (at Evcik) and the Sea

of Marmara (at Silivri), forty miles west of the Theodosian walls of Constantinople. The wall was designed to protect the hinterland of Constantinople, especially the aqueducts, from attacks from north and west, and it required large garrisons to be effective. The wall was 11.5 feet (3.5 meters) wide, with a foundation 8.2 feet (2.5 meters) deep, and it was at least 32.8 feet (10 meters) high. Built from limestone blocks, sometimes alternating with rows of bricks, the wall had towers of different shapes. The distance between the towers 262–541 feet (80 to 165 meters) depended on vulnerability to attack (towers were more dense in open fields). Their variable forms reflect the different periods in which they were constructed. A ditch of 36–43 feet (11 to 13 meters) was dug outside some parts of the wall, and the defense of some gates was strengthened with forts attached behind the wall, six of which have been identified.

Some historians believe that the Long Walls were constructed soon after the Hunnic invasion of 447, whereas others believe that Anastasios built them around 500. If the first hypothesis is accurate, Anastasios made repairs only after the damage caused by an earthquake in 478. The fortification was again repaired by Justinian in 559 after another earthquake in 557. The Kutrigurs crossed the wall in 559, but it helped prevent further Avar and Slavic invasions in 577, 581, 583–585, 587, and 619. During the great Avar siege of 626, forces again penetrated the wall, and it lost its defensive function until it was restored by Basil II at the end of the tenth century, during the war against Bulgaria. Today less than half of the wall survives, and its greatest height is sixteen feet (five meters).

[See also Anastasios I; Constantinople, *subentry* on Fortifications; and Justinian I.]

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Alexandru Madgearu

WAR CRIES

Together with bells and trumpets, cries were an important tool of regulation and communication in the Middle Ages. Many cries were used as signals, some had legal functions, others were repeatedly used as signs of social or political identity. No wonder many cries were shouted during fights, battles, and sieges—some very noisy times.

War cries must be related to three main levels of understanding and analysis:

- The clatter of the war: trumpets, weapons noise
- Signs of identification of warriors and noblemen: banners, pennons
- The transition from written to spoken word, because the cries were fixed by written sources

During fights, combatants uttered a cry of arms, a ritualized cry that was a sign of identity and solidarity. This type of cry was generally a collective one in that—according to historical sources, especially chronicles—it was shouted by the group as a whole. As a sign of loyalty to a feudal lord or, more and more, the sovereign, there was a certain sacred dimension to the cry. Because its meaning was often linked to the identity of the group, the war cry was also a sign of that identity. These meanings were borrowed from different types of identity signs: territories (“Guyenne!” for the Gascons or “Aragon!”), saints strongly identified with a particular region or nationality (Saint George for the English, Santiago for the Spanish, and Saint Yves for the Bretons), or a combination thereof (“Montjoie! Saint-Denis!” for the French). The cry could also be an invocation or an exhortation. Moreover, the war cry served as a sign of recognition and was used to impress the enemy as well.

In the midst of action, the shout encouraged the troops and—in an era largely without uniforms—helped to distinguish friends and foes. Ritualized war cries were also used to launch the attack of a town or fortress during sieges. Warriors then shouted to terrorize the enemy—such as *Tue, tue, tuons tout* (“Kill, kill, kill them all”) for the routiers of

Robert de Floques. When the besiegers were on the verge of victory, they might signal that action with another cry, such as *Ville gagnée* (“The town is won”), and give a cry of identity.

Many other cries, more or less ritualized, were bellowed on campaign and in combat either to organize the troops or to give orders, such as “Mount” or “Havoc!” (indicating that plunder was now allowed). There were specific cries clamored during negotiations, during the peace process, or at the end of a conflict. Especially during rituals of reconciliation performed by princes, these were uttered to legitimize the dispute’s settlement, to recognize the peaceful intentions of the princes, or to express ritualized joy. Identity cries and arms cries were used not only in battles but also in other circumstances, such as at a joyful event or to signify an allegiance.

[See also *Banners and Signals*.]

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Nicolas Offenstadt

WARK, SIEGES OF

Wark Castle formerly crowned a low-lying glacial hill that runs alongside the river Tweed, on the Anglo-Scottish border between Berwick and Roxburgh. Owing to such a location, the castle saw repeated assaults. During the twelfth century, when the castle was still basically a wooden motte-and-bailey affair, it suffered four sieges as kings of

Scotland invaded England. The two biggest sieges were those of 1138 and 1174.

The 1138 Siege. The 1138 campaign actually involved two sieges. On 10 January a Scottish party tried to take the castle by a nighttime attack. When that effort was stymied, the Scots settled down to blockade the town and castle while helping themselves to the local stores. King David I and his son Henry arrived with further reinforcements for the Scottish side, but efforts to storm the castle saw further casualties, including the king's own standard-bearer. The defenders even captured some Scots worthy of ransom. After three weeks David lifted the siege.

He returned to besiege Wark in May, his attention having been drawn when the garrison raided his supply lines. According to Richard of Hexham, the closest chronicler, it was a sharp fight, in which David brought forward battering rams and other siege engines. Casualties were high among the attackers, while no mention occurs of even wounded defenders. Again the Scottish king left in search of a more decisive triumph, assigning two barons to continue blockading the castle. After his defeat at the battle of the Standard in August, however, David returned to Wark. Townsmen joined the royal garrison in a vigorous defense. Notably, one defender died during a sally that destroyed much of David's growing assemblage of siege equipment. Once more David turned to blockading. To continue the siege, he explicitly got Wark exempted from the peace terms he signed with King Stephen that autumn. The payoff came in November, when the garrison, having already eaten their horses, prepared to quit the town by launching a breakout sally. The abbot of Rievaulx, however, negotiated a surrender that let the garrison depart honorably with their arms. David then ordered the castle destroyed.

The 1173 Siege. Naturally, the castle was rebuilt. Its wooden palisade was more than a mere wall, as vernacular descriptions imply a "prickly" or "hedgehog" arrangement of the stakes. When William the Lion joined the 1173–1174 coalition against Henry II of England, he found Wark as difficult to take as had his grandfather. He brought Flemish allies, famed in siegecraft, along with his own levies, slingers,

crossbowmen, and siege engines. Against this force Roger Stuteville had a garrison of ten knights and forty sergeants, which he had provisioned well during the Lenten break in campaigning. Soon after Easter 1174, Stuteville's preparations were mightily tested, as the Flemings fought their way across the moat to attack the walls themselves. Jordan Fantosme's chronicle gives vivid descriptions of the ferocity of the fighting, of the wounded, and of William's frustration. The vagaries of operating siege weapons showed up clearly: in one instance a loaded catapult misfired, nearly killing a Scottish knight; in another case William was bringing fire against the castle, but the wind turned and made the task impossible. Stuteville appears as a capable commander, husbanding his men and weapons, directing his troops to make every shot count, and instructing them to defend themselves only when they had to. His strategy was simple: to raise the price of assault too high to be worthwhile, but not so high as to monopolize the Scots' angry attention. When William finally abandoned the siege, the ever careful Stuteville commanded his troops not to taunt the retreating foes, for fear of goading them back to the attack.

[See also David I; Henry II of England; Stephen of England; and Wark Castle.]

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Steven Isaac

WARK CASTLE

Wark Castle lies on the river Tweed at the north-west corner of Northumberland on the southern

border of Scotland—the reason for its turbulent history of numerous sieges and conquests by the Scots. The castle, founded by Walter L'Espec in the early twelfth century, started life as an earthwork castle with motte (mound) and attached bailey with wooden defenses; in the late twelfth or thirteenth century the wooden defenses were superseded by stone walls and an encircling shell keep on top of the mound. The bailey was divided into an inner and outer work by a cross wall. The castle, never one of the strongest fortresses of the realm, reportedly was demolished more than once, because it lay on a low ridge overlooking the river in a not very defensible situation, though its defenses did suffice to hold off a royal Scottish army in 1174. The remains are fragmentary, but the general shape and stump of the masonry tower on the motte are clear.

We know from an Elizabethan sketch that the motte was the site of a large four-story polygonal tower with pairs of gunports in its upper story, while the bailey was defended by a plain curtain wall lacking towers but having a rather feeble gatehouse at its far end. The tower provided the lord's accommodation, because there was none in the bailey. A documentary record survives of the completion of the great tower (*dongeon*, or donjon) early in the reign of Henry VIII (r. 1509–1547) after the Scottish invasion and defeat at Flodden Field (1513).

The king's complete change in castle construction from this early part of his reign to the construction of what amounts to batteries along the south coast for artillery in around 1540 constitutes the main interest of an otherwise not outstanding castle. The polygonal tower at Wark, which recalls a fifteenth-century illumination in a manuscript, in many ways was an ornamental residence for the lord. The gunports are for guns of small caliber, which had to be hauled to the top of the tower, and the tower itself was a sitting target for enemy guns. The forts that Henry built along the south coast, though of various shapes, had low, round petal-shaped bastions that presented little face to target and, being solid, were suitable platforms for gun mounts. The change marks the end of the medieval castle as a residence and its metamorphosis into a garrisoned fort.

[See also Castles; Fortifications, *subentry on Overview*; and Welsh Castles of Edward I.]

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Michael W. Thompson

WARNS, BATTLE OF

See Staveren, Battle of.

WARS OF THE ROSES

See Roses, Wars of the.

WARWICK THE KINGMAKER

(born Richard Neville, 1428–1471), Earl of Warwick and Earl of Salisbury and prominent figure in the Wars of the Roses. Richard Neville was a magnate of considerable influence and power. A fortuitous marriage to the daughter of the Earl of Warwick resulted in his inheritance of the earldom in 1449. The extensive Warwick estates and his northern Neville lands formed his power base. He also became Earl of Salisbury upon his father's death in 1460. His epithet "the Kingmaker" reflects his significant role in the coronation of Edward IV and the subsequent restoration of Henry VI. This "proud setter up and putter down of kings" (Shakespeare's *Henry VI*) is one of the best-known figures of the Wars of the Roses, though perhaps more for his political machinations than for his military commands.

As a ground commander, Warwick has been accused of being an "incompetent general" (Pollard), "too cautious to be a successful field commander" (Hicks), and lacking courage (Gravett). He has undoubtedly suffered through comparison with his one-time ally and later nemesis Edward IV. Yet he led

the decisive attack at the first battle of Saint Albans (1455) and contributed to a number of Yorkist victories, including Towton (1461). At Northampton (1460), he vowed to negotiate with Henry VI or die on the field, and he showed that he could be ruthless, ordering "no quarter" for the nobility.

Warwick was a defensive tactician, as demonstrated by his deployments at the second battle of Saint Albans (1461), where he surrounded his men with physical defenses, preventing the rapid redeployment that the action dictated. In 1471 his decision to remain within Coventry's walls and await reinforcements, rather than fighting Edward IV, again demonstrates his caution.

Warwick used artillery on the battlefield at a time before this was common. He was captain of Calais, where the use of defensive artillery was ingrained. This perhaps prompted his interest in guns, although he may have expected too much of a technology that was still in its infancy. On at least two occasions, his artillery was ineffective: at the second battle of Saint Albans his handguns misfired in bad weather conditions, and at Barnet (1471) a night bombardment of his enemy was largely inaccurate.

The sea going Warwick was a marked contrast—a positive, confident, and occasionally rash naval commander. He was not averse to piracy, attacking both enemy and friendly shipping to gain supplies and enhance his fleet. In addition to Calais, he held a number of key maritime posts, including keeper of the seas, admiral of England, and warden of the Cinque Ports. He understood the importance of controlling major coastal towns and the seas to influence national and international affairs. His naval commands were crucial in underpinning the Yorkist cause in 1460, when he captured Lancastrian ships and successfully attacked Sandwich, and during his 1470 invasion of England on behalf of the Franco-Lancastrian alliance.

Warwick clearly had the respect of his contemporaries and an ability to harness popular support. While his military exploits were not always successful, he deserves his reputation as a key player in the Wars of the Roses until his death at Barnet in 1471.

[See also Edward IV of England and Roses, Wars of the.]

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Veronica Fiorato

WASSENBERG, BATTLE OF

The battle of Wassenberg, on 27 July 1206, was an important turning point in the conflict between the rival pretenders to the German throne, Otto IV of the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen Philip of Swabia. In the course of this conflict, Philip had succeeded in gaining support among the German magnates. Among his most fervent opponents, however, were the city of Cologne under Archbishop Bruno, who had been helped to his position by Otto IV, and Duke Henry III of Limburg.

Around the feast of Pentecost in 1206, Philip decided to launch an attack against the city and come to the aid of the deposed Hohenstaufen archbishop of Cologne, Adolf I, who had managed to retain his position in some surrounding areas and now led raids against the city. Philip began his offensive in June and was able to march unhindered along the Rhine, plundering the territory of Cologne

and finally uniting his forces with those of Adolf I. He set up camp on the river Erft near the castle of Wassenberg. The commander of Otto's army, Henry of Limburg, deserted to Philip's side. Some historical sources view this betrayal as the principal reason for Otto's ensuing defeat. In order to retain control over the duchy of Limburg, Otto IV and Archbishop Bruno led an army of four hundred knights and two thousand infantry out of Cologne and risked an open battle. Their troops were surrounded and attacked by Philip's forces in the marshy lands on the river Rur near Wassenberg on 27 July. Panic broke out in Otto's army; four hundred men fell, and the others were captured or fled into the swamps. According to a version of the battle in the *Kölner Königschronik* (Royal chronicle of Cologne), Philip and Otto had decided on the evening of the 27th to carry out the conflict the following morning; however, on his way back to his camp, Otto was ambushed by the counts of Hochstaden and Kalden, allies of Adolf I, and this led to the battle.

After the defeat, Otto IV and Bruno fled to Wassenberg Castle, which was promptly surrounded and taken. Together with three companions, including Walram of Limburg, Otto managed to escape, but Bruno was captured and delivered to Philip, who made him prisoner in the imperial castle of Trifels. Philip himself set up camp between Bonn and Cologne. Although Cologne remained impregnable fortified, Philip's victory gave the city's Hohenstaufen party the upper hand and caused the commune to join in allegiance with Philip, who was thus able to triumphally enter the city on 21 April 1207.

[See also Germany, *subentry* on Narrative (1125–1250), and Otto IV.]

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Julia Knödler

Translated from the German by Duane Henderson

WATCH AND WARD

The armed services of watch and ward appeared during the Carolingian period. Their development can be traced and defined in the form of customs of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. Thereafter, in the context of the wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, watch and ward were maintained at the behest of the princes.

The first mentions of watch (*wacta*) and ward (*warda*) are found in Carolingian sources. These words of Germanic origin refer to armed service that could be provided by all freemen to defend a territory. They are enumerated with various military obligations in chapter 2 of the capitulary of Boulogne-sur-Mer (811). The capitulary of Pitres (864) states that freemen who lacked the resources to enter the army had to assure "the watches in each city and frontier region" (chapter 27). From this period the service became an obligation, as in the Saint-Germain-des-Prés polyptych of around 820.

Beginning in the eleventh century, in the European feudal world, watch and ward (or *estage*) were required in fortified places, from the nobles, because of their position as vassals, as well as from the villagers under the lord's command. Thus, for example, the twelve months of watch (*excubia*) for the castle of Vendôme were provided for seven months by the count's vassals and for the remaining five by the count himself, three of these being fulfilled by virtue of the watch obligation (*gaitagium*) imposed on the townsmen.

The eleventh- and twelfth-century sources in all European states give many examples of the levy of vassals for the protection (*custodia*) of the castle.

Similarly the development of towns and communes implies the existence of such customs. In the cities the inhabitants were grouped by neighborhood or by occupation. The watch (*guetum*) was a lookout duty carried out with the help of a trumpet on a bell-fry, the ramparts, or a watchtower. The rear watch (*reguetum*, *retroexcubia*) was a military surveillance duty inside a stronghold in case of imminent danger, to protect not only the watchers but also the gate guards, and to ensure the security of the place. Finally, the guard (*garda porta*) protected the gates and the vulnerable points on the ramparts. In wartime these services were provided night and day by rotation. These customs fell into disuse in the thirteenth century except in cities like London, the city-states of northern and central Italy, Flanders, and the German Rhineland.

The wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, particularly the Hundred Years' War, revived these military obligations. After 1346 a sense of insecurity led the commune towns and the feudal lords supported by princes to start requiring watch and ward again. This caused many conflicts and lawsuits with the reluctant residents, and often between older and newer lords as well, whose motivations were ill-defined and changeable. In the name of the "common benefit" and because of his recognized superiority in time of war, the king or the prince frequently became the arbitrator. This was the case with the king of France, who enjoyed these rights by virtue of specific ordinances passed in 1373 and 1451. Mobilization affected all residents, except nobles and beggars. Every household was required to furnish one man. Failure was punishable by a fine. One could find a replacement or, more rarely, be exempted. Service was carried out under the command of a captain, assisted by sergeants. The men were divided up over the year into teams, according to their resources: the watch for the "small people," the rear watch for those of medium standing, and the guard for the rich. This commandeering did not mobilize all the men. Those who did not go into service paid a redemption fee. After 1453, with the return of peace, these customs gradually faded out, to be replaced by taxes.

[See also Obligation, Military.]

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Guy Jarousseau

Translated from the French by
Johanna M. Baboukis

WEAPONS, BYZANTINE

Byzantine military technology was part of a much wider picture, and both shared in and contributed to the evolution of the defensive and offensive techniques common to the western Eurasian world. In the former, in respect to the adoption of techniques and products from the East; in the latter, in respect to transmitting the Byzantine version of these techniques to neighboring cultures. Through the various peoples who inhabited or passed through the steppe regions north of the Danube and the Black Sea, the empire maintained regular contacts with more distant societies, so that elements of central Asian and even more easterly military panoply or practices permeated into the Balkans, Asia Minor, and the Middle East.

In the late sixth century, the stirrup was adopted from the Avars, who had carried it across from the eastern steppe and China; the same people seem also to have stimulated the use of lamellar armor on a much greater scale than hitherto; while in

the eighth or ninth century the single-edged cavalry saber and the lamellar cuirass, with associated splinted armguards was adopted from the steppe, probably through the Khazars and Magyars. A number of descriptions of Byzantine soldiers' panoply are included in the various military treatises of the sixth and especially of the tenth century; in addition, some archaeological material—actual items of weaponry and armor—contribute to the picture; while pictorial representations of different types of arms and armor also add substantially to our knowledge, both from the Byzantine world and from those areas whence the major influences were derived.

Weapons were produced until the seventh century in a number of imperial arms factories, and these assured a certain element of uniformity within and between units. On the other hand, many items, such as helmets, shields, or bows, may also have been produced on the basis of government commissions to provincial craftsmen, and this will have encouraged a certain amount of variation. Archaeological evidence from the fourth to the sixth century certainly suggests this was the case and that, independently of the imperial manufactories, there were a number of private production centers in many cities producing bows and arrows, helmets, and items of field artillery. In particular, it seems that frontier fortresses and cities maintained a small-scale arms production tailored to the needs of the permanent garrison units of the region in question.

Although some imperially controlled arms production continued after the middle of the seventh century, loss of territory and a very different economic situation meant that the government produced most of the equipment, including weapons, through commissions or compulsory levy by thematic or provincial administrations. Provincial commanders and governors were ordered to produce a certain number of weapons, to be delivered to key points for collection or distribution. This system was supplemented by an imperial arsenal at Constantinople, and there may have been others, although there is only the vaguest evidence for them. It was through this method that the armies were equipped thereafter, except in the case of

non-Byzantine mercenaries, who usually brought their own weaponry with them.

[See also Arms Industry and Trade.]

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
John Haldon

WEAPONS, HAND-TO-HAND

Throughout the medieval period the main weapons were those used for fighting hand-to-hand at close quarters, primarily the sword and the staff weapon of which there was a bewildering variety. However, soldiers used a range of other hand-held weapons during this period, ranging from the dagger and the ax to war hammers and cudgels.

Swords. The main hand weapon for most types of soldiers throughout the medieval period was the sword. By at least the first century B.C.E. the Roman soldier had adopted the *gladius*, a short sword consisting of an iron blade with a bronze-covered wood, bone, or ivory cross-guard, pommel, and grip attached. The *gladius* could only be used for thrusting and thus had limited effect when wielded from horseback, for which a longer sword (c. 28 to 36 inches [71 to 92 centimeters]) was carried, the *spatha*. It had appeared by the end of the second century C.E., first as a cavalry weapon but quickly finding popularity among the infantry as well, which may suggest an increased desire on the soldiers' part to use the sword as a slashing rather than a thrusting weapon.

Swords were also the weapon of choice for the elite of barbarian society, and from very early on the sword became a part of every cavalryman's arsenal,



Sword. English or French, fourteenth century. © WALLACE COLLECTION, LONDON, UK/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

its ownership generally preceding even that of a warhorse. But they were also used by large numbers of infantry; the Visigothic Code of Ervig (r. 680–687) even made the ownership of a sword mandatory for all men joining the army. Thus swords quickly became a symbol for the freeman all over Europe.

Although barbarian soldiers used short swords—archaeological examples average 16 inches (40 centimeters) in length, no doubt imitating Roman gladii or a weapon based on them—the preference of these warriors was for the longer *spatha*-type weapon. These were heavy, likely meant to be used with two hands, and two-edged, and with a center of gravity

near the point. Archaeological evidence has shown them to be long, 29.5 to 39 inches (75 to 100 centimeters), and narrow, 2.4 inches (6 centimeters) in width on average, which has given rise to the scholarly opinion that they were not very strong or well made.

A type of sword specific to this time was the *scramasax* (also called a *sax* or *seax*). This was a single-edged weapon that could be up to 33.5 inches (85 centimeters) in length with a width between 1.6 and 2.6 inches (40 and 65 millimeters). But, unlike the long swords of the period, the lower range of whose length they equaled, the *scramasax* was lighter in weight and could be wielded in one hand. Shorter examples, measuring around 8 inches (20 centimeters) long, have also been found.

Barbarian swords had large pommels and cross-guards, of various sizes and shapes, made of the same metal as the blade. Some pommels were also covered in a thin sheet of bronze or silver. Grips were covered in wood and leather and sometimes also had metal elements. Scabbards differed little in construction from their Roman predecessors—wood covered with leather and decorative and reinforcing metal elements. Blades, hilts, and scabbards were frequently decorated; especially popular was the inlaying of gold, silver, and bronze, and decorative effects such as gold *cloisonné* and the attachment of jewels. The most wealthy of barbarian leaders owned extremely decorated swords; that of Childeric, the fifth-century Merovingian chief whose extremely rich tomb was excavated at Tournai in 1653, had gold inlay and *cloisonné* decoration on both the hilts and scabbards of two swords found in his grave—a *spatha* and a *scramasax*. Daggers were also used by many barbarian soldiers, with artistic and archaeological remains confirming their stylistic and technological connection to Roman ones.

Almost all Carolingian soldiers would have carried a sword. It is especially prominent in Charlemagne's many capitularies that refer to weaponry, especially for the cavalry. If a warrior owned a warhorse, then he also owned a sword. Thus it is not surprising that in illustrations and excavations these weapons are common. Nor should it be surprising that the sword

began to gain a reputation as the weapon of honor for the noble and wealthy soldier.

In the early Carolingian period it appears that swords themselves were not substantially different from previous Frankish examples. Both the longsword and the scramasax are attested by literary and archaeological sources, and both were similar in size and manufacture to the earlier weapons. However, by the end of the eighth century the scramasax began to disappear and the longsword began to change both in shape and manufacture.

The longsword blade was usually of simple broad shape and could be single- or double-edged, with a rounded point and made for slashing and cutting rather than thrusting. The hilt was usually fitted with a simple straight cross-guard and pommel. Of particular interest in this period was the manufacture of what are known today as pattern-welded swords. They were made by building up the blade of a weapon from many smaller pieces of iron, either from the same source or else a source very slightly different in composition, with one containing slightly more phosphorous than the other. These pieces of iron were then welded together, twisted and worked in such a way that the resultant surface of the blade exhibited a discernible and visible pattern akin to waves, ripples, or woven patterns, especially herringbone work. To the central core of this pattern-welded material a steel edge could be welded on, producing a very high quality sword. The reason that blades were made this way, requiring as it did a great deal of time and enormous skill, is not known for certain. It has generally been thought that the use of separate pieces of iron twisted and welded together improved the blade by combining their hardness and toughness. Yet it is also possible that they were made in this manner because it was difficult to obtain large enough blooms of material to make entire blades for the increased number of swords required by the larger armies of that period.

It was common for swords of this period to bear an inscription of some sort; many remain indecipherable to us today, but inscriptions might be Christian symbols or the name of the owner or maker, among other possibilities. For example, the inscriptions

INGELRII and ULFBERHT are both known from several swords and probably refer to the smith or the workshop where they were made, showing that swordsmiths had developed a wide reputation for quality and that their work was exported across Europe.

What is known for certain is that swords were very expensive to make, whether pattern-welded or not. This is undoubtedly why the weapon became a powerful and vital symbol—of manhood, valor, authority, and honor—that found its way into the contemporary literature and culture. An example of this can be found in the Anglo-Saxon poet Cynewulf's description of the fiery sword that guarded Eden: "The hard-edged blade with its woven patterns quivers and trembles; grasped with terrible sureness, it flashes into changing hues."

By the eleventh century, the sword was quite simple, consisting of a wide, double-edged blade with a somewhat rounded end, a simple cross-guard, and pommel. It was kept in a scabbard, which was secured to a simple waist belt. At this time the sword was a cutting and thrusting weapon well suited to hand-to-hand combat and the attack of the mail armor in use during this period, and it remained the basic sword type throughout the next two centuries—essentially a weapon with a broad blade and simple hilt. However, it is not true to say that all swords in this period were identical. There was considerable variation in length, for example, from as short as 26 inches (66 centimeters) to as long as 38 inches (96 centimeters). The cross-guard, although usually of quite simple form—often just a plain straight bar of iron—could also be more elaborate. For example, the ends might curve either away from or toward the hand, and it might be more ornately shaped and perhaps decorated. The pommel, too, tended to be relatively simple, with many swords having just a plain disc pommel—although the so-called Brazil-nut form common earlier in the Middle Ages also remained in use. Early examples also frequently have inscriptions or inscribed decoration on the blade itself. The grip was usually short, fitting just one hand, although longer grips, which could accommodate a second hand to increase the

power of attack, were not unknown. Grips themselves ranged from the simple wood bound with leather to the very elaborately decorated high-status examples made for kings and nobles.

The use of the sword began to change in the later thirteenth century from a cutting and slashing weapon with a relatively wide blade to a thrusting and piercing weapon where the point was used more than the edges—a change that no doubt is related to the development of plate armor. During the first half of the fourteenth century, sword blades were made narrower with longer points and were diamond or hexagonal in cross section. Over the same period, the grip was lengthened and extended so that it could be used either in one or two hands. The simple straight cross-guard of the earlier sword also changed and by around the middle of the fifteenth century was curved toward the blade, and the simple wheel-shaped pommel was replaced by pommels of triangular, conical, or oval shape. National characteristics also emerged during this period, with swords of different designs being developed in different areas of Europe.

An extra ring at the base of the blade was sometimes added through which the forefinger was inserted, and from the early fifteenth century an iron ring was added to one quillon (the cross piece at the base of the hilt) as extra protection. From about 1450, a second ring was added to the other quillon, and by the end of the century, pieces of iron, called guards, were added from the cross-guard to the pommel to provide added protection for the hand. Over time the hilt became more elaborate and additional guards were added, which in some cases almost enclosed the hand in a cage of iron bars. However, this development was neither straightforward nor standard, and many early features, such as straight quillons, continued to be used on some types of swords. During the fifteenth century, there was a tendency for swords to be made lighter and, at the end of the century, they had become an essential part of everyday dress. As a result, these swords became highly decorated and ornate, leading eventually to the development of the rapier in the sixteenth century, the civilian sword par excellence, as

the sword moved from the battlefield to the town street.

Training in the use of swords was of course very important, and swordsmanship was taught in a master-pupil relationship. From the early fourteenth century, the techniques of fighting with the sword started to be written down and illustrated, and there are manuscripts showing the various starting positions, called wards, and sequences of movements that had to be learned by the aspiring swordsman. Although a few examples from the fifteenth century survive, such as the *Fechtbuch* of Hans Talhoffer, written in 1467, fencing books proliferated after the 1530s when fencing became part of every gentleman's education.

Axes. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Roman soldiers used axes as weapons, it is clear that barbarians used them extensively. Contemporary writers report that barbarian warriors used axes both in close infantry fighting and as missile weapons and that axes as weapons were easily able to damage armor, cleave helmets, and penetrate shields. When used as infantry weapons, axes were swung with one or both hands, and when used as missile weapons they were thrown. One tactic, used especially by Frankish soldiers—whose term for such an ax, “francisca,” has been adopted by historians as a name for all of them—was to throw their axes in unison at approaching troops, thus disrupting their charge.

The fact that these weapons were thrown suggests that franciscae were relatively small, a fact confirmed by artistic renderings and archaeological finds that indicate that their average weight was about 2.6 pounds (1.2 kilograms), with the head weighing between 9.6 and 32 ounces (300 and 1,000 grams). These ax heads measure 7 to 8 inches (18 to 20 centimeters) in height, and it is estimated that their handles measured in the region of 16 inches (40 centimeters) in length. For example, the francisca head found in the tomb of Childeric, King of the Franks (r.c. 440 to c. 481), measures 8 inches (20 centimeters) and weighs 30 ounces (935 grams). Soldiers had to be skilled enough to judge the speed and distance of a charging enemy in order to completely take



Axman. Illustration from thirteenth-century Exchequer documents. HIP/ART RESOURCE, NY

advantage of the small cutting edge when throwing their axes. Forged from a single piece of iron, franciscae had a distinct shape: the upper head with an S-shaped curvature; the lower edge of the blade a simple elbow; the lower part of the head swinging strongly to the handle; and the upper edge of the blade formed into a point or rounded.

The throwing ax remained important to barbarian soldiers until the beginning of the seventh century, when it began to decline in use, possibly because of a drop in the number of skilled throwers but more probably due to an increase in the use of archers by the Franks. By the end of the seventh century the francisca had effectively disappeared. The handheld ax, however, continued to be favored as an infantry weapon throughout the rest of the Middle Ages,

although with a longer handle and larger head and usually wielded with two hands.

Axes continued to be used widely throughout Europe at this time. Indeed, in Scandinavia and England they were almost as popular and “honorable” as the sword; the Vikings, in particular, used them extensively. In the Carolingian Empire, axes did not have the same appeal or carry the same symbolism, but they were still used. They were either small and used with only one hand or relatively large and wielded with two hands. There are rare contemporary illustrations of double-headed axes with a similar sized head on either side of a central socket. Axes were used primarily by foot soldiers, although one-hand axes could also be effective weapons from horseback. Very-high-status axes were often decorated with inlays of silver.

Daggers. Some historians have suggested that the scramasax did not disappear at the end of the eighth century but, rather, became a supplementary weapon to be carried in addition to the spear and sword: the dagger. During the Carolingian period, it seems that many warriors began to carry daggers. However, the evidence for their use is scarce, and it is not always clear whether they were subsidiary weapons to the spear and sword. Despite the fact that there are no daggers depicted on the Bayeux Tapestry, their use must have been widespread at the time and indeed for all this period, though they do not figure greatly as a fighting weapon until the later thirteenth century. The scramasax seems to have been the common and widespread form of dagger from before this period until around 1300.

During the period from 1300 a number of different types of daggers appeared across Europe. The quillon dagger probably first developed around the middle of the thirteenth century. The earlier versions of these daggers had quillons and pommels curved away from the grip (known as antennae pommels) or pommels in a crescent or ring form. Later quillon daggers were characterized by guards that resemble quillons of swords, and indeed they most often look like smaller versions of the swords of the same era. Pommels could be of almost any form—discs, wheels, octagonal, or spherical pommels

among others. The grip could be either of one or two pieces and was usually wrapped in leather and wire. The quillons often curved forward toward the blade, which was usually short and could be either double-edged, of flattened diamond section, or single-edged and triangular in shape. In both, the blade tapered from the hilt to the point. Surviving scabbards are rare, especially early ones, but were probably of leather with a metal throat and chape. Usually a knightly weapon, they were worn on the right side hanging from the sword belt on a cord or thong.

The rondel dagger was introduced around 1300 and was in widespread use all over Western Europe from the middle of the fourteenth century. Most often slender and elegant in form, like the quillon dagger, it too was a knightly weapon. It gained its name from the discs of either wood or metal at either end of the grip. The blade was relatively short, double-edged and of flattened diamond section, and tapered from the hilt to the point. Later on, the blades became longer, up to about 15 or 16 inches (38 or 40 centimeters) in length, and single-edged blades become more common. Scabbards were usually just simple leather sheaths, often with decorative tooling.

Perhaps the most common and widely used form of dagger was the baselard, which probably originated in Basel, Switzerland, in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, from where it quickly spread all over Europe. Baselards were very common from 1350 until the late fifteenth century. Although during the fourteenth century baselards were particularly a knightly weapon, especially in southern Germany and Italy, in the fifteenth century they became more of a civilian weapon. They were commonly worn on the right hip, suspended at the front or from a hanger attached to the sword belt. Their hilts have a very characteristic form, with cross pieces at both the guard and pommel ends giving it the shape of an H on its side or a capital I. The cross pieces can be of equal length and both can be quite small, but the typical baselard has a cross piece at the guard slightly longer than that at the pommel. The grip was usually made of two pieces of wood, ivory, horn, or bone and was riveted through

the tang, often with many rivets. Although early examples have single-edged blades, they are most commonly of double edged or flattened diamond form. Scabbards, again rare survivals, were made from leather with metal mounts at the throat, middle, and chape. Luxury versions of baselards were also made, and a few have survived in which the scabbard is made from carved ivory or bone. Some baselards have elaborately carved hilts of boxwood, bone, or ivory, and another type has curved cross pieces shod with metal.

An intriguing type of dagger was developed about 1300 in which the hilt was made from wood with no metal and shaped with two prominences at the guard and a bulbous knob at the top. The contemporary name was "ballock dagger," obviously derived from the shape of the guard, but more prudish historians in the nineteenth century called them "kidney daggers." The grips of ballock daggers that survive are made in one piece, and although most are made from plain wood, ivory, or horn, later metal examples are known. Early examples have a single-edged blade of triangular cross-section tapering evenly from the hilt to the point but, from about 1400, double-edged versions appear. Scabbards were usually made of leather with no metal mounts. The ballock dagger was worn on the left hip, hanging vertically at the front or sometimes horizontally at the back.

The "eared dagger," characterized by two discs at the pommel rather like ears, developed in Spain at the end of the fourteenth century and spread to Italy, France, Germany, and England in the fifteenth. In general, eared daggers are elegant and the two discs are usually highly decorated with enamel, incised, or colored decoration, often with etching, damascening in gold or silver, or niello work. The guard of the eared dagger was usually of disc form and was larger early on; reducing in size over time until it almost disappears. The blade is broad and double-edged, often with a broad *ricasso* (the groove along the blade).

The final distinct type dagger, the so-called "cinquedea" (literally "five fingers"), was a specialty of Italy. The very broad flat blade, which tapers evenly from the hilt to the point, has either a strong


medial ridge or is fluted. The flutes are almost always arranged in three layers running with the axis of the blade, two at the tip, three immediately behind those, and four near the hilt. The hilt can be of two forms: either with a wheel pommel, a grip like a sword, and quillons curved toward the blade or, more commonly, having an arched pommel with strongly down-curving quillons of rectangular cross section. Cinquedeas can be very long and indistinguishable from a sword or they can be short and dagger-like. Scabbards were usually made from the hardened leather known as *cuir boulli*, shaped to fit the blade, and often covered in tooled decoration.

The dagger was used for a number of purposes, not only on the battlefield, but as a weapon for personal protection, for assassination, and for eating. And, of course, throughout the late Middle Ages a wide range of knives and peasant daggers of many different forms were also in use.

Staff Weapons. Evidence for the use and types of staff weapons before the end of the thirteenth century is somewhat limited. When mentioned in this period, they are always the weapons of the foot soldiers and idiosyncratic in form. These refer to a form of long-hafted weapon, some of which may actually be axes rather than the polearms of the later medieval period. For example, in 977 a Catalan document refers to a *guisarme*, described as a long-hafted weapon with an extremely long, ax-shaped head. Similarly, a capital of the Church of Saint Nectaire in France, carved in the late eleventh or early twelfth century, depicts two Roman soldiers carrying long-hafted weapons, one of which is fitted with an ax head and the other with what appears might be a broad blade like the later glaive. Although staff weapons, used both by foot and equestrian soldiers, are of great antiquity, the period from 1300 was when they especially came into their own as an infantry weapon. In 1302, at the battle of Courtrai, the Flemish townsmen from Bruges, Ypres, and Courtrai, armed, in the main, with staff weapons, routed a superior and supposedly better armed French army. The reaction to this victory, essentially from the lower and middle classes, and the

large numbers of French cavalry dead were noted throughout Europe and caused uproar among the nobles, knights, and upper classes of society. The weapon, called a goedendag ("good day"), which caused such a devastating and unexpected victory, far from being sophisticated or innovative, was basically a heavy club with an iron cap to which an iron spike was attached. Its use at Courtrai and, equally important, the discipline of the Flemish forces, mark the rise of the infantry armed with staff weapons as a potent force on the battlefields of Europe. This victory was followed by that of the Swiss using staff weapons at the battle of Morgarten against the Austrians in 1315. From this time on staff weapons played an increasingly important part on the battlefield—blocks of disciplined, well-trained, and drilled infantry all armed with similar weapons were common down to the seventeenth century.

The traditional infantry weapon, the spear, was around 6 to 9 feet (2 to 3 meters long) and was essentially a defensive weapon. It was used to extend the reach of the foot soldier in a thrusting motion, which, when well directed, was effective against both other infantry and mounted troops, especially when used in formations of closely ordered infantry. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, the spear had been joined, as discussed above, by other forms of staff weapons, in particular the goedendag. However, the increase in the use of armor, especially the development of the full-plate harness, led to the need for an infantry weapon that was capable of both thrusting and cutting actions. Essentially, the ability of plate armor to resist penetration coupled with its smooth, rounded surfaces, which tended to deflect blows, meant that the thrusting spear was less effective. From the very end of the thirteenth century there developed a new type of staff weapon, the halberd, which combined the spear with the long, two-handed ax. At first the halberd consisted of a fairly broad blade with a spike projecting from the top secured to the end of a long pole—around 6 feet (2 meters) in length. It was used in a similar way to the spear as a thrusting weapon, but it could also be swung over the head and brought down with considerable force. During the fifteenth century,



Battle of Crécy. Soldiers and knights in armor fight with swords, spears, and halberds during the battle of Crécy, 25 August 1346. Illustration from *Les chroniques de France*, MS Cott. Nero. E. II., fol.152v, fifteenth century. BRITISH LIBRARY, LONDON, UK/© BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

an extra spike was added to the ax portion of the head, making it an even more formidable weapon.

The halberd is most closely associated with the Swiss armies of the later thirteenth and, especially, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Swiss had been granted rights of freedom that carried with them the right to bear arms, and this resulted in a population that carried weapons as a norm of everyday life. This familiarity with arms, especially staff weapons, resulted in the creation of a voluntary, part-time army that was both well disciplined and skilled. In fact, Swiss mercenaries gained a considerable reputation all over Europe during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and were much sought after by military leaders and commanders. By the end of the fifteenth century, a very characteristic

Swiss halberd had developed, used alongside the pike, although it is important to note that it was not just their weapons that made the Swiss such a formidable force but discipline and the ability to fight as a unit.

The halberd and the goedendag were joined by a variety of other staff weapons over this period, some very characteristic of particular areas and some more widely distributed around Europe. The glaive, a large cutting and thrusting weapon, had a long blade with a convex front edge and a straight back. Although it was never very common, it probably first appeared in Europe during the thirteenth century and was used throughout the end of the Middle Ages. Later, in the sixteenth century, it came to be used very much as a ceremonial weapon carried

by official guards and in processions. The "bill" was a weapon far more commonly used throughout Europe in the later medieval period. Although there were considerable variations in its form, a bill generally consisted of a broad cutting surface with a forward-facing hook with one or more spikes projecting from the rear, the front, or both. Simpler bills were similar to halberds and were probably used in much the same way. Other more complex types were developed. For example, the Welsh bill had a long slender curved blade and a right-angle spike, and the *roncone*, developed in Italy, which had a long straight blade with a smaller curved hook, with both top and backward-facing spikes. Finally, the partisan, a later type of staff weapon used throughout Europe from about 1500, was basically a long, flat blade tapering to a point, rather like an elongated spear.

Although staff weapons were commonly used as an individual weapon in one-to-one combat they were increasingly used as a mass weapon by a group of soldiers acting together in formation—in particular the massed pikemen of the Swiss. Staff weapons were also commonly used as ceremonial weapons carried by official guard companies.

Maces, War Hammers, and Poleaxes. While swords were primarily used for slashing and thrusting, mounted cavalry also used a number of other close-range weapons, although none as common as the sword. The mace, which was used from at least the twelfth century, came to be made most often entirely of iron, as opposed to earlier versions that consisted of a copper alloy or iron head mounted on a wooden shaft. It was therefore heavier and capable of inflicting greater damage, and it was especially effective against more heavily armored foes. Short war hammers consisting of a rectangular head, often with a backward protruding spike, were very effective from horseback and were common from the mid-thirteenth century, when one is shown in the hand of an anonymous English knight's effigy in Malvern Priory Church. A surviving war hammer, dating from about 1450, in the Wallace Collection in London, has a hammer head that is square in shape, although turned at a forty-five-degree angle

to present a diamond-shaped front; the pick is short, slightly curved, and equal in length to the head.

The ax, which earlier had, for the most part, been used primarily by the infantry and had fallen into disuse, again became popular in the fourteenth century and was used for fighting on foot as well as being used by cavalry and in the foot tournament. Fitted with a long two-handed shaft, the ax as a weapon was also usually furnished with a backward-facing short spike—a weapon called a poleax. Injuries, causing death, from the spikes of both war hammers and poleaxes have been identified in the skulls recovered from the graves of soldiers killed at the battles of Visby in 1361 and Towton in 1461.

Irregular Weapons: Clubs, Cudgels, and Flails. Finally, it is also clear that throughout the medieval period crude and simple weapons, particularly clubs and cudgels, were used, but these weapons, by their very nature, do not survive or have not been recognized as weapons with the result that they are usually completely ignored in studies of arms and armor. Yet, simple weapons, farm implements, clubs, and even stones were used in warfare, especially by the poorer soldiers of low social and economic standing, from the very early conflicts of history into the modern age.

Here, perhaps, should be considered the weapon that consists of a wooden handle on one end of which is attached a length of chain ending with an iron ball, often spiked. Opinions about whether this seemingly "quintessential medieval weapon" of cartoon and movie fame really existed are severely divided. One problem is that they do not appear in any medieval Western European records—although something similar is occasionally seen in non-Western sources. A second issue is that from a practical point of view such a weapon would be very difficult to wield, as, should a blow from it fail to connect with an attacker, the momentum of the ball end would bring it back to injure its user!

What was used, however, was the agricultural flail or a weapon based on it. This consisted of a long wooden shaft to which a second, and shorter, piece of wood was attached by means of a simple iron ring or short chain. This was certainly used

by the common soldier during the Middle Ages, as there are numerous references in written sources, although surviving examples date only from the early modern period.

[See also *Armor, Body; Arms Industry and Trade; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Franks, Carolingian, subentry on Narrative (751-899); Hand-to-Hand Combat; Morgarten, Battle of; Switzerland, subentry on Narrative; Vikings; and Visby, Battle of.*]

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Robert Douglas Smith

WEAPONS, MISSILE

Before the development of gunpowder weapons, only three hand missile weapons were available to the medieval soldier: the sling, the longbow, and the crossbow.

The Sling. The sling was a weapon for lower-status soldiers. It consisted of a string or cord some 2 to 3 feet (60 to 90 centimeters) long attached to a wider middle section that was twirled around to throw a missile—both stone and lead slingshot have been recovered from excavations, although none can be conclusively dated. It was certainly in use in ancient times and was used by the Romans—Vegetius deemed the sling to be more effective than the bow. Illustrations indicate that the sling was swung either over the head or at the side of the body, and modern

experiments have determined a range of between 500 and 1,300 feet (about 150 to 400 meters).

The sling is rarely mentioned in sources, and although ammunition has been identified, there are no surviving medieval examples and none has been recovered from archaeological contexts, with the result that it has been very little studied. Slings certainly continued in use down to the later medieval period and can be seen in many illustrations—for example being used in hunting in a ninth-century illustration and at the siege of Rhodes in 1480 from a near contemporary painting. Although lead and stone remained the main ammunition, slings were also used in the later period to throw firepots and other incendiaries. These were fitted with a fuse that was lit before throwing; when the pot shattered on landing, the contents would ignite, spreading fire and confusion. It appears that the sling went out of general use in the sixteenth century.

The Longbow. It is very probable that both the self bow—that is the plain wooden bow—and the composite bow—constructed from wood, sinew, and horn—were used by the Romans, as attested by evidence from later sources as well as from archaeological and pictorial evidence, although no extant examples have survived. The archaeological and pictorial evidence indicate that the bowstring could be drawn both by the fingers—the so-called Mediterranean release—or the thumb—the Mongolian release. Bracers on the left wrist and stalls or rings for the fingers or thumb are also depicted, as are quivers to hold the arrows.

Two types of arrowheads have been identified from archaeological excavations dating from the early medieval period—the long, thin bodkin arrowhead, possibly used as an armor piercer—and a triple- or quadruple-veined trilobite arrowhead for unarmored targets. Both could be tanged or socketed and were either bound or glued to a reed or cane shaft, which was kept from splitting on impact by the addition of a solid wooden piece in the middle.


By the time of Charlemagne and the establishment of the Carolingian Empire with its professional army, the bow was in extensive use. In the 802–803 Capitulary of Aachen, Charlemagne ordered that

the bow should be the chief weapon of the infantry, ordering soldiers to carry a bow, a spare string, and twelve arrows, presumably the contents of one quiver. Charlemagne followed this with a decree in 806 demanding that each horseman also should be equipped with a bow as well as several quivers of arrows.

From the many depictions of archers in the Bayeux Tapestry we know that the longbow was a common weapon in the eleventh century and it remained popular until the end of the medieval period. Archers on the Bayeux Tapestry are usually shown pulling the bowstring back to the chest, while later illustrations indicate that the bow was pulled back to the side of the face. Whether this resulted in greater power, needed more skill, or was just a different fashion is impossible to ascertain. Shooting the long bow required a great deal of skill, experience,

and training, and its use became associated with particular regions of Europe, such as the Welsh Marches. Evidence from the skeletons of archers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries show distinct changes to the bone structure caused by long-term practice and shooting of bows.

Just how powerful these bows were is suggested by evidence from the longbows found on the wreck of the English ship the *Mary Rose*, which sank in 1545, indicating that their draw weight—how much force was needed to pull the string back to the firing position—was in the order of 110 pounds (50 kilograms). Whether all longbows were of similar strength is not known, however, and it is likely that longbow draw weights varied based on the ability and experience of the archer. It has been estimated that a fully trained longbowman could probably shoot as many as ten to twelve arrows per minute, but whether this rate



Missile Weapons. A group of soldiers scale the walls of Ribodane under the covering fire of longbowmen (*left*) and a crossbowman (*center right*). Illustration from the *Chronique d'Angleterre*, vol. 3, MS Roy 14 E. IV, fol. 252, fifteenth century. © THE BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD

of fire was ever achieved, or, more importantly, ever required, is open to question. Shooting as and when the archer had a suitable and achievable target was probably more normal.

The use of the longbow is particularly associated with the English forces, especially in the Hundred Years' War against France (1337–1453). Of note was their use of archers in their battle tactics, particularly at the battles of Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415). In each of these conflicts, the performance of the archers has been seen as critical to the English success and has been the subject of many long and detailed studies.

Keeping armies supplied with sufficient bows and arrows was a significant logistic problem, as large numbers of weapons, arrows, and skilled men were needed. For example, in 1356, Edward, Prince of Wales ("the Black Prince"), ordered the arrest and forced labor of all fletchers in Cheshire until his supply of arrows could be replenished. Between 1360 and 1381 the stores of bows and arrows kept in England had declined from a total of 11,000 bows and 23,600 sheaves of arrows—each sheaf holding 24 arrows—to no bows and only 1,000 sheaves of arrows. But, by the middle of the fifteenth century, it was not a shortage of bows and arrows but a shortage of skilled archers that was the problem. In 1450 Edward IV ordered that twenty thousand archers be raised for the army, but had to settle for fewer than thirteen thousand, and in 1456 he decreed that the playing of football or other sports and amusements by all men between the ages of twelve and sixty be replaced by archery practice. But nothing could halt the decline of longbow archery in England, and by the early sixteenth century bows and arrows had largely been replaced by gunpowder weapons.

The longbow was made from a single piece of wood, usually yew, although other species such as ash were sometimes used. Records from the reign of Edward II (1307–1327) indicate that the longbow should be made of yew, either imported from Spain or grown in England, be an average of 2 ells in length (probably meaning 74 inches [188 centimeters]), 4 thumbs thick in the middle, and fire an arrow a yard long. By a skillful combination of the sapwood, which

is strong in tension, and heartwood, capable of withstanding compression without losing flexibility or strength, the bow maker was able to make a bow that was both powerful and tough. Bow strings were made from strands of linen and obviously easily broken, as inventories frequently list extra supplies per bow. The bows recovered from the wreck of the *Mary Rose* also show that the ends of the bow, the nocks, were sometimes reinforced with bone or horn.

Arrows were usually made from ash, but a variety of other woods could also be used as available. In the later medieval period many types of arrowheads, which were made from iron or steel, were used, leading to much debate and controversy among modern scholars. It can be assumed that the shape and purpose of the arrowheads were linked: for example, larger winged arrowheads were probably used for hunting. The bodkin, a long thin arrowhead, was commonly thought by researchers to be armor piercing, but more recent experimental work has shown that it can curl up on impact. The more likely candidate for the armor-piercing arrowhead is a small winged arrow that has been shown by analysis to often have steel edges and tip. This small, highly sophisticated design would certainly be fully capable of piercing armor. These arrowheads could be made in the hundreds of thousands in relatively short periods of time.

The other part of the arrow—the fletching, or flight—consisted of feathers that were attached with glue to the rear of the arrow to stabilize it in flight, giving it greater accuracy. The archer usually wore a leather bracer, to protect the inside of the left arm from the string as the arrow was loosed, as well as a quiver in which to keep his supply of arrows. When in position in the battle line, archers usually placed their fresh arrows either point down in the ground in front of them or else stuck through their belt—both easy ways to quickly grasp the next arrow.

The Crossbow. A form of crossbow was in use in ancient Greece—the so-called *gastraphretes* (or "belly bow")—and later in Rome as well as in China. In Western Europe it does not seem to have become popular until the eleventh century, although some historians have argued that the crossbow was used,



Crossbow Practice. The figure on the right is using a cranequin to bend his bow. Illustration from the *Mittelalterliches Hausbuch*, 12r, c. 1480.

albeit infrequently, by the Franks throughout the early Middle Ages.

The crossbow consists of a tiller, made of wood and often decorated with horn ivory or bone, to one end of which was attached a short bow. At first this was made from wood, like the ordinary bow, but later it was replaced by stronger and more powerful composite bows made from layers of wood, horn, and sinew glued together. The string, stretched between the ends of the bow, was pulled back, either by hand or by means of a mechanical device, and fitted into a groove cut into the edge of a disc—the nut—made of horn or other hard material, set into the stock, and held in the shooting position by a trigger mechanism. A short-flighted arrow, called a bolt, was then placed in a groove cut in the top of the tiller and set against the string. Squeezing the trigger released the nut, which turned about its center, releasing the string and shooting off the bolt. At first crossbows were less powerful and the string could be pulled back by hand, the crossbow being held securely by inserting a foot through a loop fastened to the end of the tiller. A simple hook attached to a waist belt was also used to pull the string back to the firing position—the user bending down and catching the string in the hook while holding the crossbow

down with a foot—the act of standing up pulled the string back into the firing position. For more powerful bows the “goats-foot” lever was used. This was a simple lever device consisted of two interlocking frames pivoted about their ends. It was laid onto the stock and folded over. The string was then hooked on to one end, and the action of unfolding the two ends and pulling the frames back into the straight position drew the string back to the nut.

Crossbow bolts were normally shorter—in the region of 12 inches (30 centimeters) in length—and thicker—around half an inch (12.5 millimeters) in diameter—than the arrows used with longbows and were fitted with a substantial iron or steel head often of pyramidal form.

The crossbow offered a number of advantages over the bow. First, it could be prepared and be ready to let off ahead of the time needed—unlike a long bow, which had to be released as soon as it was drawn. Second, the effective use of the crossbow did not depend on an enormous amount of training and practice as did the ordinary bow, although it did require some considerable time to load and prepare for shooting.

It is difficult, well nigh impossible, to determine with any confidence from the sources just how effective the crossbow was. Although it is described as a very powerful weapon, its use never seemed to have conferred any significant advantage to either side in war. Yet it must have been fairly effective, as after the twelfth century its use increased markedly across continental Europe. Commanders frequently employed mercenary crossbowmen—primarily from Gascony or Italy, especially from Genoa. They were often used tactically at the beginning of a battle and on the flanks as a means of harassing opposing forces and preventing flanking actions. The crossbow was condemned by the Church, which proscribed its use on the grounds of its violence and power, first in 1096–1097 and again at the Second Lateran Council in 1139. The fact that these prohibitions had a very limited effect is perhaps not surprising, as it shows that no military leader or commander could afford not to use them.

There was a significant development in crossbow technology in the later medieval period with the introduction of the steel bow, which increased the power of the weapon. This needed more force to draw the string back to the firing position, and it was therefore a more potent weapon than its composite bow counterpart—imparting a greater velocity to the bolt, and thus a greater range, and making it capable of shooting a heavier missile. Estimates as to the range vary from between 1,200 to 1,600 feet (350 and 500 meters). However, in order to draw the string back, special devices were required. The “cranequin” worked on the rack-and-pinion principle, while the windlass used a system of pulleys to enable the crossbowman to pull the string back to the firing position. Although these both slowed its rate of fire, the crossbow was still used extensively on the battlefield and at sieges.

Although declining in popularity, crossbows continued to be used throughout the fifteenth century, until, in the early decades of the sixteenth century, they became almost exclusively a hunting weapon due to their speed and silence; huntsmen preferred them to the early firearms whose noise, smoke, and delay alerted prey to their presence.

[See also Agincourt, Battle of; Bayeux Tapestry; Charlemagne; Crécy, Battle of; Gunpowder; Handguns; Infantry; Infantry, Mounted; and Poitiers, Battle of (1356).]

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Robert Douglas Smith

WELFESHOLZ, BATTLE OF

When the Roman emperor Henry V campaigned against his opponents in Westphalia and Lower Lorraine in September/October 1114, probably after the defeat of an imperial army near Andernach, the leading members of the Saxon nobility also formed an alliance against Henry V. The emperor gathered an army consisting primarily of southern German followers but also including Count Hoyer of Mansfeld, his main Saxon supporter. Henry's army left Wallhausen on 10 February to trek about twenty miles (thirty-two kilometers) through ice and snow to meet the Saxon rebels on the same day at a location called Welfesholz, about thirty-five miles (fifty-six kilometers) south of Magdeburg. The chronicler Ekkehard of Aura reports that the armies faced each other for some days, but the *Annales Pegavienses* (Annals of the monastery of Pegau) declare that the battle had already begun on the morning of 11 February. The Saxon army, consisting of cavalry and infantry, was led by Reinhard, bishop of Halberstadt, Lothair of Süpplingenburg (Duke of Saxony), Frederick of Somerschenburg (Palsgrave of Saxony) and Rudolf of Stade (Margrave of the Nordmark). They were supported by the Westphalian count Frederick of Arnsberg and Count Henry of Limburg, former Duke of Lower Lorraine; the latter had already fought successfully against Henry V in the battles of Visé (1106) and Andernach (1114).

According to the *Annales Pegavienses*, the emperor himself arranged his battle formation and put his Saxon protégé Hoyer of Mansfeld into the first battle line. But then Henry evidently could not control Hoyer, who acted on his own authority when he began the battle. Accompanied by just a few pugnacious combatants, he died during that onslaught. The main battle occurred later, but the sources are silent on the details. Again the *Annales Pegavienses* state that only nightfall interrupted the combat and that the rebellious Saxons stayed on the battlefield the whole night because they feared being ambushed again by the imperial army. Not until morning were they sure that they had conquered the enemy forces and driven the emperor into flight. Henry V's defeat

at the battle of Welfesholz allowed the insurgents to capture or destroy strongholds of the imperial party like Quedlinburg or Dortmund. Henry V had finally and absolutely lost his authority in Saxony for the coming years.

[See also Andernach, Battle of (1114); Henry V, Emperor; Lothair III of Süpplingenburg; and Visé, Battle of.]

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Martin Völkl

WELSH CASTLES OF EDWARD I

The Welsh Wars (1277, 1282–1283, and 1294–1295) of Edward I (r. 1272–1307) resulted in a program of castle-building and strengthening that cost between £95,000 to 100,000. He ordered the building of a series of castles, some of which had fortified new towns (*bastides*) attached, a development that Edward and his master builder knew from Gascony in the south of France. Master James of Saint George (c. 1235–1308), after his arrival in England by 1278, became “master of the king’s works in Wales.” He was a master mason from Savoy and many Savoyard details are to be found in the architecture of the castles as well as in their building techniques, such as the use of helicoidal (spiral) scaffolding in round tower construction. Among the ten new castles built, the six castles that ring the coastline of North Wales—Flint, Rhuddlan, Conwy, Caernarfon, Harlech, and Beaumaris—were all able to be supplied by sea. Because of their comparative completeness these castles remain some of the most potent and impressive symbols of power and conquest constructed during the Middle Ages. These six castles, four of which (Conwy, Caernarfon, Harlech, and Beaumaris) were inscribed as UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 1986–1987, are masterpieces,

marvels of medieval military engineering and architecture. Beaumaris is arguably the finest example of a concentric castle in Britain, where an inner wall allowed the shooting of the enemy over the top of a lower outer wall. (If the outer wall was taken, the enemy still found itself under attack from those defenders on the inner wall.)

These castles were not only strategic strongholds, making use of the era’s most recent sophisticated military technology; they were also centers of administration, royal palaces, and formidable symbols of power. The walls and towers of Caernarfon evoked the might of imperial Rome, while the walls of Harlech, originally covered in a white rendering, created an awe-inspiring monolithic structure. Edward I built these castles to ensure Wales remained under the suzerainty of England and that his own authority was vividly stamped on this mountain fastness.

Flint (begun 1277–completed 1284). Flint was the first castle built by Edward in Wales, as a forward base of his initial military campaign of 1277. Set upon a rocky outcrop, it was completed by Master James, who was involved with its building from 1280, at a cost of around £7,000. The castle has two baileys, the inner of square plan and originally surrounded by water, with a round tower at each corner. The large and dominating isolated southern Great Tower, which includes a chapel within its 23-foot (7-meter) thick walls, is more like a keep (or *donjon*). Access to the tower was via a drawbridge from the inner bailey, and it too was surrounded by a wet moat fed by the river Dee.

Flint was also the first of the new planned and fortified accompanying towns, setting a pattern for the future. Although some traces of bank and ditch survive, the original walls of timber and earth are no longer visible. In 1282 the princes Llywelyn and Dafydd unsuccessfully besieged the castle, and in 1399 King Richard II was captured at Flint by Henry Bolingbroke.

Rhuddlan (begun 1277–completed 1282). The building of Rhuddlan was begun during Edward I’s first campaign and completed by Master James. It involved the huge engineering feat of diverting the River Clwyd to allow access by sea. A 2.75-mile


(4.4-kilometer) new canal was cut over a period of three years (1277–1280) at a cost of some £755, and the present river still follows this course. The total cost of the castle and town was over £9,613. Master James probably had greater influence on the design of this concentric castle as he took control of its building operation in early 1278. It has a diamond-shaped ground plan with two round towers and notable opposing twin-towered gatehouses at east and west. Attached to the castle was a *bastide*.

It was probably at Rhuddlan that Edward, the Prince of Wales (the future Edward II, r. 1307–1327), was presented to the Welsh nobility in 1284. The castle successfully withstood two attacks, one in 1294 by the Welsh rebel Madog and another in 1400 by Owain Glyn Dŵr.

Conwy (begun 1283–completed 1287). Conwy was begun during Edward I's second military campaign and was designed as both fortress, with a garrison of thirty men, and royal residence, together with its walled *bastide*. It cost around £15,000. The complete .75-mile (1-kilometer) circuit of superbly preserved medieval town wall, the finest extant in Britain, includes twenty-one (of twenty-two)

surviving mural towers and a notable row of twelve garderobes. Built simultaneously with the castle, it protected the new town of 1284. Much of the town wall can still be walked along, giving views onto the medieval street plan within.

Conwy Castle is a linear enclosure, its plan dictated by the spur of rock upon which it is built, and the main entrance was up an enormous stone ramp and over a drawbridge. The castle is divided by a cross wall into two wards, the inner being almost square, which allowed either ward to be defended independently. The curtain wall has eight majestic mural towers, and access was through one of two barbicans at either end, both of which carry stone machicolations, the earliest such surviving examples in Britain. Four towers made up the inner ward along with buildings containing the royal apartments. These, including a chapel, are still visible in the east barbican, which overlooks what was once the "Queen's garden." The Great Hall, in the outer ward, is some 125 feet (38 meters) in length and curves along the castle wall following the rock from which it sprang. Traces of the original white lime wash can still be found on the exterior of the



Conway Castle. The suspension bridge was a nineteenth-century addition. VIEWS OF LANDSCAPE AND ARCHITECTURE IN WALES, PRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

castle walls. In 1295 Edward I himself was unsuccessfully besieged in Conwy Castle by Madog, and the castle only fell to the Welsh during the rebellion of 1401 owing to a clever ruse.

Harlech (begun 1283–completed 1289). Owing to its form, preservation, and site, Harlech Castle, which was begun during the second Welsh campaign of Edward I, is one of the finest examples designed by Master James of Saint George. Although the smallest of the new castles, it cost over £8,184. The castle is perched dramatically high on cliffs 200 feet (60 meters) above sea level atop an outcrop of rock. In this superb setting the castle seems to grow from the landscape itself. It had a garrison of some thirty-six men, including a constable and ten “crossbowmen.”

Harlech is a concentric castle of square plan, although the outer curtain wall is mostly leveled. The inner wall has huge round towers at each corner and a massive fortified twin-towered gatehouse on the east front, the only entrance to the inner ward. Originally the gatehouse could only be reached after ascending a stone ramp (as at Conwy Castle), but this was replaced (in 1323–1324) by a double drawbridge built over the deep rock-cut dry moat. The gatehouse, of three doors, three portcullises, “murder holes,” and arrow-loops, had to be negotiated before gaining access to the inner ward. The living quarters are well situated, and perhaps it is no coincidence that Master James was constable of Harlech between 1290 and 1293, quite possibly residing in the lodgings designed by himself within this great gatehouse, together with his wife, Ambrosia. Harlech Castle used to overlook the sea, and the vital connection to the sea below, used to keep the castle supplied, was made by the “Way from the Sea,” some 127 steps that led from a water gate protected by two artillery platforms.

In 1294 Harlech was unsuccessfully besieged by the Welsh during the Madog rebellion. Following a protracted siege between 1401 and 1404 the castle was captured by Owain Glyn Dŵr and the Welsh, with help from a French fleet that cut off access by sea. After a siege begun by the English (led by future Henry V, r. 1413–1422) in 1408, the castle fell in 1409.

During the Wars of the Roses (1455–1485) Harlech Castle was held from 1461 by Lancastrian forces (traditionally the “Men of Harlech” in the song of the same name) against Yorkist besiegers until they surrendered in 1468.

Caernarfon (phase one, 1283–1292; phase two, 1294–1330). Caernarfon was the last castle begun during Edward I's second Welsh campaign, and it was also built to be the administrative center of English royal government in Wales and a royal palace. Caernarfon castle, together with its walled new town and harbor, cost around £27,000 to build. It is not a concentric castle but, like Conwy, a linear one based upon the rocky outcrop it was built on. It made use of a preexisting eleventh-century Norman motte and, again like Conwy, was originally divided by a cross wall into two wards. The single curtain wall has nine polygonal mural towers, including the three-story Eagle Tower (which was the largest and contained a chapel and a water gate with a small dock), and two twin-towered gateways. The main entrance, the Kings Gate, was an impressive show of “defense in strength,” as it involved crossing a drawbridge and then passing through an area comprising five gates, six portcullises, numerous arrow-loops, “murder-holes” in the ceiling, a dogleg turn, and a (never completed) final drawbridge. The walls of the castle have two stories of intramural passages, and many of the arrow-loops that appear as a single loop on the exterior are designed to allow multiple shots from the interior. The plan of the medieval new town still survives, as does much of the 800-yard (734-meter) long medieval town wall, with its two twin-towered gatehouses and eight towers.

The sheer scale of Caernarfon Castle exudes power, and the curtain wall, with its geometric walls and towers and horizontal bands of red sandstone, deliberately evoke Constantinople (Istanbul), the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, and its fifth-century walls. The stone sculptures of eagles on the Eagle Tower may also symbolize imperial Rome as well as echoing a story from the Welsh epic the *Mabinogion*. These eagles may once have been gilded. The castle was the birthplace of Edward of Caernarfon, future Prince of Wales and Edward II, in 1284. In 1294 the

castle and town were sacked by the Welsh during the Madog rebellion, and in 1403–1404 the English castle garrison, reduced to twenty-eight, fended off repeated assaults by Owain Glyn Dŵr, causing some three hundred casualties. Caernarfon Castle still plays a part in the constitutional affairs of Great Britain as the site of the Investiture of the Princes of Wales, the last in 1969.

Beaumaris (phase one, 1295–1298; phase two, 1306 to about 1330; town walls, after 1407). Beaumaris is the last, largest, and single most expensive castle to be built by Master James (then in his fifties or sixties) for Edward I. It cost at least £14,500. Beaumaris (which means “fair marsh”) was never completed, nor was the accompanying fortified town to the southeast. It was probably planned as part of the building program of 1283 but was not built because of the lack of resources at that time. If Caernarfon was the administrative center of Edward I’s North Wales, then Beaumaris was its commercial one.

The plan of the castle is concentric and almost perfectly symmetrical. Because the ground was open and there was no previous building footprint to influence the design, the result is the most perfect example of this form of castle. The rather squat profile belies its spacious floor area of 3 hectares (.75 acre), which was built to include generous accommodation.

The castle is surrounded by an 18-foot- (5.5-meter) wide water-filled moat, fed from the Menai Strait, which, for the most part, still survives. So does the attached fortified sea-dock, which could accommodate ships of up to forty tons, making it the ideal image of what a “real” castle should look like. The entrance to the castle consisted of fourteen obstacles, including a dogleg turn to access the south barbican, upon which was a shooting gallery. The main gatehouse itself has two sets of doors and three portcullises. The six towers of the inner ward are connected, like Caernarfon, by intramural passages, and the outer wall had twelve towers and two twin-towered gatehouses. The town walls, of which only few fragments survive, were built later than the castle. In 1403 Beaumaris fell to Owain Glyn Dŵr

and the Welsh, but in 1405 it was regained by the English.

[See also Edward I of England; Fortifications, *subentry on* Overview; and Roses, Wars of the.]

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Robert C. Woosnam-Savage

WERGILD

See Blood-feud.

WERNER

(d. 1353), Duke of Urslingen. Werner of Urslingen was the second son in an aristocratic but impoverished noble Swabian family that had inherited the title of a duke of Spoleto. This was the reason for his decision to become, together with his elder brother, a soldier. In 1337 he served the republic of Venice. After peace was concluded, the demobilized veterans of this war established a mercenary company in 1338/1339. Though there is no direct evidence, most authors claim that Werner was one of its commanders. In 1342 he recruited troops in Tuscany and formed the self-named Great Company. Afterwards he invaded Lombardy, where he was bought off. In this context an Italian chronicler claims that Urslingen wore a breastplate showing his reputed motto: “Guarnieri, signore della gran compagna, nimico di Dio di pietà e di misericordia” (Werner, commander of the great company, the enemy of God, of pity, and of mercy).

In 1347 he entered the service of Louis I the Great, King of Hungary, whom he assisted in obtaining possession of Naples. Urslingen effectively exploited shifting allegiances for his own benefit and returned from southern Italy in 1350 with great booty. After short-term service to Bologna and the pope he left Italy in 1351. He died in Germany on 5 February 1353.

Urslingen was posthumously credited with having founded the so-called Great Company. Attributing the company's creation to his efforts is certainly not correct. However, by his social and military reputation he formed, out of a group of professional soldiers and freebooters, a well-knit company, which under his command possessed a remarkable esprit de corps. It was this firm team spirit that gave further armies operating under the same name an element of continuity.

[See also Condottieri; Great Companies; Louis I of Hungary; and Mercenaries.]

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Stephan Selzer

WESTROZEBEKE, BATTLE OF

Following the success of the battle of Bevershoutsveld against their Flemish rival, Bruges, earlier in 1382, the rebellious Ghentenaar army prepared to face the French force approaching Flanders to put down the rebellion. Philip van Artevelde, son of the earlier fourteenth-century rebel leader Jacob van Artevelde, was the leader of the rebels, although it seems that his role may have derived more from this filial relationship than from his ability to lead a military force.

Having only barely escaped after Bevershoutsveld, the Count of Flanders, Louis de Male—the object of the Ghentenaar rebellion—traveled to Paris to petition his father-in-law, Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, and the new French king, Charles VI, to assist him in regaining his county. They gathered

their forces and marched to Flanders. Peace was offered to the rebels, but it was refused. Instead, the Ghentenaars marched to Westrozebeke (also known as Rosebeke), between Ghent and Ypres, where a few days later, on 26 November 1382, the Franco-Burgundian forces fought a battle against them.

In describing what occurred at Westrozebeke, the best source is Jean Froissart's *Chroniques* (Book III), which was written a short time after the battle and is based on eyewitness accounts. It is decidedly pro-French, as are the slightly later but equally detailed accounts in the *Chronique de Flandre*, Jean Juvenal des Ursins's *Histoire de Charles VI*, and the *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis*. These all describe a battle where the Franco-Burgundian army was very large, between twenty thousand and forty thousand, while the Flemish rebels probably numbered fewer, over twelve thousand, although the latter seem to have possessed a much greater number of gunpowder artillery pieces, used to recent advantage at Bevershoutsveld. The Flemings also had good morale and were very well organized. They were further encouraged by Masses and religious orations the morning of the battle.

The battle of Westrozebeke began when a thick fog covered the battlefield. The Flemings were positioned in their customary formation, a long solid line of infantry. The Franco-Burgundians faced them with their own infantry, formed in a line (or two, according to some sources) with two wings, their cavalry positioned behind them. No archery exchange occurred at the onset of the battle, probably an indication that there were few archers in either army or of how thick the fog was. Instead, the battle commenced with a Flemish charge into the Franco-Burgundian line, the Flemish leaders likely believing that the fog would obscure their movements. And initially, the rebels were victorious, pushing their enemy's line back and causing some of its soldiers to flee. But a counterattack by the Franco-Burgundian wings and cavalry stopped the Flemish advance and sent them into rout. In this, it seems, the royal and ducal forces were aided by the sudden lifting of the fog, which they interpreted as having resulted from the unfurling of the oriflamme,

the sacred standard of the French, said to mean that God was on their side. The Franco-Burgundians then fought with renewed vigor, quickly driving the rebels from the field.

Flemish casualties were significant, some chroniclers suggesting that more than half of the total numbers were killed. This is undoubtedly too high, although it is certain that Philip van Artevelde was slain in the battle. Casualties among the Franco-Burgundians were not tallied by contemporaries but also seem to have been significant, enough to keep Charles VI and Philip the Bold from advancing on Ghent. The rebellion would continue until the successful Burgundian siege of Ghent in 1385.

[See also Artevelde, Philip van; Bevershoutsveld, Battle of; Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479); and Philip the Bold.]

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Kelly DeVries

WILLEM VAN JÜLICH

Willem van Jülich (Gulik in Dutch) was the son of Willem V van Jülich and Maria, the daughter of Guy de Dampierre, Count of Flanders. Two years after his grandfather had been imprisoned by the French king Philip IV (the Fair) for treason, Willem—sometimes called “the Younger” to distinguish him from his father—came to prominence when he and his uncle, Guy of Namur, joined the 1302 Flemish rebellion against the king. It is not known how old he was at the time, but his capabilities as a military leader were recognized the following 11 July at the battle of Courtrai. Although only one of the leaders of the Flemings, he certainly was among the chief tacticians there, and following that victory he took

over the generalship of the largest rebel army, leading them through the next two years. In 1303 at the battle of Arques, the Flemings again defeated the French, but in 1304, at the battle of Mons-en-Pève, after a daylong engagement and suffering numerous casualties, the rebels were defeated. During the fighting Willem van Jülich died, from fatigue and thirst if the account in the *Annales Gandenses* (Annals of Ghent)—which is very critical of the young general—is accurate.

[See also Arques, Battle of; Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Low Countries, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1479); and Mons-en-Pève, Battle of.]

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Kelly DeVries

WILLIAM OF YPRES

(c. 1090–1165), Flemish nobleman. William of Ypres is often described as one of the Middle Ages' first mercenary captains. Such a description is essentially true, but the full picture of his activities and of the networks in which he operated shows the growing complexity of medieval military developments.

William's first prominent appearance came in March 1127 after the assassination of Charles, Count of Flanders. An illegitimate member of the comital family, William forcefully pressed his claim to the title. He understood the growing role of money and towns in medieval warfare, occupying Ypres and forcing the merchants there to swear him loyalty. He came into possession of funds by which he hired three hundred mounted warriors. He claimed the money came from Henry I of England; his detractors said it was a gift from the king's assassins.

Regardless, he joined the English king's opposition to William Clito's accession to the title of count of Flanders, thereby partnering for the first time with Henry's nephew Stephen of Blois.

William's claim ended a month later when he and his forces sallied out from Ypres to break the siege of William Clito and Louis VII. The attack appears to have been hard fought, but it came to nothing when townsmen opened another gate in a prearranged surrender to the French king and his appointee. William endured a brief period of captivity and then went through several stormy years with the eventual count, Thierry. When Thierry exiled William in 1133, he sought out his former ally Stephen.

Stephen's seizure of the English throne in 1135 brought an immediate rise in William's fortunes. The exile commanded the troops, many of them Flemish soldiers, with whom Stephen bolstered his claim to the royal title. The number and quality of these troops are unknown, but are known to have included one of William's brothers and an exiled castellan, which argues for a mounted force of some talent and men conversant with aristocratic military conventions. Although the nature of their payment is clouded by the lack of contemporary pipe rolls, the chief supposition is that William was given control of Kent and its revenues for the maintenance of these troops.

In Normandy, William's efforts for Stephen backfired when local magnates refused to work with him. Back in England, William's forces seem to have given a decent account of themselves at the battle of Lincoln, but William led them away when it became obvious the battle was lost. This naturally led to severe criticism, but William redeemed himself in the ensuing months by supporting Stephen's queen vigorously. He had a leading role at the siege of Winchester, and was in action during the two big defeats of the empress Matilda's troops that eventually saw King Stephen freed.

Like his fellow magnates, William engaged in larceny and extortion. Unlike his fellow magnates, he fueled extra resentment because he was a foreigner. He was not forgiven, even after blindness ended his active military career, and he was banished from

England in 1157 by the new king, Henry II. He retired to Flanders where substantial gifts made earlier to monasteries yielded him a final sanctuary.

[See also Lincoln, Battle of and Stephen of England.]

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Steven Isaac

WILLIAM I

(1028–1087), Duke of Normandy and (from 1066) King of England. William I, "the Conqueror," was one of the preeminent warriors of his day. Best known for his victory over Harold Godwinson, King of England, at the battle of Hastings on 14 October 1066, William's was the first of the reigns of the Anglo-Norman kings.

A dominant view of William's generalship holds that his brilliant success was achieved through the exercise of his authority. Strong control over his men and sheer force of will allowed him to claim victory in unlikely circumstances. This was highlighted most clearly at Hastings, when he regained his mount and rallied his Breton cavalry, which had been repulsed by the Anglo-Saxon shield wall and was fleeing through his ranks. This event indicates other recognized aspects of his generalship: courage and an ability to carry on a fight in adverse conditions.

William had acquired sufficient reputation in the continental wars of his early career as duke of Normandy that by 1066 those men loyal to him,

as well as his foes, respected his abilities. He had campaigned with great success in and around Normandy since the 1040s while solidifying his tentative control of the duchy. He defeated Guy of Burgundy in 1047 at the battle of Val-ès-Dunes, captured Arques from rebels in 1053, and survived two invasions by the allied forces of Henry I, King of France, and Geoffrey II Martel, Count of Anjou, in 1054 and 1057, respectively. In 1063 William invaded and conquered Maine, a victory he followed with an ambitious but unsuccessful invasion of Brittany the next year. By 1066 he had amassed a superior record that would nonetheless be eclipsed by his invasion of England.

In many ways the battle of Hastings was the defining moment in William's military career. A victory of world-historical proportions, it gained him a crown and enduring legacy. From a tripartite formation of Breton, French, and Norman cavalry he launched multiple charges towards his enemies. The duke rallied his dispirited men, engineered either one or two feigned retreats (a complicated maneuver in what was a constrained field of battle), and annihilated Godwinson's formidable shield wall. Yet Hastings also revealed William's shortcomings. The battle dragged on for several hours as he sought a way through the Anglo-Saxon defenses. Historians have also criticized his lack of tactical sense for ordering an uphill charge into formed infantry and for failing to coordinate the attacks of his missile troops, infantry, and cavalry until late in the battle.

Regional control was central to William's military planning. More often than not he declined battle, preferring to ravage farms and villages, capture provisions, and build and garrison castles, thereby controlling territory through logistical control—the so-called “Vegetian” manner of war. Thus were created the Marcher earldoms of Chester, Hereford, and Shrewsbury on the Welsh frontier, and his ambitious program of fortress construction included not only the famous White Tower in London but at least seventy-five other named castles in England alone. Many of these (such as Chepstow in Gwent) were constructed out of stone.

Even so, events often forced the king's hand, and William did not hesitate to march on campaign when necessary. The north, for example, required direct intervention. In the late 1060s William moved to intercept forces of Welsh, Scots, and Scandinavians, some of whom had joined with the pretender Edgar the Aetheling. In the so-called “Harrying of the North,” William won a series of skirmishes and battles, built castles, and captured Lincoln and York; in 1072, he received the submission of Malcolm III MacDuncan, King of Scotland. Throughout his campaigns William won a reputation for brutality: he cut off the hands and feet of a captured castle garrison, killed prisoners of war, and devastated local landscapes.

William's military career was not one of complete success. He fared poorly in the later stages of his reign. In 1076 he was defeated at Dol by Ralph, earl of Norfolk, and thereafter he faced two separate rebellions of his son Robert Curthose, who had cobbled together alliances of French, Angevin, and Breton warriors in his attempts to gain personal control of Normandy. Telling were the large numbers of mercenaries in William's armies in the 1080s. Although William had used hired soldiers in the past, his reliance upon them suggests that the thesis of his dominant authority over feudal subjects ought not to be pushed too far. William bequeathed his lands to his eldest sons Robert (Normandy) and William Rufus (England), an action that initiated a series of wars over the Anglo-Norman regnum.

[See also Bayeux Tapestry; Britain, *subentry on* Narrative (1000–1300); Castles, *subentry on* (1150–1350); Cavalry; Hastings, Battle of; Logistics and Transportation; Norman Conquests, Norman Expansion; Robert II Curthose of Normandy; and Vegetius.]

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John D. Hosler

WOMEN AS COMBATANTS

There are many reports of women taking part in military activities in medieval sources, but few studies discussing matters such as their military objective or what training, if any, the women had for the undertaking. Although the accounts are affected by gender in addition to the writer's literary inclinations and which side the women were fighting on, it has been possible to analyze some of the reports.


Reports of women in combat, physically engaging the enemy rather than exercising command or supply functions, turn up in a number of Crusade narratives. The Third Crusade provides what is probably the best-known example, thanks largely to lively descriptions coming from the Muslim historians Beha al-Din and Imad al-Din. Both report finding women among the dead on the field after an abortive attack on al-Adil's camp on 25 July 1190 and hearing of other women killed or captured in the same action. During an attack on the crusaders' siege camp outside Acre on 2 July 1191, a woman archer is reported to have wounded a number of attackers before being killed. Her wooden bow was presented to Saladin, who marveled, whether at the woman's skill in archery or the crudeness of her weapon is unclear. In contrast, the Christian reports of women in action are reticent: a woman killed while working on an engineering project, some shipwrecked Turks butchered by women—who did it badly because of lack of both physical strength and proper weapons.

During the Fifth Crusade, Christian writers report that at the siege of Damietta in 1219 almost everyone in the camp, including women and merchants, was liable for guard duty with penalties for failure to perform or carry weapons while on duty. Al Malik al-Kamil's attempt to relieve the city by the bold move of sending troops and supplies right through the siege camp when the Templars and Hospitallers were at prayer failed when a woman, presumably on assigned guard duty and appropriately armed, spotted them and raised the alarm. Very few got through to the city, and even fewer escaped alive. Some accounts report that the fugitives were killed by the women of the camp. Muslim writers do not mention the presence of women who were alive and victorious after the action.

Further accounts come from the Baltic Crusades. When Duke Swantopelk of Pomerania moved against Elbing in 1245, the women prepared to defend the town. Because "nowhere was the fragility of their sex apparent" the duke believed the brothers of the Teutonic Order had returned and gave up his attack. There are also reports of women taken as captives who rose up against their captors and freed themselves.

To these can be added such incidents as the extraordinarily lucky women operating the petraria (rock-throwing machine) that killed Simon IV of Montfort at the siege of Toulouse on 25 June 1218 during the Albigensian Crusade. Margaret of Beverly, who had the extraordinarily bad luck to fulfill her crusading vow in Jerusalem just as it came under siege by Saladin, fought from the walls of the city wearing makeshift armor. In 1305 the women defended the walls of a castle held by the Catalan Company at Gallipoli, although against the Genoese, not the Turks.

What these varied descriptions have in common is the ad hoc nature of the activity. The usual male authority figures are absent or unable to function effectively. The women combatants are not noblewomen commanding their own troops, but commoners who had at best rudimentary preparation. Most lack proper equipment, and run a high risk of death or injury.



Women as Combatants. The women of Scythia attack soldiers in a tower with picks, axes, and stones. Illustration from *Histoire universelle*, MS Add. 15268, fol. 101v, c. 1286. BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS, FRANCE/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY INTERNATIONAL

The Crusade reports have been more intensively studied, but there are numerous similar descriptions. In the Hundred Years' War and the Hussite Wars, women of the commons took part in the defense of fortifications or even fought in the field. According to chronicler Thomas Walsingham, women of the countryside around Dartmouth took part in the defeat of a French amphibious raiding force. A group of 156 women is reported among the Bohemian Hussites taken prisoner after an attack on Prague. The fifteenth-century Chronicle of Diebold Schilling the Elder includes a depiction of two women halberdiers and a handgunner. Most of these women remain anonymous, but not even Big Margot, the Flemish standard bearer who fell at the battle of Westrozebeke in 1382, has achieved the fame of Joan of Arc, seen as the paramount woman warrior of the Middle Ages.

The line between combatant and noncombatant is tenuous even when the combatants are noblewomen. Sichelgaita of Salerno was a middle-aged mother of ten when she is first reported taking an active role in military actions. In 1081 at Dyrrachium she rallied troops whose formation had been broken and was wounded in the action. Like her

sister-in-law, Judith of Evreux, the wife of Roger I of Sicily, she acted in coordination with her husband, Robert Guiscard. Some women have a substantial military record. Matilda of Tuscany fought two wars against Emperor Henry IV. The emperor deposed her in 1081, and she had no heir, yet at her death in 1115 she was still in control of her large territories despite rebellions and the rise of the communes. There is no direct description of her taking part in a battle although "she openly led the life of a soldier," and was clearly the leader of the papal party. A statement that she fought "even to blood" (*usque ad sanguinem*) indicates that she was wounded at least once.

[See also Acre, Siege of; Damietta, Siege of; Joan of Arc; Toulouse, Sieges of; and Westrozebeke, Battle of.]

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Valerie Eads

WORRINGEN, BATTLE OF

The battle of Worringen, on 5 June 1288, decided the Limburg war of succession. Ermengard, the daughter and heir of the last Limburg duke, Walram IV, had died in 1283. In addition to her husband, Count Reinald of Guelders, Count Adolf VIII of Berg, a nephew of Duke Walram, and several other local nobles also laid claim to the dukedom. As a result of the intervention of John I, Duke of Brabant, and the archbishop of Cologne, Siegfried von Westerburg, the succession dispute turned into a war for dominance at the lower Rhine. This war, which devastated large portions of Limburg, continued, with interruptions, from 1283 to 1288. In the battle of Worringen, the duke of Brabant and his allies—chiefly the counts of Berg, Looz, and Jülich, as well as the citizens of Cologne—defeated the archbishop and his followers, the counts of Guelders and Luxembourg. Limburg fell to Brabant, the political supremacy of the archbishops of Cologne over the lower Rhine came to an end, and the city of Cologne was able to free itself from episcopal control.

The historical sources for this battle are good, but also problematic. The Middle Dutch verse chronicle of Jan van Heelu offers an extraordinarily detailed description in over four thousand verses, with numerous military details. This allows a very concrete look at this battle in particular and thirteenth-century war in general, especially as it includes not only descriptions of individual actions, but also corresponding tactical explanations. The chronicle is a problematic source, however: Heelu writes as a partisan of the victors in the battle.

The purpose of his poem was to make the language of John II of Brabant, son of John I, more accessible to his wife, the English princess Margaret: It is a hymn of praise to the Duke of Brabant, depicting a knightly ideal that the duke of the chronicle fulfills in every respect. The text dates from 1290, so that Heelu was a contemporary of the battle—even an eyewitness, many historians suspect—and could support his narrative with information from the Brabançon camp. The bias in his account is less of an issue than his focus on his heroes' knightly deeds and the fact that his verse form often makes his narrative hard to understand. Despite these reservations, the verse chronicle remains the best source for reconstructing the course of the battle.

The battle was fought on the Fühlinger heath, about six miles northwest of Cologne. The battlefield was flat, and therefore well suited to the deployment of mounted fighters. Of decisive significance were the few roads that crossed the heath: because of the ditches running alongside them, they formed an obstacle to riders. The archbishop's coalition advanced toward the Duke of Brabant's troops from the south, from the direction of Brauweiler, to raise the siege of the city of Worringen, a dependency of Cologne. John of Brabant had penetrated deep into his opponent's territory, and Siegfried von Westerburg wanted to exploit this to strike a decisive blow. According to Heelu, he announced to his men that "a great whale" had wandered onto his land, and they were to kill it and distribute the pieces. The two armies met on 5 June. The sources offer comparatively good estimates of the troop strengths: John of Brabant is said to have led, all together, about twenty-three hundred armored cavalry and twenty-five hundred infantry into battle, the latter consisting of citizens of Cologne and peasants belonging to the Count of Berg. The archbishop's side had about twenty-eight hundred cavalry and fourteen hundred infantry at its disposal; they thus had a cavalry advantage over their opponents. Both armies fought in a three-part formation. John of Brabant had his knights in the center; the counts of Berg and Mark, and the Cologne and Berg infantry, formed the left wing; the counts of Looz and

Jülich, the right. Siegfried von Westerburch personally commanded his army's right wing; the Count of Luxembourg and his brothers were in the center; and the Count of Guelders on the left wing. As the battle began with the advance of the archbishop's wing, the Brabançon forces stood on a rise and observed how Siegfried approached the Count of Berg and his infantry. Clearly he wanted to attack the treacherous citizens of Cologne first. This attack put the Cologne contingent to flight with heavy losses; the cavalry under the Count of Berg withdrew—which is to say, retreated—from the archbishop. Siegfried was unable to strike his opponent's left wing decisively. In this situation, the archbishop decided to attack his opponent's center. To do this, however, he needed to cross a road, which threw his formation into disorder. Heelu depicts one of the Duke of Brabant's men exulting over this: The enemy could not win the battle because they had broken ranks. The great importance of a closed formation for the success of a cavalry attack is shown here. In this connection, the chronicler reports a dispute among the men of Brabant. They see themselves in contrast to the superior strength of the archbishop's and Luxembourgers' division; up to this point, the archbishop's army had clearly formed a single large combat unit, advancing on the Brabançon center en masse and were obviously numerically superior. Some of the Brabançon soldiers wanted to react to this situation by spreading out, so as to avoid being encircled. Others, on the contrary, were in favor of closing ranks, because only a massing of their own troops could stop the enemy's breakthrough. The latter opinion prevailed, and John of Brabant led his riders downhill to the attack. While the Brabant troops struck the center with the Luxembourg-archbishop contingent, part of the Guelders division pushed into the Brabançon camp and plundered it. This action partly reduced the numerical superiority of the archbishop's army. The Guelders cavalry was largely neutralized by the counts of Jülich and Looz. The decisive action, however, took place in the center. Here the archbishop was unable to break

through the Brabançon battle lines. Instead, Henry IV, Count of Luxembourg, and his brothers fell. The counts of Jülich and Looz also intervened in the center, so that Siegfried's party fell into increasing distress. The Count of Berg and the Cologne soldiers returned to the battle and struck the archbishop's flank. The infantry, reports Heelu, could not tell the coats of arms of the noble warriors apart, so at first killed friend and foe indiscriminately, until they were led against the enemy by a Brabançon squire. The archbishop and the Count of Guelders were taken prisoner; the wagon carrying the archbishop's banner was destroyed. The foot soldiers went across the battlefield killing and looting. The victory of John of Brabant was complete. The attack of some of the Guelders men on the Brabançon camp and the deaths of the Count of Luxembourg and his brothers were probably the decisive factors in the outcome. The significance of having the nobility as leaders for the functioning of a medieval army can be seen here. The advances of the infantry from Berg and Cologne were not part of the tactical plan, but came about in the course of the battle. The casualties were enormous, confirming the difficulty of the battle: The victors lost six hundred to eight hundred men, the losers around a thousand to twelve hundred.

[See also *Brabançons and Heelu*, Jan van.]

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Martin Clauss

*Translated from the German by
Johanna M. Baboukis*

X, Y, Z

XAINTRAILLES, JEAN POTON DE

(d. 1461), one of several professional soldiers who came to dominate the French effort in the latter stages of the Hundred Years' War. His early career is obscure, although he was a minor noble of Gascon origin and served against the Duke of Burgundy at the siege of Coucy in 1419. He was present at the siege of Orléans, and he accompanied Joan of Arc when she entered the city in April 1429. Along with La Hire, he emerged as one of her most capable lieutenants and was present at the defeat of lords Talbot and Scales at Patay in June.

After the coronation of Charles VII as king of France, Xaintrilles was rewarded with the office of master of king's horse (*grand écuyer*). He was captured by Richard Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, in 1431 and exchanged for Lord Talbot three years later. Like La Hire, his military skill rested principally in the ruthless efficiency with which he was able to keep his men in the field, an attribute demonstrated during his campaign of raids and brigandage in Normandy in 1435. In 1445 he was appointed to the command of the one of the twelve newly formed *compagnies d'ordonnance* and as such participated in the reconquest of Normandy between 1449 and 1450. In recognition of his services, he was appointed governor of Falaise and bore the sword before Charles VII's triumphant procession into Rouen in June 1451.

After Normandy, he took part in the successful Gascon campaign of 1452–1453, becoming governor of Bordeaux Castle, marshal of France in 1454, and governor of Guyenne in 1458. Throughout his career Xaintrilles was fiercely loyal to Charles VII, and, as a result, he was discharged by the new king, Louis XI, on his accession in July 1461. Xaintrilles died later that year in Bordeaux, leaving no heirs.

[See also Charles VII of France; Compagnies d'Ordonnance; Joan of Arc; La Hire; Orléans, Siege of; and Patay, Battle of.]

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David Grummitt

YARMUK, BATTLE OF

The battle of Yarmuk was the culmination of a campaign begun by the emperor Herakleios (Heraclius) in early 636 to finally drive out the Arab-Islamic forces threatening Syria and Palestine. After much maneuvering, the combined imperial field armies of the east and Armenia confronted the Arabs forces in the vicinity of Gabitha or Jabiya, a strategically

important base and camping area for the Ghasanids, Byzantine allies, from which the route south from Damascus could be controlled. The numbers fighting on each side are unknown. A total imperial force of about twenty thousand is probable, with a probably smaller Muslim force against them.

The exact order of events is difficult to determine. Imperial forces commenced a general advance across the entire front on 18 or 19 August, starting at about midday, perhaps chosen by the Arab commanders as the time at which the Byzantine forces would suffer most from the heat. Byzantine forces were strategically in a good position, but tactically they faced several problems, including broken terrain and the unavoidable fragmentation of their forces by the two wadis (dry riverbeds) which they were crossing. The first day's action produced some initial imperial success but ended with Herakleios's forces driven in on their left (northern) wing and a wedge of Muslim troops occupying the space between these units and the Byzantine center. The situation worsened when, in a surprise night attack, the Muslim forces were able to storm and capture the imperial camp at Yaqusa, driving those detachments positioned around it to flight in the broken terrain of the wadis.

This defeat meant that the main divisions of the imperial army were cut off from the left wing and were without any prospect of an orderly withdrawal because they were now boxed into the area between the Wadi al-Ruqqad and the Wadi al-'Allan on the west and east and the Wadi al-Yarmuk on the south. On the morning of 20 August 636, with the approach of a strong Muslim contingent from the north (from a location supposedly occupied by imperial troops) and the advance of the Muslim troops that had taken their main camp at Yaqusa, the main divisions were rapidly driven to panic, and a complete rout began. At some point a sandstorm blew up, and all semblance of cohesion was lost. Many men and animals perished in attempts to flee across the steep-sided and broken terrain along the Wadi al-Ruqqad to their west and the Yarmuk to the south. Many soldiers and their officers cast aside their

arms and sat down to await capture, but it seems that the Muslim commanders had issued orders that no prisoners be taken, so those who followed this course of action were cut down where they waited. Pursuit was merciless, and although many managed to escape the scene of the catastrophe, there are reliable reports in several sources of Muslim units chasing Byzantine troops as far as Damascus and beyond—even as far as Emesa to the north—and cutting them down. The imperial army effectively ceased to exist.

[See also Byzantine Empire, *subentry* on Narrative (500-900) and Herakleios.]

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John Haldon

YOUTH

[This entry contains two subentries, on youth before 1000 and after 1000.]

Before 1000

Archaeological and documentary sources suggest that elite boys would begin training in the use of weaponry, particularly spears, from the age of about five. It is at this age that small spearheads were associated with some children in the early Anglo-Saxon burial ritual, for example. Law codes indicate that, in the early medieval period, ages ten to twelve marked a transition from childhood to adulthood in legal and ritual terms: it is at this age that boys could take control of their property if they were orphans, swear oaths of allegiance, and be held culpable for

their own crimes. This is also the age at which light weapon sets of spears and shields begin to appear in the Anglo-Saxon furnished burial ritual, indicating that, at least in ritual terms, boys from this age could hold warrior status in society.

For elite, secular males, the documentary sources indicate that the period between the mid-teens and mid-twenties marked the most likely phase of active participation in violent activities. Early medieval Irish sources indicate that youths of this age (*fer midboth*, "men of the middle houses") were considered too old to remain in the family home, but too young to have inherited or acquired the wealth to establish their own families, and there is some evidence that youths elsewhere in medieval Europe occupied a similarly transitional social position. It was these youths who formed the bulk of the gangs, war bands, and household armies that prosecuted the violent raids and feuds characteristic of the early medieval period: it was at fifteen, for example, that the young seventh-century English saint Guthlac took up his spear and spent the next ten years leading a successful war band.

The vocabulary used to describe male youths emphasizes the fluidity of their social position. In Old English terms, for example, a male youth might be called *cniht* (knight) or *cnapa* (knave)—words encapsulating ideas of childhood, apprenticeship, and warrior activity. Through participation in violent activities, young men could access the power, prestige, and wealth required to progress to marriage, landholding, and adulthood, but there was no fixed end to "youth": social status, wealth, and opportunity as well as age determined when, and if, one of the "lads" would become a social adult.

[See also Children.]

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Sally Crawford

After 1000

During the battle of Hastings on 14 October 1066, a rumor spread through the Norman ranks that their leader Duke William—in reality, soon to be crowned William I of England and nicknamed "the Conqueror"—had been killed. At this point William's half-brother, Bishop Odo of Bayeux, encouraged the "boys" (*confortat pueros*) fighting for the duke. These "boys" were probably young men (*iuvēnes*), many of whom had never fought in a battle before. The confusion and uncertainty of medieval battle tested their mettle and the effectiveness of the military training they had undergone since boyhood. Training itself could be dangerous, and there were fatalities among young men being prepared for war. Youths were a significant element in medieval armies, especially among the chivalric elite. They were sometimes dubbed knights in recognition of their bravery on campaign.

Since the work of Duby the more disruptive character of youth has been emphasized. In warfare young men had to be restrained from launching premature attacks or, as at Hastings, from fleeing at the first sign of defeat. Wandering bands of young men took advantage of conditions on medieval Europe's frontiers to establish lordships and force their way into the local landholding elites. More recent work suggests that many youths were also prepared to serve loyally in their fathers' households and wait patiently for the chance to establish their own lordships. Important in the culture of these youthful war bands was a sense of group solidarity or honor. Such bonds were vital throughout the period as success in battle and on campaign often depended on cooperation in small groups. Ties formed during youthful adventures could shape future political allegiances. Courtly literature reflected the aspirations of this

social group and provided role models. If the ritual of dubbing was seen as the rite of passage into this period of a young man's life, then marriage and the establishment of an independent household marked his attainment of full adult status.

[See also Children; Hastings, Battle of; Knighthood and Knights; Training; and William I of England.]

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William M. Aird

YPRES, SIEGE OF

During the fifty years of almost constant fighting between France and England that defined the first half of the Hundred Years' War, the County of Flanders was torn between the economic need for English wool to support its cloth-making industry and political loyalties to France that its counts and others had. Parts of the county, led by the city of Ghent, had already rebelled once during this period, from 1338 to 1346, while another rebellion, also led by Ghent, began in 1379 and would last until 1385. It was in the midst of this rebellion that a strange and notably ineffective campaign took place, the "Crusade" of Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich, into Flanders. The strangeness of this campaign derived from the fact that the Bishop of Norwich in crusading against the followers of Pope Clement VII in Avignon, whom he considered a usurper of the papal crown held rightly by Pope Urban VI in Rome, fought against those who believed the same as he.

The Bishop of Norwich's campaign is also noted as one of the most ineffective of the Middle Ages.

The English landed at Calais some time before 17 May 1383 and immediately marched into Flanders. On 19 May they captured Gravelines without conflict and began a siege of Bourbourg, which ended successfully a few days later. Shortly thereafter they captured Dunkirk and after a small skirmish nearby, which they won, turned east toward Ypres, besieging the town from 9 June to 10 August. Here they were joined by soldiers from Ghent; Ypres had recently abandoned the rebellion and its citizens were in favor of returning to French rule.

The English and Ghenteners began the siege with a gunpowder artillery bombardment of the town's fortifications. Although many inside the city were killed as a result, the Yprois decided to hold out against their besiegers, staging impressive displays and processions to build unity against any who wanted to surrender. Despite the intensive bombardment, the fortifications of Ypres held, largely because of the large water-filled moats around the town that separated the bishop's artillery from the walls. They also kept the English from directly assaulting the city. By the beginning of August the bishop's troops had become demoralized and, after a final desperate attack on one of the city's gates, they raised their siege and returned to Calais, leaving behind guns and other military material. In early October the bishop returned to England, where he was tried for abusing indulgences, misusing funds, and personally profiting from his willingness to retreat across the Channel without doing battle with the French.

[See also Hundred Years' War, *subentry* on Costs and Low Countries, *subentry* on Narrative (1300–1479).]

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Kelly DeVries

ZADAR, SIEGE OF

See Zara, Siege of.

ZAHARA, SIEGES OF

The village and castle of Zahara in Cadiz Province, Spain, was one of several fortifications along the eastern border of Castile and Granada and consisted of a typical frontier village, with a fortress atop a strategic point. It was close to the Muslim city of Ronda, and, because of this proximity, Zahara became the target of attacks and frequently changed hands throughout the fifteenth century.

In 1407, the Castilian prince Fernando de Antequera initiated a war against the kingdom of Granada, beginning in September with a deployment of troops numbering in the thousands and consisting of knights and infantry. This force was reinforced by heavy artillery including three bombards. The Christian force attacked several castles along the border with Ronda, including Zahara. Fernando's army surrounded the castle between 26 September and 2 October, using the great cannon to bring down the town walls. The 453 inhabitants of the village and castle surrendered, handing over the fortress in exchange for free passage to Ronda with all their possessions, save for food and weapons.

During the years that followed, the situation along the border continued unstable, and the town of Zahara suffered a severe blow on 5 April 1410, when a traitor informed the Muslims of the absence of the fortress's commander. They scaled the walls, unleashing an attack that killed 114 men; 62 women and 122 children were captured. After pillaging the village, they set the gates on fire. They did not retain the town for long, however, before the Christians recaptured, rebuilt, and repopulated it.

In 1481 Zahara was the stage for an episode that would have an impact on the history of Castile. On 27 or 28 December of that year, the Muslim governors of Ronda were informed by their spies that Zahara was undefended. They deployed three hundred knights and four thousand infantry against the fortress.

During a stormy night, they scaled the walls and took the castle, killing the entire garrison save for the commanding castellan, who was taken prisoner. The Muslims went down to the village and captured 150 inhabitants, and, unlike the assault of 1410, they retained control of the fortress. This invasion and capture of Zahara was the excuse the Catholic monarchs needed to carry out their plans for initiating a final war against the kingdom of Granada.

Zahara remained under the rule of Granada until October 1483, when the Marquess of Cádiz, Rodrigo Ponce de León, took part in an episode typical of military actions along the Christian-Muslim frontier. Ponce de León was a distinguished frontier nobleman of the time, with high political, territorial, and financial ambitions for the Granada borderland. He possessed notable military skills that could be put to royal service or used for his own advancement.

The marquess had a body of spies who were responsible for gathering information concerning the state of readiness among Muslim castles along the border. In this way, he was informed that whenever a Christian contingent approached the town of Zahara, part of the garrison would come out to battle, while the remaining population would gather at the wall to watch the conflict, leaving the fortress unsecured.

This information was enough to give him an idea on how to conquer the town and its castle. On 26 October 1483, he gathered an army of six hundred knights and fifteen hundred infantry. On the following night, he ordered fifty men with scaling ladders, led by the famous *escalador* (wall-climber) Ortega de Prado, to conceal themselves close to the walls. Meanwhile, a group of ten knights approached the town gate while the rest of the force remained under cover. As had happened so often before, the Muslims came out to engage the ten Christian knights in close combat, while the rest of the garrison looked down on this skirmish from atop the walls. Taking advantage of this distraction, the *escaladores* scaled the rear walls. When the Muslims realized they had been tricked, they began to fight the men who were conducting the escalade. At that moment the rest of the army came out of hiding and unleashed an attack on the village gate. Attacked on two fronts, the Muslims

of Zahara fled from the village, heading for refuge in the castle, where they held off Christian attackers for a day and a half.

The Muslim garrison on 29 October finally agreed to a surrender that guaranteed the safe and free passage of the 150 inhabitants. The rapidness of the surprise attack and the capture of the town explains the low number of casualties in the Christian army—only four dead and twenty injured.

[See also Catholic Monarchs, The; Fernando de Antequera; and Iberia, subentry on Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Francisco García Fitz

Translated from the Spanish by Daniella Sforza

ZALLAQAH, BATTLE OF

At the battle of Zallaqah (23 October 1086; alternate spellings Zalaca, Zallaqa, Zallaka; also known as the battle of Sagrajas), an Almoravid army led by the emir Yusuf ibn Tashfin defeated a smaller force led by Alfonso VI, the king of Castile and León (1065–1109). The battle introduced the Almoravids into Iberian politics and sealed the fate of the *taifa* kingdoms, which had ruled Muslim Spain since the end of the caliphate of Córdoba in 1031.

Alfonso VI had imposed tribute (*parias*) on the *taifa* kings and captured the *taifa* kingdom of Toledo in 1085. The remaining *taifa* kings believed that Alfonso was planning to weaken them and then pick them off one by one. They requested military aid

from the Almoravids, a Berber tribe that had established an empire in North Africa. In addition to their bellicose reputation, the Almoravids followed a strict interpretation of the Quran, and the *taifa* kings knew that their new, religiously conservative allies might easily turn on them.

Upon receiving the *taifa* kings' appeal for help, Tashfin collected a Berber army of seven thousand cavalry and crossed to Algeciras in August 1086. There he met al-Mu'tamid al-Allah, the king of Seville, who swelled the Muslim force with some twenty thousand men from the Iberian Peninsula. Tashfin soon realized that the divided and religiously lax *taifa* kings were unreliable allies. He planned his own conquest of Spain, starting with a holy war against Alfonso and eventually ending with the overthrow of the *taifas*.

Alfonso was besieging Zaragoza when he learned of Tashfin's arrival. He lifted the siege and returned to Toledo, where he mustered his army. There are no exact figures for the size of the Christian forces, but estimates include 750 heavy cavalry and an additional 750 lightly armed horsemen as reserves. Alfonso probably thought Tashfin intended to besiege Toledo, and he planned to engage him before he arrived at the city. He caught up with the Almoravid army while it was camped outside the city of Badajoz. Alfonso surmised that Tashfin would have to cross the Guadiana River and would be vulnerable when the Muslim force had its back to the river. Alfonso's frontal cavalry attack scattered the Almoravid army, but Tashfin's flanking movement overran the Christians. Alfonso broke away in a running retreat, arriving seriously wounded two days later in Coria. One count, Rodrigo Muñoz of Galicia, was slain at Zallaqah, and other Galician counts and bishops disappeared from the records after the battle. Alfonso may have lost three hundred knights and all his infantry.

Tashfin did not immediately pursue Alfonso. Instead, he retired to Seville, and then returned to North Africa, believing it too late in the year to continue a campaign. He had defeated Alfonso VI with an army composed of forces from North Africa and Al-Andalus, and he planned to unify al-Andalus under Almoravid rule before proceeding further. Alfonso

spent the rest of his life defending Toledo against the Almoravids.

[See also Al-Andalus; Alfonso VI of Castile; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (500–1100); and Toledo, Siege of.]

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Theresa M. Vann

ZARA, SIEGE OF

The extensively fortified city of Zara (present-day Zadar, Croatia) kept its privileged position among the Dalmatian cities even after the Hungarian occupation of 1105, and it became a theater of a long political and military rivalry between Venice, Hungary, and the political fractions of the cities. The anti-Venetian party in Zara got new support from the Angevin dynasty in Hungary, and the seizure of the city from Venetian dominance became a part of King Louis I of Hungary's strategic plan for founding a new Angevin sphere of interest from Naples as far as Buda. By June 1345, the city recognized the sovereignty of King Louis, and a long siege was launched by the Venetian land and naval forces. On the sea, the Venetians tried to cut the supply lines from the friendly cities, such as Ancona, and to break the chain at the harbor by force. On land, the Venetians concentrated their efforts on building wooden castles (called *bastidas*) for hosting their mercenary troops, as well as siege towers and engines (from 14 September), to cut off the city from its agricultural fields and from supplies, and to make impossible the arrival of the Hungarian relief troops.

Although the daily military activity was recorded by two eyewitness diaries, it is still difficult to determine (1) why the Venetians were unable to conquer the city earlier (they themselves were dissatisfied

with their field army leaders, Pietro de Canale, Marco Giustiniani, and Marin Faliero), and (2) why the strong Hungarian relief contingents could not enter the city. The Hungarian forces, led by Nicholas Alsólendvai Bánfi, ban of Slavonia, first arrived at Zara in November 1345 but soon turned back. In May and June 1346, King Louis I personally approached the city, attacked the biggest Venetian *bastida* in vain, and was forced to withdraw. Some sources suggest the corruption of the Hungarian leaders was to blame, but the failure of the Hungarian troops could be explained mainly by military reasons. For the first time in decades, the Hungarians were meeting Venice's professional mercenary troops, who employed completely unfamiliar infantry tactics, based partly on the *bastida*. To convert the numerical superiority of the Hungarians (often some tens of thousands, mostly light cavalry forces) into military success proved to be impossible. Even after the Hungarian army retreated on 4 July, Zara defended itself with great bravery, but the defenders gradually ran out of food and drink. Their morale eroded, Zara capitulated on 15 December 1346, and a few days later Venetian troops entered the city.

[See also Hungary, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1526) and Louis I of Hungary.]

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László Veszprémy

ZARAGOZA, SIEGE OF

Springing from the first-century military colony of Caesaraugusta, Zaragoza (sometimes spelled Saragossa) emerged as the prime ecclesiastical center in the Ebro River basin during the Roman Empire and even after the Visigothic conquest of Spain in the fifth century. Although attacked on several occasions in the next century by Frankish forces, Zaragoza's formidable fortifications maintained its safety for the next two hundred years. With its fall in 714 to forces of Tariq, the city, called Saraqusta in Arabic, became the capital of the northern march of the Umayyad caliphate in Spain. A dynamic mix of Arabs, Berbers, *mozarabes* (Christians under Muslim rule), and Jews, Zaragoza rapidly became linked to the Abbasid opposition against Umayyad rule. When the city's ruler was threatened by Córdoba in 787, he called for help from his erstwhile ally, the Frankish leader Charlemagne (r. 768–814) who, the next year, led an unsuccessful relief expedition to the city.

With the fall of the caliphate in the eleventh century, Córdoba's governors in Zaragoza gradually sought increasing autonomy from caliphal authority before declaring full independence in 1023. After a century of turbulent self-government in which the city leaders often allied themselves with Aragonese and Castilian sovereigns, the Iberian rulers of the city were driven out and replaced by Almoravid agents. Temporarily pushing Muslim control northward toward Huesca and eastward toward Barcelona over the next few years, the new masters of Zaragoza were suddenly thrown on the defensive by the determined crusading of the Aragonese king, Alfonso I "the Battler" (r. 1104–1134).

Following the examples of his father, Sancho I Ramirez (r. 1063–1094), and his brother, Pedro I (r. 1094–1104), Alfonso methodically prepared for his great conquests by capturing and building fortresses that ringed his main objectives: Lérida and Zaragoza. To increase his manpower for a drive on the latter, the Aragonese king petitioned several southern French nobles for help; their participation was largely guaranteed through the crusade bull issued in 1118 by

Pope Gelasius II (1118–1119). This document granted full indulgence to military participants in the siege and a partial one for those who aided in rebuilding Zaragoza's cathedral. With this kind of ecclesiastical assistance in place, Alfonso led his army southward from Huesca in the spring of 1118. After spending some weeks capturing the castles that ringed Zaragoza, he began the siege of the city in May. After nine months of heavy fighting during which Zaragoza's high walls were severely damaged by artillery and its population driven ever closer to starvation, Alfonso finally gained a prize he had long sought with Zaragoza's surrender on 18 December 1118. He gave the Muslim population mild terms, allowing many of them to stay on as his subjects, and drew new Christian citizens to the city with the promise of political and economic privileges.

The capture of Zaragoza would prove a key moment in the Aragonese reconquest, opening the door for the capture of important cities in the Ebro basin and pointing the way to victory over the wealthy *taifa* (Muslim kingdom) of Valencia.

[See also Alfonso I of Aragon; Charlemagne; Iberia, *subentry on* Narrative (1100–1300); and Reconquest, *Concept of*.]

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Donald J. Kagay

ŽATEC, SIEGE OF

Representatives of Czech and Moravian estates refused to acknowledge the Holy Roman Emperor, Sigismund of Luxemburg, as Czech king in the Čáslav Diet (3–7 June 1421). They elected a government to manage the country until a new nominee for the Czech throne was found; candidates were sought

in Poland and Lithuania. They wanted to appoint Sigismund Korybutowicz, nephew of Władisław Jagiello, king of Poland. Sigismund of Luxemburg decided to take advantage of the disputes between the quarreling Czech and Moravian estates regarding Korybutowicz's election by preparing the Second Hussite Crusade. In the meantime, the Hussites captured the castle of Břlina in northwestern Bohemia and several towns and castles situated nearby. In May 1421 the imperial diet gathered in Nuremberg and, as instructed by Pope Martin V, a crusade against the Hussites was declared. The situation in Bohemia made it even more urgent, and Cardinal Branda and Prince Elector Friedrich of Brandenburg, together with other prince electors, planned to gather crusaders at the beginning of September. These crusaders—most of whom were members of troops put together by Saxon princes—were supposed to fight in northern Bohemia and ward off the Hussite attacks there.

At first the crusaders succeeded in recovering several towns. The Hussites, as they retreated, gathered in Žatec and fortified themselves there; according to one source the defenders numbered six thousand men. The crusaders made three major attempts to storm the defenses—including six waves of assault on 19 September—but each attack was driven off with heavy losses. King Sigismund's promise to send his troops to help the crusaders near Žatec was not fulfilled. On 30 September the Hussites staged a successful sortie, which contributed to the demoralization of the besiegers. On 2 October, having received word of the approach of a Hussite relief army, the crusaders broke camp and retreated out of Bohemia—giving rise to a joke that the crusaders were so pious they could not bear even to look upon a heretic. Their losses during the siege reportedly amounted to two thousand men.

[See also Sigismund of Luxemburg and Slavic Lands, subentry on Narrative (1300–1500).]

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Miloslav Polívka

ZIERIKZEE, NAVAL BATTLE OF

This encounter took place in August 1304 between French and Flemish forces off the island of Schouwen in Dutch Zeeland, near the trading town of Zierikzee. With fewer lasting consequences than the land battle of Courtrai (the battle of the Golden Spurs, 1302), in which the French had suffered a stunning loss, this French victory is of interest for the international composition of the warring parties, the types of vessels, and their tactical deployment.

Philip V of France sought to extend control over Flanders. Zierikzee, located in the lands of John d'Avesnes, Count of Holland and Hainault, and linked by trading ties to England, had been besieged by Guy of Namur, the Count of Flanders. French relief forces were led by Rainier Grimaldi, Prince of Monaco, who had brought eleven Genoese-built galleys and their crews. Grimaldi was supported by Jean Pedrogue of Calais, who had thirty-eight ships, eight formerly active in the Spanish trade. These would have been "round ships" (*grands nef*s) with fore, aft, and top castles.

Early in the engagement, groups of ships in both fleets were linked by rope cables, a tactic more fully documented from galley engagements in the Mediterranean. We do not know how the galleys, initially positioned to the rear, performed in this North Sea context. Galleys would later be a regular feature of English and French fleets.

In the constricted waterway, the battle was chaotic and continued through the night. Stones, bricks, blocks of wood, fire pots, and crossbow bolts were fired before boarding actions led to hand-to-hand

fighting. Some of Pedrogue's vessels ran aground on a sandbar but were freed by the rising tide. Flemish fire ships were carried back by the wind and the same tide against their own forces. Although Guy rammed Grimaldi's flagship, Pedrogue's capture of Guy gave victory to the French, and the siege was lifted.

[See also Courtrai, Battle and Siege of; Galleys; Low Countries, *subentry* on Narrative (1300-1479); and Ships and Sailing.]

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William Sayers

ŽIŽKA, JAN

(c.1376-1424), Hussite captain. Žižka, the greatest Hussite general, was born in southern Bohemia into a minor noble family. First he earned a living as a robber knight (1405), then as a mercenary in the Czech-Austrian disputes of 1407-1409. Thus he gained good military skills, which he improved in the wars of the Teutonic Knights against Władisław Jagiello, king of Poland, on whose side he participated in the victory of Grunwald (1410). He learned to fight in forested and wet terrain and also gained experience in capturing castles and towns and became familiar with the advanced tactics and military skills of the crusaders, with the power of their firearms

(handguns and cannons), and also the strength and fighting methods of Polish and Lithuanian cavalry.

Afterward Žižka joined the Bohemian royal court as a low-ranking officer. He was probably immediately appointed a soldier in the Vyšehrad fortress and had a chance to learn the tactics applied in such a large town as Prague, where the Hussite reform movement was getting stronger; he was interested in and probably participated in Jan Hus's sermons in the Bethlehem Chapel. After Hus was sent to the stake in Konstanz (1415), the influence of his supporters, called "Hussites," grew stronger. Žižka's name is first mentioned in this context in 1419. On 30 July 1419 councilors of the New Town of Prague were removed from power (by defenestration) and violent clashes erupted all over the country. Žižka became one of the leaders of the Prague troops in the battle of Vyšehrad; however, he subsequently had to leave Prague along with the radical Hussites. He stayed in Pilsen, but soon moved to the newly established town of Tábor. On the way to Tábor he conducted his first battle with Catholic troops near Sudoměř (23 March 1420) and defeated them. In Tábor he became one of the two captains managing the stronghold. His military experience proved advantageous when Tábor was built as farmers and poor burghers who arrived in the town had no experience in the construction of a fortress.

Žižka's authority was growing quickly in Prague and outside it especially after the battle of Vítkov (14 July 1420) where he and a small troop he led saved Prague from being captured by crusaders led by Sigismund of Luxemburg, a pretender to the Czech throne. When radical and moderate Hussite priests failed to reach an agreement, Žižka left Prague (summer 1420) and established the Association of Tábor Town and Nobility in southern Bohemia.

This organization was similar to the recently established Prague Association and East-Bohemian Orebite Association. At the end of that year, Žižka became the chief-captain of the Tábor troops. He required order and good sanitation, not only in the town of Tábor but also in its army. In spring 1421 he eliminated the local radical sect of Pikarts (or Adamites) whose free morals endangered the

integrity of the Tábor community. As regards his efforts in the military field, the introduction of a so called "Žižka's Military Order" in spring 1423 is worth mentioning. This document, comprising just a few pages, defined the structure of Hussite troops, their command, rules for lining up of carriages and infantry before a battle, utilization of spies, and distribution of loot.

Even though Žižka did not support extreme radicalism in Tábor or Prague, he did help the Prague troops, led by the priest Jan Želivský, to avoid defeat in a battle near the town of Most in northern Bohemia. After Praguers joined troops of moderate Hussite nobility (1422), Žižka supported the Czech defense against Sigismund's crusade (suffering defeat near Kutná Hora in 1422), but the tension between Prague and Tábor kept growing. It reached its peak in April 1423 when Žižka established a so called "Lesser Tábor" that was separated from Tábor and cooperated mostly with East Bohemian Hussites. In 1423 and 1424 there were many battles between Žižka's troops and Praguers with their noble allies (for example, near Hořice and Malešov). In 1424 the parties reconciled and set off to conquer Moravia. Žižka died on 11 October 1424 near Přebyslav and his supporters started calling themselves Orphans. His name became a part of the Czech national tradition.

Žižka was an extraordinary commander. With his talent for understanding modern warfare, he brought his Hussite troops success in fights of infantry, cavalry, and war-wagons in the central European environment. No other Hussite leader was his equal for preparing a strategy for a war in open terrain, for capturing towns or taking over control of significant territories in the Czech lands and their borders. His military force gave him great political power as well; however, he was not able to fully utilize it in the revolutionary environment.

[See also East Central Europe, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); Grunwald, Battle of; Orders, Military, *subentry on* Northern; Sigismund of Luxemburg; Slavic Lands, *subentry on* Narrative (1300–1500); and Vyšehrad, Siege of.]

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Miloslav Polívka

ZÜRICH, SIEGE OF

The siege of the Swiss city of Zürich in 1444 took place during an intra-Confederation war fought from 1436 to 1450. The origin of this war lay in the competition between the urban region of Zürich and the rural regions of Schwyz and Glarus over the territories of Count Frederick of Toggenburg, who had died childless in 1436 and had controlled extensive possessions in eastern Switzerland. The two rural districts managed to bring the remaining confederated regions into an alliance against their confederation partner, Zürich. The resulting war lasted for years, with varying intensity. Eventually Zürich was able to enlist the aid of the Habsburg ruler Frederick III (r. 1440–1493). Zürich had already been threatened with siege in 1443, after Zürich troops were defeated by Confederation forces in the battle of Saint Jacob on the Sihl. The region around Zürich was laid waste, but no siege was laid. The following spring (1444), Zürich's territory was once again plagued by a war of looting and destruction.

This time, the Confederation forces decided to besiege the city of Zürich, and on 24 June 1444 they surrounded the city with about twenty thousand men. Access to the city was not completely blocked, however; the city could still be entered in two places facing the lake. Zürich, under the command of its chief captain Hans von Rechberg, was well prepared. At first the confederated troops confined themselves

to destroying the countryside around the city and fighting skirmishes with groups of retreating cavalry; simultaneously, the city was bombarded by artillery. On 25 July 1444 the city was attacked by storm, which the Zürich army repelled with little difficulty. Frederick III persuaded the French king to send an Armagnac mercenary army of about forty thousand—unemployed because of a truce concluded that year between France and England—to march against the Confederation under the command of the French dauphin, Louis. A Confederate army of about fifteen hundred was crushed at Saint Jacob on the Birs on 26 August 1444, though the Swiss inflicted heavy casualties before being wiped out. When the news of this defeat reached the besieging Confederation army at Zürich, the siege was lifted, and the troops were moved into defensive positions in anticipation of an Armagnac attack. The latter, however, halted their offensive.

The war between Zürich, allied with Habsburg, and the other confederated regions continued until 1450.

[See also Frederick III of Habsburg, Emperor and Switzerland, *subentry on Narrative*.]

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Oliver Landolt

Translated from the German by Johanna M. Baboukis

TOPICAL OUTLINE OF CONTENTS

This outline provides a general overview of the conceptual scheme of *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, listing the title of each entry and subentry. Because the section headings are not mutually exclusive, certain entries may be listed in more than one section. Entries in the Encyclopedia are organized alphabetically. Entries in this outline are arranged under the following headings:

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Commynes, Philippe de	Gilbert of Mons	Jean le Bel

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 Lambert von Hersfeld
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DIRECTORY OF CONTRIBUTORS

John Aberth

Department of History, St. Michael's College, Vermont

Black Death

Film

Andrew Abram

Department of History, University of Wales Lampeter

Esquire, Armiger, Escuyer, Squire

Monasteries and Monks

Gábor Ágoston

Department of History, Georgetown University

Hungarian Defense System

Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), Siege of

Ottoman Armies and Military Methods

Nicolás Agrait

*Department of History, Long Island University-
Brooklyn*

Alfonso XI of Castile

Algeciras, Sieges of

Argilers, Siege of

Burriana, Siege of

Caballeros Villanos

Fernando de Antequera

Gibraltar, Sieges of (1309, 1333, and 1350)

Heredía, Juan Fernández de

Iberia: Historiography (1300–1500)

Jaime II of Aragon

Manuel, Juan

Salado, Battle of

Adrian Ailes

The National Archives, United Kingdom

Heralds and Heraldry

William M. Aird

*School of History and Archaeology, Cardiff University,
United Kingdom*

Youth: After 1000

Christopher Allmand

University of Liverpool, Emeritus

Desertion

Diplomacy

Hundred Years' War: Causes

Immunity from War

Propaganda

Spies and Intelligence

Vegetius

Reuven Amitai

*Institute of Asian and African Studies, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem*

Baybars I

Mamluks

Saladin

Maurizio Arfaioli

Independent Scholar, Empoli, Italy

Arbedo, Battle of

Pisa, Siege of

David S. Bachrach

Department of History, University of New Hampshire

Tancred

Attila Bárány

University of Debrecen, Hungary

Alba Societas

Auxiliary Peoples, Military

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Esztergom, Siege of

Hausbergen, Battle of

Khazars

Kroissenbrunn, Battle of

Nicopolis, Battle of

Patzinaks

Sigismund of Luxemburg

Toldi, Miklós

John W. Barker

*Department of History, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, Emeritus*

Adrianople, Battle of (1205)
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Amanda Beam

Department of History (Scottish), University of Glasgow
Caerlaverock, Siege of
Neville's Cross, Battle of
Otterburn, Battle of

Adrian R. Bell

*International Capital Market Association (ICMA)
Centre, University of Reading, United Kingdom*
John of Gaunt

David B. Beougher

*Department of Military Science and Leadership,
Eastern Michigan University*
Brian Boru
Ulster Cycle, The

Holger Berwinkel

Political Archive, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin
Frederick I Barbarossa
Henry the Lion
Otto of Freising and Rahewin

Adrian J. Boas

*Department of Archaeology and Department of Land
of Israel Studies, University of Haifa, Israel*
Crusader Castles
Fortified Churches

Sergio Boffa

*Musée Communal d'Archéologie, d'Art et d'Histoire de
la Ville de Nivelles, Belgium*
Ane, Battle of

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Constance B. Bouchard

Department of History, University of Akron
Chivalry: Sources
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D'Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton

*The Medieval Institute and Department of
History, University of Notre Dame*
Orders of Chivalry and Knighthood

Charles R. Bowlus

University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Emeritus
Agrarii Milites
Augsburg, Siege of
Avars

Judith Bronstein

*Department of General History, University of
Haifa, Israel*
Crusades: Historiography (1095–1183)
Crusades: Historiography (1180–1245)

Shirley Ann Brown

*Departments of Humanities and Visual Arts,
York University, Toronto*
Bayeux Tapestry

Stefan Burkhardt

Historisches Seminar, Universität Heidelberg, Germany
Bishops: Overview
Bishops: Sources
Bishops: Historiography
Feudalism in Europe
Frederick II
Otto I

Peter J. Burkholder

Department of History, Fairleigh Dickinson University
Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte, Siege of

Thomas S. Burns

Department of History, Emory University
Roman Heritage: Maximalist Interpretation

William Caferro

Department of History, Vanderbilt University

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Federico Canaccini

Uninettuno University, Italy

Benevento, Battle of
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Niccolò Capponi

Independent Scholar, Florence, Italy

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Simonetta Cerrini

Independent Scholar, Ovada, Italy
Orders, Military: Levantine Orders

Matthieu E. Chan Tsin

Department of Foreign Languages, Coastal Carolina University

Jean de Bueil
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Martin Clauss

University of Regensburg, Germany

Cologne, Siege of (1205–1206)
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John Clements

The Association for Renaissance Martial Arts

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Samuel Cohn, Jr.

University of Glasgow

Cesena, Massacre at

William J. Connell

Department of History, Seton Hall University
Machiavelli, Niccolò

Nadia Covini

*Dipartimento di Scienze della Storia e della
Documentazione Storica, Università degli Studi di
Milano, Italy*
Attendoli, Muzio
Federico da Montefeltro
Malatesta, Sigismondo Pandolfo, and the Malatesta Clan
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Paul F. Crawford

California University of Pennsylvania
Crusades: Historiography (1245–1500)
Raymond of St. Gilles

Sally Crawford

Institute of Archaeology, Oxford
Youth: Before 1000

Oliver Creighton

*Department of Archaeology, University of Exeter,
United Kingdom*
Castles: 500–1100
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Anne Curry

University of Southampton, United Kingdom
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Farhad Daftary

Institute of Ismaili Studies, London
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Kelly DeVries

Department of History, Loyola University Maryland
Arques, Battle of
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Bryan Dick

Department of History, University of Glasgow
Marque and Reprisal, Letters of

Brian G. H. Ditcham

Independent Scholar, Gillingham, United Kingdom
Baugé, Battle of
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Charles VII of France
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John E. Dotson

*Department of History, Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Emeritus*
Alghero, Siege and Naval Battle of
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Bernard Doumerc

Université de Toulouse, France
Bari, Siege of
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Roger I
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Paul M. Dover

Department of History and Philosophy, Kennesaw State University

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Seán Duffy

Department of History, Trinity College Dublin
 Celtic Styles of Warfare

A. A. M. Duncan

Department of History, University of Glasgow, Emeritus

Bannockburn, Battle of
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Valerie Eads

*Department of Humanities and Sciences,
 School of Visual Arts*

Amalfi, Siege of
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Ana Echevarria

*Departamento de Historia Medieval, Ciencias y
 Técnicas Historiográficas, Universidad Nacional de
 Educación a Distancia, Madrid*

Almogaveres
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Susan B. Edgington

*Department of History, Queen Mary,
 University of London*
 Crusades: Sources (1095–1183)

Stephen S. Evans

Independent Scholar, Stafford, Virginia
Comitatus

Veronica Fiorato

Independent Scholar, Hermitage, United Kingdom
 Warwick the Kingmaker

Márta Font

*Department of Medieval and Early Modern History,
 Institute of History, University of Pécs, Hungary*

Alexander Nevsky
Druzhina
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Péter Forisek

*Department of Ancient History and Institute of History,
 University of Debrecen, Hungary*
 Medicine, Military: Byzantine Medicine

John France

*Department of History, Swansea University,
United Kingdom*

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Daniel P. Franke

Department of History, University of Rochester

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Ian Friel

Historian & Writer

Cinque Ports
Hundred Years' War: Naval Raids on England

Claude Gaier

Arms Museum of Liège, Belgium

Arms Industry and Trade

Philippe Gaillard

Historic'One

Anthon, Battle of
Varey, Battle of

Francisco García Fitz

*Department of History, University of
Extremadura, Spain*

Alfonso V of Aragon

Antequera, Siege of
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Ceuta, Siege and Battle of
Fernández de Córdoba, Gonzalo
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Richard C. Gay

Independent Researcher, Edison, Georgia

Díaz de Vivar, Rodrigo
Valencia, Siege of (1238)
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C. M. Gillmor

Independent Scholar, Salt Lake City

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Vassil Gjuzev

Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Anchialos, Battle of (708)
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Pliska, Battle of
Sofia, Siege of
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Eric J. Goldberg

*Department of History, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology*

Louis II of East Francia

Jan Goossens

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

Heelu, Jan van

João Gouveia Monteiro

*Department of History, Faculty of Letters,
University of Coimbra, Portugal*

Lisbon, Siege of, and the Battle of the Tagus (1384)
Pereira, Nuno Álvares
Saltes, Naval Battle of

Tadeusz Grabarczyk

Institute of History, University of Łódź, Poland

Chojnice, Battle of
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Obrona Potoczna
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David Green

Harlaxton College, United Kingdom

Chandos, Sir John
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Jean de Vienne
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Pontvallain, Battle of

Louis Green

Monash University (Deceased)

Campaldino, Battle of
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Ezzelino III da Romano

R. A. Griffiths

Swansea University, United Kingdom

Glyn Dŵr, Owain

Paolo Grillo

*Dipartimento di Scienze della Storia e della
Documentazione Storica, Università degli Studi di
Milano, Italy*

Altopascio, Battle of
Charles of Anjou
Conradin
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David Grummitt

The History of Parliament Trust, United Kingdom

Bureau Brothers
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John Haldon

Department of History, Princeton University

Anzen, Battle of
Bathys Rhyax, Battle of
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Notitia Dignitatum
Recruitment: Byzantine Recruitment and
Conscription
Syllaion, Battle of
Themata (Themes)
Versinikia, Battle of
Weapons, Byzantine
Yarmuk, Battle of

Bernard Hamilton

*University of Nottingham, United Kingdom,
Emeritus*

Christianity
Raynald of Châtillon

Catherine Hanley

*The Reinvention Centre, University of Warwick,
United Kingdom*

Chanson de Roland
Chivalric Biographies
Epic Poetry
Romances

Yuval Noah Harari

Department of History, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Geoffroi de Charny
Special Operations

Robert Helmerichs

Independent Scholar, Minneapolis

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Michael Hicks

Department of History, University of Winchester, United Kingdom

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Elizabeth Horodowich

Department of History, New Mexico State University

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John D. Hosler

Morgan State University

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Ian Howard

Independent Scholar, Freshfield, United Kingdom

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Kathryn Hurlock

Department of History and Economic History, Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom

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Steven Isaac

Department of History, Longwood University

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Guy Jarousseau

Université Catholique de l'Ouest, France

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Carsten Selch Jensen

Department of Church History, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen

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Michael Jones

School of History, University of Nottingham, Emeritus

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Robert W. Jones

Institute for Medieval Studies, University of Leeds;

School of History and Archaeology, Cardiff University,

United Kingdom

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Donald J. Kagay

*Department of History, Albany State University,
Georgia*

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Hermann Kamp

*Department of History, University of Paderborn,
Germany*

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Maurice Keen

Balliol College, Oxford, Emeritus

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Angus J. Kennedy

*School of Modern Languages and Cultures,
University of Glasgow*

Christine de Pizan

Andy King

*Department of History, University of Southampton,
United Kingdom*

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*Handschriftenerschließungszentrum, Bayerische
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Zoltán Kordé

*Department of Medieval and Early Modern
Hungarian History, University of Szeged, Hungary*

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Hans-Henning Kortüm

Department of History, University of Regensburg, Germany

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Rossina Kostova

*Department of Archaeology, Faculty of History,
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Turnovo, Bulgaria*

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Didier Lett*Université de Paris VII, Denis Diderot*

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Yaacov Lev*Department of Middle Eastern History, Bar-Ilan**University, Israel*

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Katherine J. Lewis*Department of History, University of Huddersfield,**United Kingdom*

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Richard Lomas*Durham University, Emeritus*

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Ben Lowe*Department of History, Florida Atlantic University*

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Alexandru Madgearu*Institute for Defence Studies and Military History,**Bucharest*

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Lisa J. Mahoney

Department of Art History, Northwestern University
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Sergio Mantovani

Independent Scholar, Ferrara, Italy
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Ernest Marcos Hierro

Department of Greek Philology, University of Barcelona
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Laurence W. Marvin

*Department of History, Evans School of Humanities,
Berry College*
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Christo Matanov

*Faculty of History, Sofia University "St Kliment
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Lawrence J. McCrank

*Library and Instruction Services, Chicago State
University*
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David C. McDaniel

Department of History, Texas Tech University
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Auburn University
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Piers D. Mitchell

*Department of Biological Anthropology, University of
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Kristian Molin

School of History, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom

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Philip Morgan

Department of History, Keele University, United Kingdom

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Nicholas Morton

School of Arts and Humanities, Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom

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Institute for Medieval Studies, University of Leeds, United Kingdom

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Department of History, Catholic University of America

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Helen Nicholson

Cardiff School of History and Archaeology, Cardiff University, United Kingdom

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David Nicolle

School of History, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom

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Arnold Odio

Department of English, Modern Languages, and Mass Communication, Albany State University, Georgia

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Elena Baca Odio

Department of English and Modern Languages, Georgia Southwestern State University

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Nicolas Offenstadt

Université de Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Klaus Oschema

Department of History, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany; University of Berne

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Leif Inge Ree Petersen

Department of History and Classical Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

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István Petrovics

Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History, University of Szeged, Hungary

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Colin Platt

University of Southampton, United Kingdom, Emeritus

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Miloslav Polívka

Historický Ústav Akademie věd České Republiky, Czech Republic

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Tony Pollard

Centre for Battlefield Archaeology,

University of Glasgow

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Stephen Pollington

Independent Scholar, Basildon, United Kingdom

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J. M. B. Porter

Change and Tradition Program, Butler University

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James F. Powers

Department of History, College of the Holy Cross, Emeritus

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Department of History, Durham University, Emeritus

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Humboldt University, Berlin

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University of Toulouse, France

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Philippe Racinet

Faculté d'Histoire et de Géographie, Université de Picardie Jules Verne, France

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E. A. Rees

Centre for Russian and East European Studies,

University of Birmingham, United Kingdom

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Lisa G. Robeson

Department of English, Ohio Northern University
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José Manuel Rodríguez García

Facultad de Geografía e Historia, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid
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Clifford J. Rogers

Department of History, United States Military Academy at West Point
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Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany
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Manuel Rojas Gabriel

Department of History, University of Extremadura, Spain
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Susan Rose

Open University
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Independent Scholar, Pradines, France
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Department of Comparative Literature, Cornell University
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Historisches Institut, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
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Edward J. Schoenfeld

*Arts and Sciences, University of Phoenix,
Milwaukee Campus*

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Institute of History, University of Szeged, Hungary

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Jonathan Shepard

University of Cambridge, United Kingdom, Emeritus;

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Scandinavian Department, Bonn University, Germany

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International Capital Market Association (ICMA)

Centre, University of Reading, United Kingdom

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Independent Scholar, New York, New York

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Independent Scholar, Leeds, United Kingdom

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Durham University, United Kingdom

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Department of History, University of Glasgow

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*Department of Curriculum and Instruction,
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Department of History, Ball State University

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Jan Szymczak

Institute of History, University of Łódź, Poland

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Christian Teutsch

United States Military Academy at West Point

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Independent Scholar, Cambridge, United Kingdom

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Steve Tibble

*Independent Scholar, Chalfont St Giles,
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Uwe Tresp

University of Münster, Germany

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Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard Law School

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William Urban

Department of History, Monmouth College

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István Vasáry

Oriental Institute, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

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J. F. Verbruggen

*University of Congo; University of Bujumbura
(Burundi), Emeritus*

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László Veszprémy

Institute and Museum of Military History, Budapest

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L. J. Andrew Villalon

Department of History, University of Texas, Austin;

Department of Romance Languages and Literatures,

University of Cincinnati, Emeritus

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Martin Völkl

*Department of History, University of Regensburg,
Germany*

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Steven A. Walton

Science, Technology, & Society Program,

Pennsylvania State University

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David A. Warner

Department of History, Philosophy & the Social

Sciences, Rhode Island School of Design

Thietmar of Merseburg

Danielle Westerhof

School of Historical Studies, University of Leicester,

United Kingdom

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Robert C. Woosnam-Savage

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David Wyatt

*Centre for Lifelong Learning, Cardiff University,
United Kingdom*

Slavery

Phillip Wynn

Medieval Institute, University of Notre Dame

Gregory of Tours

Josef Zemlička

*Historický Ústav Akademie věd České Republiky,
Czech Republic*

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